Cookish et a l . v . Rouleau et a l . CV-02-526-B 03/11/04

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Dennis R. Cookish & Michael Donovan

v. Civil N o . 02-526-B Opinion N o .

Angela Rouleau, et. a l .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Dennis R. Cookish and Michael Donovan, both

incarcerated inmates at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional

Facility (“NCF”) in Berlin, N H , bring a claim for equitable

relief and damages pursuant to

against

defendants Angela Rouleau, Bruce Cattell, Philip Stanley, and

John Vinson, in their individual and official capacities.1

Plaintiffs claim that the defendants have denied them meaningful

access to the courts. In particular, they challenge the prison

library’s photocopy policy, the way in which it hires and uses

inmate law clerks, the adequacy of the law library’s reference

1 Angela Rouleau has recently married and changed her name. I refer to her by her maiden name throughout this order. Rouleau is the prison librarian, Cattell is the warden, Stanley is the commissioner, and Vinson is the prison’s in-house counsel. materials and the way in which law library time is allocated to

inmates. The parties have filed competing motions for summary

judgment. I deny plaintiffs’ motion and grant defendants’

motion.

I. FACTS2

Plaintiffs assert the policies and practices of the prison

impermissibly deny them meaningful access to the courts. They

separate the policies and practices into four categories: (1) the

prison’s photocopying policy; (2) its hiring and use of inmate

law clerks; (3) the adequacy of the law library; and (4) the

allocation of law library time to inmates. I lay out the factual

background of each in turn.

A. Photocopy Policy

Plaintiffs first argue the prison’s photocopy policy

infringes their right of access to the courts. The photocopy

machine is located in Rouleau’s office and any legal material

2 In evaluating motions for summary judgment, I describe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Because I have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, I describe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

2 that an inmate wishes to have copied must be given to Rouleau.3

Rouleau does not read documents that are submitted for copying

but she does inspect them for staples or crumpled paper that

could damage the copier. She also confiscates documents that

upon cursory review appear to be contraband items. Any

confiscated documents are reviewed in depth and, if determined to

be benign, are returned to the inmate. One such incident

occurred when Cookish attempted to have a town’s voter checklist

photocopied as part of an action he was preparing to file in

state court. Rouleau seized the document and had it reviewed

before returning it to Cookish three days later after it was

determined that Cookish could properly have the voter checklist.

Likewise, inmates are not allowed to possess the property of

another, and when Cookish tried to photocopy public files

relating to other inmates, the documents were seized until it was

determined that Cookish was entitled to use them for his own

research purposes.

3 Cookish and Donovan allege that Rouleau impermissibly reads privileged and confidential legal materials when she reviews documents submitted for copying. The record, however, contains no evidence to support these conclusory claims.

3 Photocopying at the law library is not “on demand.” Rather,

all documents submitted for copying are required to be copied

within 24 hours. Most copies, however, are completed and

returned to inmates within a few minutes to a few hours.

Photocopying is not free. Inmates must pay 10¢ for each side of

a page that is copied, regardless of how much copying an inmate

requires.4 The cost of copies is deducted from an inmate’s

account. If an account has insufficient funds, the Inmate

Accounts Office notifies the photocopy service provider office to

cease photocopy service to that inmate until the shortage is made

up. The Inmate Accounts Office then automatically withdraws the

shortage from the inmate’s next monthly pay and notifies the

inmate of such action.

B. Inmate Law Clerks

Plaintiffs next challenge the prison’s hiring policy and its

use of inmate law clerks. The prison has a standing policy that

inmates using the law library are not to assist each other

without the warden’s approval and are to conduct their research

quietly and independently. Rouleau employs two inmate law clerks

Outside parties are charged 50¢ per page.

4 who assist her in guiding inmates to find what they need in the

law library. These inmate law clerks, however, may not give

legal advice or conduct research for others. In hiring inmate

law clerks, legal research proficiency is desirable, but a

priority is placed on penologically important qualifications such

as good conduct, work ethic, and a lack of security issues. If

an inmate law clerk is unable to assist an inmate, Rouleau can

assist him.

