UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kayla Lynn Ellison

v. Case No. 14-cv-35-PB Opinion No.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Kayla Lynn Ellison seeks judicial review of a ruling by the

Social Security Administration denying her application for

supplemental security income (“SSI”). For the reasons set forth

below, I deny Ellison’s request and affirm the decision of the

Commissioner.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Stipulated Facts

Pursuant to this court’s Local Rule 9.1, the parties have

submitted a joint statement of material facts, which is part of

the court’s record (Doc. No. 11). The facts relevant to the

disposition of this matter are discussed below. B. Procedural History

On January 9, 2012, Ellison applied for SSI, alleging a

disability beginning May 15, 2010. She was 23 years old at the

time and was working part-time at an externship as part of her

continuing education to become a medical assistant. The

Commissioner denied her application on April 16, 2012, and

Ellison requested a hearing before an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”). On November 13, 2012, Ellison, her counsel, and a

vocational expert appeared before an ALJ.

A month later, the ALJ issued an Unfavorable Decision,

finding that Ellison was not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. He determined that Ellison had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since her application date of

January 9, 2012, and he concluded that she suffers from the

following severe impairments: “mood disorder not otherwise

specified, diabetes, and obesity.” Tr. at 87. The ALJ found

that Ellison had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform “light work.” 1 Tr. at 89. He noted, however, that:

1 Light work is defined as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”

(b). Further, “a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”

2 she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs but never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; she requires the option to alternate between sitting and standing once per hour, but she will not require a break when changing positions and will be able to remain on task while changing position; she can only understand, remember, and carry out short simple instructions.

Tr. at 89. The ALJ concluded that Ellison could not perform any

past relevant work, but he determined that there are jobs in the

national economy that she could perform notwithstanding her RFC.

The Appeals Council denied Ellison’s request for review,

thereby making the ALJ’s denial of her application the final

decision of the Commissioner.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under

(g), I am authorized to review the

pleadings submitted by the parties and the administrative record

and enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

“final decision” of the Commissioner. My review “is limited to

determining whether the ALJ used the proper legal standards and

found facts [based] upon the proper quantum of evidence.” Ward

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(1st Cir. 2000).

Findings of fact made by the ALJ are accorded deference as long

as they are supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial

evidence to support factual findings exists “‘if a reasonable 3 mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could

accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.’” Irlanda

Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

(1st

Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1981)). If the

substantial evidence standard is met, factual findings are

conclusive even if the record “arguably could support a

different conclusion.” Id. at 770. Findings are not

conclusive, however, if they are derived by “ignoring evidence,

misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.”

Nguyen v. Chater,

(1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

The ALJ is responsible for determining issues of credibility and

for drawing inferences from evidence in the record. Irlanda

Ortiz,

. It is the role of the ALJ, not the

court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

Ellison contends that the ALJ erred in finding that her

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of [her] symptoms” were not credible. See Doc. No. 7 at

4.

4 It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine whether a

claimant’s statements about her symptoms are credible. See SSR

96–7p,

, at *4 (July 2, 1996); see also

(c)(3). A two-step analysis governs an ALJ's

evaluation of symptoms. SSR 96–7p,

, at *2.

First, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is suffering from

“an underlying medically determinable physical or mental

impairment[] . . . that could reasonably be expected to produce

the individual's pain or other symptoms.”

Second, the ALJ

must determine whether the claimant’s statements about her

symptoms are substantiated by objective medical evidence, and if

not, the ALJ must consider other relevant information to weigh

the credibility of her statements. See id.; Guziewicz v.

Astrue,

. The ALJ’s credibility assessment of

the claimant “is entitled to deference, especially when

supported by specific findings.” Frustaglia v. Sec’y of Health

& Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1987) (citing DaRosa

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

(1st Cir.

1986)). This is because the ALJ, not the reviewing court,

“observed the claimant, evaluated [her] demeanor, and considered

how that testimony fit in with the rest of the evidence . . . .”

5 At step one, the ALJ found that Ellison’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause

some of her alleged symptoms. He determined that Ellison’s

diabetes, obesity, and mood disorder were severe impairments.

He also considered how her weight and its impact on her ability

to walk affected her functional limitations. At step two,

however, the ALJ found Ellison’s statements regarding the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms to

be unsubstantiated by objective medical evidence and not

credible to the extent they were inconsistent with her RFC.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that

Ellison’s back pain symptoms were not as intense or limiting as

she alleged. Despite Ellison’s subjective reports, the ALJ

noted that diagnostic testing did not identify any abnormality;

her gait had been consistently normal; she had full strength in

all her extremities; and her reports of back pain were

intermittent. Tr. at 90 (citing Tr. at 439, 441, 452, 453, 484,

518, 520). Additionally, the ALJ gave significant weight to the

opinion of Ellison’s treating physician, Dr. Duda, who stated

that Ellison is able to lift up to 50 pounds and is able to sit,

stand, and walk for three to four hours each in an eight hour

workday. Tr. at 90 (citing Tr. at 537). 6 Ellison does not contend that the ALJ erred in relying on

either the objective medical evidence or on Dr. Duda’s opinion.

Instead, she contends that he “ignored” evidence that supports

her statements. Nearly all of the evidence to which Ellison

refers is her own testimony from the hearing. Even her

assertion that her “therapist thinks she has a bulged disk,” is

supported only by her own testimony and not by any statements

from her therapist. See Doc. No. 7 at 5 (citing Tr. at 40).

Contrary to Ellison’s argument, however, “[i]t is the ALJ's

prerogative to resolve conflicting evidence, and [the court]

must affirm such a determination, even if the record could

justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by

substantial evidence.” Vazquez–Rosario v. Barnhart,

(1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The ALJ is not obligated to defer to an applicant’s subjective

reports during hearing testimony, especially when objective

medical evidence in the record contradicts those reports. Here,

the ALJ did not find Ellison’s reports of the limiting effects

of her symptoms to be credible because “the objective medical

evidence, [her] treatment history, and the credible opinion

evidence do not support her allegations.” Tr. at 90.

7 Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that

Ellison’s mental symptoms were not as intense or limiting as she

alleged. In support of his credibility determination, the ALJ

relied on a variety of evidence, including: normal mental status

examinations; a lack of outward signs of depression, anxiety, or

agitation; a positive response to treatment when sought; her

demonstrated ability to function; and opinion evidence from a

psychologist and from her treating physician. Tr. at 91-92

(citing Tr. at 392-99, [443], [454], 518, 520, 543-45). Ellison

argues that the ALJ ignored relevant evidence about her mental

impairment, such as her testimony about lacking the motivation

to get out of bed, experiencing memory problems, having panic

attacks, and wishing she was dead every day. Doc. No. 7 at 5-6.

The ALJ did not ignore Ellison’s testimony, but rather found it

not credible in light of “medical observations, [her] treatment

history, her demonstrated abilities, and the credible opinion

evidence.” Tr. at 91.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I grant the Commissioner’s

motion to affirm (Doc. No. 10) and deny Ellison’s motion to

reverse (Doc. No. 7) is denied. The clerk is directed to enter 8 judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

January 16, 2015

cc: Christine Woodman Casa Robert J. Rabuck

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