UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kevin Brown, et al.

v. Civil Nos. 16-cv-242-JL 16-cv-243-JL Opinion No.

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., et al.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Resolution of the plaintiffs’ motions to remand these

environmental trespass actions to state court turns on whether

these actions amount to “local controversies” under the Class

Action Fairness Act (CAFA). See

(d)(4)

Plaintiffs filed two purported class actions in Hillsborough

Superior Court against Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.

and Gwenael Busnel, general manager for Saint-Gobain’s facility

in Merrimack, New Hampshire, alleging damages from chemical

contamination from that facility.1 The defendants timely removed

the actions, citing this court’s jurisdiction under CAFA. See

(d)(2). Plaintiffs subsequently moved to remand

1 Though the plaintiffs base both purported class actions on the same allegedly-culpable conduct by the defendants, they propose different (albeit somewhat overlapping) classes and seek different damages through each case. both actions to the Superior Court, arguing that they satisfy

the local-controversy exception.

The court denies the plaintiffs’ motion. Though the

plaintiffs make a strong showing on several elements of the

exception, several lawsuits filed in New York and Vermont

“during the 3-year period preceding the filing of” these actions

prevent the exception from applying here. See

§ 1332(d)(4).

Background

This proposed class action arises out of the release of

toxic chemicals from Saint-Gobain’s manufacturing plant in

Merrimack, New Hampshire. Saint-Gobain has owned and operated a

plant in Merrimack since 2003. In early 2016, the New Hampshire

Department of Environmental Services discovered the presence of

Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) in residential wells in the

plant’s vicinity and recommended that certain residents of

surrounding cities and towns not drink or cook with water from

those wells. The United States Environmental Protection Agency

considers PFOA “likely to be carcinogenic to humans.”2

The plaintiffs filed two suits in Hillsborough Superior

Court against Saint-Gobain and the plant’s general manager as a

result of the PFOA contamination. In the first, they contend

that the presence of PFOA in private wells and soil on the class

2 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 33.

2 members’ properties has decreased the value of those properties,

and seek damages accordingly.3 In the second, they contend that

the presence of PFOA has the potential to damage the class

members’ health, and seek to have Saint-Gobain cover the costs

of medical monitoring for class members.4

The defendants timely removed both cases to this court

under CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions. The plaintiffs now ask

the court to remand both cases, citing an exception to that

jurisdiction in cases of distinctly local character. See

(d)(4)

Analysis

A. CAFA jurisdiction

The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) gives district courts

“original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of § 5,000,000, . . .

and is a class action in which . . . any member of a class of

plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant

. . . .”

(d)(2)(A). The parties agree that

these requirements are satisfied.

In seeking to remand the actions, the plaintiffs invoke

CAFA’s “local-controversy exception,” which mandates that “[a]

3 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 1-1) ¶¶ 44-46, E. 4 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 1-1) ¶¶ 46-47, D.

3 district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction” under

CAFA

(i) over a class action in which—

(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed;

(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant—

(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class;

(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and

(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; and

(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and

(ii) during the 3–year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons[.]

(d)(4)(A). If these conditions are met, this

court is required to remand the action to the originating state

court.

Plaintiffs, as the parties seeking remand, bear the burden

of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

local-controversy exception to CAFA applies in these actions.

In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564

(1st Cir. 2009); see also Padilla-Mangual v. Pavia

Hosp.,

(1st Cir. 2008) (applying preponderance

standard to questions of diversity jurisdiction). Because the

defendants invoke CAFA as the basis of this court’s

jurisdiction, the plaintiffs do not enjoy any presumption

against removal. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,

(2014) (“[N]o antiremoval presumption attends

cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate

adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”). The

court resolves any doubt as to whether the exception applies

against the parties seeking remand. Westerfield v. Independent

Processing, LLC,

(8th Cir. 2010) (“the party

bearing the burden of proof is not entitled to the benefit of

the doubt”).

The plaintiffs argue that the court should look to their

Second Amended Complaints, filed after these cases were removed,5

to decide whether they have met their burden.6 This is contrary

to the general rule that “the Court looks to the complaint as

5 The plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaints as of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(1)(B). 6 See Reply (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 25-1) at 7-10. The parties filed substantially identical memoranda in support of and in response to plaintiffs’ motion in both actions. For sake of convenience, the court cites only to those filed in civil action no. 16-cv-242.

5 filed at the time that the case was removed” when deciding

whether remand is appropriate. Premo v. Family Dollar Stores of

Mass., Inc., No. 13-11279-TSH,

, at *2 (D. Mass.