Cookish applied for an inmate law clerk position but was not

hired despite his legal research experience. Cookish cited his

previous experience as an inmate law clerk at a different New

Hampshire state prison and two and a half years of legal study at

the Nova University College of Law on his application.

Nevertheless, Rouleau did not hire Cookish as an inmate law clerk

because she claimed that the positions were already filled. In

an affidavit submitted with her motion for summary judgment,

Rouleau also cited Cookish’s tendency to not follow prison

regulations by dispensing legal advice as another reason why he

was not hired. Cookish has admitted to assisting at least one

other inmate in preparing and drafting legal pleadings.

5 Plaintiffs also complain that inmate law clerks are

untrained in finding the law and are unable to give legal advice

or prepare legal pleadings for inmates.

C. Research Materials

Plaintiffs next challenge the adequacy of the prison law

library. The NCF law library has a combination of law books and

computers with research tools installed on them. Near the end of

2001, the law library began to shift away from hardbound books

toward a computer based system. Prior to that time, law books

were supplemented with various subscription services to keep them

current. When some of the subscription services lapsed, updated

legal material became available under Loislaw5 on the inmate law

library computers, with the librarian’s computer having an

internet connection and expanded access to Loislaw. The library

still has some hardbound books, such as Federal Jury Practice and

Instructions, Jury Instructions, and Federal Practice and

Procedure, just to list a few items from the library’s inventory.

5 Loislaw is a computer based legal research system available on computer disk or the internet. Loislaw offers access to a range of legal materials, ranging from federal and state court opinions, to federal and state law, to federal and state court rules. The scope of available legal material is limited by the type of Loislaw subscription a patron has.

6 Inmates have access to both state and federal law under the

Loislaw system, including, but not limited t o , New Hampshire

Rules of Evidence, Practice and Procedure, New Hampshire statutes

and case law, federal Circuit Court opinions, U.S. Supreme Court

opinions, Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, and

Local Rules of Procedure. The U.S. Code is available on Loislaw

through the librarian.6 If Rouleau is unable to find what an

inmate needs, the inmate can fill out a request form and Rouleau

can pass on the request to the main prison library, the inmate

attorney, the prison’s in-house counsel, or even the New

Hampshire Supreme Court library. Inmate law clerks are trained

in the use of Loislaw and Loislaw instruction booklets are

available to inmates.

On at least one occasion, Cookish requested two cases from

Rouleau and was provided with copies of both cases. He also

requested a copy of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

, the Civil Rights Act,

, and the Federal

6 During the transition from hardbound books toward a computer based system, the pocket part for

disappeared from the law library. Inmates, however, could obtain any updated information via requests to the law librarian who would obtain the information from other sources.

7 Communications Act,

5 1 , with all of their

annotations. Rouleau attempted to fulfill this request by

requesting copies of the relevant material from the New Hampshire

Supreme Court library. She, however, eventually denied his

request as overly broad after she was informed that it would

require copying and shipping more than 380 pages for just one of

the statutes and its corresponding annotations, something the New

Hampshire Supreme Court library was not prepared to d o . Cookish

did nothing to narrow his request after this problem was

explained to him. The library has since acquired a copy of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act.

D. Library Scheduling

The final policy the plaintiffs challenge is the law

library’s scheduling policy. Inmates are allowed access to the

law library once per week for four hours, and the librarian

schedules inmate appointments weekly per prison policy. Inmates

who fail to keep their library appointments, or fail to cancel

them, are subject to disciplinary action. Cookish had his

scheduled library visits changed from Thursdays to Mondays in

June, 2003. This change effectively stopped Cookish from going

8 to the library for a week because there was no Thursday in the

last week of June and no Monday in the first week of July

(6/27/03-7/5/03), a total of 8 days. Cookish claims that when he

questioned Rouleau about this change, he was told he would only

receive four library visits a month, not one visit every week.

This would effectively deprive him of four library visits a year,

since a visit every week results in 52 visits a year, while four

visits a month only results in 48 visits a year.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgement is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A genuine issue is one “that properly can be resolved

only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved

in favor of either party.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

4 2 , 250 (1986). A material fact is one that affects the

outcome of the suit. See id. at 248.

