HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF DURHAM v. Thorpe
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision. The 11 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham (Supreme Court of the United States 1967)
- Alan F. Gersman v. Group Health Association, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1992)
- Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham (Supreme Court of the United States 1969)
- Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond (Supreme Court of the United States 1974)
- State v. Currie (N.C. Ct. App. 1973)
- Fuller v. Urstadt (New York Supreme Court 1970)
- Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1970)
- Municipal Housing Authority v. Meade (Yonkers City Court 1968)
- Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (District Court, E.D. Virginia 1966)
- Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1968)
- HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF DURHAM v. Thorpe (N.C. 1967)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
The plaintiff is the owner of the apartment in question. The defendant has no right to occupy it except insofar as such right is conferred upon her by the written lease which she and the plaintiff signed. This lease was terminated in accordance with its express provisions at midnight 31 August 1965. With its termination, all right of the defendant to occupy the plaintiff’s property ceased. Since that date the defendant has been and is a trespasser upon the plaintiff’s land.
The defendant having gone into possession as tenant of the plaintiff, and having held over without the right to do so after the termination of her tenancy, the plaintiff was entitled to bring summary ejectment proceedings against her to restore the plaintiff to the possession of that which belongs to it. G.S. 42-26; Murrill v. Palmer, 164 N.C. 50, 80 S.E. 55. It is immaterial what may have been the reason for the lessor’s unwillingness to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant after the expiration of the term as provided in the lease.
Having continued to occupy the property of the plaintiff without right after 31 August 1965, the defendant, by reason of her continuing trespass, is liable to the plaintiff for damages due to her wrongful retention of its property and for the costs of the action. *434 G.S. 42-32; McGuinn v. McLain, 225 N.C. 750, 36 S.E. 2d 377; Lee, North Carolina Law of Landlord and Tenant, § 18.
No error.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.