Holder v. Town of Newton, et al. CV-08-197-JL 07/23/09 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ralph Holder

v. Civil No. 08-CV-197-JL Opinion No.

Town of Newton et a l .

O R D E R

This civil rights action involves the constitutional

dimensions of pretrial detention and bail, as well as the

pleading reguirements in § 1983 case against municipalities.

Ralph Holder has sued the towns of Newton and East Kingston,

their police chiefs, certain of their police officers, the

Rockingham County Department of Corrections, and its

superintendent, alleging a number of constitutional violations

and common-law torts arising out of his arrest, detention, and

prosecution on a simple assault charge that was ultimately

dismissed. Two of the defendants, the Rockingham County

Department of Corrections and its superintendent, Albert J.

Wright (the "county defendants") moved to dismiss Holder's

constitutional claims against them, arguing that they fail to

state a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) .1 In

1Because the county defendants submitted an answer to the complaint before moving to dismiss it, their motion is properly treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 1 2 (c). The distinction, however, is largely academic, as Rule particular, the county defendants argue that (1) their continued

detention of Holder, even after he had allegedly been determined

to be eligible for release on bail, was not unconstitutional and

(2) Holder has not pled any policy or practice of deliberate

indifference to medical needs sufficient to establish a

constitutional claim for the county defendants' allegedly

depriving him of access to his prescription medications.

This court has subject-matter jurisdiction under

(federal guestion) and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction) .

After oral argument, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part.2 There is ample authority that the Constitution

12(b) (6) and Rule 12(c) impose identical standards. See, e.g.. Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C.,

(1st Cir. 2008). Furthermore, while Holder has since filed an amended complaint as ordered by this court at the preliminary pretrial conference, the amendment, as contemplated by the order, simply specifies which of the defendants are named to each count without changing the substance of the allegations at all. So the court has treated the motion to dismiss as directed at the amended complaint. See Hall v. Brooks,

, 2 n.2, appeal docketed. No. 09-1594 (1st Cir. Apr. 24, 2009). Holder, moved to strike the motion to dismiss as an improperly supported motion for summary judgment. While that relief has been denied, the court has treated the motion to strike as an objection to the motion to dismiss.

2The county defendants also filed a "supplemental motion to dismiss," joining in a motion to dismiss filed by other defendants that was based on Holder's failure to make initial disclosures in a timely fashion. That motion, as filed by the other defendants, was denied by margin order of March 25, 2009. The county defendants' reguest for the same relief is now denied for the same reasons.

2 prohibits "overdetention" of the kind the court understands

Holder to allege. But Holder has not alleged adeguate facts to

support his other claim: that the county defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs as the result of

their policy or practice. So while his complaint states an

overdetention claim for which relief can be granted, the medical

care claim is dismissed.

I. Applicable legal standard

To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth

"[f]actual allegations [that are] enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all of

the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

fact)." Bell At1. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)

(citations and footnote omitted). This showing "reguires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do."

By the same

token, the showing does not reguire "detailed factual

allegations,"

simply "enough factual matter (taken as true)

to suggest" the plaintiff's right to relief.

.

3 II. Background

Following Holder's arrest by local police in May 2005, he

was detained in the Rockingham County House of Corrections.

Holder alleges that "after the Bail Commissioner was informed of

the charges and determined that [Holder] was eligible for and

entitled to release on personal recognizance," the county

defendants "intentionally denied him prompt release, holding him

for an additional nine hours on the pretext of a purported

policy" that "prohibit[ed] the release of protective custody

detainees without a ride." Holder alleges he was not in

protective custody but, even if he had been, "he could have

called a cab or otherwise obtained a ride." Holder also alleges

that he "told officers at intake that he was insulin dependant

and hypertensive," but that he was nevertheless deprived of his

prescription medications for his whole nine-hour detention.

III. Analysis

A. Claim for denial of release

As clarified by the recent amendment, see note 1, supra.

Holder's complaint asserts a claim against the county defendants

under

, alleging that they "deprived [him] of his

constitutionally and statutorily protected right to reasonable

and prompt bail . . . in violation of Part I, Articles 15 and 33

4 of the New Hampshire Constitution as well as the Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." In

moving to dismiss this claim, the county defendants argue that

the federal Constitution "contains no right to immediate release

after bail" but, even if it did, that right could not have been

violated by Holder's claimed nine-hour detention as a matter of

law.3 That is not correct.

