Burrell, Jr. v . University of Maine CV-00-114-M 07/25/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William L. Burrell, Jr, Plaintiff

v. N.H. Civil N o . 00-114-M M e . Civil N o . 99-107-PC Opinion N o .

Board of Trustees of the University of Maine System, et al., Defendants

O R D E R

William Burrell, Jr. brings action seeking compensatory and

punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief, for alleged

violations of various federally protected rights. He also raises

several claims under Maine common and statutory law, as to which

he invokes the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Following

recusal of the judges of the United States District Court for the

District of Maine, the undersigned was designated to hear the

matter. Presently pending is the Report and Recommendation of United

States Magistrate Judge Margaret Kravchuk, recommending that the

court: (1) grant Burrell’s motion to amend his complaint

(document n o . 3 2 ) ; (2) grant defendants’ motions to dismiss all

of Burrell’s federal claims; and (3) decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. As to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the court dismiss his

complaint, Burrell objects.

Pursuant to

(b)(1), the court reviews de novo

those portions of the report and recommendation to which a party

has filed timely and specific objections. See also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b) (“Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the

recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific,

written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations.”). There being no objection to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation that Burrell be allowed to amend his

complaint, that recommendation is accepted.

2 Background

Burrell filed this action after he was dismissed from his

work-study position at Student Legal Services at the University

of Southern Maine (“USM”), following the USM Student Senate’s

conclusion that he had misrepresented his position and authority.

The factual details of his complaint are summarized in the Report

and Recommendation, and need not be repeated.

Generally speaking, Burrell’s amended complaint alleges that

he was denied due process in the proceeding before the Student

Senate that resulted in the decision to terminate his employment,

claiming that he was not afforded an opportunity to “confront or

cross examine his accusers.” Amended complaint, para. 8 3 .

Burrell also claims to have been the victim of unlawful racial

discrimination, and says that various defendants violated

, Title VII, the Whistleblower’s Protection Act, the

Maine Human Rights Act, Maine’s Freedom of Access Law, and Title

VI. Finally, he also brings claims for breach of contract,

3 intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and

defamation.

Discussion

Burrell’s amended complaint is a lengthy and somewhat

rambling account of a complex and wide-ranging conspiracy among

defendants to deprive him of numerous federally protected rights.

Often, the precise nature of his claims is unclear. And,

unfortunately, his objection to the Report and Recommendation is

no more illuminating, consisting largely of an unfocused attack

on the Magistrate Judge’s construction of his claims and her

interpretation of what often appear to be minor and non-

dispositive facts underlying those claims. See e.g., Plaintiff’s

objection at 4 (discussing his view that the Magistrate Judge

erroneously construed his disputes with students at Student Legal

Services as arising out of the “client intake process,” when

Burrell says his claims relate to “much more than the client

intake process”).

4 Perhaps more fundamentally, Burrell seems to be confused as

to which of his proposed amended complaints has been accepted by

the court and which have been stricken (the Report and

Recommendation discusses in some detail Burrell’s efforts to

amend his complaint). See, e.g., Plaintiff’s objection at 9

(“none of the Defendants’ cases can stand against the Plaintiff’s

cases, and Plaintiff’s two latest amended versions [of his

complaint] clearly state a claim.”) (emphasis supplied).

Consequently, Burrell argues:

Plaintiff was ordered (without being granted leave to file another motion to amend) to submit a shorter version of his complaint. It is this Plaintiff’s contention that since he was not granted leave to file another motion to amend that the latest motion to amend should be in support of both of plaintiff’s amended versions. This only seems fair considering plaintiff’s pro se status. . . . Does this Court read facts that are sufficient to state the Plaintiff’s claims in one complaint, ask him to submit a shorter version, and pretend the previous facts were never stated? This is only a motion to dismiss and this Plaintiff contends that at this early stage this Honorable Court should take into consideration everything this Pro Se Plaintiff has said in the entire pre-trial record to ascertain[] what the Plaintiff is really trying to say.

5 Plaintiff’s objection at 3 (emphasis in original). Just so there

is no confusion on this point, the court notes that only the

amended complaint filed on November 2 9 , 1999, is relevant;

Burrell’s numerous other proposed amended complaints were

stricken by order dated November 1 2 , 1999.

