Subsequently, a second VSA titled "Modified Voluntary Support Agreement
and Order" was signed by defendant on 25 June 2001. This agreement did not reference
the original VSA or the 1999 order, nor did it show that the district court established
defendant's paternity in 1999. The parties did attach a child support worksheet
stating defendant had a monthly gross income of $1,724.66 and recommending $419.00
for his monthly child support obligation.1 The 2001 VSA was approved by the court
and entered on 28 June 2001. This order is the basis of all controversy on appeal.
In the 2001 VSA, defendant agreed to pay $419.00 per month in child support starting
1 July 2001 and to reimburse the State $422.78 for public assistance given to his
children. In addition, defendant agreed to provide health insurance to his children
through his then-employer, Crown Heritage, Inc. Unlike the 1999 VSA, the 2001 VSA
contains no modification provision., **86Throughout the following years, defendant
failed to comply with the 2001 VSA. Accordingly, the trial court entered consent
contempt orders on 20 November 2003, 21 July 2005 and 25 January 2007. Each time
defendant admitted to being in civil contempt for his failure to pay amounts due
under the 2001 VSA. By 2007, the amount defendant owed totaled $16,422.28. In the
2007 consent *477order, the trial court ordered defendant to make monthly child
support payments totaling $479.00 with $60.00 going towards arrears. On 5 April
2007, the district court concluded defendant was in compliance with the 25 January
2007 order and determined that his arrearages were $15,572.80. The district court
ordered defendant to continue his monthly child support payments of $419.00 plus
$60.00 towards arrears. Eventually, defendant again failed to pay the child support
ordered by the court., On 7 April 2011, defendant filed, pro se, a motion to modify
the 2007 consent order. Defendant stated there was a change in circumstances because
he "draw[s] unemployment, [and his] kids [ages 17 and 18] have quit school." The
district court heard the matter on 11 August 2011. Ms. Rackley failed to appear.
On 15 September 2011 the district court found a change in circumstances, noting
that "[d]efendant was drawing unemployment benefits, since has obtained fulltime
employment. Oldest child ... has emancipated according to [ N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c)
]." Based on the child support guidelines, the district court reduced defendant's
monthly child support obligation to $247.00 and found his arrears to be $6,640.75.,
In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued, in pertinent part, that the district
court erroneously concluded that a motion to modify a child support obligation must
precede a modification order. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language
of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) "requires a 'motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances' as a necessary condition for the [district] court to modify an existing
support order." Catawba County ex rel. Rackley v. Loggins , --- N.C. App. ----,
----, 784 S.E.2d 620, 625-26 (2016) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (2015) ). The
Court of Appeals recognized that a district court is without authority to sua sponte
modify an existing support order. Id. at ----, 784 S.E.2d at 626 (quoting Royall
v. Sawyer, 120 N.C. App. 880, 882, 463 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1995) ). Therefore, according
to the Court of Appeals, it was "impossible to enforce the second [VSA] and order
because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept the second [VSA] and
enter the modified order." Id. at ----, 784 S.E.2d at 626 (citation omitted)., Rule
12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows for dismissal based upon a trial
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1,
Rule 12(b)(1) (2015). We review the decision *478of a trial court to dismiss an
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Harris v. Matthews , 361
N.C. 265, 271, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007) ; see Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann , 212
N.C. App. 137, 139, 710 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2011) (applying a de novo standard of review
to a district court's decision to dismiss a plaintiff's claims for child support
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)., Without regard to the amount in controversy,
the district court conducts "the trial of civil actions and proceedings for annulment,
divorce, equitable distribution of property, alimony, child support, child custody
and the enforcement of separation or property settlement agreements between spouses,
or recovery for the breach thereof." N.C.G.S. § 7A-244 (2015). Subdivision 50-13.7(a)
permits a child support order to be "modified or vacated at any time, upon motion
in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party." Id. § 50-13.7(a)
(2015). Additionally, "[a] judicial decree in a child custody and support matter
is subject to alteration upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of
the child and, therefore, is not final in nature." Stanback v. Stanback (Stanback
II ) , 287 N.C. 448, 456, 215 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1975)., **89As a result, "the jurisdiction
of the court entering such a decree continues as long as the minor child whose custody
