Adie v. SSA CV-95-217-SD 08/12/96 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Scott L. Adie

v. Civil No. 95-217-SD

Commissioner, Social Security Administration

O R D E R

Pursuant to section 20 5 (g) of the Social Security Act,

(g), plaintiff Scott L. Adie seeks review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration denying his claim for benefits. Presently before

the court is plaintiff's motion to reverse, which primarily

argues that the decision of the Commissioner was not supported by

substantial evidence. Defendant has moved for affirmance.

Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability

and for disability insurance benefits on November 23, 1993,

alleging an inability to work since October 22, 1992. Transcript

(Tr.) 60-63. The application was denied initially, Tr. 76-77,

and upon reconsideration, Tr. 82-83, by the Social Security Administration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), before whom

plaintiff and his attorney appeared, considered the matter de

novo, and on December 16, 1994, found that plaintiff was not

under a disability. Tr. 12-22.

Applying the five-step seguential evaluation process

prescribed by

, the ALJ found that (1) Adie

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22,

1992; (2) he has "severe degenerative disc disease", Tr. 21; (3)

his impairments or combination of impairments do not meet or

egual the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. p t . 404, subpt. P, app.

1; (4) his impairments prevent him from performing his past

relevant work as a chef; and (5) he has a residual functional

capacity (RFC) for sedentary work. Tr. 21-22. The ALJ further

found that Adie was not credible regarding the severity of his

subjective complaints of pain and their effect on his ability to

perform substantial gainful activity. Tr. 21.

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's reguest for review on

February 28, 1995, Tr. 3-4, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision

the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, subject to judicial review.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Scott Adie had worked for nearly twenty years as a

2 chef when he injured his back while moving a refrigerated salad

table at his place of employment on October 22, 1992. Tr. 39,

113. At the time of the accident, he was head chef at Capucino's

Restaurant in Newton, Massachusetts, and was thirty-eight years

old. Tr. 38, 158. Adie was out of work for approximately six

weeks before he returned on a part-time basis with limited

duties. Shortly thereafter he left work because of a returning

pain in his back, buttocks, and right leg. Tr. 38, 41, 159.

On March 5, 1993, plaintiff was examined by Dr. B. Eugene

Brady, an orthopedic surgeon, who reported that an MRI of

plaintiff's lower spine revealed a herniation of the L5-S1

intravertebral disc. Tr. 113.1 Otherwise, Dr. Brady found that

plaintiff had normal ankle and knee reflexes and a normal motor

exam, although a sensory exam showed some reduction of motion in

his back. Dr. Brady recommended conservative treatment,

including rest and a swimming program, and indicated that if

plaintiff's symptoms did not improve, surgical intervention might

1It appears that plaintiff received medical attention on February 17, 1993, concerning his complaints of back pain, Tr. 112, but the details of this visit are unclear in the record and plaintiff does not describe them in his motion. Defendant, however, states that at such visit plaintiff was able to straighten and raise his right leg 75 degrees and had normal reflexes. See Defendant's Motion at 4. In addition, on such visit, plaintiff was diagnosed with back pain and was prescribed the medications Toradol and Flexeril. It was also recommended that he have an MRI of his spine and that he use a TENS unit.

3 possibly be necessary.

Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Brady

in April and May of 1993, complaining of back pain. On May 14,

1993, Dr. Brady reported that from a standing position Adie

continued to have flattening of the lumbar lordosis, consistent

with persistent muscle spasm. Tr. 114.

On April 9, 1993, Adie was evaluated by Dr. Mordecai E.

Berkowitz, an orthopedic surgeon, at the reguest of the carrier

of his employer's workmen's compensation insurance. Adie

complained to Dr. Berkowitz of lower back and right leg pain.

Tr. 118. Dr. Berkowitz observed plaintiff to be in mild

distress, with limited range of motion in his back, and noted

that at that time plaintiff did not appear to be capable of

gainful employment. Tr. 118-20. In addition, he found plaintiff

to have normal ankle and knee reflexes and normal strength. Tr.

