Jones v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff sues to recover damages because, as he alleges, be was wrongfully ejected from one of tbe defendant’s cars. He got aboard one of its cars on tbe evening
The evidence tends to establish the custom in these matters, and apparently it is not the custom to leave a car on a street car line and to walk about, transacting business in the meantime, and then go to another line presenting a transfer which does not purport to be issued for use on that line. The plaintiff testified that he told the conductor that he wanted to go to Courtland Beach; that the conductor gave him a transfer on Seventeenth street, a Cuming street transfer; that he rode north on the Thirteenth street car to Dodge street; that he would go across 1 to Fourteenth street, that it would not be crowded so much. He claimed to have done that at other times. He testified that he got off the car at podge street, and that he walked west to Fourteenth street, and then got on a closed car and asked the conductor for a transfer on Locust street to Courtland Beach. The plaintiff said he wanted a transfer on Locust street to the Beach, and the conductor said he would not give it to him. The plaintiff told the conductor, he testified, to give him a transfer, and the conductor said: “You will have to pay another nickel if you get a transfer.” When the parties reached this sort of a controversy, the plaintiff says that he and the conductor called each other names. The plaintiff testified, “I told him to give me my transfer and I would get off and walk back, and he would not give it, so he grabbed me and jerked me around, and the motorman came out, and he said, “We can’t hold that car here; and then the conductor put his knee against my back and gave me a shove out, and I went through the door.” This brings us to the question as to which was right in the controversy.
As a part of this same matter it is proper to inquire what sort of a transfer the plaintiff presented when he boarded the Fourteenth street car. B. Yan Horn was the conductor to whom the transfer was presented. He testified: “He got on at Fourteenth and Dodge, and I went
B. W. Bennett, a conductor, Avas sworn as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and was shown the transfer, exhibit No. 1, and, from an examination of it, testified that it was issued “on the Sherman avenue line going south;” that it permitted the passenger to ride south; that, under the custom or rules of the company, the conductor would not be authorized to receive or accept that transfer for fare from a passenger going north; that it was not the custom to receive a transfer of that kind on the Fourteenth street line going north. He further testified: “Q. Would you accept a transfer where the party was going the opposite direction than that allowed or indicated by the transfer? A. No, sir. Q. Where a party got off the Thirteenth street line at Dodge and walked back to Douglas and did shopping, and then walked north on Fourteenth street to Fourteenth and Dodge, and had a transfer punched for Seventeenth and Cuming, would that transfer be good on the Fourteenth street line going north, according to the custom or rule of the company? A. No, sir.” The transfer slip itself shows that it was a south hound transfer slip issued on the 23d of July, and not on the 24th.
W. L. Musgrave testified that he was superintendent of transportation of the defendant street railway company; that he had been connected with it 23 years; that, by reason of his experience in connection with the company and duties required to be performed, he was familiar with the operation of cars on the different lines, and kneAv the custom that existed with reference to the issuance and receiving of transfers for fares; that he was not on the car from which the plaintiff was ejected, and that he did not know what had happened there; that he had heard the testimony of the witnesses Van Horn and Bennett. “Q. I. will show you the transfer that has been offered in evidence in this case, which the reporter has marked exhibit No. 1, and will ask if you have examined that before, so as to know what it relates to? A. Yes, sir; it came into my hands the next morning. * * * Q. What is the fact
The plaintiff was called and testified by way of rebuttal that the passengers did not help pull him off the car. He did not deny the testimony concerning the alleged fact that the transfer which he held would not entitle him to go north. He had testified at his examination in chief that he paid his fare and asked for a transfer to Court-land Beach; that the conductor gave him a transfer on the Seventeenth street line, a Cuming transfer; that he asked for a transfer at Seventeenth and Locust; that the conductor did not. object to the transfer offered until he asked for the transfer at Seventeenth and Locust; that at that time he had ridden two blocks on the car; that he said to the conductor: “I wanted a transfer on Locust street to the Beach, and he said he could not give it to me; he said that was a Dodge transfer. I told him it was not, because I just got off at Thirteenth and walked from there.” He then describes what happened between him and the conductor; that the conductor wanted him to pay another nickel; that he told the conductor he was not going to get off unless the conductor gave him his transfer. The plaintiff testified that he had before ridden on a Fourteenth street car immediately north from Dodge street-on a transfer like the one he was then riding on, and before the day in question; that he had been doing that, and did not know that it was against the rules; that he had been doing that two or three months. His excuse for doing it seems to have been to avoid the Sherman avenue crowded car.
The plaintiff has neglected to brief his case. We are not very clear, as to what his theory may be, but we are unable to justify a 'disregard of the rules of the company by its conductors. We see no excuse for disregarding the
If it is suggested that it was for the jury to find whether excessive force was used by the conductor in putting the plaintiff off the car, it may be answered that the plaintiff testified that he resisted being put off, and that he held on to the seat, and afterwards held on to the handrail on the platform; and it is fully shown that he made a most stubborn resistance; that one of the things which he did was to get hold of the necktie of the conductor and hang on to it; and he does not say or attempt to prove that more force was used than was necessary to overcome his resistance and eject him. For the reason that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, the district court should have directed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant.
It is in evidence that the plaintiff asked for and supposed that he had received a transfer slip entitling him to transfer at Seventeenth and Cuming streets. That is certainly conclusive against his right to attempt to transfer and use a transfer slip at either Thirteenth or Fourteenth and Dodge streets, and defeats his cause of action. Keen v. Detroit Electric Railway, 123 Mich. 247.
As disclosed by the plaintiff’s own testimony that he attempted to use a transfer slip at a point which was not a transfer point, and upon a street car line to which it was not issued, the conductor was justified in ejecting him. Shortsleeves v. Capital Traction Co., 35 Wash. Law Rep. 4.
'When the conductor refused to receive the transfer slip presented on the Fourteenth street line, it was the duty of the plaintiff to either unconditionally pay his fare in cash or to leave the car. Norton v. Consolidated R. Co., 79 Conn. 109, 4 Am. Street R. Rep. 114, 118, and cases there cited.
While the amount of the judgment is for only $80, the principle involved in the case is important, because it includes a consideration of the right of a street railway company to collect and receive fares, and to fix reasonable
In the instant case, there seems to have been no abuse of which the plaintiff had a right to complain. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded, with instructions to render a judgment for the defendant.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.