Yates v. Cunningham et a l . CV-98-046-B 04/23/99

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William A. Yates II

v. Civil No. 98-046-B

Michael J. Cunningham, et. a l .

O R D E R

William Yates brings this civil rights action for injunctive

and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages, under

. The defendants, the warden and two counselors at

the New Hampshire State Prison, have moved to dismiss Yates'

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons

set forth below, I grant defendants' motion.

I. STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), I must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and

construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,

(1st Cir. 1989). Accordingly, I should grant a motion to dismiss only if the complaint fails to state a claim

for relief under any plausible theory. See

. I apply

these standards to the issues presented here.

II. FACTS

Yates originally filed this action while he was incarcerated

in the New Hampshire state prison system. He was paroled in

October 1998 and is now serving a consecutive federal sentence

elsewhere. He has sued the defendants in their individual and

official capacities, alleging deprivations of his civil rights

while he was jailed in New Hampshire. Specifically, he claims

that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause of the

First Amendment to the United States Constitution by conditioning

his early release upon participation in a religiously-based

alcohol treatment program.

In November 1996, after serving three years of his 5- to 10-

year sentence for retaining stolen property, Yates filed a motion

to suspend his sentence pursuant to

in Merrimack County Superior Court.1 The court ordered defendant

1 "Any person sentenced to state prison shall not bring a petition to suspend sentence until such person has served at least 4 years or 2/3 of his minimum sentence, whichever is greater, and not more freguently than every 3 years thereafter."

(1)(a) (West 1996). The statute

-2- Cunningham, the warden of the New Hampshire State Prison, to

prepare a report in conjunction with Yates' motion for purposes

of deciding whether to modify Yates' sentence. Cunningham's

report, dated December 13, 1996, stated that "Mr. Yates has done

minimal programming and otherwise has an undistinguished record."

Yates objected to Cunningham's report, advising the court

that he had, in fact, participated in alcohol rehabilitation

through the Rational Recovery program. The court ordered

Cunningham to produce an updated report "which clarifies whether

the Warden has taken into account all programs which defendant

has completed." Cunningham responded in a report dated June 13,

1997, which stated "See my 12/13/1996 recommendation to the

Court, which remains current."

In October 1997, the court again ordered Cunningham to

produce a background report on Yates, similar to a presentence

investigation report. The court noted that Cunningham was to

make a recommendation on Yates' motion, complete with his reasons

for making that recommendation.

further provides that "As a condition of any suspension of sentence, the court may include restitutionto the victim . . .; performance of uncompensated public service .. .; or such other conditions as the court may determine."

(111) (West Supp. 1998).

-3- Pursuant to the court's request, Yates was interviewed by

defendant Wayne Brock, a mental health counselor at the New

Hampshire State Prison. Yates discussed Rational Recovery with

Brock, providing Brock with materials on the program. Yates also

provided Brock with copies of court decisions finding that forced

attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") constituted a violation

of the Establishment Clause as AA is religious in nature.2 Brock

stated that, if Yates continued to participate in Rational

Recovery, he would recommend that Yates "go to Club Fed." Yates

2 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution bars Congress from making any "law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const, amend. I. The provisions of the First Amendment are made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Several federal and state courts have held that required attendance at AA or AA-based programs violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment due to the program's religious content. See, e.g. Warner v. Orange County Dept, of Probation,

(2d Cir. 1996)(forced attendance at AA meetings as condition of probation violated Establishment Clause); Kerr v. Farrev,

, 479- 80 (7th Cir. 1996)(conditioning prisoners' risk status and parole eligibility on participation in Narcotics Anonymous violated Establishment Clause); Arnold v. Tennessee Board of Paroles,

(Tenn. 1997)(where treatment program is religious and is the only treatment program available, forced participation and consideration of attendance or non-attendance in parole decisions violates Establishment Clause); Griffin v Coughlin,

(N.Y. 1996)(mandated rehabilitation programs at prison which incorporate AA principles violate Establishment Clause), cert, denied, 117 S. C t . 681 (1997). Because I dispose of Yates' claims on grounds of absolute immunity, I do not reach the question of whether or not conditioning a state prisoner's sentence suspension on attendance at AA-based programs constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.

