US v . Rawnsley and Reynolds 08-CR-085-SM 05/06/09 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America, Government

v. Criminal N o . 08-cr-85-1-2-SM Opinion N o .

Phillip Rawnsley and Justin Reynolds, Defendants

O R D E R

Defendants move to suppress evidence obtained during an

investigative stop and subsequent frisk for weapons. A firearm

was taken from each defendant. Defendant Rawnsley also moves to

suppress incriminatory statements he subsequently made during two

custodial interrogation sessions. An evidentiary hearing was

held and the court later orally ordered the firearms suppressed,

but otherwise denied the motions, reserving the option of

providing a written decision should the need arise.

The government pointed out that the court did not address

the government’s alternative argument in opposition to Defendant

Rawnsley’s motion to suppress the firearm taken from him — that

the frisk of Rawnsley stood on different grounds than the frisk

of Reynolds, since it occurred after a firearm was found on

Reynolds. The court took that issue under advisement. For the reasons given below, evidence of the firearm taken from Reynolds

is suppressed. Rawnsley’s motion to suppress evidence of the

firearm taken from him, and the statements he made to police

during two custodial interrogation sessions (with some caveats),

is denied.

Background

On December 2 9 , 2007, sometime after 8 p.m., New Hampshire

State Trooper David Kane came upon what appeared to be a minor

one-car accident near the Bedford Mall and Route 3 in Bedford,

New Hampshire. A white Econoline van was some 15 to 20 feet off

the roadway and lodged in a snowbank. No one was at the scene,

and the trooper noticed that a single set of footprints lead away

from the van, down an embankment and toward Carrabba’s

restaurant, located some distance away at 2 Upjohn Street (and in

the general parking lot area of the Bedford Mall). The trooper

checked the vehicle’s registration and obtained a very basic

physical description of the owner (height six feet, weight 180

pounds, hair brown and eyes brown). He also found that the

registered owner had a prior conviction for Driving While Under

the Influence (DWI) “or something similar to that” on his record.

Suspecting the driver might have committed the offense of leaving

the scene of an accident, or even D W I , he called for assistance.

2 Shortly thereafter, Trooper Aaron Eder-Linell arrived with

his K-9 partner, Kody. Kody followed the tracks and led the

troopers across Route 3 to Carrabba’s restaurant. The troopers

went inside and asked the hostess if anyone fitting the

registered owner’s general description had come i n . She reported

that a disheveled-looking man generally fitting the description

given had come into the restaurant about 45 minutes earlier and

had asked to use the telephone. After making a call, he left.

The troopers and Kody went outside to look around the area

for the suspect, thinking he might still be in the area waiting

for a ride. By that time, it was approximately 9 p.m. After

they walked around the building, the troopers noticed what they

took to be employees of the restaurant on a break. They also saw

two men, later identified as Defendants Rawnsley and Reynolds,

about 50 yards away, walking on Upjohn Street. Upjohn Street is

a public way adjacent to the mall parking lot. Trooper Kane

testified that the area was well-lighted — the parking lot lights

were on — “it was fairly well-lit in that dark corner.”

(Testimony of Trooper Kane, March 3 , 2009.) No evidence was

presented to suggest that the locale qualified as a “high-crime”

area. The two men were walking toward Route 3 (where the van was

located), on a course that would converge with the troopers.

3 The troopers thought it unusual for pedestrians to be

walking on Upjohn Street in the evening, as no establishments

(but the restaurant) were open in that general vicinity. The

nearest buildings housed a daycare center and a bank. The men

were wearing hooded sweatshirts. The troopers were in full

uniform and had Kody on a leash.1

The troopers suspected the two men might be connected in

some way with the accident under investigation, one perhaps being

the driver and the other a friend called to provide a ride, or to

assist in extracting the van from the snowbank.

The troopers observed that the two men saw them, made eye

contact, and then abruptly turned around and began walking in the

opposite direction, at a quickened pace. Trooper Eder-Linell

immediately shouted at them: “State Police, stop!” Instead of

stopping, the two men quickened their pace even more. The

1 The government says in its brief that Kody “led the Troopers around to the southern side of the restaurant where both Troopers noticed two individuals with hooded sweatshirts walking west along Upjohn Street toward Route 3,” but in fact Kody was not tracking and was not leading the Troopers around the building and I reject the government’s implicit contention that Kody somehow was suggesting that the two individuals had some connection to the footprints or scent Kody was tracking earlier. If that had been the case, his handler would have so testified, and the prosecutor would certainly have brought that fact out at the evidentiary hearing. Trooper Eder-Linell made no such claim during his testimony.