Mar. 28, 2014) (citing Cavallini v. State Farm Auto Life Ins.

Co.,

(5th Cir. 1995)).

Without such a rule, disposition of the issue would never be final, but would instead have to be revisited every time the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to assert a new cause of action against the nondiverse defendant, all at considerable expense and delay to the parties and the state and federal courts involved.

Cavallini,

. The weight of authority supports

following this approach in cases removed under CAFA. In Touch

Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship,

(2d Cir.

2015) (“Since a post-removal amendment does not defeat federal

jurisdiction premised on a federal question or on diversity, we

cannot see why it would defeat federal jurisdiction under

CAFA.”); Cedar Lodge Plantation, L.L.C. v. CSHV Fairway View I,

L.L.C.,

(5th Cir. 2014) (“the time-of-

removal rule prevents post-removal actions from destroying

jurisdiction that attached in a federal court under CAFA”); In

re Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co.,

(7th Cir. 2010) (“CAFA is, at base, an extension of diversity

jurisdiction. Even in cases filed originally in federal court,

later changes that compromise diversity do not destroy

jurisdiction.”); see also Reece v. AES Corp.,

(10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (affirming district

court’s denial of motion to amend class definition to satisfy

local-controversy exception); but see Kaufman v. Allstate New

Jersey Ins. Co.,

(3d Cir. 2009) (“the local

controversy exception requires consideration of the defendants

presently in the action”); Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (when plaintiffs “amend the

complaint to explain the nature of the action for purposes of

our jurisdictional analysis, we may consider the amended

complaint to determine whether remand to the state court is

appropriate”).

This court is inclined to follow the traditional rule in

this action, but need not conclusively decide the issue here.

Furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiffs allege new facts

in the Second Amended Complaints, they merely elaborate on

points already raised in the First Amended Complaints.

Specifically, the plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaints provide

more detailed allegations concerning: (1) the responsibilities

associated with Busnel’s position7; (2) Busnel’s alleged

negligence in failing to test for PFOA8; (3) the detection of

7 Second Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243) ¶¶ 23, 35, 38-39. The Second Amended Complaint in civil action no. 16-cv-242 includes substantially the same allegations. 8 Id. ¶¶ 36-37, 40, 43.

7 PFOA in the vicinity of Saint-Gobain’s plants in New York and

Vermont and defendants’ knowledge thereof9; and (4) when the

defendants reported contamination around the Merrimack site.10

Because these additional details merely elaborate on facts

alleged in the First Amended Complaints,11 the amendment would

not alter the court’s jurisdictional analysis.

B. Applicability of the local-controversy exception

In the context of diversity jurisdiction, the First Circuit

Court of Appeals requires the party bearing the burden of

proving jurisdiction to do so by proving the facts supporting

jurisdiction -- such as the citizenship of the parties -- by a

“preponderance of the evidence.” Padilla-Mangual,

(citing Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle,

(1st

Cir. 1992)). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which invokes

the same rule in the diversity context, has also concluded that

parties moving to remand a case under an exception to CAFA must

9 Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 41 10 Id. ¶ 42. 11Specifically, the plaintiff alleged in the First Amended Complaint that: (1) Busnel was the General Manager of the Merrimack plant, First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243) ¶¶ 8, 22; (2) Busnel allegedly violated a duty to operate the Merrimack plant in a safe and reasonable manner, id. ¶¶ 8, 31, 40; (3) PFOA had been detected in the vicinity of Saint-Gobain’s New York and Vermont facilities, id. ¶¶ 29-30; and (4) elevated PFOA levels were detected around the Merrimack facility, id. ¶¶ 35- 36.

8 do likewise. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr.,

Inc.,

(5th Cir. 2007). This court does the

same here.

The defendants concede that this action satisfies two of

the local-controversy exception requirements: (1) that

defendant Busnel is a New Hampshire citizen, see

(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc), and that the principal injuries

occurred in New Hampshire, see

§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III).

They dispute whether the plaintiffs have satisfied the remaining

requirements. As discussed more fully below, though the

plaintiffs likely have satisfied most of the local controversy

elements, the fact that several cases alleging similar facts

were filed in New York and Vermont during the three years prior

to these actions defeats their motion to remand.

1. Other class actions - § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii)

To satisfy the local-controversy exception, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that “during the 3–year period preceding the

filing of th[is] class action, no other class action has been

filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against

any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.”