"There is a substantial body of law in support of the

proposition that a plaintiff who alleges overdetention, sometimes

even for a very short period, states a claim for constitutional

violations." Barnes v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing cases); see also, e.g.. Berry v. Baca,

, (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. Hall,

(8th

Cir. 2004); Lewis v. O'Grady,

(7th Cir.

1988); Douthit v. Jones,

(5th Cir. 1980). In

this context, "overdetention" means simply that the plaintiff has

3The county defendants also argue that the New Hampshire constitution likewise confers no such right but that, even if it did, the right would not be enforceable through a § 1983 action. The court need not reach the first of these arguments, because the second one is correct. Section 1983 provides a right of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States, not the States, so the alleged violations of the New Hampshire constitution (or other state law) cannot support Holder's § 1983 claim. See Ortega Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon,

(1st Cir. 1977) .

5 been imprisoned by the defendant for longer than legally

authorized, whether because the plaintiff's incarcerative

sentence has expired or otherwise. See, e.g., Davis,

(citing cases). A number of cases, in fact, have recognized

that a constitutional claim can arise from the continued

detention of the plaintiff after he has been granted release on

bail. See, e.g., Golberg v. Hennepin County,

, 810-

11 (8th Cir. 2005); Barnes,

; West v.

Tillman, No. 04-100,

, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Jul. 21,

2006); Barilla v. Eslinger, No. 05-850,

, at *6-*7

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2005); Powell v. Barrett,

(N.D. G a . 2005), rev'd on other grounds,

(11th Cir. 2007); accord Doyle v. Elsea,

,

516 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) ("the constitutional liberty interest in

release on bail arises after a magistrate has determined that an

accused may be released upon deposit of whatever sum of money

will ensure the accused's appearance for trial").

To be sure, these authorities differ on the source of the

constitutional right at issue: some locate it in the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while others locate it in the

cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment.

See Lemarr v. Doe, No. 05-167,

, at *4-*5 (S.D.

Tex. May 15, 2008) (discussing divergent authority). Because the

6 Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, provides

for the rights of pre-trial detainees--as opposed to convicted

prisoners--in state or local custody, see Burrell v. Hampshire

County,

(1st Cir. 2002), the Fourteenth Amendment

would appear to provide the source of the right here. Resolving

that theoretical guestion, though, is not essential to deciding

the county defendant's motion to dismiss. It is enough to

recognize, as one court has, that where " [d]efendants are alleged

to have simply refused to release the plaintiff[]--despite a

court order to do so--pursuant to an official policy, practice,

or custom," a constitutional violation has "obviously" been

stated, at least if the refusal remains "unjustified." Barilla,

, at *7.

The county defendants' contrary view depends entirely on the

Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. McCollan,

(1979), and a decision by the court of appeals following it,

Brady v. Dill,

(1st Cir. 1999). The plaintiff in

each of those cases had been detained on a warrant bearing his

name, but protested his innocence--rightly, as it turned out,

because the warrant had issued due to another person's falsely

claiming to be the plaintiff during a prior arrest. Baker,

; Brady,

. Though each of the

plaintiffs was ultimately released after the fraud was uncovered,

7 he claimed that the intervening period of detention violated his

constitutional rights. Baker,

; Brady,

. The plaintiff in Baker claimed that "despite his

protests of mistaken identity, he was detained" for a period

until "the validity of his protests was ascertained."

. The plaintiff in Brady claimed that, in contrast, he was

detained even after the defendants came to realize that his

protests were valid,

; he was set free only after

they secured his appearance before a judge, who ordered the

plaintiff's release,

.

Both claims were rejected. The Supreme Court ruled that,

while "mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face

of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a

certain amount of time deprive the accused of liberty without due

process of law, ... a detention of three days over a . . .

weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation."

Baker,

(internal guotation marks and ellipse

omitted). And the court of appeals ruled that "it would take

circumstances much more egregious . . . to conclude that a

weekend detention of approximately thirty-six hours, accompanied

by a concerted effort on the part of the police to secure the

detainee's release, resulted in a wrong of constitutional dimensions."4 Brady,

. Neither Baker nor Brady,

then, considered the constitutional implications of keeping a

person in custody for any particular length of time after he has

been granted bail.