4 troopers thought they were about to run, and Trooper Eder-Linell

again shouted at them: “Police, stop!” The two men stopped after

the second command was shouted, and the troopers and Kody

approached them.

The troopers asked the men for identification and also asked

what they were doing in the area. Although seemingly hesitant,

Reynolds produced identification, while Rawnsley said he had

none, but gave his name and date of birth. Trooper Kane focused

on Rawnsley while Trooper Eder-Linell focused on Reynolds. The

troopers consciously moved the two men apart, to keep them out of

earshot of each other, to obtain independent answers to the

questions being posed. The two men were not “overly nervous,”

but were being “kind of evasive . . . they were acting funny. . .

not wanting to spend too much time with us.” (Testimony of

Trooper Kane, March 3 , 2009.)

When asked why they were in the area, Reynolds told Trooper

Eder-Linell that Rawnsley’s girlfriend had dropped them off and

they were going to the Bedford mall to see a movie. The troopers

found that explanation implausible, because the men had been

walking away from the movie theater, and the theater in the mall

had been closed for several months, which closing had been

noticed on a large billboard at the mall. Under further

5 questioning, Rawnsley told Trooper Kane that he had had an

argument with his girlfriend and that she had dropped him and

Reynolds off. He said he had called her to come back and pick

them u p . (Before stopping the two men, the troopers had noticed

a female driving a car with a loud muffler, alone, in the parking

lot of Carrabba’s restaurant.)

Trooper Eder-Linell questioned Reynolds. His testimony

differed from Trooper Kane’s in some respects: he claimed it was

“dark, [with] very little street light or anything like that in

the area.” (Testimony of Trooper Eder-Linell, March 3 , 2009.)

He also said Reynolds did not, at least initially, give his name

or provide identification. I find that the scene was not “dark,”

but was well-lit by the parking lot and street lights, and that

Reynolds did provide his name and identification, primarily based

on Trooper Kane’s testimony, but also based upon Trooper Eder-

Linell’s demeanor and manner while testifying. Eder-Linell

seemed to have only a loose grasp of the order of events, and

generally gave the impression that his memory was not as clear as

Trooper Kane’s with regard to details. I also infer that the

names and identification given by the defendants were not

consistent with the name of the registered owner of the white

van, and that the defendants’ physical characteristics did not

match those of the registered owner.

6 While Trooper Eder-Linell was questioning Reynolds, Kody

nudged Reynolds’ right front pocket with his nose and paw.

Because Kody was trained to detect drugs, Eder-Linell thought

Kody might have caught a scent coming from Reynolds’ pocket.

Trooper Eder-Linell asked Reynolds if he had anything on him that

the trooper should know about. Reynolds said he did not.

Trooper Eder-Linell then asked Reynolds for permission to search

him. Reynolds declined, whereupon Eder-Linell immediately told

Reynolds that he was going to “pat him down for my safety.”

(Testimony of Trooper Eder-Linell, March 3 , 2009.) When he

patted down Reynolds’ right front pocket he felt something that

seemed to him to be a metal object, possibly a knife. The

trooper asked Reynolds what was in his pocket and he responded

“stuff.” The trooper asked what kind of stuff, and Reynolds

responded “just stuff.” At that point Eder-Linell reached into

the pocket and pulled out a metal lighter and, along with i t , a

plastic baggy containing some pills — the trooper said the baggy

came out unintentionally. Reynolds was asked about the pills and

responded that they were prescription Ibuprofen.

Trooper Eder-Linell continued to frisk Reynolds and felt a

metal object around the bottom area of his right leg. He shook

the pant leg and a pistol fell to the pavement. At that point

Eder-Linell alerted Trooper Kane by shouting “gun” and told

7 Reynolds to get down on the ground, which he did. Trooper Kane,

upon hearing the alert, physically put Rawnsley on the ground as

well and frisked him for weapons, finding a pistol in his

waistband.

