Williams v. Parks
Williams v. Parks
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff’s amended petition in this case sets out a note for $1,500 made and delivered by one C. J. Hale, in 1889 to the Nebraska Wesleyan University, with interest coupons attached, for interest at 8 per cent., due July 24,1894, and payable at the State National Bank, of Lincoln, Nebraska; that this note was for value, sold and delivered to Miles & Thompson, with indorsement as follows: “The Nebraska Wesleyan University, By W. G. Miller, Pres. Bd. Trustees, O. A. Atkinson, Secy.”; — and was afterwards sold for value, in the ordinary course of business, to the plaintiff, with the following guarantee: “We guarantee the payment of this note principal and interest at the First National Bank of Davenport, Iowa, as it becomes due without expense to the holder of the note. J. L. Miles. James Thompson”; that on July 23, the plaintiff caused the note to be sent to the First National Bank of Lincoln for collection, with instructions to present and demand payment of it, and, in the event of refusal, to properly protest, and give notice of the non-payment to the Nebraska Wesleyan University ; that the defendant Parks was a notary public and the defendants Harwood and Hanna, his bondsmen; that Parks was an employee of the First National Bank, and on July 27, 1894, the note was turned over to him as notary public with instructions to present for payment, and, if refused, to protest, and give notice to the university, and
The facts in the case are either admitted or undisputed.
“Protest............................$1 00
Recording protest................... 50
Certificate and seal....... 25
6 notices at 25 cents each............. 1 50
Postage........................... 06
Total........................$3 31”
It appears that the note was received from the Commercial National Bank of Omaha with the following letter, which was called to Mr. Park’s attention:
“Omaha, Nebraska, July 23, 1894.
“First National Banlc, Lincoln: We enclose herewith for collection and Cr. Number. 51451 Name. Note & Mtg. Due, 7-27 Protest. Yes. Amount 1500 & Int.
“Alfred Millard, Cashier.
“Please report by our number. Do not hold collections past maturity.
“First National Bank, Lincoln, Neb. Jul. 24, 1894. Received.”
The notary returned the note, with his certificate of protest, to the First National Bank, and it was subsequently returned to the Commercial National Bank of Omaha. Mr. Parks had charge of the collection department of the First National Bank. He does not remember of any other notices-. The charge for fees was in Mr. Park’s hand-writing, and he supposes they were paid. There was a post office at University Place at that time. He says he got no part of the fees; that the First National Bank procured his bond; that protesting paper was a part of his duties as manager of the collection department of the bank, and he also had charge of the correspondence relating to the collections. It sufficiently appears, also, that the maker of
It is claimed that the petition merely alleges damages by reason of a failure to follow instructions, and as no instructions were given, except merely to protest the note, there can be no recovery. This ground for supporting the judgment can not be sustained. It is entirely true, as remarked in 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 929, the term “protest” includes, in a popular sense, all the steps necessary to fix the liability of a drawer or indorser of negotiable paper. It is so understood currently among commercial men, and the meaning is recognized in Wood River Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 36 Nebr., 744. It was also recognized by the- defendant Parks as having that meaning, and he undertook to folloAV his instructions in that respect. Plainly, that was what was both meant and understood by this Avord in the advice with this note.
It is next claimed that the Commercial National Bank of Omaha was plaintiff’s agent, and had notice of Avhat had been done, and if the notice was imperfect should have sent a good one. It is true, the certificate of protest showed Avhat was done, but we are unable to find any where in this record when that certificate reached the Omaha Bank or plaintiff, or when it left Lincoln. That it was in the power of plaintiff or his agent to correct this mistake in time to charge the university, is neither pleaded nor proved. Doubtless, as is abundantly shoAvn by defendant’s
It is urged that it is not a part of a notary’s official duty to give notice of dishonor of paper intrusted to him. Such is the doctrine of commercial law. In the absence of any statutory change in the law, he is to be deemed, so far as notices are concerned, the mere agent of the holder. Swayze v. Britton, 17 Kan., 625. It is to be observed however that the Kansas statute differs materially from ours. In that state his certificate is evidence of protest only; in ours, of notice as well. Code Civil Procedure, sec. 349. In that state his authority is to protest paper. In Nebraska his express authority is to give notice, also. Compiled Statutes, ch. 61, sec. 6. - He is allowed an official fee, which was charged in this case. Compiled Statutes, ch. 28, sec. 19. It seems clear that in this state the giving notice of dishonor must be accounted an official duty. It is'so held under statutes much less distinctly making it so than ours. Wheeler v. State, 9 Heisk. [Tenn.], 393; Peabody Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 29 W. Va., 528, 548; Tevis v. Randall, 6 Cal., 632; Hyde v. Planters’ Bank, 17 La. [old series], 563. If this is to be regarded as an official act of the notary, of course, the contention of defendant that he was only a subagent can not be sustained. It would seem that the bank would be liable for due care only in selecting a notary. The remitter, in directing a protest,' must be presumed to have known that the corporation to which he was sending his note could not act as a notary, nor could it control the naming of any individual who could. Of course, where he is a mere agent of the holder in giving
Finally it is claimed that the indorsement of the unive^sity was void ab initio, and no damage resulted. No reason if given, and we are cited to Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Mechanic Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wend. [N. Y.], 31,
It is recommended that the judgment of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing ■ opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and'' the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
This was cited as page 131 in the brief. — Reporter.
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- Frances R. Williams v. Frank Parks
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