Notwithstanding some of the confusion arising from Burrell’s

objection to the Report and Recommendation, it is clear the he

disputes nearly every legal conclusion reached by the Magistrate

Judge. He has, however, failed to provide much support for those

objections. For example, at one point Burrell simply says,

“Plaintiff objects to the entire recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge from this point o n , but further points out some glaring

oversights.” Plaintiff’s objection at 9. Such a generalized

objection is not very helpful. Nevertheless, because of

Burrell’s pro se status, the court has tried, where possible, to

identify and address his specific legal challenges to the Report

and Recommendation.

6 Viewing both his amended complaint and objection to the

Report and Recommendation liberally, the court discerns three

specific challenges. First, Burrell objects to the Magistrate

Judge’s construction and disposition of his due process claims

against the Board of Trustees of the University of Maine System

(the “University Defendants”). Next, Burrell challenges the

recommendation that the court dismiss his First Amendment claims.

Finally, he asserts that the Magistrate Judge improperly

recommended dismissal of his § 1983 claims against defendants

Kaestner and Finlayson (saying the Magistrate Judge erroneously

concluded that his amended complaint fails to allege that those

defendants acted under color of state l a w ) .

I. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim and the University Defendants.

Invoking the provisions of

, Burrell seeks

compensatory and injunctive relief against the University

Defendants, alleging, among other things, that he was fired from

a work-study position in Student Legal Services without due

process. Giving Burrell the benefit of the doubt, the Magistrate

7 Judge assumed that his amended complaint adequately alleged that

he had a protected property interest in his work-study position

under Maine law. See Report and Recommendation at 13-14. She

then concluded, however, that Burrell had been afforded all the

process he was due. See Id. at 14-15.

The Supreme Court has observed that, “In procedural due

process claims, the deprivation by state action of a

constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or

property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is

unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without

due process of law. The constitutional violation actionable

under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is

not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due

process.” Zinermon v . Burch,

(1990) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in assessing

the validity of any procedural due process claim, a court must

engage in a two-step inquiry.

8 We first decide whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property.” If protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute “due process of law.” Protected [property] interests may arise from two sources - the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the states.

Brown v . Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.,

, 534-

35 (1st Cir. 1995).

Here, Burrell does not appear to claim that the manner in

which defendants decided to terminate his employment violated any

state or federal statutory provisions. Instead, his procedural

due process claim appears to emanate exclusively from the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently (again,

assuming he had a property interest in his j o b ) , Burrell “was

entitled to the constitutional minimum of ‘some kind of hearing’

and ‘some pretermination opportunity to respond.’” O’Neill v .

Baker,

1 , 47-48 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleveland Bd.

of Educ. v . Loudermill,

(1985)).

9 Notwithstanding Burrell’s contrary assertions, his amended

complaint makes clear that he received all the process to which

he was constitutionally entitled. Burrell was suspended based

upon five charges leveled against him, each of which was

explained to him in a letter. See Amended complaint at paras.

60-61. Burrell complained to the Student Senate about his

suspension, and the Senate ordered an investigation into the

matter.

at para. 7 1 . Subsequently, the Student Senate Ad-

hoc Investigative Committee (SSAIC) cleared Burrell of four of

the charges against him, but found him guilty of the fifth

(misrepresentation of his position and authority).

at

paras. 77-78. Burrell was subsequently fired.

at para. 8 1 .

Burrell says he repeatedly sought a post-deprivation

hearing, which was eventually offered to him approximately seven

months later.

at para. 8 3 . But, when he learned that he

would not be permitted to cross-examine any witnesses, Burrell

elected not to participate. In light of Burrell’s refusal to

participate, it appears that no hearing was ever conducted. That

10 issue i s , however, unclear from Burrell’s pleadings. Compare,

Plaintiff’s objection at 5 (alleging that no post-deprivation

hearing ever took place) with amended complaint at para. 87

(“Despite the fact that Hill knew in the very beginning of

February 1999 that Burrell wanted the process halted, Hill

nevertheless . . . went ahead with the process”) (emphasis in

original).