Trooper Eder-Linell explained his reasons for patting down

Reynolds a s :

Q: Are any issues of officer safety present in your mind at this point?

A: Definitely, not knowing who they are, not having a willingness on their part to identify themselves. The fact that they were wearing kind of bulky clothing, you know, with the hooded sweatshirts u p , not being able to see some of their movements, keeping their hands, I repeatedly told them to keep hands out of pocket where I can see them because obviously it’s just not having the ability to see if they have any weapons or anything like that on them at that point and not being up front with information when asked.

I find that in fact the defendants did identify themselves,

certainly by that point. The clothing worn by defendants was

fairly described as “bulky” (but not unlike most outerwear

commonly seen in New Hampshire in December). The troopers, of

course, could not see if weapons were underneath the clothing,

but could plainly see defendants’ movements as they were in close

proximity and were engaged one-on-one. I also find that the

8 defendants were not (as implied by Trooper Eder-Linell) putting

their hands in their pockets, or disobeying any commands to keep

their hands out of their pockets, or putting their hands where

they could not be observed. Trooper Kane did not testify about

any such behavior, and Trooper Eder-Linell did not testify that

defendants actually engaged in such behavior.

Discussion

Defendants argue that the investigative stop was unlawful at

its inception, because the troopers did not have a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that they were involved, or about to become

involved, in any criminal activity. See Terry v . Ohio,

(1968). Defendants also contend that, even if the initial stop

was not unlawful, the pat/frisks were unlawful because the

officers had no particularized reason to think that either

defendant was armed or dangerous. See United States v . Romain,

3 , 71 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v . Coplin,

6 , 100 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v . Chhien,

, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).

“The oversight of brief investigatory stops has two aspects.

First, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion of an

individual’s involvement in some criminal activity in order to

make the initial stop. Second, actions undertaken pursuant to

9 that stop must be reasonably related in scope to the stop itself

‘unless the police have a basis for expanding their

investigation.’” United States v . Ruidiaz,

5 , 28-29

(1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion

requires more than a mere hunch, but less than probable cause.

United States v . Sokolow,

, 7 (1989). Determining

reasonableness requires a practical, commonsense assessment that

entails a measurable degree of deference to the perceptions of

experienced law enforcement officers. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d at 2 9 .

Nevertheless, the government bears the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that a police officer’s actions

were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

Assuming a valid investigative, or Terry, stop, a pat-frisk

for weapons is permissible if the police officer “is justified in

believing that the person is armed and dangerous to the officer

or others.” United States v . McKoy,

8 , 39 (1st Cir.

2005)(citations omitted). “It is insufficient that the stop

itself is valid; there must be a separate analysis of whether the

standard for pat-frisks has been met. To assess the legality of

a protective frisk, a court looks at the totality of the

circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized,

objective basis for his or her suspicion.”

(citing United

States v . Arvizu,

(2002)); see also United

10 States v . AM, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL1058617 (1st Cir. April 2 1 ,

2009).

The Terry Stop

It is doubtful that, when Trooper Eder-Linell first exerted

his authority and shouted a command for the defendants to stop,

the officers had a legitimate basis to conduct a brief

investigative stop. They were looking for a single driver

involved in a minor one-car accident that occurred well beyond

the vicinity of the restaurant and Upjohn Street. The suspicion

of crime, even the minor offense of leaving the scene of an

accident, was weak — after all, the van was off a ramp in a busy

highway area, and one can readily understand that a stranded

driver might walk directly toward a place of business to make a

call for help rather than stand on the ramp indefinitely on a

cold December night. Nevertheless, the troopers’ speculation

that a leaving the scene of an accident offense (or even DWI)

might have occurred was not unreasonable.

The troopers dutifully sought to track any potential

offender down with a trained canine, and found themselves at

Carraba’s restaurant, where the hostess confirmed that a

disheveled man fitting the general description of the registered

owner had come into the restaurant, made a call, and left, some

11 45 minutes earlier. When the officers went outside to look for

that person, and saw two men some 50 yards away walking on a

public way in the general direction of the accident scene, they

had no reason, beyond hunch, to think one might be connected to

the accident, or that either was involved in any kind of criminal

activity. There were no furtive movements; the area was well-

lighted; it was a parking lot serving a large mall, the roadway

was adjacent to that lot; the area was not a “high-crime” area,

there was no suspicious activity, and there was nothing about the

two men that suggested that they were engaged i n , or were about

to engage in anything illegal, or that criminal activity was

afoot.

