Wang v . NHBd Reg. in Medicine CV-91-685-B 07/12/94 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John W . Wang, M.D.

v. N o . 91-685-B

New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, et a l .

O R D E R

Dr. John Wang challenges a decision by the New Hampshire

Board of Registration in Medicine to revoke his medical license.1 Presently before me are the parties' cross motions for summary

judgment. Wang argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

because the revocation hearing was so replete with serious

procedural errors that, as a matter of law, the Board violated

his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. The

Board counters that it is entitled to summary judgment on two

grounds: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

what is essentially an appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme

Court's decision upholding revocation of Wang's license; see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v . Feldman,

(1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust Co.,

(1923); and

(2) the alleged procedural errors had no bearing on the Board's

1 Wang's remaining claims are against the Board's members in their official capacities. For convenience, I refer to these defendants collectively as the "Board." decision because, by statute, it was entitled to summarily revoke

Wang's license for disciplinary actions taken against him in

another jurisdiction. I find the United States Supreme Court's

decisions in Rooker and Feldman dispositive, and accordingly do

not address the parties' other arguments.

I. FACTS

1. State Proceedings

In July 1991, the Board began hearings to determine whether

to revoke Wang's license to practice medicine in New Hampshire.

The hearings concluded in October, and in early March 1992, the

Board issued an order revoking Wang's license. Wang then

appealed the Board's order to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,

alleging that the Board members were biased against him; that the hearings were replete with serious procedural errors; and that,

as a result, the Board's revocation decision violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process and equal

protection, as well as his rights under various provisions of the

New Hampshire Constitution. On August 2 6 , 1992, the supreme

court summarily affirmed the Board's order, stating that "the

agency has issued a decision which the Court does not find unjust

or unreasonable and no substantial question of law is presented on appeal." The Court later denied Wang's motion for

reconsideration.

2. Federal Proceedings Shortly after the Board concluded its hearings, Wang brought

the present action in federal court, alleging that the hearings

were rife with serious procedural errors and that, as a result,

the Board had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Wang

sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the Board from taking

any disciplinary action against him; a declaration that the

Board's actions were fundamentally unfair and violated his due

process rights; a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from

taking any future action against him based on the conduct at

issue in the present disciplinary proceedings; and an award of money damages and reasonable attorneys fees against the

individual board members. Wang thus alleged claims virtually

identical to those he later raised in his Notice of Appeal to the

New Hampshire Supreme Court.

After Wang filed his federal complaint, the Board issued its

decision. This Court then stayed the present proceedings pending

resolution of Wang's appeal. When the New Hampshire Supreme

Court affirmed the Board's decision, the stay was lifted and

3 defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wang's claims. I granted

the motion with respect to all claims other than Wang's claim for

prospective injunctive relief against the Board members in their

official capacities. This latter claim is the subject of the

parties' present motions.

II. DISCUSSION2

Relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Board argues

that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Wang's

claim. I agree.

2 I judge the parties' motions against the following standard. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue is one "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

4 2 , 250 (1986); accord Garside v . Osco Drug, Inc.,

6 , 48 (1st Cir. 1990). A "material issue" is one that "affects the outcome of the suit . . . ." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The burden is upon the moving party to aver the lack of a genuine, material factual issue, Finn v . Consolidated Rail Corp.,

3 , 15 (1st Cir. 1986), and the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, according the non-movant all beneficial inferences discernable from the evidence. Oliver v . Digital Equip. Corp.,

(1st Cir. 1988). If a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that a genuine issue exists. Donovan v . Agnew,

(1st Cir. 1983).

4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the federal

district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state

court judgments. Rooker,

-16; Feldman,

. Unsuccessful state court litigants are thus precluded from

appealing to federal district court rather than petitioning the

Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. This holds true

regardless of whether the appeal is de jure or de facto. If the

claims raised in federal district court are "inextricably

intertwined" with the state court's decision, i.e., "if the

federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court

wrongly decided the issues before it," the district court must

dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

regardless of the form of action brought. Feldman,

n.16; Pennzoil v . Texaco, Inc.,

, 25 (1987)

(Marshall, J., concurring). Here, Wang requests that I declare the Board's decision

invalid and enjoin its enforcement. To grant his request,

however, I must necessarily conclude that the New Hampshire

Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the Board's decision. Wang's

federal suit is thus "inextricably intertwined" with the state

5 court's disposition of Wang's appeal.3 That he requests

prospective relief is immaterial. The First Circuit has held

that "insofar as the injunctive relief sought ... would be

tantamount to reversal of the [state court order], 'federal

courts do no review state civil proceedings under the guise of

the Civil Rights Act.'" Malachowski v . City of Keene,

(1st C i r . ) , cert. denied,

(1986). I

therefore dismiss Wang's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4

3 Although Wang filed suit in district court before the Board rendered its decision, and thus necessarily before the New Hampshire Supreme Court's disposition of the case, this does not affect my decision. "A [plaintiff's] deliberate bypass of those procedures that envisioned (ultimately) a reviewable final state- court judgment, itself under Feldman not subject to federal district court review, should not ... entitle the [plaintiff] to a review of his constitutional claims by a federal district court that would have been unavailable to him if he had pursued his claim to final state court judgment." Thomas v . Kadish,

(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

(1985). 4 Wang makes two arguments beyond those I have implicitly rejected above. First, he contends that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

, which explicitly authorizes federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings in limited circumstances. This argument is meritless. Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violation of certain federal rights, but only for those violations over which a federal district court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction. Second, Wang essentially argues that several exceptions to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply with equal force to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For example, he argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude his

6 III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Wang's motion for summary

judgment (document n o . 48) is denied. The Board's motion for

summary judgment (document n o . 51) is granted. The Clerk is instructed to issue judgment for the defendants

in accordance with this order and my order of September 2 3 , 1993.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge July 1 2 , 1994 cc: Daniel Mullen, Esq. Vincent Martina, Esq.

claim for prospective relief because there is no absolute identity between the claims raised in his federal complaint and those raised in his state appeal, or between the opposing parties in each litigation. These arguments are also unpersuasive. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are defenses, not limitations on the federal district courts' jurisdiction. Buckley v . Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd.,

2 4 , 227 (7th Cir. 1993).

7