A property owner who has no reasonable access to his property and for that reason is denied the beneficial use thereof may file his petition with the clerk of the Superior Court and, upon a showing of necessity and payment of the damages sustained, have an easement imposed on the land of his neighbor to provide the isolated property owner reasonable access to a public road. G.S. 136-69.

The statute merely accords a right to the property owner who is without reasonable access to the public road. It imposes no duty on him to exercise that right. Compensation for the servitude imposed by *206 establishing -a cartway is a 'Condition precedent to acquisition. Garris v. Byrd, 229 N.C. 343, 49 S.E. 2d 625.

Kanupps, plaintiffs, are not here seeking a cartway a-cross the properties of Lands and the other defendants. They seek to reverse the statutory process: they seek the .aid of the court fo compel Lands and 'the other defendants to acquire a cartway across plaintiffs’ property. The statute does not accord plaintiffs tiffs right; nor can defendants be compelled to accept .a cartway in substitution for .an easement present? ly owned by them. Andrews v. Lovejoy, 247 N.C. 554.

Also essential to the establishment of a cartway is absence of reasonable access to the public road. If reasonable access exists, plaintiffs .are not entitled to have a cartway established. G.S. 136-69; Garris v. Byrd, supra; Waldrop v. Ferguson, 213 N.C. 198, 195 S.E. 615; Collins v Patterson, 119 N.C. 602; Plimmons v. Frisby, 60 N.C. 200; Burgwyn v. Lockhart, 60 N.C. 264.

Prior to the institution of this proceeding, it had been judicially determined that the road from the property of 'defendíante Laa to the Connelly Springs Highway shall be kept open, and the traffic ,thereon ■shall not be interfered with. Plaintiffs here allege that the properties ■of all defendants abut on that road. No defendant suggests that it does not provide reasonable access ito a public road. To (the oontratry, •answering defendants insist that the road so required to be kept iopen does provide them with reasonable access to ia puiblic road. Present plaintiffs Kanupp and present defendíante Land were -before the Superior Court of Caldwell County with their positions reversed when the count was 'called upon to determine the right to use the road providing .access to ¡the highway. The court, having jurisdiction of the parties .and' of the question presented, answered the question and adjudged in effect that Lands and others had the right to use the road which provided them access to the public highway. The judgment then rendered is conclusive rand binds the parties. Gaither v. Skinner, 241 N.C. 532, 85 S.E. 2d 909; Cannon v. Cannon, 223 N.C. 664, 28 S.E. 2d 240; Current v. Webb, 220 N.C. 425, 17 S.E. 2d 614; Clinard v. Kernersville, 217 N.C. 686, 9 S.E. 2d 381; Leary v. Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E. 2d 570.

Since it had been determined that one of the essential elements requisite to the establishment of .a .cartway 'did not exist, the court correctly adjudged that plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the 'action for ra cartway.

Plaintiffs do not pretend to seek the aid of the court in locating the boundaries of the road declared to exist by the judgment entered in the '.action of Land v. Kanupp. The provisionls of c. 38s of the General Statutes would be available to determine the location of the road de *207 scribed in that judgment; buit plaintiffs cannot 'ask for the location of something which they deny exists. Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E. 2d 472; Wood v. Hughes, 195 N.C. 185, 141 S.E. 569; Parker v. Taylor, 133 N.C. 103. Plaintiffs do not seek damages for a trespass by defendants Land.

Affirmed.