The defendants had every right to turn around and walk away

from the officers when they saw them. The officers were in full

state police uniform and were accompanied by a police dog, which,

for many people, would constitute an intimidating circumstance,

preferably avoided. Had defendants stopped upon the first

command, the legitimacy of the stop would be of doubtful

legality. But, defendants did not stop. Instead, they ignored

the trooper’s command, quickened their pace, and appeared to be

about to run. When the second command was issued, they stopped,

thereby submitting to the officers’ authority.

12 Considering the totality of the circumstances, I find that

an objectively reasonable police officer would have had a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendants were

connected to or involved in the car accident under investigation

when the second command was shouted. The defendants were walking

toward the general area of the accident, with no obvious

alternative objective (there were no stores, houses, or other

places in the immediate area to which they were likely walking).

One could reasonably conclude that the driver went to the

restaurant, called for a ride, or assistance in extricating the

van from the snowbank, and arranged to meet the person called in

the mall parking lot. Walking back to the scene from the mall

parking lot would have been a reasonable strategy, given the ease

of parking, the modest distance to the van from the parking lot,

and the busy nature of the off-ramp, where an additional car

would pose a genuine hazard if stopped on the ramp, or parked

off-road. When the defendants saw the troopers and turned to

walk away, the troopers could reasonably assume that it was

because defendants did not wish to speak to them because they, or

one of them, had been the driver of the abandoned van. The

balance decidedly tipped, however, when the defendants refused to

submit to the trooper’s first invocation of his police authority

— that i s , when he shouted to them “State Police, Stop!” By

ignoring that command and quickening their pace in the opposite

13 direction, and behaving as if they were preparing to run, they

effectively engaged in flight.

Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Terry stop

occurred not when the trooper first commanded the defendants to

stop, but after the second command, when they actually submitted

to the trooper’s authority by complying. California v . Hodari

D.,

(1991). By that point, the troopers reasonably

could have suspected defendants, or one of them, of being

involved in criminal activity — leaving the scene of the

accident, and possibly DWI. Defendants’ obvious intent to flee

from known police officers, who had commanded them to stop,

constituted a sufficient added factor (consciousness of guilt) to

support a reasonable suspicion that one of the men was the driver

being sought, and that he was intent upon avoiding apprehension.

See, e.g. United States v . Pope,

(6th Cir.

1977)(flight from clearly identified law enforcement officer may

furnish sufficient grounds for limited investigative stop);

Illinois v . Wardlow,

(2000) (flight is not

necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly

suggestive of such).

Accordingly, the investigative stop was lawful at its

inception.

14 The Pat-Frisk

The only reason for stopping the defendants (beyond mere

general curiosity — in the nature of a hunch — about their

appearance and presence on Upjohn Street), was their potential

connection to the van stuck in the snowbank some distance away on

the highway off-ramp, and the possibility that a DWI offense or

leaving the scene of an accident offense had occurred. Neither

crime under investigation, however, was of the type that would

give rise to a justifiable suspicion that the detainees were

armed and dangerous. That i s , “[t]his is not a case where the

police had reason to suspect the presence of firearms based on

the type of crime suspected.” McKoy, 428 F.3d at 40 (quoting

United States v . Lott,

7 8 , 785 (1st Cir. 1989)).

Beyond that, the defendants gave no indication that they

might be armed and dangerous. They were merely walking on a

public way and turned to avoid the police. They were not in a

“high-crime” area; they engaged in no suspicious interactions

suggestive of drug-trading; there were no bulges in their

clothing that caused the officers to suspect weapons; the

defendants were cooperative and answered the questions put to

them (albeit not to the officer’s satisfaction); they gave their

names, date of birth, and, in Reynolds’ case, identification;

they were not overly nervous and gave no other indication of

15 dangerousness. The area was well-lighted by the Bedford Mall

parking and street lamps; defendants engaged in no furtive

movements; and they did not try to put their hands in their

pockets, or where they could not be seen. Defendants were not

belligerent, used no profanity, and offered no resistance of any

kind.