Parenthetically, the court notes that Burrell takes great

pains to distinguish between the “process” he claims to have been

denied, and the post-termination “hearing” he apparently declined

to attend. The precise distinction Burrell is attempting to draw

i s , however, unclear.

Plaintiff is NOT talking about a HEARING when he uses the word PROCESS! The PROCESS that this Plaintiff is referring to is Mr. Hill notifying the Senate in writing of the charges against them, meeting with both sides to discuss procedure, setting a date for hearing, etc. Initiating a hearing/proceeding is a far different matter. Note the differences in the Magistrate Judge’s terminology and the plaintiff’s: “Hill did not initiate a hearing until seven months after plaintiff requested one.” (Report and

11 Recommendation at 9 ) , compare to “83. Mr. Hill ignored Burrell’s pleas for a post-deprivation hearing for more than SEVEN MONTHS. When Mr. Hill finally got around to setting a date for a hearing, he reaffirmed for Burrell that he would not be entitled to confront or cross examine his accusers.” (plntfs amend. complt. at 8 3 ) .

Plaintiff’s objection at 5 (emphasis in original). Needless to

say, neither the nature of Burrell’s due process claim, nor his

objection to the Report and Recommendation, is very clear.

Notwithstanding that confusion, however, it appears that the

Magistrate Judge reasonably and plausibly construed Burrell’s

effort.

Even assuming (as Burrell alleges in his objection) that no

post-deprivation hearing was conducted, the amended complaint

makes clear that it was because Burrell objected and refused to

participate. See Amended complaint at para. 8 6 . In light of the

foregoing, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that Burrell was afforded all the process to which he

was entitled: (1) he was notified of the charges pending against

him; (2) prior to his termination, Burrell disputed those charges

12 before the Student Senate; (3) an investigation into those

charges was conducted; (4) that investigation uncovered evidence

that Burrell had misrepresented his position and authority; (5)

The SSAIC found him guilty of that particular charge and,

accordingly, his employment was terminated; and (6) he was

offered (but refused to participate in) a post-deprivation

hearing. Although it is unclear what additional process Burrell

believes he was entitled t o , it is clear that he was afforded all

the process to which he was entitled under the Constitution.

Consequently, Burrell’s procedural due process claim fails as a

matter of law. See Report and Recommendation at 14-15.

II. Burrell’s First Amendment Claim.

With regard to Burrell’s § 1983 First Amendment claim, the

Magistrate Judge concluded that his amended complaint fails “to

state a claim under the First Amendment because he has failed to

allege sufficient facts to support his conclusory assertion that

his complaints were a motivating factor behind his dismissal.”

Report and Recommendation at 12 n.1. Burrell objects, but fails

13 to point to any specific references in his amended complaint that

might refute the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion. Instead, he

simply says that the Magistrate Judge “offers absolutely no

elaboration as to why she feels Plaintiff has failed to allege

sufficient facts nor does she point to one example in Plaintiff’s

complaint that is a conclusory assertion used to support a First

Amendment claims.” Plaintiff’s objection at 6.

A. First Amendment Claims Against the University Defendants.

Assuming that Burrell’s work-study position at Student Legal

Services makes him a “public employee,” to state a viable claim

under the First Amendment for unlawful retaliatory discharge, he

must allege: (1) that he was speaking on matters of public

concern; (2) that his and the public’s interest in free discourse

on those matters outweighed the countervailing government

interest in promoting the efficient performance of public

service; and (3) that his expression was a motivating or

substantial factor in the decision to terminate his employment.

See Padilla-Garcia v . Rodriguez, __ F.3d __,

(1st

14 Cir. May 1 5 , 2000); Wytrwal v . Saco School Bd.,

(1st Cir. 1995). Even liberally construing Burrell’s amended

complaint, the court concludes that Burrell has failed to

adequately plead a viable First Amendment claim.