9 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See

Navarro v . Pfizer Corp.,

0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001). The

party moving for summary judgment, however, “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v . Catrett,

1 7 , 323

(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce evidence on

which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof

burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce

such evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v .

Bristol Myers-Squibb Co.,

6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing

Celotex,

; Anderson,

4 9 ) . Neither

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, or unsupported

speculation are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See

Carroll v . Xerox Corp.,

3 1 , 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ claims hinge on the extent to which the

10 challenged policies impede their access to the courts. “It is

undisputed that inmates have a fundamental constitutional right

of access to the courts.” Carter v . Fair,

(1st

Cir. 1986) (citing Bounds v . Smith,

1 7 , 828 (1977)).

This right of access, however, only “requires prison authorities

to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful

legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries

or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds,

430 U.S. at 828. In order to make a claim that this right of

access has been denied, an inmate “must go one step further and

demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal

assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”

Lewis v . Casey,

(1996). The right of access

“is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff

cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.”

Christopher v . Harbury,

(2002). It therefore

“follows that the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated

or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint,

just as much as allegations must describe the official acts

frustrating the litigation.”

11 It is important to note that because the touchstone is

meaningful access to the courts, “prison law libraries and legal

assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the

means for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present

claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the

courts.’” Lewis,

(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at

825). “Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding

right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot

establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his

prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in

some theoretical sense.” Id. Therefore, in order for the

plaintiffs to assert a violation of their constitutional right of

meaningful access to the courts under Bounds and its progeny,

they must “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been

frustrated or was being impeded” by the policies and practices of

the prison authorities. Lewis

; see also

Christopher,

.

A prison regulation or practice may interfere with a

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts if the

challenged regulation or practice bears a rational relation to

12 legitimate penological interests. See Overton v . Bazzetta,

(2003); Lewis,

; Savard v . Rhode

Island,

3 , 30-31 (1st Cir. 2003). Thus, even if

plaintiffs are able to establish that the policies that they

challenge actually impeded their access to the courts with

respect to a specific claim or claims, they are not entitled to

relief if the policies satisfy this requirement. As I explain

below, plaintiffs’ claims fail both because they cannot prove

that the challenged policies actually impeded their ability to

litigate specific claims and because the policies are rationally

related to legitimate penological interests.

A. Photocopy Policy

Although plaintiffs clearly are unhappy with the prison’s

photocopy policy, they have not established that the policy

materially impeded their ability to litigate any specific claim.

As I have explained, this defect is fundamental and it

necessarily defeats their claim. Even if plaintiffs could

overcome this hurdle, however, they still could not succeed

because the prison photocopy policy does not materially burden

their ability to access the courts as a general matter and the

policy is rationally related to legitimate penological interests.

13 1. Photocopying By Librarian

Requiring inmates to temporarily hand over legal materials

to the librarian for up to 24 hours for photocopying does not

materially affect an inmate’s ability to access the courts as a

general matter. “[I]t would be unrealistic to expect prison

authorities to give all prisoners unfettered access to all of

their legal materials at all times.” Sowell v . Vose,

2 , 35 (1st Cir. 1991). “[W]here a prisoner . . . does not

allege an absolute deprivation of access to all of his legal

materials, but rather complains about some sort of conditional

restriction of access to some of them, [I] think it fair to

require him to show an ‘actual injury’ as a prerequisite to

recovery.”

Losing access to legal materials for up to 24

hours while they are copied by the librarian can hardly be

construed as an absolute denial of access to all legal materials.

More importantly, no actual injury has been shown by

plaintiffs stemming from this policy. Even when questionable

documents are seized by the librarian, they are readily returned

if Rouleau determines that they are not contraband items. When

Cookish had documents temporarily seized by Rouleau after

submitting them for photocopying, the documents were returned to

14 Cookish within three days. Cookish has not shown that this

three-day seizure of his documents caused him to miss a filing

deadline or otherwise impede his ability to access the courts

with respect to any specific claim. Under the circumstances,

this delay was not unreasonable. See, e.g., Lewis,

(16 day delay in accessing legal material allowed); Vigliotto

v . Terry,

(9th Cir. 1989) (three-day

deprivation of legal materials not a constitutional deprivation).