118-19. Dr. Berkowitz diagnosed Adie as having a sprain to the

lumbosacral spine with right sciatica and a guestionable

herniated disc at L5-S1. Tr. 119. He further opined that the

objective findings substantiated plaintiff's subjective

complaints, although the limitations in his back motions were

somewhat greater than that which would normally be expected of a

patient who had received the type and degree of therapy that

plaintiff had previously received (traction, hydroculator pads,

ultrasound, and massages). Tr. 119-20. Dr. Berkowitz

4 recommended that claimant undergo a more aggressive

rehabilitative exercise program, and further noted that claimant

might need surgery should a new MRI confirm the presence of a

herniated disc at L5-S1. Tr. 121.

Dr. Scott Masterson treated plaintiff on June 8, 1993, at

the Northeast Rehabilitation Hospital. Tr. 150-52. Dr.

Masterson noted that Adie had L5-S1 disc herniation, centrally

located. Tr. 151. Physical examination revealed minimal lumbar

range of motion and no lumbar lordosis. Tr. 151. He also

reported that Adie's clinical examination was more significant

for localized muscular tenderness, loss of lumbar symmetry, and

deconditioning than specifically for a lumbosacral radiculopathy.

He recommended that Adie go on a six-day course of anti­

inflammatory medication, physical therapy, and a swim therapy

program. Tr. 152. At a follow-up examination three weeks later.

Dr. Masterson observed that Adie was still walking with a forward

flexed position and a slight limp in the right leg. Tr. 153.

Adie was also still tender around the right iliolumbar region,

the right PSIS, and somewhat in the sacroiliac region, although

not in the gluteals or the greater trochanter.

On this

visit, Adie told Dr. Masterson that he would not take the six-day

course of steroids because he feared the long-term side effects.

However, he agreed to a local steroid injection into the

5 area of the iliolumbar region and the PSIS.

Dr. Masterson

recommended a regular swimming program and continuation of Adie's

exercise program, but discontinued physical therapy for Adie's

back.

A mid-August progress report to Dr. Masterson written

by Adie's physical therapist indicated that the swimming therapy

had not helped Adie's symptoms. Tr. 124.

On August 16, 1993, Adie reported to Dr. Masterson that he

was feeling worse and that he still was experiencing pain in his

lower back, radiating down into his legs. Tr. 154. At Adie's

reguest. Dr. Masterson referred him to a neurosurgeon for further

work-up and a decision about surgical intervention.

On August 31, 1993, Adie was examined by Dr. Amin F. Sabra,

a neurologist, Tr. 128-29. On this visit, plaintiff reported

pain upon standing or sitting, relieved by lying down on one

side. Tr. 128. Dr. Sabra noted plaintiff was able to straight-

leg raise to 45 degrees bilaterally and that his reflexes were

normal, but that there was diffuse weakness in the left leg.

In addition to a CAT scan and an EMG, Dr. Sabra recommended

conservative treatment. Tr. 129. A CAT scan of plaintiff's

lumbosacral spine, performed on September 10, 1993, revealed mild

stenosis at L5-S1, with disc protrusion centrally and toward the

right, which appeared to impinge on the right SI nerve root and,

to a lesser degree, on the left SI nerve root, proximal to their

6 lateral recesses. Tr. 132. In addition, EMG and NCV tests

revealed bilateral SI radiculopathy, but no active denervation.

Tr. 135. At a follow-up examination. Dr. Sabra recommended

aggressive physical therapy and an epidural block. Tr. 130. Dr.

Sabra also noted the possibility of surgical intervention if

plaintiff did not improve within six weeks.

On November 10, 1993, Adie was examined by Dr. Steven C.

Schachter, a neurologist. After noting that plaintiff's EMG had

been abnormal and that a CAT scan had revealed a herniated L5-S1

disc, both to the right and to the left. Dr. Schachter diagnosed

plaintiff as having a "[c]hronic herniated disc secondary to

[his] work related injury." Tr. 136. After observing that

conventional treatment had not helped plaintiff, he further

opined that plaintiff would be "completely disabled from all

forms of gainful employment including light and sedentary

activity given the degree of pain that he is in and his

functional limitations" until he received surgery. Tr. 136-37.

Plaintiff visited Dr. Edwin G. Fischer, a neurosurgeon, in

February 1994. Tr. 155. Dr. Fischer found plaintiff had limited

range of motion of his back, but that he had normal reflexes and

essentially normal strength in his lower extremities. In

addition, no sensory loss was apparent. In March, after

examining claimant's test results. Dr. Fischer concluded that

7 surgery would not be unreasonable given the duration of

plaintiff's disability. Tr. 156. Dr. Fischer also prescribed

Flexeril and Darvocet.