To be sure, Burrell’s amended complaint alleges that he

complained about certain issues related to Student Legal

Services. See Amended complaint at paras. 41 and 5 1 . His

amended complaint also alleges that he was suspended in

retaliation for having engaged in that conduct. See Amended

complaint at paras. 63 and 7 0 . Notwithstanding those

allegations, Burrell’s amended complaint still falls short of the

mark. First, there are several factual problems with Burrell’s

claim. For example, he acknowledges that the 27th U.S.M. Student

Senate “was not aware of the dispute in Student Legal Services

(SLS) which the 26th U.S.M. Student Senate had been dealing

with.” Amended complaint at para. 5 7 . Consequently, it is

difficult to see how the 27th Senate could have “retaliated”

15 against Burrell if it was unaware of his prior protected speech

(in the form of his complaints).

Burrell’s amended complaint also acknowledges that the 27th

Student Senate rescinded his suspension, restored his weekly

salary, and ordered an immediate investigation into the matter.

See Amended complaint at paras. 71 and 7 4 . Following that

investigation, Burrell was found “guilty of the fifth charge”

lodged against him: misrepresenting his position and authority.

See Amended complaint at para. 7 8 . While Burrell alleges that

his termination was the product of some sort of conspiratorial

agreement among many of the defendants, he does not claim that it

(as distinguished from his earlier suspension) was motivated by

his having engaged in protected speech. See Amended complaint at

paras. 78 and 8 1 . Thus, while the amended complaint (charitably

construed) alleges that the initial investigation into Burrell’s

conduct was motivated, at least in part, by an unlawful effort to

retaliate against him for having engaged in protected speech, it

also makes clear that he was terminated (i.e., an adverse

16 employment action was taken against him) only after it was found

that he misrepresented his position and authority within Student

Legal Services.

The amended complaint suffers from additional shortcomings

as it relates to Burrell’s First Amendment claim. First, it is

well established that a governmental entity cannot be held liable

under

on a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability; the governmental entity itself must

proximately cause the constitutional injury, through the

promulgation (or tacit approval) of a policy or custom. See City

of Canton, Ohio v . Harris,

(1989). See

generally Monell v . New York City Dept. of Social Services,

(1978). And, to state a viable claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege in substance that the challenged

governmental custom or policy was the “moving force” behind the

constitutional injuries at issue. See Board of County

Commissioners of Bryan County v . Brown,

(1997).

17 Accordingly, in order to hold the Board of Trustees liable,

Burrell must allege that his unlawful termination for having

engaged in protected speech was the product of some custom or

policy adopted or implemented by the Board. The amended

complaint simply fails to make any such allegations, other than

periodic vague references to a policy of “failure to train.”

However, Burrell’s amended complaint fails to link that alleged

policy to his wrongful termination for having engaged in

protected speech. See, e.g., Amended complaint at para. 121.

Finally, Burrell’s amended complaint fails to specifically

identify which defendants allegedly violated his First Amendment

rights and/or how they accomplished that task. Instead, it

generally describes certain actions taken by various defendants

and then merely declares that all are somehow liable to him under

§ 1983. Plainly, more specificity in identifying the allegedly

wrongful conduct by each named defendant is necessary.

18 Having conducted a de novo review of the record, see

(b)(1), the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that Burrell’s amended complaint fails to state a

viable First Amendment § 1983 claim for retaliatory discharge.

B. Plaintiff’s Remaining First Amendment Claims.

Burrell describes his First Amendment claim against

defendants Ryan, Monroe, and Stanhope as follows:

Defendants Ryan, Monroe, and University of Southern Maine Police Officer, James, Stanhope, conspired to defame and file a false cease harassment notice against Mr. Burrell. This deprived Burrell of his rights under

, specifically the 1st Amendment . . .”

Amended complaint at para. 125. While Burrell alleges that the

“cease harassment notice” was filed “in retaliation to Burrell’s

initial complaints concerning discrimination,” amended complaint

at para. 126, he does not claim that it had any impact upon the

decision to terminate his employment. In fact, it appears that

Burrell was served with the notice well after his termination.

See Amended complaint at para. 101. Plainly, therefore,

19 Burrell’s claim against defendants Ryan, Monroe, and Stanhope is

unrelated to his retaliatory discharge claim discussed above.

To state a viable § 1983 claim against Ryan, Monroe, and

Stanhope under

, Burrell must allege that: (1)

defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) their conduct

deprived Burrell of a right secured by the Constitution or a

federal statute. See West v . Atkins,

2 , 48 (1988).