Plaintiffs also assert that the prison photocopy policy

allows Rouleau to impermissibly review and read legal documents

submitted for photocopying. Plaintiffs seem to base this

argument on an assertion of privacy rights in the legal materials

submitted for photocopying. Plaintiffs, however, are inmates,

and as such have only limited privacy rights. See Stow v .

Grimaldi,

(1st Cir. 1993) (prison policy of

inspecting prisoners’ non-privileged outgoing mail found

permissible because it furthered the important governmental

interest of security and was a minimal limitation on prisoners’

First Amendment rights); Warburton v . Goord,

(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (prison officials searching an inmate’s law

library desk, typewriter memory, and a crate containing legal

15 materials found to not violate inmate’s privacy rights nor deny

inmate access to the courts). 7

Additionally, requiring the librarian to review all

documents submitted for photocopying is reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest. All documents to be photocopied

are checked for staples, crumpled pages, tape, or other defects

which might damage the photocopier. Ensuring that the copy

machine is not damaged and remains of use to the inmates is a

legitimate penological interest. Also, preventing inmates from

using the copier for illegal activities or for other activities

that may pose a security risk or impact on public safety, is

clearly related to a penological interest. Therefore, even if

plaintiffs could establish that the photocopy policy interfered

with their abilities to exercise their right to access the

courts, it is still valid under Overton because it is reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest.

7 Plaintiffs do not argue that the documents at issue are protected by the work product privilege. Further, because plaintiffs have not identified any evidence suggesting that Rouleau or any of the other defendants have used the photocopying policy to review documents that are protected by the attorney- client privilege, I need not speculate about whether the policy would permit Rouleau to read privileged documents.

16 2. Photocopy charges

Plaintiffs claim the policy of charging 10¢ per side of each

page copied also deprives them of meaningful access to the

courts. Once again, however, the plaintiffs fail to explain how

they have been actually injured by this policy. Prisons are not

required to provide free, unlimited photocopy services to all

inmates. Wanninger v . Davenport,

9 2 , 994 (11th Cir.

1983) (“We agree with the Tenth and Third Circuits that jail

officials do not necessarily have to provide a prisoner with

free, unlimited access to photocopies of legal precedents in

order to protect the prisoner’s right to access to the courts.”).

“The prisoner’s right of access to the courts may be balanced

against the State’s legitimate interests, including budgetary

concerns . . . . The State should not be forced to provide free

access to copier machines for prisoner use when there is an

acceptable, less costly substitute.” E.g., Gittens v . Sullivan,

(S.D.N.Y. 1987) aff’d, Gittens v . Sullivan,

(2d Cir. 1988). Since prisons need not provide

free, unlimited copies, it is reasonable for the prison to charge

a small fee for providing and maintaining the copy service. Such

a fee is reasonably related to the legitimate penological

17 interest of providing inmates with services while minimizing

state budgetary expenses. Here, all proceeds taken in for copies

are returned to the inmate Recreation Fund to continue support of

equipment and supplies for the inmates, further advancing a

legitimate interest of maintaining adequate recreational

equipment for inmates. Therefore, even if plaintiffs could

demonstrate an actual injury stemming from the 10¢ copy fee, the

fee is permissible because it is reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest.8

B. Inmate Law Clerks

Plaintiffs next contend that the prison impermissably hires

under-qualified inmates while refusing to hire inmates such as

Cookish who have a background in the law. They also challenge

the limitations placed on inmate law clerks, who, per prison

policy, are not allowed to give legal advice, conduct legal

research for other inmates, or assist in drafting legal

pleadings. The hiring and use of inmate law clerks in the prison

8 While I can conceive of circumstances in which an indigent inmate might be entitled to a court order exempting him from photocopying charges in a particular case, plaintiffs’ claim that the 10¢ per copy charge is in all cases an impermissible interference with an inmate’s right of access to the courts simply has no merit.

