Staradumsky v . West Warwick Police CV-90-2000-B 01/13/94 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John J. Staradumsky

v. Civil N o . 90-2000-B

West Warwick Police Department, et a l .

O R D E R

Before the court in this

action is defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Defendants seek to (1) rely on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to preclude plaintiff from relitigating civil rights violations that he previously litigated in state court; and (2) invoke the statute of limitations to bar claims that accrued before September 1 5 , 1984. For the following reasons I grant defendants' motion only with respect to their res judicata and collateral estoppel claims.

Factual Background

This case began as two separate actions. Plaintiff filed

the first complaint on September 1 5 , 1987, alleging violations of

, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Initially fifteen

defendants were named in this action and plaintiff later filed an amended complaint naming approximately seventy new defendants.

After reviewing the pleadings, the court ordered plaintiff to

file a second amended complaint or face dismissal of the action.

See Order dated June 2 6 , 1990. Because plaintiff never amended

the complaint, the court dismissed plaintiff's claims against all

of the defendants except the Town of West Warwick, the West

Warwick Police Department, Police Chief Danny Patrarca, certain

unnamed West Warwick police officers, and William Field. See

Order dated August 1 7 , 1990.

Plaintiff filed the second action against one hundred and

ninety-seven defendants, including the original fifteen

defendants from the first action. After numerous procedural

events, many defendants were dismissed because plaintiff failed

to complete service on them as required by law. By an Order

dated August 1 7 , 1990, plaintiff was given twenty days to file an

amended complaint in the second action or face dismissal. At

least one extension of time was granted to the plaintiff, and

during this period the two cases were consolidated. See Order

dated February 1 9 , 1991. Because plaintiff never filed an

amended complaint, the court dismissed the second action. See

Order dated June 1 1 , 1991.

2 The remaining five defendants named in the first action filed a motion to dismiss the first complaint. After careful examination of the complaint, the court granted their motion with respect to plaintiff's

, 1985, and 1986 claims. See Order dated June 1 1 , 1991. Thus, only plaintiff's

claims remained viable. Next, defendant William Field moved for summary judgment. This motion was granted by the court in an Order dated July 3 1 , 1992.

The only claims that remain for decision are plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the Town of West Warwick, the West Warwick Police Department, Police Chief Danny Patrarca, and certain unnamed West Warwick police officers. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants conspired to illegally: (1) conceal defendants' refusal to investigate complaints plaintiff made when his business burned in 1983, (2) detain him on July 1 6 , 1984, (3) have him evicted from his apartment on September 15 and 1 6 , 1984, and (4) assist his wife in gaining custody of his children on or about June 2 9 , 1986 and February 1 6 , 1987. Additionally, plaintiff makes vague allegations that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment, slander and spying against him. According to plaintiff, this continuing conspiracy was animated by a desire to drive plaintiff to suicide, cause him to become

3 insane and deter him from proceeding with various civil actions

he had brought in state and federal courts.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that:

(1) the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata

preclude plaintiff from litigating certain of his allegations,

and (2) plaintiff is barred from bringing this action by the

applicable statute of limitations. I consider these contentions

seriatim.

Discussion1

A . Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

In 1983, plaintiff litigated and lost an action in the Rhode

1 In ruling on this motion for summary judgment, I am guided by the following standards. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden is upon the moving party to establish the lack of a genuine, material, factual issue, Finn v . Consolidated Rail Corp.,

3 , 15 (1st Cir. 1986), and the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, according the non-movant all beneficial inferences discernable from the evidence. Oliver v . Digital Equipment Corp.,

(1st Cir. 1988). If a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that a genuine issue exists. Donovan v . Agnew,

(1st Cir. 1983).

4 Island Superior Court in which he claimed that the West Warwick

Police Department and the Town of West Warwick, among others,

concealed their refusal to investigate complaints he made in 1983

regarding a fire that took place at his business. Although the

legal theory on which the complaint was based is unclear, the

state action concerned the same events that are the subject of

the first count of the plaintiff's claim here.

The United States Supreme Court has held that a state

court's resolution of an issue or claim has the same preclusive

effect in federal court that it would have in the state court

where the matter was finally determined. Migra v . Warren City

School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S . C t . 8 9 2 , 898 (1984) (res

judicata); Allen v . McCurry, 101 S . C t . 4 1 1 , 413-414 (1980)

(collateral estoppel); see also Kyricopoulos v . Orleans,

4 , 16-17 (1st Cir. 1992) (collateral estoppel); Pasterczyk v .

Fair,

2 , 13 (1st Cir. 1987) (res judicata). This rule

applies with equal force to § 1983 claims. Migra, 104 S . C t . at

898; Allen, 101 S . C t . at 413-414; see also Kyricopoulos,

; Pasterczyk,

.