And, typically, in order to show that a deprivation of a First

Amendment right has occurred, a plaintiff must, at a minimum,

demonstrate that the defendant intended to inhibit speech

protected by the First Amendment, Tatro v . Kervin,

(1st Cir. 1994), and that the defendant’s conduct had a chilling

effect on the protected speech that was more than merely

“speculative, indirect, or too remote.” Sullivan v . Carrick,

, 4 , (1st Cir. 1989).

Even charitably construing Burrell’s amended complaint, it

appears that his claims against defendants Stanhope, Ryan, and

20 Monroe are nothing more than common law claims for defamation.

Among other things, the amended complaint is devoid of any

allegations that those defendants sought to stifle Burrell’s

constitutionally protected speech or that their allegedly

wrongful conduct actually chilled Burrell’s speech. In short,

Burrell’s amended complaint fails to articulate a viable § 1983

First Amendment claim against any of those defendants.

III. Defamation and Defendants Kaestner and Finlayson.

Finally, Burrell challenges the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that the court dismiss what Burrell has cast as §

1983 claims against defendants Kaestner and Finlayson. In his

amended complaint, Burrell alleges:

Jean S . Kaestner, who is now material to this action concerning the charge of defamation only, as it applies to state tort law and Due Process violations, was a duly appointed, employed, and acting Family Services Coordinator for Freeport Community Services and Coastal Economic Development’s Head Start Centers at Freeport and Brunswick.

Elizabeth R. Finlayson, who is now material to this action concerning the charge of defamation only, as it applies to state tort law and Due Process violations,

21 was a duly appointed, employed, and acting Executive Director of Freeport Community Services.

Amended complaint at paras. 19-20 (emphasis supplied). As to

those defendants, Burrell alleges:

Jean Kaestner and Elizabeth Finlayson, officially and individually, under color of State Law, conspired together to defame William Burrell by writing false, defamatory letters to his supervisors, as stated above. Said defamation caused Burrell great injury in the form of the loss of his job, a Government benefit in which he has both a Property and Liberty interest. Kaestner and Finlayson’s defamatory comments deprived Burrell of substantive and procedural Due Process Rights.

Id., at para. 124 (emphasis supplied). The content of the

letters attributed to Kaestner and Finlayson, described in

paragraphs 89 through 94 of Burrell’s amended complaint, need not

be detailed. It is sufficient to note that both defendants

allegedly complained about the deceptive manner in which Burrell

sought to obtain confidential information apparently maintained

by their employers.

22 Burrell’s § 1983 claim against these defendants suffers from

several shortcomings. First, notwithstanding his conclusory

allegation that defendants acted under color of state law, it is

entirely unclear from the amended complaint whether Freeport

Community Services (Finlayson’s employer) or Coastal Economic

Development’s Head Start Centers (Kaestner’s employer) are state

(or municipal) entities or whether they are private

organizations. Accordingly, it is unclear whether Kaestner or

Finlayson could have been acting “under color of state law” when

they lodged complaints against Burrell. Moreover, even assuming

that Kaestner and Finlayson were acting under color of state law,

Burrell’s claim that they defamed him fails to state a cause of

action under

. Instead, it appears to b e , at

best, a rather straight-forward common law claim for defamation.

23 Conclusion

Pursuant to

(b)(1), the court has made a de

novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which plaintiff has objected. For the

foregoing reasons, the court accepts and adopts the Report and

Recommendation prepared by the Magistrate Judge, dated February

1 , 2000 (N.H. docket n o . 4 ; M e . docket n o . 4 9 ) , for the reasons

given by the Magistrate Judge and as supplemented by this order.

Burrell’s amended complaint does not represent his first

effort to set forth viable (and comprehensible) claims against

defendants. Due, no doubt, in large part to his pro se status,

the United States District Court for the District of Maine has

afforded him substantial latitude. By May of 1999, Burrell had

filed his original complaint as well as an amended complaint (Me.

docket nos. 1 and 5 ) . In response, defendants filed motions to

dismiss. On June 3 , 1999, and then again on August 1 0 , Burrell

sought to further amend his complaint by adding new defendants

24 and at least three new causes of action (Me. docket nos. 13 and

27).