18 law library, despite plaintiffs’ protestations, does not deny

plaintiffs their constitutional right of access to the courts.

Not only have plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an actual injury

stemming from this policy, but such a policy is reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest, and is therefore

valid.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, there is no freestanding

constitutional right to legal advice. Shaw v . Murphy,

, 231 n.3 (2001). Rather, under the Supreme Court’s “right-

of-access precedents, inmates have a right to receive legal

advice from other inmates only when it is a necessary means for

ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed

violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.”

(quotations and citations omitted); Lindquist v . Idaho State

Bd. of Corr.,

5 1 , 857 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Inmate law

clerks need not be extensively trained to possess adequate

ability to assist disadvantaged inmates and to provide them

constitutionally sufficient access to the courts.”). This is not

the case here. The prison provides ample resources to inmates to

ensure that they have access to the courts. Plaintiffs’ own

success in presenting their claims demonstrate the sufficiency of

19 the access provided. See Lewis,

(“the

Constitution does not require that prisoners . . . be able to

conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to

present their grievances to the courts”). Plaintiffs fail to

identify any actual injury stemming from the prison’s policy of

prohibiting inmate law clerks from assisting on legal issues.

The prison’s policy on the hiring and use of inmate law

clerks also serves a legitimate penological interest. “[I]t is

‘indisputable’ that inmate law clerks ‘are sometimes a menace to

prison discipline’ and that prisoners have an ‘acknowledged

propensity . . . to abuse both the giving and the seeking of

[legal] assistance.’” Shaw,

(quoting Johnson v .

Avery,

(1969)). For this reason the prison

prohibits any inmates from rendering legal advice of any kind to

other inmates while in the law library without approval from the

warden. Likewise, the importance of maintaining order in the law

library requires the hiring of inmate law clerks who will follow

prison rules and regulations. This includes not assisting other

inmates by rendering legal advice, something Cookish admits he

has done. Thus, the prison’s policy of hiring inmate law clerks

who follow the rules and regulations of the prison by not

20 dispensing legal advice or drafting pleadings for other inmates

is consistent with upholding the legitimate penological interest

of maintaining prison discipline. Therefore, under Overton, the

prison’s inmate law clerk policies are valid even if plaintiffs

could establish that the policies interfered with their abilities

to access the courts in particular cases.

C. Adequacy of Research Materials

Plaintiffs also argue the prison law library is inadequate.

They point to the transition period when the library switched

from mostly hardbound books to computer based resources, and

claim that the library failed to maintain current law and failed

to provide computer access to legal research materials. The

facts, however, do not support this allegation.

Much like the First Circuit held in previous litigation

brought by Cookish, the plaintiffs here are “asking for too

much.” Cookish v . Cunningham,

, 5 (1st Cir. 1986).

Like the library then in question, the NCF prison library

“contain[s] numerous volumes on prisoner’s rights, civil rights,

habeas corpus, and legal research, as well as appropriate

reporters, encyclopedias, dictionaries, and statute books.” Id.;

see also Lindquist,

(“the Prison need not provide

21 its inmates with a library that results in the best possible

access to the courts”). The only difference is that the majority

of these resources are now available in electronic format instead

of in hardbound volumes. Inmates have access to most of their

resources on Loislaw, and booklets as well as inmate law clerks

are available to instruct inmates on the use of Loislaw. Any

resource not available directly through Loislaw is available to

the inmates through a request process with the librarian. The

librarian has access to an expanded version of Loislaw through

the internet and can submit inmate requests to the inmate

attorney, the prison in-house counsel, and even to the New

Hampshire Supreme Court library. Any required statute can be

accessed through the librarian’s version of Loislaw or by

requesting copies of specific sections of the statute from the

New Hampshire Supreme Court library. Although Cookish claims

that Rouleau denied three different requests for statutes with

their corresponding annotations, these denials were permissible

as only one of the requested statutes and its corresponding

annotations would have required over 380 pages be copied and sent

from the New Hampshire Supreme Court library to the prison, an

excessive request from any perspective. See Lewis,

355 (“Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to

transform themselves into litigating engines”). Moreover,

Cookish was free to renew his request provided that he could

narrow what he wanted into manageable sections. He never

bothered to do s o .