(d)(4)(A)(ii). The plaintiffs’ failure to do so

precludes remand under the local-controversy exception in both

of the plaintiffs’ actions.

9 As the defendants point out, five other putative class

actions have been filed against Saint-Gobain in New York and

Vermont within the last three years.12 There is no dispute that

these actions were filed by “other persons” and assert

allegations against “any of the defendants.”13 The only question

the court must address, then, is whether the factual allegations

of these five previously-filed actions are similar to the

allegations in the actions before this court. The court

concludes that they are.

Painted with a broad brush, the similarities between the

New York and Vermont cases and the cases before this court are

striking. In all seven cases, the plaintiffs allege that:

(1) PFOA is a hazardous substance, pollutant, and/or toxic

chemical, as well as a threat to the environment and harmful to

12Sullivan v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16- cv-125 (D. Vt. filed May 6, 2016); Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-220 (N.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 24, 2016); Tifft v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-292 (N.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 10, 2016); Hickey v. Saint- Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-394 (N.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 6, 2016); Schrom v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-476 (N.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 26, 2016). 13The previously-filed actions must also have been filed “on behalf of the same or other persons.” This requirement is easily satisfied: any previously-filed action must necessarily have been filed by the same persons who filed the present action or “other persons.” If serving no other purpose, this language emphasizes that an action need not be filed by or on behalf of the same purported class of plaintiffs to meet the criteria set forth in this section.

10 humans; (2) Saint-Gobain released PFOA into the environment;

(3) it did so intentionally, willfully, and/or maliciously;

(4) water supplies in the vicinity of a Saint-Gobain plant

tested positive for PFOA; (5) residential wells and/or municipal

water supplies were affected, leading residents to use bottled

water; (6) PFOA in private wells devalued properties in the area

of contamination; and (7) plaintiffs will require long-term

medical monitoring to detect illnesses caused by the PFOA

contamination.14

The plaintiffs argue that, despite these similarities, the

New York and Vermont cases against Saint-Gobain do not contain

“the same or similar factual allegations” as these actions

because the New York and Vermont cases do not address any harm

caused in New Hampshire by the Merrimack plant.15 The statute

does not require, however, that the claims in both cases be

identical or nearly identical, nor that they arise out of the

same occurrence or under the law of the same state, nor that the

plaintiffs be citizens of the same state. It focuses instead on

the “factual allegations” made against the common defendant, and

requires only that they be “similar.” Courts have found such

similarities where plaintiffs alleged nearly identical conduct

14 See Surreply, App’x B (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 27-2). 15 See Reply (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 25-1) at 11.

11 by the same defendant in different states resulting in the same

injury to different plaintiffs. See Torre v. CleanNet, U.S.A.,

Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-2818,

, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

4, 2014) (similar facts where both actions alleged misconduct by

a common national defendant against franchisees, despite

additional, local defendants and claims under different state

laws); Brook v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. 06 CV 12954,

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) (similar facts alleged

where “virtually identical” class actions were filed in

Connecticut and New York, but classes were limited to physicians

of their respective states); but see Anderson v. Hackett,

(S.D. Ill. 2009) (factual allegations not

“the same or similar” where defendant’s actions contaminated two

different tracts of land). So it is here: the plaintiffs in

the New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire actions allege that

their claims arise from effectively the same conduct by Saint-

Gobain, albeit conduct affecting different plaintiffs and

different localities. This renders the factual allegations

sufficiently similar to meet this requirement. The plaintiffs

have therefore not carried their burden of demonstrating that no

other class action has been filed during the preceding three-

year period “asserting the same or similar factual allegations

12 against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other

persons.”16

(d)(4)(A)(ii).

2. Local plaintiffs - § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I)

Though the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the “other

lawsuits” element of the local-controversy exception disposes of

their motion, the court considers, for the sake of thoroughness,

whether the plaintiffs have satisfied the exception’s other

elements.

In order to demonstrate a local controversy, the plaintiffs

must also show that “greater than two-thirds of the members of

all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of”

16The court also considered -- and requested additional briefing from the parties on -- whether the fact that the plaintiffs filed two suits alleging the same facts against the same defendants on the same day required remand of the later-filed suit, should the court find all other elements in the plaintiffs’ favor. See no. 16-cv-242, doc. nos. 33, 34; no. 16- cv-243, doc. nos. 33, 34. Courts applying this element of the local-controversy exception “to two actions filed the same day have looked to which action was filed first, and concluded that under the plain language of the statute, the first-filed action was filed within three years preceding the filing of the second action, such that the court lacks jurisdiction over the first- filed action but not the second.” Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. CV 14-04744 MMM CWX,

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2015), aff'd,

(9th Cir. 2015). The defendants assert that such is the case here; the plaintiffs contend that, because the suits were filed at precisely the same time, neither qualifies as a previously-filed action. The court ultimately need not address this question, having concluded that the New York and Vermont actions satisfy this requirement and prevent application of the local-controversy exception to these actions.