Burrell’s efforts to amend his complaint continued. On

August 1 7 , 1999, he again sought to amend his complaint “to

attach additional causes of action to his Amended [Complaint]

Copy #3” (Me. docket n o . 2 8 ) . Notwithstanding the fact that he

had submitted literally hundreds of pages of filings, to that

point, Burrell still had not settled upon the final form of his

complaint, the nature of the claims he was bringing, or even the

defendants against whom he was proceeding (in fact, in the most

recent version of his amended complaint, which is currently

before the court, Burrell seeks to add seven additional

defendants).

In response to Burrell’s efforts in August, the District

Court wrote, “The Court is sympathetic to the difficulties faced

by pro se litigants, but Defendants are also entitled to an

answer on their Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff cannot continue

25 reformulating his claims, creating more work for Defendants’

counsel, and delaying action on those Motions interminably.”

Order dated August 1 8 , 1999 (Me. docket no. 29) at 2 .

Accordingly, the court struck Burrell’s most recent proposed

amended complaint and granted him “leave to file one Motion for

Leave to Amend Complaint, together with a copy of the proposed

Amended Complaint in its entirety.”

On September 7 , 1999, Burrell complied with the court’s

order and filed a motion and proposed amended complaint. After

reviewing that submission, the District Court observed:

The [Amended] Complaint is a single-and-a-half spaced document that is forty-seven pages long. The [Amended] Complaint also contains numerous portions of documents (reproduced in very small print), and individual allegations that run for an entire page. Defendants filed an objection to the amended Complaint stating that the “allegations in the proposed Amended Complaint are now so prolix that it is often impossible to determine how the allegations relate in any way to his claims for relief.” On this the Court agrees.

Order dated November 1 2 , 1999 (Me. docket n o . 3 6 ) . Additionally,

acknowledging defendants’ difficulty in discerning the precise

26 nature of Burrell’s claims, the court concluded that the proposed

amended complaint did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) in

that it failed to contain a short and plain statement of his

claim(s). It noted that, “A review of the [Amended] Complaint

reveals that it is argumentative, contains excessive verbiage,

and pleads evidence, all of which imposes an unnecessary burden

on Defendants in properly responding to [it].”

Accordingly,

the court struck Burrell’s fifth proposed amended complaint and

afforded him one last opportunity to file a succinct and

comprehensible proposed amended complaint.

The result is the amended complaint presently before the

court, representing Burrell’s sixth attempt to state his claims

with clarity and precision. As noted above, its factual

allegations and 14 counts detail what Burrell perceives to have

been a wide-ranging conspiracy to discriminate against him,

deprive him of numerous federally protected rights, inflict

emotional and economic ruin upon him, and expose him to public

ridicule by revealing confidential information to the media.

27 Unfortunately, like its predecessors, the amended complaint i s ,

at best, marginally comprehensible and, more importantly, fails

to set forth the essential elements of any viable federal claims.

Based upon his court filings to date, Burrell gives every

indication that he is capable of reading and understanding

relevant statutes and judicial opinions. While the task i s , no

doubt, a difficult one for someone untrained in the law, by now

he should have been able to draft a complaint that clearly and

succinctly identifies viable causes of action against specific

defendants and includes allegations pertinent to each of the

essential elements of those claims. He has failed to do s o .

And, notwithstanding his pro se status, the court cannot invent

necessary factual allegations where none exist, nor can it act as

Burrell’s counsel and redraft his amended complaint so that it

states viable causes of action.

Having made a de novo determination of those portions of the

Report and Recommendation to which Burrell has objected, the

28 court concludes that the recommended disposition of Burrell’s

claims is legally correct. Accordingly, the court accepts and

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Me.

docket n o . 4 9 ; N.H. docket n o . 4 ) . Defendants’ motions to

dismiss (Me. docket nos. 4 0 , 4 1 , and 42) are, therefore, granted.

Burrell’s federal claims are dismissed, without prejudice, for

failure to state a claim. As to his state law claims, the court

declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and they too

are dismissed, without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). The

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this

order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

July 2 5 , 2000

cc: William L. Burrell, J r . Patricia A . Peard, Esq. Peter E . Rodway Philip M. Coffin, I I I , Esq. William S . Brownell, Clerk

29