Plaintiff's claim that the Town of West Warwick and the West

Warwick Police Department are liable because they concealed their

refusal to investigate complaints plaintiff made when his

5 business burned in 1983 is identical to the claim plaintiff

litigated and lost against these defendants in the state court

action. Moreover, because the individual defendants in the

present case have been sued for their alleged roles in the 1983

coverup in their capacities as members of the West Warwick police

department, it also appears that facts which are essential to

plaintiff's claim against the individual defendants in this

action were decided adversely to the plaintiff in the state court

action. Since there is nothing unusual about the way in which

Rhode Island courts apply the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel, see generally State v . Wiggs,

(R.I. 1993) (collateral estoppel); Forte Bros. v .

Ronald M . Ash & Assoc.,

1 7 , 722 (R.I. 1992) (res

judicata), these doctrines will prevent plaintiff from

relitigating the state court claim here unless plaintiff can

establish that his case is governed by a recognized exception.

Plaintiff's only argument challenging defendants' res

judicata and collateral estoppel claims is that neither doctrine

is applicable because the verdict in the state court action was

produced by a "conspired/rigged/fixed jury." He has given no

specific facts to support this assertion, and even viewing the

record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no

6 evidence to support this contention in the record. "Conclusory

responses unsupported by the evidence" are not enough to meet

plaintiff's Rule 56 burden. Griggs-Ryan v . Smith,

1 2 ,

115 (1st Cir. 1990). Accordingly, summary judgment is granted

with respect to plaintiff's first claim.

B . Statute of Limitations

Defendants next contend that they are entitled to summary

judgment because certain of plaintiff's claims are barred by the

statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed the instant action on

September 1 5 , 1987. Defendants argue that plaintiff's claims are

subject to a three year statute of limitations. Accordingly,

they assert that plaintiff is barred from litigating claims that

accrued prior to September 1 5 , 1984. Upon a thorough reading of

the complaint, it appears that the only remaining claim that

could be barred by the statute of limitations is plaintiff's

claim that he was illegally detained on July 1 6 , 1984. Plaintiff

asserts that his claims should not be barred by the statute of

limitations because of the conspiratorial nature of defendants'

acts.

Actions under § 1983 are subject to the governing state's

personal injury statute of limitations. Wilson v . Garcia, 105 S .

C t . 1938, 1949 (1985). Rhode Island's statute of limitations for

7 personal injury claims is three years. R.I. Gen. Law § 9-1-14

(1985). However, "[w]hile state law supplies the statute of

limitations in a § 1983 action, federal law governs the accrual

period." Lafont-Rivera v . Soler-Zapata,

, 2-3 (1st

Cir. 1993). Moreover, the First Circuit has held that in

conspiracy cases, "these types of actions accrue when the last

overt act alleged to have caused the damages is performed."

Edwards v . Sotomayor,

(D.P.R. 1983) (citing

Kadar Corp. v . Milbury,

3 0 , 234 (1st Cir. 1977);

Scherer v . Balkema,

3 7 , 439 (7th Cir. 1988) (and cases

cited therein), cert. denied, 108 S . C t . 2035.

Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, he has alleged that at least two overt acts were

performed in furtherance of the conspiracy within three years of

the commencement of this action. First, he alleges that

defendants had him evicted on September 1 5 , and 1 6 , 1984, and

second he alleges that defendants assisted his wife in gaining

custody of his children on or about June 2 9 , 1986 and February

1 6 , 1987. Because defendants have not averred in their summary

judgment motion that the defendants' allegedly illegal detention

of the plaintiff in July 1984 was not part of a conspiracy that

continued beyond September 1 5 , 1984, I do not consider whether

8 plaintiff can demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists with

respect to this issue. However, in an effort to expedite this

six year-old case, I will allow defendants thirty days to file a

properly supported motion for summary judgment averring that the

defendants' alleged detention of the plaintiff on July 1 6 , 1984

was not part of a conspiracy that allegedly continued beyond

September 1 5 , 1984. If defendants file such a motion, the burden

will then shift to plaintiff to show that a genuine issue remains

for trial with respect to this claim.

C . Remaining Claims

Also remaining for decision are plaintiff's claims that

defendants conspired to illegally: (1) assist his wife in gaining

custody of his children on or about June 2 9 , 1986 and February

1 6 , 1987, and (2) have him evicted from his apartment on

September 15 and 1 6 , 1984. Defendants have not specifically

addressed these claims, but it is clear that to the extent that

the custody and eviction issues were decided in a state court

where the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his claims, these allegations would be barred by the doctrines of

res judicata or collateral estoppel. See, e.g. Sylvander v . New

England Home for Little Wanderers,

(1st Cir.

1978) (custody); Lovely v . LaLiberte,

(1st Cir.

9 1974) (eviction), cert. denied, 95 S . C t . 526. If defendants

file a properly supported motion for summary judgment alleging

that no triable issue exists with respect to the substance of

plaintiff's claims, defendants may be entitled to summary

judgment on this basis as well. Accordingly, defendants have

thirty days to file a motion for summary judgment addressing

these issues.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the defendants' motion for summary

judgment (document n o . 61) is granted in part, and the parties

are ordered to proceed in accordance with the provisions set

forth herein.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

January 1 3 , 1994

cc: Peter Meyer, Esq. Seth Bowerman, Esq. John Staradumsky Brian McDonough, Esq.

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