The cases' reasoning, moreover, strongly suggests that

overdetention of the sort alleged here raises entirely different

considerations: each decision relied heavily on the notion that

our constitutional system places responsibility for releasing a

detainee on the judicial system, rather than on law enforcement

officers who have accomplished the detention pursuant to a valid

warrant. Baker,

; Brady,

. So

Baker, and cases like Brady that follow it, essentially present

the converse of the case here, where a judicial officer

determines that a detainee should be released, but law

enforcement personnel continue to hold him anyway. Indeed, a

number of the courts of appeals have found Baker inapposite in

this context. See Davis,

; Douthit,

; see also Cannon v. Macon County,

(11th

Cir. 1993) ("The Baker decision has not been read to preclude all

4Significantly, this "concerted effort" included summoning a bail commissioner, who offered to release the plaintiff on his own recognizance.

. The plaintiff refused, fearing that agreeing to appear to answer the charge would in some way legitimate it.

§ 1983 claims based on false imprisonment"); Coleman v. Frantz,

(7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing Baker in part

because, there, the plaintiff's detention "could only have been

prevented by the institution of significant and burdensome

investigative procedures," rather than by judicial intervention).

Two further points of clarification are necessary. First,

the court has assumed that this is in fact the nature of Holder's

claim, i.e., that the bail commissioner effectively ordered his

release on his own recognizance but the county defendants

nevertheless continued to hold him in accord with the purported

dictates of one of their policies.5 While this is certainly one

plausible reading of the complaint, another plausible reading--at

least in light of additional statements in Holder's motion to

strike--is that the county defendants learned, through contact

with the bail commissioner on the night of Holder's arrest, that

he would be eligible for release on his own recognizance, but

that, for reasons that are not yet clear, the bail commissioner

did not in fact order Holder's release until the next morning.

5At oral argument, the county defendants disputed that the amended complaint fairly alleged such a claim, but the court disagrees. In any event, the county defendants' motion rests on the assumption that this is the nature of Holder's claim; hence their argument that the Constitution "contains no right to immediate release after bail" (emphasis added).

10 Whether that amounts to a violation of Holder's

constitutional rights would seem to present a different question

from the one just considered. Furthermore, the answer could

potentially implicate Brady, on the theory that jailers who know

their prisoner is eligible for release on yet to be granted bail

have no more constitutional duty to arrange a bail hearing

immediately than police who know that their arrestee is not the

man named in the warrant have to arrange his release.

It is sufficient at the moment, though, to reject the

county defendants' argument that "complaints regarding delayed

detentions must be based on detentions of 48 hours, at a minimum"

to state a constitutional claim, even though the period of delay

follows a release on bail. Indeed, one court of appeals has held

that "even a thirty-minute detention after being ordered released

could work a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment." Davis,

(citing

Young v. City of Little Rock,

(8th Cir. 2001)

(upholding verdict against defendant on claim that its thirty-

minute delay in carrying out a judge's order to release plaintiff

violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights)). If further factual

development reveals that Holder was not "ordered released" by the

bail commissioner until the morning after the arrest, then the

court can consider whether the county defendants' alleged role in

11 that delay transgresses the constitution. C f . Wagenmann v.

Adams,

(1st Cir. 1987) (upholding verdict

against arresting officer on excessive bail claim, despite his

lack of authority to set bail, in light of officer's "helping to

shape, and exercising significant influence over, the bail

decision" by the commissioner). But again, for now, the court

does not understand Holder to be making such a claim, which is

all that matters on a motion to dismiss.

That brings the court to the second point of clarification:

the Constitution does not invariably reguire the "immediate"

release of a prisoner pursuant to a bail or other judicial order

for his release. As one court has recognized:

administrative tasks incident to the release of a prisoner from custody may reguire some time to accomplish . . . . Reasonable time must be allowed for such matters as transportation, identity verification, and processing. It is virtually impossible to establish an absolute minimum time to meet all potential circumstances which might exist.

Lewis,

; see also Berry,

.