is the subject of the decree remains within its jurisdiction." Id. at 456, 215 S.E.2d
at 36 (citing Spence v. Durham , 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied
, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 1417, 39 L.Ed.2d 473 (1974), and Stanback v. Stanback ,
266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965) ); see also N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(f) (2015) ("An
action or proceeding in the courts of this State for custody and support of a minor
child may be maintained in the county where the child resides or is physically present
or in a county where a parent resides....")., Here, the district court in Catawba
County ruled on the original VSA in this action. According to the principles specified
above, *479the district court thereafter retained jurisdiction over further proceedings,
including modifications to the VSA. As reasoned by this Court in Stanback II , unless
the district court "was somehow divested of its continuing jurisdiction, it was
the only court which could modify the earlier judgment upon a motion in the cause
and a showing of a change of circumstances." 287 N.C. at 456, 215 S.E.2d at 36 (citations
omitted). At the time the 2001 VSA was approved, all parties resided in North Carolina.
As a result, "the jurisdiction of the [district court] continue[d] as long as the
minor child whose custody is the subject of the decree remain[ed] within its jurisdiction."
Id. at 456, 215 S.E.2d at 36. No circumstances are present here that would divest
the district court of its jurisdiction to modify the VSA. See id. at 456, 215 S.E.2d
at 36 ; Story v. Story , 221 N.C. 114, 115-16, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137-38 (1942) (concluding
that while an order requiring the husband to make monthly payments for child support
was a consent judgment, the court had jurisdiction to hear the wife's subsequent
motion for modification of the order, thereby allowing the court to award permanent
custody of the child to the wife and to increase the husband's monthly payments);
Massey v. Massey , 121 N.C. App. 263, 273, 465 S.E.2d 313, 319 (1996) ("In view
of our holding affirming the trial court's voiding of the parties' Stipulation
of Dismissal and because of the court's continuing jurisdiction acquired in consequence
of its rendering the original child custody and support order, ... we discern no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its order of consolidation
and no injury or prejudice suffered by [the] defendant."); Jackson v. Jackson ,
68 N.C. App. 499, 501-02, 315 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1984) (holding that because the district
court originally had jurisdiction over the child custody and support dispute, it
had continuing jurisdiction to rule on a subsequent motion filed by the defendant
for custody and support and sequestration of the marital home for the children's
use and benefit). Thus, the district court maintained continuing jurisdiction to
modify the 2001 VSA. **90B. Plain Meaning of the Statute Does Not Impose a Jurisdictional
Prerequisite, Rules of statutory construction confirm the district court's jurisdiction.
"It is well settled that '[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute
using its plain meaning .' " In re Estate of Lunsford , 359 N.C. 382, 391-92, 610
S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005) (emphases added) (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh,
Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990) )., In In re D.S. , 364 N.C.
184, 185, 694 S.E.2d 758, 759 (2010) the defendant, a fifth-grade student, was charged
as a juvenile for touching a classmate "multiple times on her buttocks and between
her legs with a straw-like candy, known as Pixy Stix." A juvenile court counselor
filed a juvenile delinquency petition against the defendant alleging simple assault.
Id. at 185, 694 S.E.2d at 759. Over a month later, the juvenile court counselor
filed a second petition alleging that the defendant had also committed sexual battery
during the same incident. Id. at 185-86, 694 S.E.2d at 759. On appeal the defendant
argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the second petition was not filed
within the time period mandated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703, the pertinent statute, and
therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual
battery allegation. Id. at 186, 694 S.E.2d at 759-60. In reversing the decision
of the Court of Appeals, this Court reasoned that, **91While the subject matter
of In re D.S. is distinguishable, the essence of this Court's reasoning is applicable
in the case sub judice . Subsection 50-13.7(a) states that a child support order
can be "modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing
of changed circumstances by either party." N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a). Just as with the
controlling statute in In re D.S., subsection 50-13.7(a) does not indicate that
a party's failure to file a motion divests the court of jurisdiction. There is
no language in either law establishing jurisdictional consequences for failure to
follow the statutory provisions; the statutory language is clear and unambiguous
and the plain meaning of each statute imposes no jurisdictional prerequisites. As
we reasoned in In re D.S. regarding the statute at issue there, the legislature
here could have set forth requirements that would affect jurisdiction in N.C.G.S.
