Woodcock v . Bristol Myers Squibb CV-03-168-PB 6/27/05

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Lana Woodcock

v. Case No. CV-03-168-PB Opinion No.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Lana Woodcock brings this action against her former

employer, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“Bristol-Myers”) claiming

that she was “wrongfully discharged” in violation of New

Hampshire law. Bristol-Myers moves for summary judgment (Doc.

N o . 2 0 ) , arguing that Woodcock’s claims are preempted by the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),

(a). For the following reasons, I grant the motion

for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Lana Woodcock was a Bristol-Myers employee from September

1997 until January 2000, when she was “voluntarily terminated” for failing to return to work following a leave of absence for a

short-term disability. While employed at Bristol-Myers, Woodcock

was responsible for overseeing the company’s hospital-related

sales efforts in New England, which required her to spend much of

her time traveling by automobile to institutions throughout the

region.

On May 3 , 1999, Woodcock was injured in a work-related

automobile accident. Unable to perform many of the functions of

her job, Woodcock immediately filed for short-term disability

(“STD”) benefits. STD benefits are available to Bristol-Myers

employees through the “BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY SHORT TERM

DISABILITY PLAN” (hereafter referred to as “the Plan”). Whether

an employee qualifies for these benefits is determined by a

third-party “Claims Administrator.” In this case, the Claims

Administrator was CORE, Inc.

Upon receipt of information regarding Woodcock’s condition,

CORE immediately concluded that her injuries prevented her from

performing the essential functions of her job. Thus, it granted

her full STD benefits from May 3 , 1999 to June 6, 1999, and

Temporary Alternative Work Duty benefits from June 6, 1999 to

-2- October 1 3 , 1999.1 In an October 2 5 , 1999 letter, however, CORE

determined that Woodcock was no longer eligible for protection

under the Plan because her physicians had failed to respond to a

number of CORE’s inquiries. Woodcock disagreed with this

conclusion and immediately exercised her right to appeal.

In November 1999, while her appeal was pending, Woodcock,

who had become pregnant in May 1999, began to experience

cramping. Doctors interpreted these symptoms as the early

warning signs of a premature birth and ordered that she be placed

on bed rest. Nonetheless, on December 9, 1999 and January 5 ,

2000, Bristol-Myers insisted that she return to work, threatening

to terminate her if she did not.

Woodcock responded in three ways. First, she informed her

supervisor, Anthony McBride, that she was six months pregnant and

that she could not return to work. Second, on January 6, 2000,

she forwarded a letter from her physician to CORE, requesting

that CORE begin to process a new claim for disability benefits

based on her pregnancy. Third, she attempted to return to work

1 Under the Plan, “the Claims Administrator may approve an Employee’s return to work on a full-time or part-time basis performing the responsibilities of a Temporary Alternative Work Duty assignment.”

-3- in a full-time capacity.

These efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, and on January

2 6 , 2000, Bristol-Myers terminated Woodcock as a company employee

effective immediately. Bristol-Myers later changed the date of

termination to January 5 , 2000 without explanation.

Three months later, on March 2 0 , 2000, CORE notified

Woodcock that both her STD benefits appeal and her independent

pregnancy-based claim for STD benefits had been denied. As to

Woodcock’s pregnancy-based claim, CORE explained that it had been

denied because it was filed on January 6, 2000 and thus post-

dated the effective date of her termination.

Woodcock initiated her “wrongful termination” claim against

Bristol-Myers in Rockingham County Superior Court on January 3 ,

2003. She argued that the manner in which she was terminated

violated: (1) the public policy in favor protecting an unborn

life; (2) the public policy in favor of protecting injured

workers from further injury; (3) the public policy in favor of

-4- the good faith administration of company-provided benefits; (4)

the public policy in favor of protecting the jobs of workers

suffering from on-the-job injuries; and (5) the public policy

against permitting retaliation against employees for reporting

wrongful conduct.

Bristol-Myers successfully removed the case to federal

court.2 Woodcock then filed a motion to remand (Doc. N o . 9 )

which this court denied in a June 1 7 , 2003 order (Doc. N o . 1 0 ) .

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A trial is necessary only if there is a genuine factual

issue “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

2 The basis for removal was that cases involving ERISA preemption are “‘necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of congress,’” and therefore that this case “‘arises under . . . the laws . . . of the United States’” for jurisdictional purposes. Fitzgerald v . Codex Corp.,

(1st Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

-5- because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either

party.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

4 2 , 250

(1986). A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the

suit. See id. at 248.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See

Navarro v . Pfizer Corp.,

0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001). The

party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v . Catrett,

1 7 , 323

(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,

the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “produce evidence on

which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof

burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce

such evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v .

Bristol Myers-Squibb Co.,

6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). Neither conclusory allegations, improbable

inferences, nor unsupported speculation are sufficient to defeat

-6- summary judgment. See Carroll v . Xerox Corp.,

3 1 , 236-

37 (1st Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Bristol-Myers argues that Woodcock’s state law claim for

“wrongful termination” is preempted by § 1144(a) of ERISA.

Section 1144(a) provides for the “preemption of all state law

causes of action ‘insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to

any employee benefit plan.’” McMahon v . Digital Equip. Corp.,

8 , 36 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting

(a)). This

provision is “conspicuous for its breadth” and has been

interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to preempt state

law claims even if a claim’s effect on ERISA is “indirect.”

Hampers v . W.R. Grace & Co., Inc.,

4 , 49 (1st Cir.

2000) (citing, inter alia, District of Columbia v . Greater Wash.

Bd. of Trade,

(1992)).

ERISA preemption analysis involves “two central questions:

(1) whether the plan at issue is an ‘employee benefit plan’ and

(2) whether the cause of action ‘relates to’ this employee

benefit plan.” McMahon,

(citing Rosario-Cordero

-7- v . Crowley Towing and Transp. Co.,

2 0 , 124 (1st Cir.

1995). Both parties agree that this case involves an ERISA

employee benefit plan. The question, then, is whether Woodcock’s

cause of action for “wrongful termination” “relates” to Bristol-

Myers’ employee benefit plan for preemption analysis purposes.

According to the First Circuit, a cause of action “‘relates

to a covered employee benefit plan . . . if it [1] has a

connection with or [2] a reference to such a plan.’” Carpenters

Local Union N o . 26 v . U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.,

(1st Cir. 2000) (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards

Enforcement v . Dillingham Constr.,

(1997)).

Woodcock claims that because the basis of her suit was

Bristol-Myers’ decision to “terminate” her, her cause of action

neither connects with, nor refers t o , an ERISA plan. I disagree.

In its January 2 6 , 2000 letter, Bristol-Myers explicitly stated

that its decision to “terminate” Woodcock depended directly on

CORE’s finding that Woodcock was no longer entitled to STD

benefits. There can be no question, then, that, despite

Woodcock’s characterization of the claim, at the heart of this

dispute are facts that are both “connected with” and “refer to”

-8- an ERISA plan. See McMahon,

(concluding that

the re-characterization of state law claims did not save the suit

from preemption because, at the core of the suit, was an ERISA

plan); see also Metropolitan Life Insurance C o . v . Taylor,

8 , 61-62 (1987) (wrongful termination claim preempted by

ERISA where termination resulted from employee’s refusal to

return to work after disability benefits were terminated).

Woodcock’s “wrongful termination” cause of action is therefore

preempted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Bristol-Myers’ motion for summary judgment is granted (Doc.

No. 2 0 ) . Woodcock shall have 30 days to file an amended

complaint stating a claim under ERISA.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge June 2 7 , 2005

cc: James Kazan, Esq. Mark Swirbalus, Esq.

-9-