Dr. Deepak S. Tandon, a neurologist, examined plaintiff on

April 29, 1994, at the reguest of plaintiff's employer's

workmen's compensation carrier. Tr. 158-65. Plaintiff told Dr.

Tandon he was experiencing moderately severe lower back pain,

with right-sided sciatica, and that the pain freguently traveled

down the right buttock to the back of the right knee. Tr. 161,

164. Upon examination. Dr. Tandon found mild restriction of

lumbar spine movements, difficulties with straight-leg raising, a

moderate amount of lumbar muscle spasm, and an antalgic gait.

Tr. 164. Dr. Tandon further found no evidence of a motor or

sensory deficit.

He opined that the objective findings did

correlate with the subjective symptoms, Tr. 164-65, and also

noted that he thought surgery would be beneficial to plaintiff,

Tr. 164.

On August 23, 1994, Adie visited Dr. Schachter and told him

that although Dr. Fischer had recommended surgery, he had refused

because of fears of surgical complications. Tr. 141. Adie also

complained of pain as before, varying from dull and constant to

sharp and severe.

Dr. Schachter discussed the advisability

of surgery with Adie, prescribed Flexeril and Percocet, and recommended that Adie continue with his TENS unit and swimming

program.

In September 1994, Dr. Schachter completed a medical

assessment of plaintiff's ability to perform work-related

activities. Tr. 142-48. Dr. Schachter opined that for an eight-

hour day, plaintiff would be able to lift and/or carry up to 15

pounds occasionally and up to 10 pounds freguently. Tr. 142. He

also stated that plaintiff could stand and/or walk for 30 minutes

at a time, for a total of three hours per day, and that

plaintiff's ability to sit was not affected by the impairment.

Tr. 143. Furthermore, although plaintiff could occasionally

climb and balance, he could not stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl,

push, or pull. Tr. 144.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, the court may "enter,

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary

[of Health and Human Services], with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing."

(g) (Supp. 1994).

A denial of social security disability benefits should be

upheld unless "'the Secretary has committed a legal or factual error in evaluating a particular claim.'" Manso-Pizarro v.

Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Sullivan v.

Hudson,

(1989)).

When reviewing a social security disability determination,

the factual findings of the Secretary "shall be conclusive if

supported by 'substantial evidence.'" Irlanda Ortiz v.

Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1991) (quoting

(g)). "[S]ubstantial evidence" requires "'more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson

v. Perales,

(1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison

Co. v. NLRB,

(1938)); Rodriguez v. Secretary,

647 F .2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).

However, substantial evidence "is something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an

administrative agency's finding from being supported by

substantial evidence." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,

(1966) (citing NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp.,

(1942)). Moreover, the decision of the

Secretary must be affirmed, "even if the record arguably could

justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by

substantial evidence." Rodriguez Pagan v. Secretary,

,

10 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Lizotte v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1981)), cert, denied,

(1988).

It is incumbent on the Secretary "to determine issues of

credibility and to draw inferences from the record evidence."

Irlanda Ortiz, supra,

(citing Rodriguez, supra,

647 F.2d at 222). Moreover, "the resolution of conflicts in the

evidence is for the Secretary, not the courts." Id.; Evangelista

v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1987); see also Burgos

Lopez v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1984); Sitar v.

Schweiker,

(1st Cir. 1982).

Since determinations regarding factual issues and the

credibility of witnesses are entrusted to the Secretary, whose

findings should be accorded great deference, see, e.g.,

Frustaglia v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1987), the

court "'must uphold the Secretary's findings . . . if a

reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole,

could accept it as adeguate to support his conclusion.'" Irlanda

Ortiz, supra,

(guoting Rodriguez, supra, 647 F.2d

at 222).

B. Step 5

Adie challenges the adverse decision below on the ground

that the ALJ erroneously concluded, at step five of the

11 sequential evaluation process, that plaintiff's back pain would

not preclude him from performing sedentary work. At step five

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the

existence of jobs in the national economy that claimant can

perform. Heggartv v. Sullivan,

(1st Cir. 1991)

(citing Ortiz v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1989)).

In evaluating subjective complaints of pain (and their

effect on a claimant's ability to perform work), the ALJ first

must decide whether there is "'a clinically determinable medical

impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain

alleged.'" Da Rosa v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1986)

(quoting Avery v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1986)).

