Smart v . NYS DOC CV-99-179-M 09/30/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Pamela Smart, Petitioner

v. Civil N o . 99-179-M Opinion N o .

Glenn S . Goord, New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent

O R D E R

Petitioner was convicted in the New Hampshire Superior Court

as an accomplice to the first degree murder of her husband,

conspiracy to commit that murder, and witness tampering. She

seeks habeas corpus relief, asserting violations of her Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, denial of due process and

a fair trial, and violation of her Eighth Amendment protection

from cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent counters that

petitioner is entitled to no relief on any of her claims.

Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted on March 2 2 , 1991, following a 23-

day jury trial. She filed post-trial motions for relief in the New Hampshire Superior Court, and pursued a direct appeal of her

convictions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court on several

grounds, some of which are reasserted in this habeas petition.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner’s

conviction in a published opinion. See State v . Smart,

(1993). Four years later, petitioner filed a state habeas

petition in the Superior Court, raising (and exhausting) the

claims presented here. The state habeas court denied relief,

and, on appeal from that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme

Court summarily affirmed. Petitioner then timely filed this

petition for federal habeas relief.1 She is currently serving a

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility

of parole.

Standard of Review

Since passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

(d), the power to

1 The petition was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where petitioner is incarcerated pursuant to an agreement between the states of New Hampshire and New York. The case was transferred here as petitioner is in the custody of the State of New Hampshire

2 grant federal habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court has been

substantially limited. A federal court may not disturb a state

conviction unless the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a

decision that was contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable

application o f , clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the Unite States,” at the time the state

conviction became final.

(d)(1). See

also Williams v . Taylor,

6 2 , 399 (2000).

Additionally, if the state court resolved a petitioner’s

claim on an “adequate and independent state ground,” a federal

court may only disturb that ruling if the petitioner shows “cause

. . . and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation

of federal law, or demonstrate[s] that failure to consider the

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman v . Thompson,

2 2 , 750 (1991). See also Gunter

v . Maloney,

(1st Cir. 2002). “Cause” is particularly

relevant when the independent state ground is petitioner’s

procedural default (i.e., the failure to raise the issue on

direct appeal). In that case, petitioner must provide a reason

3 for the default that is external to the petitioner. See Coleman,

501 U.S. at 7 5 0 , 752. The “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

test can be met by showing “actual innocence” or “a fair

probability that, in light of all the evidence . . . the trier of

the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of [her]

guilt.” Sawyer v . Whitley,

(1992) (quoting

Kuhlmann v . Wilson,

(1986)).

Discussion

This petition asserts five grounds upon which relief should

be granted. Each was fully presented to the New Hampshire

Superior Court, and, subsequently, to the New Hampshire Supreme

Court, thereby satisfying the requirement that federal review be

preceded by the exhaustion of available state remedies. See

(b) and ( c ) .

Asserted Grounds for Relief

Petitioner first asserts that she is entitled to a new trial

because on three occasions the trial judge engaged in ex parte

communications with members of the jury, in violation of her

constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the

4 trial, and her right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury

(Ground 1 ) . The first challenged communication took place when

the trial judge informed the jury, during the afternoon of the

first day of deliberations, that they would have to be

sequestered, beginning the next night, if a verdict was not

reached. The second communication involves the judge’s in

camera, on the record, questioning of a juror about alleged juror

misconduct. The final communication took place after petitioner

was convicted and also involved the judge’s in camera, on the

record, questioning of a (different) juror about alleged

misconduct. Petitioner argues that her presence on those

occasions could not be waived, and her absence undermines her

conviction.

Petitioner also says she is entitled to a new trial because

the presiding judge violated her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights

to due process and to confront witnesses when he failed to allow

her to re-call co-defendants who had previously been called as

witnesses by the prosecution (Ground 2 ) . After the witnesses had

been excused, petitioner discovered letters written by them while

they were incarcerated. She claims the letters demonstrated “a

5 total disdain for the criminal trial process and prove that the

witnesses had an opportunity to collaborate on their testimony.”

Pet. at 2 2 . Accordingly, she says, she should have been

permitted to re-call and cross-examine those witnesses regarding

the content of the letters, presumably to undermine their

credibility and establish fabrication.

