Yule v. Webster
Yule v. Webster
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court of Pierce county, in an action involving the title to one-half section of land in said county.
The petition alleges that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the south-east quarter and the north-west quarter of section 25 of township 25, range two, and also the south-east quarter of section 25 of township 26, range
It is alleged that said county was without a bonded debt, and that said sinking fund levy was without authority of law and is void. Also that said levy for courthouse expenses, and for bridge funds, were each without authority of law, and that said illegal levies were charged against said land and were part of the consideration for
It is alleged that the assessor did not subscribe an oath and attach the same to the assessment roll, as required by Sec. 12, Chap. 66 of the General Statutes; -that the said treasurer, at the sale of March 1, 1875, sold the lands mentioned for a greater sum than was due for taxes,' interest, and penalty for all purposes under the statutes of this state, conceding that the whole levy was lawful.
It is further alleged that Frank Kipp, on January 1, 1874, executed to John A. Van Steenberg a mortgage on said lands for the payment of $1,000 in six years from date; that in 1879 said Van Steenberg commenced in the district court of said county a foreclosure of said mortgage against A. A. Campbell, administrator, and Mary Briggs, administratrix, of Frank Kipp, deceased, and James H. Brown, to whom said tax deed was executed; that said Brown upon answer and cross-bill, in which was set up his pretended tax title, on September 8, 1879, obtained a decree, quieting his title as against said Van Steenberg’s mortgage, and the administrator and administratrix, who made no answer; that in the foreclosure of the mortgage, under which decree the defendant claims title by virtue oí Brown’s deed to her, Ralph Kipp, under whom the plaintiff claims, and who is sole heir to Frank Kipp, who died April 2, 1874, was not made a party to the action. The plaintiff offers to pay, tenders, and brings into court, to and for the defendant, the amount of taxes paid by her and her grantor, upon the lands in controversy, with twelve per cent interest from. the date of each payment. Plaintiff prays that the decree of September 8, 1879, the deed of said Brown to the defendant, and the deed of the county treasurer to Brown, be set aside and declared null and void; that an accounting be had of the taxes paid by her and her grantor on said lands, and that plaintiff be permitted to pay the same to her, and that the cloud on
The defendant’s answer admits that on April 2, 1874, Frank Kipp died intestate, seized of said lands in fee simple, leaving as sole heir Ralph Kipp, but denies the-plaintiff’s title therein. She also admits that she claims title by warranty deed dated March 19, 1881, of James H. Brown, whose title is by county treasurer’s tax deed, dated August 30, 1879, but denies that it is void for the reasons alleged.
She further alleges that more than three years have elapsed, prior to the commencement of this suit, since the execution and recording of the treasurer’s deed to said Brown, and the plaintiff’s action is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. She further admits that Frank Kipp, in his life-time, on January 1, 1874, mortgaged said lands to John A. Van Steenberg for $1,000, due in six years from date, and that in 1879 said Van Steenberg foreclosed said mortgage against the administrator and administratrix of Frank Kipp’s estate, and alleges that said Brown was a party defendant, and upon answer and cross-bill set up his tax title, which, on September 8, 1879, by a decree of the district court of Pierce county, was quieted against said Van Steenberg’s mortgage, and the said administrator and administratrix, who made no answer; that by said decree it was adjudged and determined that the tax deed exechted by the county treasurer to the defendant Brown was in all respects regular and according to law,, and that Brown have absolute title, in fee simple, to said lands, under his said tax deed. She further alleges that subsequent to said decree, on November 13, 1879, Ralph Kipp, sole heir of Frank Kipp, deceased, and A. A. Campbell, his administrator, executed to said Van Steenberg a quit-claim deed to said lands; that subsequently, on December 23, 1879, certain changes and modifications were made in said decree, by an agreement between all
The plaintiff, by his amended reply to the defendant’s answer, denies that any such decree mentioned in her answer was ever made or authorized by the district court of said county, and says that the pretended decree mentioned was entered on the records of said court by some one unknown to- the plaintiff, without authority of the court, and contrary to the finding in the case in which it purports to be the judgment of the court, alleging that the judgment which was made in the case was, that the plaintiff, John A. Van Steenberg, have judgment against the defendants, A. A. Campbell, administrator, and Mary Briggs, administratrix, of the estate of Frank Kipp, deceased, in the sum of $1,908.04, together with an attorney’s fee of $150, and the mortgaged premises ordered to be sold subject to a paramount tax lien of J. H. Brown.
The plaintiff further denies that, on November 13, 1879, or at any other time, Ralph Kipp or A. A. Campbell ever made to said Van Steenberg a deed of said lands, ■or any part of it, and alleges that no deed of any kind was ever made to him, or to any one authorized to receive ■it, for any part of said land, by said Kipp, or by any one for him, and that said Van Steenberg never had knowl
Plaintiff denies that any changes or modifications were made in the decree of September 8,1879, as alleged in defendant’s answer, with the knowledge or consent of said Van Steenberg, or that any modified decree or judgment was ever made between the parties to said suit by Van Steenberg, or by his authority or consent', but alleges that the amended and modified decree mentioned in said answer was signed by E. P. Weatherby, as attorney, without the authority or knowledge of Van Steenberg, and after his authority as attorney had ceased, and for fraudulent purpose, and with fraudulent intent of cheating Van Steenberg out of his interest in said lands, aided and assisted in his fraudulent purpose by said Brown, who signed said modified decree, knowing that said Weatherby had no authority as attorney for Van Steenberg, and for the purpose of sharing in the title to said lands through the modified decree.