"' [OJther evidence including statements of the claimant or his

doctor, consistent with medical findings, shall be part of the

calculus.'"

(citing

;

(d)(5)(A)). Should the ALJ decide to disbelieve the

claimant, he must make "specific findings as to the relevant

evidence he considered in determining to disbelieve the

[claimant]."

at 26 (citing Benko v. Schweiker,

(D.N.H. 1982)) .

_____ 1. The Objective Medical Evidence

Although finding Adie suffered from a "severe impairment"

12 causing pain, the ALJ did not believe Adie's complaints of pain

were fully credible as to the severity of the pain or its effect

on his ability to perform substantial gainful activity. Tr. 21.

The ALJ based his conclusion, in part, on the objective findings

of record. Tr. 20.

Claimant testified that his injury causes him to have muscle

spasms and to experience a burning pain radiating down both legs.

Tr. 41. He stated that he is able to sit 15 to 30 minutes before

the pain reappears. Tr. 42. During a typical eight hour work

day, he states he must lie down for three to four hours to

relieve his pain. Tr. 47.

The ALJ's consideration of the objective medical evidence,

and his determination of whether there was a clinically

determinable medical impairment that could reasonably be expected

to produce the pain alleged by Adie, can charitably be described

as vague and incomplete. As an initial matter, it should be

noted that the ALJ concludes that the claimant has "severe

degenerative disc disease," Tr. 21, while in reality there is no

evidence on the record of such disease. Instead, the medical

evidence (including a CAT scan, an MRI, and an EMG), rather

consistently indicates that Adie has a central herniated disc at

13 the location of L5-S1.2 Tr. 113, 135, 136, 151, 156. There is

also some evidence on the record of either bilateral

radiculopathy (disease of the nerve roots), Tr. 135, or of

denervation, Tr. 156.

In addition, the ALJ failed to adequately consider the

medical evidence that could potentially corroborate plaintiff's

claims. When evaluating such allegations, the ALJ should

consider the medical evidence on the record, such as any evidence

of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit, or motor

disruption. See

(2). The ALJ, however,

failed to do so. For example, the ALJ does not mention that two

physicians, upon examination, discovered moderate or persistent

muscle spasms in claimant's lower back. Tr. 114, 164.

Moreover, the ALJ mischaracterizes the medical opinions

relating to whether plaintiff's subjective complaints are

corroborated by objective findings. For example. Dr. Tandon

opined,

Adie currently complains of moderately severe low back pain radiating down the right leg, in the sciatic distribution, to the back of the right knee. Objective findings include mild restriction of lumbar spine movements, difficulties with straight leg raising tests, a moderate amount of lumbar muscle spasm and an antalgic gait. There is no motor or sensory deficit at this time. J-H

2If the ALJ's mistake here was inadvertent, he (or another ALJ) will have the opportunity to clarify it on remand.

14 my opinion, the objective findings do correlate with the subjective symptoms.

Tr. 164 (emphasis added). However, the ALJ concludes that Dr.

Tandon opined that the objective findings did not correlate with

the subjective symptoms.3 Tr. 19.

The ALJ also appears to have only selectively considered the

opinion of one of plaintiff's treating physicians. Dr. Schachter.

A report written by Dr. Schachter on November 10, 1993,4 states.

Until such time that he undergoes surgery, [Adie] is completely disabled from all forms of gainful employment including light and sedentary activity given the degree of pain that he is in and his functional limitations.

Tr. 136-37 (emphasis added). The ALJ instead relies on a

residual functional capacity assessment form that Schachter

filled out in September of 1994 in which he checked a box

3The court pauses here to commend the integrity and skill of defendant's attorney. The court discovered the discrepancy between Dr. Tandon's opinion and the ALJ's rendering thereof from its own review of the record, as plaintiff did not call the matter to the court's attention. The defendant, nonetheless, accurately reports that Dr. Tandon opined that plaintiff's subjective complaints were correlated to his objective findings. See Defendant's Memorandum at 8. Such honesty and attention to detail, although perhaps not availing in the instant circumstance, likely has, and will in the future, serve defendant's counsel well.

4Plaintiff claims that said report was actually written on September 27, 1994, and that it was submitted into evidence at the hearing before the ALJ; however, there is no evidence of such report in the record provided to the court. The court therefore has assumed that plaintiff is referring to the report dated November 10, 1993.