Petitioner’s third ground for habeas relief is that the

State failed to provide her with exculpatory evidence in its

possession, thereby violating her right to due process (Ground

3). That allegation arises from petitioner’s belief that one of

her co-defendants, who testified against her, was provided with

an additional, undisclosed, incentive to testify, which should

have been revealed under the mandate of Brady v . Maryland,

(1963). See also Giglio v . United States,

(1972)(impeachment evidence is exculpatory within the meaning of

Brady and, if material, must be disclosed).

Next, petitioner claims that extensive publicity surrounding

the investigation leading to her indictment, and her trial, as

well as the disruptive presence of members of the media, both in

6 the courtroom and around the courthouse, all combined to deprive

her of a fair trial (Ground 4 ) . Petitioner argues that her

rights to both an impartial jury and fair trial were violated

because the trial judge denied her motion for change of venue o r ,

in the alternative, failed to sua sponte order a continuance,

given the extensive media coverage of her case. Drawing

comparisons between her trial and that considered in Sheppard v .

Maxwell,

(1966), petitioner says the trial

atmosphere was so chaotic due to the presence and behavior of the

media that she could not possibly have received a fair trial.

Finally, petitioner argues that the sentence imposed – life

in prison without the possibility of parole – violates the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,

since it is disproportionally severe in relation to the crimes of

conviction. She points to the fact that she was only 23 years

old when sentenced, and that her co-conspirators, who actually

carried out the murder of her husband, received substantially

less severe sentences (Ground 5 ) .

7 Analysis

Opposing habeas relief, Respondent appropriately begins by

pointing to the earlier decisions of the New Hampshire Supreme

Court and state habeas court. The state court found Grounds 1

(ex parte communication) and 3 (failure to disclose impeachment

evidence) to have been procedurally defaulted. Since a

procedural default constitutes an “adequate and independent state

ground” upon which to deny relief, federal review of those two

claims is available only upon a showing of both cause for the

default and prejudice. Alternatively, petitioner must

demonstrate that the failure to review the claims she advances

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Williams v . Taylor, supra. Respondent says petitioner has not

made the requisite showing and i s , therefore, not entitled to

federal review of those claims. Additionally, respondent argues

that even if the court considers the merits of those claims,

petitioner would still be entitled to no relief, because her

constitutional rights were not violated by any of the three

communications or by the alleged withholding of information.

8 The state habeas court declined to consider the merits of

Grounds 2 (deprivation of rights of confrontation and cross-

examination related to recalling witnesses) and 4 (deprivation of

the right to an impartial jury and fair trial due to extensive

publicity) because they had already been fully briefed,

litigated, and resolved by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on

direct appeal. Respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled

to federal relief because the state courts’ collective rulings on

those issues were neither “contrary to,” nor did they involve “an

unreasonable application o f , clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the United States Supreme Court.” Id.

The state courts also rejected Ground 5 (unconstitutionality

of a life sentence), finding life in prison without the

possibility of parole to be proportional to the crimes of which

petitioner was convicted – orchestrating the deliberate murder of

her husband by students in the high school in which she taught.

Respondent again argues that petitioner is not entitled to relief

because the state courts’ findings were not “contrary to,” and

did not involve “an unreasonable application o f , clearly

9 established Federal law, as determined by the United States

Supreme Court.” See id. Respondent is correct.

I. Grounds 1 and 3 (Ex Parte Communication / Failure to Disclose Impeachment Material)

That a claim is procedurally defaulted constitutes an

“adequate and independent state ground” for denying relief. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758. Accordingly, this court cannot grant

relief on Ground 1 or 3 unless petitioner first establishes both

cause for her procedural default, and actual prejudice from the

alleged violation of federal law, o r , unless petitioner

demonstrates that, based on the record as a whole, there is a

fair probability that, absent the alleged violations, the finders

of fact (here, the jury) would have entertained a reasonable

doubt as to her guilt. See Id. at 750.

The state habeas court determined that, with regard to the

trial judge’s communications with the jury, petitioner failed to

contemporaneously object to the first two challenged

communications. Relying upon applicable New Hampshire law, the

court found that failure to interpose contemporaneous objections

barred petitioner from pursuing those claims on either direct

10 appeal or collateral review. The court further found that while

the third communication was addressed in a motion to the trial

court seeking a new trial (which was denied), petitioner failed

to raise that issue on direct appeal, and was thus precluded from

raising it in a subsequent state petition for collateral review.