§ 50-13.7(a). Compare In re A.R.G. , 361 N.C. 392, 398-99, 646 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2007)
(holding that while the county department of social services failed to comply with
the applicable statute requiring a juvenile's address to be included in a petition
alleging that a child was a neglected and dependent juvenile, "[n]othing in the
statute suggests that the information required is jurisdictional" and stating that
to hold otherwise "would elevate form over substance"), with In re T.R.P. , 360
N.C. at 591, 636 S.E.2d at 790-91 (concluding that a petition filed by the county
department of social services alleging that a child was a neglected juvenile was
not verified as required by statute and therefore, rendered the judgment void because
"verification of the petition in an abuse, neglect, or dependency action ... is
a vital link in the chain of proceedings carefully designed to protect children
at risk on one hand while avoiding undue interference with family rights on the
other"). We decline to create a jurisdictional prerequisite in this statute where
one cannot be originally found. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to modify
the child support order.2, While the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) is sufficient
for us to determine that the district court had jurisdiction to modify the VSA,
the legislative history of the statute indicates that the legislature did not intend
for the statute to create a jurisdictional prerequisite to modify child support
orders. To determine legislative intent, this Court can also consider "the legislative
history of an act and the circumstances surrounding its adoption." In re Banks ,
295 N.C. 236, 239-40, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978) (citation omitted). The legislative
history of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) and other domestic relations statutes yields critical
insight regarding the General Assembly's intent here., Later, this Court addressed
whether the five-day notice provision was jurisdictional with respect to the alimony
laws. Barnwell v. Barnwell , 241 N.C. 565, 566, 85 S.E.2d 916, 916-17 (1955), involved
a civil action for alimony without divorce under N.C.G.S. § 50-16 in which a district
court entered an order for alimony pendente lite without notice to the defendant.
This Court determined that the failure to comply with the five-day notice requirement
in N.C.G.S. § 50-16 rendered the order void.3, *482Id. at 567-68, 85 S.E.2d at 918.
In 1967 both alimony statutes were **94repealed and the statutory framework that
exists today was enacted as evidenced in N.C.G.S. §§ 50-16.1A through 50-16.10.
The notice provision remained intact until it was repealed in 1995. Act of June
21 1995, ch. 319, sec. 6, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 646-47 (changing the laws pertaining
to alimony) (codified at N.C.G.S. § 50-16.8 (1995) ). In its present form, the relevant
alimony statute includes the same language as appears in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) and
which is at issue here: "An order of a court ... for alimony ... may be modified
or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances
by either party or anyone interested." N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(a) (2015). Moreover, both
the child support modification statute at issue here and the alimony statute cited
for purposes of instructive comparison were enacted by the General Assembly on the
same day in successive acts. Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws
1766 (alimony); Ch. 1153, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1772 (child custody and support).
As stated above, the notice provision was removed from the child support statute
in 1967, but remained in the alimony statute until 1995. This comprehensive analysis
of the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a), the governing statute in the
case at bar, establishes that the legislature did not intend that subsection 50-13.7(a)
create a jurisdictional prerequisite., The provision of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) requiring
a motion to be filed is directory rather than mandatory; consequently, the absence
of a motion to modify a child support order does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction to act under the purview of the statute. With the empirical subject
of jurisdiction substantively questioned, defendant argues that "a motion in the
cause by an interested party pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) [must be filed].
