Cooper v. Postmaster General CV-97-335-B 09/16/98 P UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James R. Cooper

v. Civil No. 97-335-B

Postmaster General

O R D E R

The primary issue presented by this motion for summary

judgment is whether the plaintiff, James Cooper, has produced

sufficient evidence in response to the defendant's motion for

summary judgment to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude

that he was the victim of retaliation in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

16. Because I hold that he has not, I grant defendant's motion.

I.

Cooper was employed as a supervisory trainee at the Concord,

New Hampshire, Post Office. In May 1995, Cooper spoke with Andre

Saxby, President of the Concord Letter Carriers' Union. Saxby

allegedly made several critical comments of a sexual nature

during the conversation concerning another supervisory trainee,

Kathy Hayes. Cooper told Hayes of Saxby's comments approximately

two months later. He also at some point discussed the comments

with Saxby in the presence of a union representative. The parties disagree about whether Cooper reported the comments to

his supervisor, Paul Cathcart, or whether Cathcart learned of the

comments from Hayes. Cathcart later directed an employee

assigned to the Post Office's Egual Employment Opportunity Office

to investigate the matter. However, the investigation concluded

without the Post Office taking disciplinary action against either

Cooper or Saxby.

Cooper was offered a supervisory position at the Lebanon,

New Hampshire, Post Office in November 1995. Shortly after the

offer was extended, however, it was withdrawn. Both sides agree

that Joseph Collins, who then served as District Manager for Post

Office Operations, caused the offer to be withdrawn. Collins

claims that he prevented Cooper from obtaining the promotion

because Cooper had failed to inform his supervisor of Saxby's

statements and instead had

"acted inappropriately by repeating the off-color remarks of Saxby to Hayes and the other employee. His actions did not show me that he was ready to take on the responsibilities of being a supervisor at the Lebanon facility. Although he may have had certain technical skills, he demonstrated a lack of judgment or "people skills" in how he handled Saxby's remarks."

Cooper filed an EEOC complaint On November 21, 1995,

alleging he was denied the Lebanon job in retaliation for

opposing Saxby's comments. Cooper later was promoted to the

position of acting supervisor in the Laconia Post Office. He

alleges, however, that when the Laconia Postmaster returned to

work after an absence of several months, she became "highly critical" of his performance without sufficient justification.

He further alleges that she "created such a hostile and abusive

work environment" that Cooper was forced to resign from his

supervisor's job and return to his prior position as a letter

carrier. He asserts that the Laconia Postmaster forced him from

his job because he had filed the EEOC complaint.

II.

Cooper claims that the defendant violated Title VII's anti­

retaliation provisions both when Collins deprived him of his

supervisor's job at the Lebanon Post Office, and when the Laconia

Postmaster allegedly forced him to abandon his position in

Laconia. The Postmaster General argues in a motion for summary

judgment that Cooper has failed to produce sufficient evidence

with respect to either claim to survive a motion for summary

judgment. I examine the evidentiary sufficiency of each claim

using the now familiar summary judgment standard. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986); accord Garside

v. Osco Drug, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 1990) .

A. The Lebanon Job

The Postmaster General contends that Cooper was not given

the Lebanon job because one of his supervisors concluded he was

ungualified. He bases this argument on Collins's affidavit.

Cooper responds in two ways. First, he contends that the affidavit constitutes direct evidence of unlawful retaliation

which, by itself, is sufficient to justify the denial of

defendant's motion. Second, he argues in the alternative that

Collins's explanation is a mere pretext concealing retaliatory

motivations. I address each argument in turn.

1. The Direct Evidence Claim

If Cooper were able to produce direct evidence to support

his claim that he lost the Lebanon job because of unlawful

retaliation, his claim based on the denial of the Lebanon job

would survive defendant's summary judgment motion. SeeSmith v.

F.W. Morse & Co., Inc.,

(1st Cir. 1996); Smith

v. Brown,

(N.D. 111. 1997) . As I explain

below, however. Cooper has failed to produce any direct evidence

of unlawful retaliation.

Title VII provides in pertinent part that:

"[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against one of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investiga­ tion, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) . Relying on this section. Cooper claims

that Collins's affidavit gualifies as an admission that he

prevented Cooper from obtaining the Lebanon job because Cooper had "opposed" Saxby's discriminatory comments.1 This argument

cannot succeed for two reasons. First, the affidavit will not

support a conclusion that Cooper was punished for opposing

1 Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because the employee "participated" in a Title VII investigation. Cooper does not argue that Collins's affidavit constitutes direct evidence of a violation of Title VII's participation clause.

- 5 - Saxby's allegedly discriminatory statements. Even if the

affidavit is construed in the light most favorable to Cooper, it

alleges that Cooper was denied his promotion, not because he had

opposed unlawful discrimination, but rather because he had failed

to report Saxby's discriminatory statements and instead had

repeated them to Hayes and another unnamed postal employee.

Title VII's opposition clause simply does not protect an employee

from adverse employment action based upon a failure to properly

report evidence of discrimination. See Hochstadt v. Worcester

Foundation for Experimental Biology,

(1st

Cir. 1976); Hazel v. United States Postmaster General,

(1st Cir. 1993); see also Larson, Employment Discrimination,

§ 34.03 (noting that courts have interpreted Hochstadt as

reguiring the court to assess the reasonableness of the conduct

for which the employee is seeking protection). Thus, rather than

constituting direct evidence of retaliation, Collins's affidavit

serves as direct evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason for his decision.