-4- apparently understood Brock's comment to mean that he would

recommend a sentence suspension so that Yates could leave the

state prison and begin serving his federal sentence. Brock's

subseguent report to the warden, however, disregarded Yates'

participation in Rational Recovery and recommended instead that

Yates complete the Summit House program as a condition of early

release. Summit House is based upon the principles of AA. The

report also contained several inaccuracies. Yates wrote to

Brock, pointing out the inaccuracies, reiterating his position on

the benefits of Rational Recovery, and objecting to the religious

nature of AA-based programs.

Warden Cunningham reviewed Brock's report and recommended

that the court deny Yates' motion for a sentence suspension. The

court did so in an order dated November 10, 1997:

The Court has received and reviewed the report and warden's synopsis ordered by the Court on October 8, 1997, and is satisfied that defendants' record does not warrant a sentence modification. . . . Regardless of the merits of the Rational Recovery Program, defendant must complete Summit House before the Court will consider any modification of defendants' sentence.

State of New Hampshire v. Yates, No. 93-S-787-792 (Merrimack Cty.

Sup. C t . Nov. 10, 1997)(McGuire, J.).3

3 In fact, Yates was ineligible for the reduced-custody Summit House program because he was to begin serving his consecutive federal sentence upon release from the state prison.

-5- Yates also discussed his concerns about attending AA-based

programs with defendant Kathleen Reaves, another counselor at the

New Hampshire state prison. Reaves told Yates that he must

attend AA programs in order to be considered for a sentence

suspension or parole. Yates provided Reaves with documentation

regarding the legality of forced attendance at AA-based programs,

as well as documentation on his participation in Rational

Recovery. Yates alleges that Reaves not only stood by her

recommendation that he attend AA-based programs, but also refused

to inform the warden about Yates' participation and apparent

success in Rational Recovery.4

Warden Cunningham also received several letters from Jack

Trimpey, the founder and president of Rational Recovery, which

detailed the case law holding that coerced participation in AA-

based programs is unconstitutional. Copies of those letters were

See Pl.'s Aff. at 5 n. 12, and annexed exhibits 10, 11, 15. Defendant Cunningham stated that he withdrew the Summit House recommendation upon learning that Yates was ineligible. See

at Ex. 11 (May 15, 1998, letter to the Court withdrawing Summit House recommendation); Ex. 15 (Cunningham Aff. at 53).

4 Yates participated in Rational Recovery beginning in 1994 and taught Rational Recovery classes while an inmate in the Maine Correctional Center from 1995-96. Yates' urinalysis tests while incarcerated in New Hampshire were negative, which he claims is due to his commitment to the Rational Recovery program.

-6- provided to Defendants Reaves and Brock. The warden also

received a memorandum from a Department of Corrections

psychologist, which supported Yates' assertion that Rational

Recovery is a viable alternative to AA-based programs such as

Summit House.

Yates alleges that the Defendants' actions violated the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.

As a result of defendants' violations, Yates alleges that he was

wrongly incarcerated in the New Hampshire state prison system

from January 1997, the date on which he was first eligible for a

sentence suspension, until October 1998, when he was released on

parole.

Yates seeks injunctive relief, in the form of an order

barring defendants from conditioning early release or parole on a

prisoner's attendance at AA-based programs, and forcing

defendants to recognize Rational Recovery as a viable alternative

to AA-based programs. He also seeks an injunction ordering

defendants to prepare and submit to the Merrimack Superior Court

another report reflecting Yates' Rational Recovery participation,

lack of disciplinary reports, negative urinalysis testings, and

to remove all recommendations regarding Summit House or other AA-

based programs as a condition of sentence suspension or parole eligibility. Further, Yates seeks a declaration from this Court

that forcing prisoners to attend AA-based programs for any reason

at all violates the Establishment Clause because those programs

are uneguivocally religious. Finally, pursuant to

,5 Yates seeks compensatory damages for the defendants'

alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Yates' claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief are moot and must be dismissed. His claim for

damages should be dismissed, they argue, because defendants are

entitled to gualified immunity. I agree that Yates' claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief are moot. Similarly, I find

that Yates' claim for damages should be dismissed, but not for

the reason argued by defendants. Instead, as discussed more

fully below, Yates' claim for damages is barred by the doctrine

of absolute immunity.