15 indicating that Adie's ability to sit during the day was not

affected by his impairment and which otherwise indicated that

plaintiff was capable of performing activities consistent with

sedentary work.5 Tr. 142-48. As there is little written

commentary in the assessment, there is no express statement about

the degree of pain experienced by plaintiff. There is also no

mention in the assessment of why Dr. Schachter apparently

departed from his previous opinion that the plaintiff experienced

pain so severe as to prevent him from performing sedentary work.

The ALJ relies on the work assessment without mentioning Dr.

Schachter's earlier reports or attempting to reconcile their

conclusions. Given that the Commissioner has the burden of

production at step five, the ALJ's failure to explain why he gave

more weight to Dr. Schachter's report of September 1994--or to

elicit additional evidence that could shed light on Dr.

Schachter's opinion--constitutes error.

In addition, the ALJ misconstrues the opinions of other

physicians concerning whether the objective medical evidence

substantiates claimant's subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ

states that other treating physicians (in addition to Dr.

5Sedentary jobs generally reguire that the worker be able to remain seated most of the day. See Da Rosa, supra,

(citing Thomas v. Secretary,

(1st Cir. 1981)) .

16 Schachter) opined that claimant is qualified for work in the

sedentary range. The court's review of the record reveals no

such statements from a treating or a nontreating physician.

Indeed, even the physicians who examined Adie on behalf of his

employer's workmen's compensation carrier opined that Adie would

not be capable of sedentary or light work until his condition

improved.6

Given the ALJ's misrepresentation of the medical evidence

that could potentially substantiate plaintiff's allegations of

totally disabling pain, the ALJ has failed to provide the

requisite specific findings to support his decision to discount

Adie's reports of pain. It is thus incumbent upon the

Commissioner to re-evaluate whether the objective medical

evidence substantiates Adie's claims of pain.

_____ 2. The Avery Factors

If after evaluating the objective findings the ALJ

determines that the claimant's reports of pain are significantly

6Dr. Tandon opined, "I do not believe that [Adie] is capable of sedentary or light work at this time, as there is enough evidence on the objective testing data (with EMG, MRI and CAT scan)." Tr. 165. Dr. Berkowitz opined, "At this time, this patient does not appear to be capable of gainful employment, but I believe that after two to three weeks of a rehabilitative exercise program, such as a swim program, he may be capable of a modified duty work capacity." Tr. 120.

17 greater than that which can be reasonably anticipated from the

objective evidence, the ALJ must consider other relevant

information.

. Considerations

capable of substantiating subjective complaints of pain include

evidence of (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the

location, duration, freguency, and intensity of the pain; (3)

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage,

effectiveness and side effects of any medication taken to

alleviate the pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than

medications, received to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (6)

any other factors relating to claimant's functional limitations

and restrictions due to pain.

(c) (3);

. The court will refer to these

considerations collectively as "the Avery factors."

Although the ALJ considers some of the Avery factors in his

decision to not fully credit plaintiff's reports of pain, he does

not provide the "full description" reguired. See

. For example, the ALJ relies on the fact that

claimant testified that he uses the medications Flexeril and

Percocet for pain but had, at a much earlier point in time, told

one of his doctors that he was not taking either medication. The

ALJ apparently believed this discrepancy was significant because

(1) claimant had not alleged any side effects from the

18 medications that would justify his decision to not take the

medication at certain times, and (2) the low level of medication

shows that plaintiff's pain is not so severe. In fact, the

claimant testified that he takes 10 milligrams of Percocet a day,

but experiences dizziness and grogginess from it, and that he

takes 10 milligrams of Flexeril three times a day, but said,

"it's a muscle relaxer, so, you know, you don't want to do too

much," Tr. 48.7 In addition, Adie testified that he takes 100

milligrams of Propacet8 three or four times a day for pain, but

the ALJ does not mention this testimony and thus apparently did

not include it in his determination. Tr. 48.

The ALJ also states that Adie testified that his pain is

relieved by the pool therapy program he participates in three

times a week. Adie's actual testimony, however, was that such

relief lasts sometimes for a couple of hours, but that sometimes

the therapy even aggravates his condition. Tr. 44.

The ALJ examined the claimant's daily activities, but.

7The court recognizes that the ALJ is entitled to disregard this testimony if not corroborated by medical records. However, it is preferable that if the ALJ chooses to discount the testimony for such reason, he should so state, instead of mischaracterizing plaintiff's claim.