Plaintiff alleges that the date of the modified decree was December 3, 1879, and not December 23, as stated by defendant, and that the date of the original instrument by Weatherby, as attorney for Van Steenberg, Brown, and others, has been changed from the 3d of December, 18794
. Afterwards the plaintiff, by leave of the court, amended his reply by striking out the second paragraph, and substituting therefor that he denies that Ralph Kipp and the administrator of . Frank Kipp, deceased, executed to Van Steenberg a quit-claim deed of said lands, November 13, 1879, but alleges that the same was not executed until February 18, 1880, at which time the same was executed and delivered to E. P. Weatherby, as attorney for Van Steenberg; that the sole consideration was the release by Van Steenberg of all claims against Kipp’s estate, and the acceptance was in satisfaction of all claims, and of the foreclosure of the mortgage in the action brought by Van Steenberg, being the judgment and decree under which the defendant claims title herein; that said Weatherby, as attorney, on February 18, 1880, executed and delivered to Ralph Kipp and the administrator of the estate of Frank Kipp, deceased, a release of all claims of Van Steenberg against said estate, which was in satisfaction of the judgment and decree of foreclosure, of which the defendant and her grantor had full notice at the time she purchased the lands now claimed by her in this action.
On December 12, 1887, Eugene Moore was appointed sole referee, to whom it was referred to find and report the amount of taxes and interest paid by defendant and her grantors on the said lands, and on January 11, 1888, the referee reported that the taxes, and interest at 12 per cent from the date of payment to the date of the report,.
There was a trial to the court, which found that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of said lands, subject to the payment of taxes and interest thereon; that the tax deed executed by the treasurer -of Pierce county to James H. Brown, August 30, 1879, is null and void; that the defendant’s deed from said Brown conveyed no title to said lands; that the judgment in favor of said Brown, and against said Van Steenberg, under which defendant claims title, was and is null and void as to this plaintiff and said Ralph Kipp, under whom plaintiff claims, for the reason that Kipp was not a party to the action in which said judgment was rendered; that the •amended and modified decree described in the defendant’s answer was actually dated on the third day of December, 1879, and not on the twenty-third of said month, as alleged in said answer, and that the deed of said premises from said Kipp to Van Steenberg, although dated December 13, 1879, was not executed and delivered until February 18, 1880, and did not take effect until said last named date; that said modified and amended decree, described in the answer, was not signed by Van Steenberg nor authorized by him, and is of no force and effect as against him or the plaintiff. And the plaintiff is entitled to a decree, as prayed, on payment into court for the use of defendant, within six months from this date (May 27, 1887), the amount of taxes paid upon said-premises by the defendant and her grantor, J. H. Brown, with interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum, from the date of such payments to that of this decree; and the court finds the amount of said taxes and interest is $939.59, and it is therefore considered, adjudged, and decreed in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with the findings set forth.
The defendant brings the case to this court by appeal.
Counsel in their brief attach importance to the fact that Weatherby, who stood for Van Steenberg, and Bruner, who stood for Kipp, represented to Brown that a quit-claim deed had been made from Ralph Kipp to Van Steenberg, when they asked him to consent to the modification of the decree, and that on this condition only he consented to its modification. While this fact is probably not proved, and is certainly inconsistent with the findings of the court, I do not perceive that the gratuitous and inconsequent consent of Brown to this stipulation can be held to be of importance in the controversy, either as an estoppel or in any other sense. The modification of the stipulation was adverse to Van Steenberg. He gained nothing, nor could he gain any right or advantage by it, had he been present, either in person or through an authorized agent. He could have made the concession, or entered a, remittitur to reduce the amount of his claim without the consent of
Eor all that appears in the record, the claim of title of' Brown to the lands in question was a naked tax title, open to various serious objections and defenses, and unaccompanied by either possession or improvements. The recording of his tax deed made it incumbent on Van Steenberg to. make him a party to his foreclosure suit, but it conferred no equitable rights, and simply gave him the opportunity to maintain his tax title. In any settlement, concession, or-litigation between Van Steenberg and the heir at law and the administrators of Kipp, he had no interest, and no act of either one of them, as such, will work an estoppel in his. favor.
The exigencies of time forbid following counsel of either-side in their extended arguments upon numerous points, presented as of importance in this case. Nor do I conceive-it to be indispensable to its careful decision. No argument is offered nor objection made to the findings of the court, as against Brown’s tax title, nor as to the authority of the-court to set aside the original decree of the district court, upholding his title.
The findings and decree of the district court are sup
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Thomas Yule, and v. Amelia P. Webster, and
- Status
- Published