The state court similarly found that, although petitioner

raised and litigated Ground 3 (failure to disclose alleged

impeachment material related to an adverse witness) during post-

conviction proceedings, she failed to brief the issue on direct

appeal. Again relying upon applicable New Hampshire law, the

state habeas court ruled that relief was unavailable.

As respondent points out, petitioner has offered no reason

at all for her failure to interpose the required objections or to

take the requisite appeals, nor has she shown that actual

prejudice resulted from any of the alleged violations of federal

law. Additionally, she has not suggested that, based on the

record as a whole, there would be reasonable doubt as to her

guilt in the absence of the alleged violations of her federal

rights, or any other reason to lack confidence in the outcome of

11 her trial. Since petitioner has not even attempted to establish

cause and prejudice relative to her procedurally defaulted

claims, and has not established any basis upon which to make an

“actual innocence” claim, the defaulted claims are not subject to

federal review. Moreover, the record reveals no possible

prejudice from either the routine judicial communication

complained o f , nor the failure to disclose possible impeachment

material related to one of the prosecution’s witness’s motivation

for testifying against her (the record discloses that the state

habeas court found that the impeachment evidence petitioner

references did not in fact exist).

II. Grounds 2 and 4 (Disallowing recall of witnesses and Prejudicial Publicity)

In addressing Ground 2 - the trial judge’s refusal to allow

petitioner to re-call witnesses after discovery of letters

authored by co-defendants - the New Hampshire Supreme Court fully

recognized that defendants do enjoy a constitutional right to

confront adverse witnesses, and attack their credibility through

cross-examination. But, in petitioner’s case, the trial judge

determined (and her legal counsel conceded) that the letters did

not relate to new issues. The judge also determined that “review

12 of the extensive cross-examination of [her co-defendants] reveals

that all of [the issues raised] had been explored.” Smart,

. Because a trial judge has “broad discretion . . .

to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation,” Davis

v . Alaska,

0 8 , 316 (1974), the New Hampshire Supreme

Court concluded that petitioner had not been deprived of her

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

Nothing in petitioner’s pleadings before this court suggests

that the state supreme court’s rulings were anything other than

entirely consistent with and proper applications of United States

Supreme Court precedent as it pertains to these asserted grounds

for relief. It is also apparent that the desired line of

questioning would have had no substantial effect on the trial

result and petitioner’s inability to pursue it does not in any

way undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. Recalling the

co-defendant witnesses for resumed cross-examination would have

been entirely cumulative of what had already been fully explored.

Regarding Ground 4 (Prejudicial Publicity), after an

exhaustive review of the record, including voir dire, trial, and

post-trial transcripts, and thirty hours of videotape of the

13 trial, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s

claim that she was denied an impartial jury and a fair trial due

to the presence and behavior of the media. Smart,

. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that

petitioner’s trial and associated media conduct were

substantially different from that in Sheppard v . Maxwell, finding

“any comparison [between the two] to be illusory.”

Based on

the totality of the circumstances and deference to the trial

judge’s role in determining impartiality, as required by United

States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the New Hampshire Supreme

Court found that the jury pool was not so tainted that an

impartial jury could not be chosen. The New Hampshire Supreme

Court also found that ample safeguards had been put in place, and

enforced throughout the trial, to protect petitioner’s due

process rights. See Id.; see also Mu’Min v . Virginia,

(1991) (“primary reliance on the judgment of the trial

court makes good sense”); Patton v . Yount,

(1984); Irvin v . Dowd,

1 7 , 724 (1961) (only overturn

factual determination of trial judge if “manifest error”).

14 It is also apparent that the state supreme court considered

petitioner’s prejudicial publicity claim in light of federal

constitutional requirements:

Although the defendant bases her claim on both the State and Federal Constitutions, she relies primarily on federal law, and does not argue for a higher standard under the New Hampshire Constitution. Because we believe the principles are the same in any event, we address her argument under both constitutions, by reference to federal decisions.