As a general matter, officer safety i s , rightly, an

overriding and important concern from any police officer’s

perspective. And, no doubt, the safest course for police

officers would be to always pat-frisk every person an officer

confronts at night, or during a traffic stop, or in a quiet or

remote area, o r , certainly, in a “high crime area.” That is not,

however, a constitutionally permissible standard operating

procedure.

Trooper Eder-Linell’s testimony, and manner, clearly

suggested that the pat-frisk of Reynolds was due less to an

articulable concern for his own safety under the prevailing

circumstances, or even a generalized concern, but, rather, was a

direct response, to Reynolds’ refusal to consent to a search of

his person after Kody’s behavior suggested the presence of drugs

of some kind in Reynolds’ pocket. The pat-down was neither

suggested by Trooper Eder-Linell, nor performed, until after

Reynolds refused to consent to the requested search. But at that

16 point, the facts warranting or not warranting a pat-frisk

remained unchanged, with the exception of Kody’s signal. And,

mere suspicion of drug possession, however, is generally

insufficient to suggest that the suspected possessor is armed and

dangerous. See, e.g. Sibron v . New York,

(1968);

Upshur v . United States,

(D.C. 1998). The Trooper’s

testimony was, essentially, that a general interest in officer

safety motivated the pat-frisk rather than a justified

articulable suspicion that the detainee was armed and dangerous.

The government failed to meet its burden to show that

Trooper Eder-Linell could have drawn an objectively reasonable

inference that Reynolds was armed and dangerous when he initiated

the pat-frisk. Accordingly, evidence of the firearm seized

during that pat-frisk is suppressed.

The pat-frisk of Rawnsley, however, stands on entirely

different footing. Trooper Kane initiated the pat-frisk of

Rawnsley only after the firearm was discovered on Reynolds. At

that point, having heard the alarm “gun,” Trooper Kane had more

than ample information to infer that Rawnsley, too, might be

armed and, therefore, dangerous to him and Trooper Eder-Linell.

Rawnsley does not have standing to challenge the lawfulness of

Eder-Linell’s pat frisk of Reynolds, and Rawnsley’s

17 constitutional rights were not violated in any way. Accordingly,

evidence of the firearm found on Rawnsley is not suppressed.

Rawnsley’s Statements

Defendant Rawnsley also challenges the voluntariness of

incriminatory statements he made to police officers after his

arrest. After his arrest, Rawnsley was subjected to custodial

interrogations on two occasions. The first occurred on December

29 when state police Lieutenant Parenteau questioned him about

his activities that evening; the second occurred on December 3 0 ,

when local police officers questioned him about recent robberies

in Manchester and Allenstown. Each time he was advised of his

Miranda2 rights, understood those rights, and waived those

rights both orally and in writing. On each occasion, he

voluntarily answered questions put to him. Rawnsley ended the

first interrogation when he told Lieutenant Parenteau he did not

wish to continue.

During the December 30 th interrogation, Rawnsley answered

questions voluntarily, with the exception of questions related to

drug activity and what other illegal activities he might have

engaged in to raise money (e.g., “What other things do you do?”).

Miranda v . Arizona,

(1966).

18 When Rawnsley refused to answer questions related to his revenue-

raising actdivity, the police asked no further questions related

to that topic and resumed questioning Rawnsley about the

robberies under investigation.

I find that the government met its burden to establish that

the challenged statements were voluntary. First, I reject the

defendant’s principal claim that he was suffering from a

disability (allegedly occasioned by drug withdrawal) to a degree

sufficient to render his statements involuntary. Nothing

presented at the evidentiary hearing calls into serious question

the voluntary character of those statements, or Rawnsley’s

understanding of and waiver of his rights. And, with caveats

discussed below, I find that Rawnsley was properly warned of his

Miranda rights, and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

waived those rights before answering questions.

Statements made by a defendant while in police custody can

be admitted as evidence in a later criminal trial only if he or

she was first warned, inter alia, of the right to remain silent,

and that anything said can be used in a court of law. Miranda,

; Dickerson v . United States,

(2000).