Given the library resources available to plaintiffs, it is

difficult to see how the plaintiffs can credibly claim that they

are denied access to the courts. Under Lewis, “the Constitution

does not require that prisoners (literate or illiterate) be able

to conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to

present their grievances to the courts -- a more limited

capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of

legal assistance.”

. Plaintiffs’ ability to

bring this suit and pursue it to the summary judgment stage is

evidence in and of itself of plaintiffs’ ability to gain

meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., Graham v . Cattell,

Opinion N o .

0 . More importantly, however, plaintiffs

are still required under Lewis to demonstrate an actual injury

resulting from the alleged inadequacy of the library. See also

Christopher,

. The mere “identification of

speculative harm, that [they are] denied the opportunity to

23 litigate issues . . . that [they] might find in [resources not

currently available in the library], is insufficient.” Lambros

v . Hawk,

(D. Kan. 1998). At best, this

is all plaintiffs assert by claiming they are “wholly unable to

do research on conditions of confinement issues [they] would like

to pursue.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12.) Plaintiffs have

failed to assert the requisite actual injury required by Lewis in

their allegations of an inadequate law library.

D. Library Scheduling

Finally, plaintiffs claim their right of access to the

courts was impermissibly infringed by the prison’s law library

scheduling policies. Inmates are only given access to the law

library once a week, for a four hour period. If inmates are late

or fail to keep their scheduled appointment without informing the

librarian, they are subject to disciplinary action. Cookish

asserts that he was inappropriately targeted by Rouleau and had

his scheduled library day changed from Monday to Thursday in

June, 2003. This, Cookish, claims, denied him access to the

library for a period of eight days.

Plaintiffs yet again fail to demonstrate an actual injury

arising from the library scheduling policy that allegedly

24 infringed their right of access to the courts. Plaintiffs “must

demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings . . . resulted in an

actual injury with respect to existing or contemplated

litigation, such as the inability to present a claim or to meet a

filing deadline.” Grimes v . Small,

(9th

Cir. 2002). No such showing of actual injury has been made by

plaintiffs. All that plaintiffs can show is reasonable delay and

inconvenience, not an actual injury as required under Lewis.

In evaluating the reasonableness of the scheduling policy,

it is important to note that “the Constitution does not guarantee

a prisoner unlimited access to a law library. Prison officials

of necessity must regulate the time, manner, and place in which

library facilities are used.” Lindquist,

. Here,

defendants are merely enforcing the reasonable prison policy

regulating the use of the prison law library to ensure it is well

maintained and that inmates are accounted for. “The fact that an

inmate must wait for a turn to use the library does not

necessarily mean that he has been denied meaningful access to the

courts.” Id.; Wilson v . Bruce,

(D. Kan.

1993) (“Meaningful access to the courts is not denied merely by

inconvenient or reasonably restrictive access to the law

25 library.”). A policy limiting inmates to four-hour visits once a

week to the law library is clearly permissible as a regulation

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Even

the eight-day delay in access that Cookish complains of is

clearly permissible. See, e.g., Lewis,

(sixteen

day delay in accessing legal material permissible); Campbell,

(delay of eight days in accessing library permissible).9

IV. CONCLUSION

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, I find the prison’s photocopy policy, its hiring and

use of inmate law clerks, its law library, and the law library

scheduling to be constitutionally adequate to ensure plaintiffs’

right of meaningful access to the courts. For this reason, and

because plaintiffs’ have alleged no actual injury, I deny

9 There may well be circumstances in which an inmate may require more time in the law library than the current policy permits. If an inmate can demonstrate in a particular case that his right of access to the courts requires additional time in the law library, a court can always order the prison to give the inmate more time. In this case, however, plaintiffs have failed to make any such showing.

26 plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. N o . 21) and grant

defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. N o . 3 5 ) .

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

March 1 1 , 2004

cc: Dennis R. Cookish, pro se Michael Donovan, pro se Andrew Livernois, Esq.

27