Thus, there may be some merit to the county defendants'

assertion that they did not violate the constitution by retaining

custody over Holder "for nine hours overnight, when [he] would

otherwise be released to rural roadways in the dark, many miles

from home," even if he had been determined to be eligible for

12 release on his own recognizance.6 Assessing this claim, however,

would reguire the court to consider facts that, as Holder points

out in his motion to strike, have not been pled in the complaint

and, for that matter, seem to contradict its allegations that he

could have arranged for a ride if necessary. So that argument,

like any argument that Holder was in fact not even granted bail

until the morning, must await disposition in a different

procedural context. See, e.g.. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, 56.

61he county defendants make this point as part of Superintendent Wright's argument for dismissal of the claims against him on gualified immunity grounds. The complaint makes clear, however, that Wright has been sued only in his official capacity, not his individual capacity. He therefore cannot claim gualified immunity, because the suit against him is the eguivalent of a suit against the Rockingham County Department of Corrections, see Hafer v. Melo,

(1991), which, as the county defendants recognize, cannot claim gualified immunity. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,

(1993). When the fact that Wright has been sued only in his official capacity was pointed out at oral argument, the county defendants asked that he be dismissed from the case, on the theory that he should not be named in an action brought only against the Department of Corrections. It is not uncommon, though, for the same suit to name both a government agency and one or more of its officers in their official capacity as defendants; doing so ensures that, among other advantages, the officers are treated as parties for purposes of discovery, subject to, e.g., reguests for admission, interrogatories, and the substantive use of their depositions at trial in the way not permitted as to non-parties. The court declines to dismiss Superintendent Wright.

13 B. Claim for denial of medical care

The county defendants also seek dismissal of Holder's claim

that he was denied his prescription medications during his nine-

hour detention, even though he told officers at intake of his

need for those medications. The county defendants argue that the

complaint does not adeguately allege that this claimed

constitutional violation resulted from any policy or custom of

the department of corrections, as would be necessary to establish

their liability for it. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

(1978). As the county defendants point out, § 1983

does not make municipalities, including counties and their

agencies, liable for the actions of their employees under

respondeat superior principles.7 Leatherman,

.

In contrast to its allegations that, even after Holder was

granted bail, the county defendants continued to hold him as a

result of a purported correctional policy, the complaint does not

fairly suggest that such a policy was the reason they allegedly

deprived him of his medication. Though the complaint here and

there invokes the county's "customs and usages," these vague

71he county defendants argue that Wright is likewise not responsible for the officers' alleged actions, absent some indication of a more significant role in them. Again, however, the complaint does not even purport to sue Wright in his individual capacity, so the court need not consider whether such a claim has been adeguately stated.

14 references--unaccompanied by any allegations explaining what

these "customs and usages" are or linking them to the claimed

denial of medical care--are the sort of "labels and conclusions"

insufficient on their own to survive a motion to dismiss.

Twombly,

.

Furthermore, though the amended complaint specifically names

the county defendants in its claims of negligent hiring,

retention, training, and supervision, there is likewise nothing

linking those omissions to the alleged denial of medical care.8

In any event, a municipality's simple negligence in the training

and the like of its employees does not amount to a constitutional

violation, as the county defendants point out. See City of

Canton v. Harris,

(1989). The complaint

therefore fails to state a claim that the county defendants

violated Holder's federal constitutional rights by denying him

access to his medications.

81here is an allegation, buried among those set forth in support of a count entitled "Negligence in Performance of Duties," that the Department of Corrections "negligently continued plaintiff's wrongful detention and deprived him of necessary medical care." Putting aside the problem that there is nothing linking the Department to this alleged negligence aside from the actions of its employees, which is insufficient as just discussed, mere negligence in failing to provide necessary medical care does not amount to a constitutional violation anyway. See Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrs.,

(1st Cir. 1995)

15 III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the county defendants' motion to

dismiss9 is GRANTED as to the § 1983 claim arising out of the

alleged denial of medical care but DENIED as to the § 1983 claim

arising out of the alleged denial of release on bail. The county

defendants' supplemental motion to dismiss10 is also DENIED. See

note 2, supra.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2009

cc: Sven D. Wiberg, Esq. Brian J. S. Cullen, Esq Charles P. Bauer, Esq. Jeanne P. Herrick, Esq. Corey M. Belobrow, Esq.

9Document no. 20.

10Document no. 22.

16