That right can be waived, but even if waived, it can be

reasserted at any time during questioning. Statements made while

19 in custody in the absence of Miranda warnings, or made after the

waived right is reasserted are inadmissable in evidence in a

subsequent prosecution. United States v . Palmer,

5 , 60

(1 st Cir. 2000); United States v . Ortiz,

0 8 , 109 (1 st

Cir. 1999).

Rawnsley argues that he invoked his right to silence during

the December 30th interrogation, after his initial waiver, but,

nevertheless, the local police officers continued to question

him. That is s o . The audio recording of the interrogation

proves Rawnsley’s point. But, there is no issue, because the

government conceded that all responses given by Rawnsley after he

stated that he was through answering questions (at approximately

the 20 minute mark on the tape of the interview) constitute

inadmissible evidence, and will not be offered at trial by the

prosecution. See Transcript, Hearing held on March 3 , 2009, p .

139, l . 22-24.

Rawnsley also says, in passing, that he invoked his right to

silence earlier in the interview as well, when he refused to

answer questions about drug dealing and other possibly unlawful

activity he engaged in to raise money. It is clear from the

recorded interrogation, however, that Rawnsley invoked his right

to silence selectively — that his, he invoked his right to

20 silence with respect to further questioning about that activity,

but not as to the topics at issue — the robberies under

investigation. He continued to answer those questions

consistently with his earlier waiver, and did not indicate, at

any time, even ambiguously, an intent to invoke his right to

silence as to those topics. See United States v . Eaton,

(1st Cir. 1989) ( “ . . . a defendant may waive Miranda

rights selectively, answering some questions but not others.”

(citations omitted).).

Finally, Rawnsley seeks to suppress his answers to

preliminary questions asked before he was advised o f , and waived,

his Miranda rights. Those questions, for the most part, fell

comfortably within the bounds of the “booking exception” to the

Miranda requirements (e.g., name, date of birth, social security

number, address, and general identification information may be

asked for without first providing Miranda warnings). United

States v . Doe,

(1st Cir. 1989); United States

v . Reyes,

(1st Cir. 2000). As the court noted in

Reyes, “ . . . we think it would be a rare case indeed in which

asking an individual his name, date of birth, and social security

number would violate Miranda.”

at 7 7 .

Questions do not, however, fall within the “booking

exception,” i f , objectively, “the questions and circumstances

21 were such that the officer should reasonably have expected the

question to elicit an incriminating response.”

citing Doe,

.

Here, again, the government seems to take the position that

it may seek to introduce Rawnsley’s statements regarding his

name, address, etc. Why is not clear. The preliminary questions

asked by the local police, however, strayed beyond what can be

regarded as routine identification matters, and included

questions about Rawnsley’s criminal record and his acquaintance

with a co-conspirator (Michele Despres). The government seemed

to recognize that those answers (regarding past felony charges,

and Rawnsley’s association with Michele Despres) were in response

to questions that a reasonable officer would have expected to

elicit an incriminating response. That i s , Rawnsley is charged

with being a felon in possession of a firearm (hence the

relevance of his prior felony record), and conspiracy (with

Despres) to commit robbery (hence the relevance of his

association with h e r ) . Because a review of the transcript leaves

me unsure about the prosecution’s intent - the prosecutor seemed

to be saying that only Rawnsley’s responses to identification

questions would be offered, but then seemed to say he intended to

offer responses related to his association with Despres as well -

let me make it clear that Rawnsley’s answers to questions related

22 to his identity and address will be admitted if offered, but

answers given before he waived his Miranda rights regarding his

criminal record, and relationship with Despres, and others, if

offered, will not be admitted into evidence.

Conclusion

With the exceptions noted above, Defendant Reynold’s motion

to suppress the firearm seized from him (document no. 23) is

granted; Rawnsley’s motion to suppress the firearm seized from

him (document no. 17) is denied; and Rawnsley’s motion to

suppress statements made during the custodial interrogation on

December 29 and 30 (document no. 17) are denied, with the caveats

noted above.

SO ORDERED.

S e v e n J. McAuliffe /Chief Judge May 6, 2009

cc: Kenneth L. Perkes, AUSA Bjorn R. Lange, Esq. James D. Gleason, Esq. U.S. Probation U.S. Marshal

23