8Plaintiff appears to be referring to Darvocet, which is indicated for the relief of mild to moderate pain, see P h y s i c i a n s ' D e s k R e f e r e n c e 1433, 1434 (50th ed. 1996), and has been prescribed for him on previous occasions, Tr. 156.

19 again, there are discrepancies between the ALJ's conclusions and

the record. For example, the ALJ notes that Adie is able to

cook, clean, and care for his three-year-old son. However, Adie

testified that his wife does most of the household chores. Tr.

46. He also stated that although he is a former professional

chef, he is now only able to make himself simple lunches. Tr.

46. He states in his Disability Report that he cares for his son

by reading to him, teaching him, and changing his diapers, but

that he can no longer play with him. Tr. 98, 99. There was

further testimony that his son is in day care during the day

until Adie's wife comes home. Tr. 50.

These and other inconsistencies within the ALJ's treatment

of the Avery factors leads this court to conclude that the ALJ

committed legal error by failing to provide a full and complete

description of the factors (in addition to the medical evidence)

capable of substantiating or disproving the claimant's reports of

pain. Thus, on remand, not only must the Commissioner reconsider

the objective medical evidence, but a new consideration of the

Avery factors should be conducted as well.

_____ 3. Use of the Grid

Finally, although the record is not clear on this point, it

appears that the ALJ committed legal error by relying solely on

20 the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set forth in 20 C.F.R. p t . 404,

subpt. P, app. 2 (the Grid). Use of the Grid is appropriate

where the claimant has an impairment that limits his ability to

meet the strength requirements of certain jobs.

; 20 C.F.R. p t . 404, subpt. P, app. 2, §

200.00(e). However, "[w]here a claimant has nonexertional

impairments in addition to exertional limits, the Grid may not

accurately reflect the availability of jobs such a claimant could

perform." Heggartv, supra,

. In these

situations, the Commissioner may rely on the Grid only where

claimant's nonexertional impairment does not "significantly

affect" his ability to perform the full range of jobs at the

relevant strength level.

If the nonexertional impairment is

of such character, the Commissioner usually must consider the

testimony of a vocational expert.

The ALJ determined that plaintiff's capacity for sedentary

work was not compromised by his exertional limitations. Tr. 22.

Applying the Grid rules as they relate to sedentary work, the ALJ

determined that the claimant was not disabled. Such use of the

Grid would be appropriate, except that the ALJ also found the

claimant's residual functional capacity "for the full range of

sedentary work is reduced by his pain." Tr. 21. The ALJ did not

21 qualify the extent to which Adie's ability to perform sedentary

work is reduced.

If, on remand, the ALJ determines that the claimant's

residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work

is significantly reduced by his pain, the ALJ may not rely solely

on the Grid. See Scott v. Shalala,

(5th Cir.

1994) (pain may constitute a nonexertional factor limiting the

range of jobs a claimant can perform and therefore an ALJ should

rely on expert vocational testimony, not the Grid, to show the

existence of jobs); c f . Da Rosa, supra,

(pain "may

be a nonexertional factor to be considered in combination with

exertional limitations"). Instead, to fulfill the Commissioner's

burden of showing the existence of jobs in the national economy

that Adie is capable of performing, the ALJ must consider the

testimony of a vocational expert.9

9A further point deserves mention. It appears from the record that the ALJ contemplated that the claimant could perform security guard work involving TV monitoring, which would permit him to stand up whenever he needed to relieve his pain. Tr. 54. If such consideration influenced the ALJ's conclusion that Adie could perform jobs in the national economy, again, the ALJ erred by not consulting a vocational expert. See Scott, supra,

(holding that it was improper to apply the Grid where claimant needed to alternate between sitting and standing).

22 Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court denies plaintiff's

motion to reverse the final decision of the Commissioner

(document 6) and denies defendant's motion to affirm (document

7). The case is remanded back to the Commissioner for

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

If the court had the power, it also would order that the

case be transferred to a different administrative law judge. See

Sarchet v. Chater,

(7th Cir. 1996) (discussing

when district court may order transfer to new ALJ). In lieu of

such order, the court will venture to merely suggest or recommend

that a new ALJ be assigned.

SO ORDERED.

Shane Devine, Senior Judge United States District Court

August 12, 1996

cc: Steven I. Bergel, Esg. David L. Broderick, Esg.

23