Without a motion in the cause the trial court is without authority/jurisdiction
to modify the existing order." This Court **95has previously held that a provision
in a statute that is directory rather than mandatory is not jurisdictional. See
In re D.S. , 364 N.C. at 193-94, 694 S.E.2d at 763-64 (citing In re C.L.C. , 171
N.C. App. 438, 443-45, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707-08 (2005) ) (concluding that various
statutory timelines governing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights,
the scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing and the filing
of permanency planning orders under cited provisions of the juvenile code are "directory,
rather than mandatory and thus, not jurisdictional" (quoting In re B.M. , 168 N.C.
App. 350, 354, 607 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2005) ), aff'd per curiam in part and disc.
rev. improvidently allowed , 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006) ). " 'Directory'
has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as '[a] provision in a statute, rule
of procedure, or the like, which is a mere direction or instruction of no obligatory
force, and involving no invalidating consequence for its disregard, as opposed to
an imperative or mandatory provision, which must be followed.' " State v. Fulp
, 355 N.C. 171, 176, 558 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
460 (6th ed. 1990)). We have reasoned that:, We conclude that failure to follow
the directory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) regarding the filing of a motion
in the cause does not divest the district court of jurisdiction. The provision requiring
a motion to be filed for a child support order to be modified is directory, not
mandatory, in nature. The provision concerns a matter of form, rather than a matter
of substance as defendant contends, and merely addresses the procedural aspects
of modifying a child support order. This Court has issued consistent determinations
to this effect, even under varying **96circumstances. See House , 295 N.C. at 200-03,
244 S.E.2d at 660-62 (concluding that while a grand jury foreman signed an indictment
that failed to explicitly indicate that at least twelve jurors concurred in the
finding but stated that the jury found the indictment to be a true bill, such omission
violated only a directory provision); State v. Rogers , 275 N.C. 411, 422-23, 168
S.E.2d 345, 351-52 (1969) (concluding that statutory provisions requiring county
commissioners making up a jury list to use, in addition to a tax list, "a list of
names of persons who do not appear upon the tax list," are "directory and not mandatory
in the absence of bad faith or corruption"), cert. denied , 396 U.S. 1024, 90 S.Ct.
599, 24 L.Ed.2d 518 (1970) ; N.C. State Art Soc'y., Inc. v. Bridges , 235 N.C.
125, 130, 69 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1952) (concluding that a statute requiring one of two
particular individuals to appraise art selected to be purchased by the State Art
Commission was directory and the decision to have a different qualified person to
appraise the art constituted substantial compliance with the statute). Thus, the
provision stating that a child support order may be modified "upon" a motion in
the cause is merely directory; therefore, plaintiff's failure to do so does not
divest the district court of jurisdiction., While N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) does not
create a jurisdictional prerequisite and does not contain a mandatory requirement
that a party or interested person file a motion for child support modification in
order for a district court to exercise jurisdiction over such a matter, defendant
nonetheless asserts that a trial court must construe the statute in such a fashion
to abide by the procedural requirements of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a). According to defendant,
to hold otherwise will encourage parties to disregard other procedural requirements
such as filing complaints, issuing summonses and observing other mandatory provisions.
This Court is not persuaded by defendant's "snowball effect" argument. Here, plaintiff
filed a VSA, which was sufficient to satisfy the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).
A primary purpose of a requirement to file a motion in order to modify child support
is to make the court aware of "important new facts unknown to the court at the time
of the prior custody decree." Tank v. Tank , 2004 ND 15, ¶ 10, 673 N.W.2d 622, 626
(2004) (citations omitted). When a VSA is filed to modify an earlier court order
on child support, the VSA is customarily a request to modify the child support order
because circumstances have changed. Thus, a VSA submitted to the district court
without such a motion still serves the purpose highlighted in Tank, a case from
the State of North Dakota that is instructive for this analysis. Thus, our decision
also harmoniously aligns with the **97statutory provision requiring a showing of
a change in circumstances in order for a child support order to be modified.