Smart,

. The state supreme court correctly

identified, construed, and applied controlling United States

Supreme Court precedent in resolving petitioner’s prejudicial

publicity claim, noting that “adverse pretrial publicity can

create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the

juror’s claims that they can be impartial should not be

believed.”

at 647 (quoting Patton v .

).

But, the court also recognized that under federal precedent, a

“trial court’s finding that a jury was impartial should only be

overturned for manifest error.”

Properly distinguishing

petitioner’s case from that of Irvin v . Dowd,

(1961), the state supreme court noted that no member of

petitioner’s jury expressed an opinion on voir dire that she was

15 guilty, and no juror was seated over her objection. Under such

circumstances, observed the court, “[i]t is difficult to conclude

. . . that the trial court’s finding that the jury was impartial

constituted manifest error.” Id. at 648.

The state supreme court also fully considered the nature of

what was undeniably extensive pretrial publicity surrounding

petitioner’s case - publicity that may well have been

unprecedented in the state, certainly unprecedented in the modern

era on instant mass communication. Again, the court properly

identified and applied United States Supreme Court precedent,

determining that, while extensive, the pretrial publicity

consisted by and large of “straightforward, unemotional factual

accounts of events and of the progress of . . . investigations.”

Id. at 649 (quoting United States v . Haledman,

1 , 61

(D.C. Cir. 1976)). See also Murphy v . Florida,

9 4 , 801

n.4 (1975) (“To ignore these real differences in the potential

for prejudice [between hostile or prejudicial publicity and

factual reporting] would not advance the cause of fundamental

fairness, but only make impossible the timely prosecution of

persons who are well known in the community, whether they be

notorious or merely prominent.”).

16 In concluding that “notwithstanding extensive pretrial

publicity, there was no manifest error in the trial court’s

determination that an impartial jury had been selected for the

[petitioner’s] trial,” the state supreme court’s application of

the analytic framework dictated by the relevant Supreme Court

precedent was neither objectively unreasonable, nor contrary to

that precedent. As noted previously, on federal habeas review,

state court findings and rulings can only be disturbed if those

rulings are contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable application

o f , clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United

States Supreme Court.

Petitioner does not address the applicable standard of

review in her pleadings but, instead, presents legal argument as

if de novo review were available in this court. It is plainly

not available. In any event, there is no basis for federal

habeas relief relative to petitioner’s prejudicial publicity

claim.

III. Ground 5 (Disproportionate and Unconstitutional Life Sentence)

Again, petitioner presumes, incorrectly, that de novo review

is available in this court. Petitioner fails to provide any

17 indication as to how the state habeas court’s finding - that her

sentence does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment - is

either contrary t o , or involves an unreasonable application o f ,

Supreme Court precedent. In any event, a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is certainly

proportional to the crimes for which she was convicted -

orchestrating the murder of her husband at the hands of her

teenage students - and flatly does not violate the Eighth

Amendment’s proscription. See generally Harmelin v . Michigan,

(1991) (life sentence without possibility of parole

for possessing large quantity of cocaine is neither

disproportionate to the crime, nor does it violate the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).

Conclusion

A paragraph by paragraph comparison of petitioner’s state

habeas petition and her federal petition sheds some light on why

the petition before this court may not address critical issues,

like the standard of review applicable in habeas cases brought

pursuant to

. Except for a few minor stylistic

changes, petitioner appears to have filed the same legal

18 memorandum in both cases. The basic question here is not whether

petitioner can assert non-frivolous, or even colorable

constitutional claims, because this court does not have de novo

review authority. Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, in the case of issues decided

against petitioner by the state’s courts on adequate and

independent state grounds, and absent state court rulings that

are manifestly contrary t o , or involve an unreasonable

application o f , clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the United States Supreme Court, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-

0 6 , federal habeas relief is not available to state prisoners.

Given the record and pleadings before the court, it is

apparent that petitioner has not and cannot establish the

predicates necessary to federal habeas relief. Accordingly,

given the limited scope of review by this court, petitioner’s

failure to assert any basis for extending relief under the

applicable legal standards, and this court’s finding of no basis

in the record for affording federal habeas relief, the petition

for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

19 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

September 3 0 , 2002

cc: Leslie H . Ben-Zvi, Esq. Mark L . Sisti, Esq. Ann M . Rice, Esq.

20