Collins's affidavit also fails to gualify as direct evidence

of unlawful retaliation because a reasonable person in Cooper's

position could not have believed that the conduct he was seeking

to oppose violated Title VII. The First Circuit has held that

when an employee seeks to base a retaliation claim on Title VII's

opposition clause, the employee must have had a reasonable belief that the conduct he was seeking to oppose violated Title VII.

Wyatt v. Boston,

(1st Cir. 1994) . Applying a

similar standard, the 11th Circuit recently ruled that an

employee's opposition to a co-worker's individual act of dis­

crimination "does not fall within the protection of [Title VII]

Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division,

(11th Cir. 1997) (guoting Silver v. KCA, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1978)); see also Evans v. Kansas City, School

District,

(8th Cir. 1995) (opposition clause

reguires reasonable belief that conduct employee opposes violates

Title VII). The conduct Cooper claims he was seeking to oppose

in this case, like the conduct at issue in Little, consisted of

isolated statements by a single non-supervisory co-worker. No

reasonable person could conclude that such comments could support

a Title VII claim against the Postmaster General. Therefore,

Cooper's alleged effort to oppose Saxby's statements is not

protected by Title VII's opposition clause. Accordingly, Cooper

cannot claim that Collins's affidavit constitutes direct evidence

of unlawful retaliation even if he was punished for attempting to

oppose Saxby's remarks.

2. Circumstantial Evidence

Retaliation claims based upon circumstantial evidence are

governed by the test developed in McDonnell-Douqlas Corp. v.

Green,

(1973). As the First Circuit recently explained the test,

"first, the plaintiff must come forward with a prima facie showing of retaliation. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The production of such a non- discriminatory reason dispels the presumption of improper discrimination generated by the prima facie showing of discrimination. The plaintiff then must show that the proffered reason is actually a pretext for retaliation."

King v. Hanover,

(1st Cir. 1997) (citations

omitted). I have already determined that the Postmaster General

offered evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

justifying the decision to deny Cooper his promotion. Thus, even

if I assume for purposes of analysis that Cooper has established

his prima facie case, his claim cannot survive defendant's

summary judgment challenge unless the evidence is sufficiently

strong to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that

Collins's explanation is a mere pretext concealing unlawful

retaliation.

Cooper has produced evidence that he was denied the Lebanon

job after reporting Saxby's comments. He also has offered

evidence suggesting that Collins acted after receiving a com­

plaint about Cooper from the president of the Letter Carriers'

Union and after speaking with another Post Office supervisor who

was known to be sympathetic to union interests. Finally, he has

offered evidence suggesting that Collins may not have been

accurate when he claimed that Cooper had failed to report Saxby's

- 8 - comments to his supervisor. According to Cooper, this evidence

demonstrates that Collins's true motivation was to assist the

union in punishing Cooper either for opposing unlawful

discrimination or for participating in the subseguent EEOC

investigation.2 Again, I disagree.

Whatever motivated the union to complain about Cooper, the

evidence he cites simply will not support a reasonable conclusion

that Collins was motivated by a desire to punish Cooper for

either reporting Saxby's comments, or for participating in the

investigation that followed. Mere speculation will not sub­

stitute for evidence when it comes to proof of an improper

motivation. See, e.g., DeNovellis v. Kelly,

, 65 (1st

Cir. 1998); Randlett v. Shalala,

(1st Cir.

1997); Fennell v. First Step Designs,

(1st

Cir. 1996). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment with respect to Cooper's claim based upon his failure

to obtain the Lebanon job.

B. The Laconia Job

I previously rejected defendant's motion to dismiss Cooper's

claim concerning the Laconia job based upon his alleged failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. In doing so, I relied on a

2 I assume for purposes of analysis that the investigation conducted by the EEOC officer gualifies as an "investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (a) .

- 9 - decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluding that

"all circuit courts that have addressed the question have held

that an ancillary retaliation claim arising after the filing of

an EEOC complaint need not be separately exhausted." Nealon v.

Stone,

(4th Cir. 1992) . Defendant, citing a

decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals that he previously

neglected to bring to my attention, asks me to reconsider my

ruling.

In Johnson v. General Electric,

(1st Cir.

1988), the court considered whether an ancillary retaliation

claim that the plaintiff had failed to present to the EEOC could

be litigated in a subsequent court action. In dismissing the

retaliation claim, the court reasoned:

No claim may be brought in federal court unless the prerequisite of administrative investigation has first been met. A complaint related to that brought before the EEOC, but which was not itself made the subject of a separate EEOC complaint, must reasonably be expected to ... have been within the scope of the EEOC's investigation in order to meet the jurisdictional pre­ requisite. The retaliation claim here could not have been expected to be a part of the scope of the EEOC's investigation growing out of the [plaintiff's] earlier complaints because plaintiff has not alleged that he ever informed the EEOC of the alleged retaliation.

; see also Borase v. M/A-Com, Inc.,

(D. Mass. 1995). In this case. Cooper has not produced any

evidence suggesting that he informed the EEOC of the Laconia

- 10 - complaint while his original complaint was under investigation.

Under these circumstances, I cannot exercise jurisdiction over

his ancillary retaliation claim. Accordingly, I reconsider my

prior ruling and dismiss Cooper's claim based on his loss of the

Laconia job.

- 11 - For the above-stated reasons, the defendant's motion for

summary judgment (document no. 8) is granted.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

September 15, 1998

cc: Eleanor MacLellan, Esg. Thomas Kanwit, Esg.

- 12 -