5 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the district of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eguity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

(West 1994).

-8- Yates was granted parole from the New Hampshire state prison

system in October 1998, the earliest date on which he was

eligible. Thus, his claims for injunctive relief are necessarily

moot, as the injunctive relief he originally sought has

essentially been granted. See Arizonans for Official English v.

Arizona,

(1997) ("to gualify as a case fit for

federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant

at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is

filed"). Indeed, Yates concedes as much in his memorandum of

law .

Yates argues that, despite his parole and early release from

prison, his claims for declaratory relief survive. I disagree.

In light of the fact that I find his damages claim barred by the

defendants' absolute immunity, I also find that his claim for

declaratory relief is moot. See, e.g. Knight v. Mills,

(1st Cir. 1987)(claim for declaratory relief rendered

moot where defendants were entitled to gualified immunity from

civil damages); Ferreira v. Dubois,

(D. Mass. 1996)(claim for declaratory relief rendered moot where

defendants were entitled to gualified immunity and plaintiff had

since been released from prison). Assuming without deciding that forced attendance at AA-based

programs, such as Summit House, violates the Establishment

Clause, I must still dismiss Yates' claim for damages on grounds

of absolute immunity. See, e.g. Briscoe v. LaHue,

(1983); Imbler v. Pachtman,

(1976). Yates

essentially takes issue with the contents of Defendants' reports

and recommendations submitted to the Merrimack County Superior

Court. The defendants were ordered by the Court to prepare and

submit those reports in conjunction with Yates' motion for a

sentence suspension.

The doctrine of absolute immunity is "based on the policy of

protecting the judicial process." Briscoe,

(1983)(guoting Imbler,

). The focus of the

absolute immunity inguiry is not on the status of the actor, but

the nature of the judicial proceeding and the actor's function

within that proceeding. See Briscoe,

; see also

Cleavinaer v. Saxner,

(1985). Subjecting

public actors to § 1983 liability for their participation in

judicial proceedings could, in some cases, "undermine not only

their contribution to the judicial process but also the effective

performance of their other public duties." Briscoe,

.

-10- Thus, judges, prosecutors, grand jurors, and witnesses,

including police officers, are absolutely immune from liability

for their judicial acts and testimony. See Cleavinqer,

. The absolute immunity protection has also been extended

to probation department employees, see Hill v. Sciarrotta,

(2nd Cir. 1998), court-appointed psychologists, see

Morstad v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

(8th Cir. 1998), and family service workers, see Salver

v. Patrick,

(6th Cir. 1989), who have been sued

because of information or recommendations they have provided to a

court to assist it in its judicial functions.

It is indisputable that had defendants provided their

recommendations to the court through sworn testimony, they would

have been entitled to claim absolute immunity because they would

have been sued based on statements they made as witnesses. See

Briscoe,

. That they instead provided their

recommendations through unsworn statements made in response to

a court order is of no conseguence. Where the testimony and

evaluative reports of such public officers are a necessary or

helpful component of a judicial proceeding, they are entitled to

protection regardless of whether the officers actually took the

witness stand and testified. See Morstad,

; Hill,

-11- 14 0 F.3d at 213; see also Namev v. Reilly, 92

(D.

Mass. 1996)(immunity is extended to "officials performing

discretionary tasks that assist judges in the decision-making

process"). This is especially true where, as here, the public

officer acted not on his own, but pursuant to a court order. See

Morstad,

; see also Mays v. Sudderth,

(5th Cir. 1996)(sheriff absolutely immune from damages claim

arising from arrest of plaintiff in compliance with facially

valid court order). Thus, I find that the defendants are

absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for preparing and

submitting reports and recommendations in connection with Yates'

motion, as they were directed to do so by the Merrimack County

Superior Court. The defendants' actions were "inextricably

intertwined with the court's task" of ruling on Yates' motion

and, as such, are entitled to absolute immunity. See Namev, 926

F. Supp. at 9.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, I grant defendants' motion

to dismiss (document no. 27) and dismiss plaintiff's complaint

(document no. 25).

-12- SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge April 23, 1999

cc: Alex Smith, Esq. Robert N. Isseks, Esq. Suzanne M. Gorman, Esq. Jennifer Brooks Gavilondo, Esq.

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