13 New Hampshire.

(d)(4)(A)(i)(I). As in the

context of diversity jurisdiction, citizenship may be equated

with domicile -- that is, “the place where an individual ‘has

his true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to which,

whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.’”

McMorris v. TJX Companies, Inc.,

(D.

Mass. 2007) (quoting Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista,

(1st Cir. 2001)). The plaintiffs’ allegations, and the

evidence they submitted in support of their motion to remand,

suggests that they have satisfied this element with respect to

one of the actions here but not with respect to the other.

Plaintiffs have brought two actions, proposing two

different -- but overlapping -- classes of injured plaintiffs.

One class comprises “[a]ll persons who own residential

properties with private groundwater wells within two miles of

the property boundary of the Saint-Gobain site.”17 This proposed

class is limited to current property owners. The plaintiffs

have submitted evidence suggesting that over 90% of residential

property owners within that two-mile radius reside in New

Hampshire.18 While a party’s residence in a state alone does not

17 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 11. 18Plaintiffs present a summary of information on property ownership and residence drawn from various tax assessors’ offices through an affidavit from two of their attorneys. See Affidavit (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 26-2). Defendants contend

14 establish domicile and, accordingly, citizenship, see Valentin,

(residence is not equivalent to citizenship),

that over 90% of those property owners also reside within the

state (even if they do not live at the property owned) strongly

supports an inference that at least two-thirds of that number

are New Hampshire citizens.19

The plaintiffs’ evidence presents a murkier picture for the

proposed class seeking medical monitoring relief. That proposed

class comprises “[a]ll persons who reside or have resided on

residential properties with private groundwater wells within two

that this affidavit amounts to attorney argument, which does not constitute evidence. See Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union AFL-CIO,

, 88 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001); Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante,

, 704 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979). White there may have been more appropriate means of presenting the evidence in question, the defendants do not challenge the affiants’ personal knowledge of the information they reviewed and summarized, and so the court will consider it for purposes of resolving the instant motion. 19The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that New Hampshire citizens own at least two-thirds of the properties with private groundwater wells. See Surreply (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 27) at 8-9. The plaintiffs have offered evidence, however, showing that over 89% of properties in Litchfield where the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services tested groundwater wells for PFOA are owned by New Hampshire residents; that 85% of the wells tested in Merrimack exist on property owned by New Hampshire residents; and that at least 90% of residences with private wells in Bedford are owned by New Hampshire residents. See Affidavit (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 25-2) at 2. Given such high percentages of properties owned by New Hampshire residents, it is a reasonable inference that New Hampshire residents own at least two-thirds of properties with wells.

15 miles of the property boundary of the Saint-Gobain site.”20 As

such, it would comprise individuals who currently reside within

that two-mile radius, as well as those who resided there during

the limitations period21 but do so no longer. Given the

geographical strictures around the class composition, it appears

likely that at least two-thirds of the former are New Hampshire

citizens. The plaintiffs offer no evidence, however, concerning

how many former-resident class members there may be or, of

those, how many remain New Hampshire citizens. Though probable

that two-thirds of this class would consist of New Hampshire

citizens, the plaintiffs -- having offered no evidence

indicating the number or citizenship of former-resident class

members -- have not carried their burden of showing the

citizenship of the medical monitoring class.

3. Local defendant criteria - § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)

For the local-controversy exception to apply, the

plaintiffs must also demonstrate that at least one defendant is

a New Hampshire citizen, “from whom significant relief is

sought” by the plaintiff class and “whose alleged conduct forms

20 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 11. 21At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that the class would be circumscribed by the statute of limitations, which is two years for willful trespass and three years for personal injury and property damage.

, I;

§ 539:8.

16 a significant basis for the claims” they have asserted.

(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa)-(cc). Neither CAFA itself

nor the First Circuit Court of Appeals has provided guidance on

what amounts to “significant relief” and what conduct amounts to

a “significant basis.” However, courts that have addressed

similar issues “have required that the conduct of an allegedly

‘significant defendant’ must be significant in relation to the

conduct alleged against other defendants in the complaint, and

that the relief sought against that defendant is a significant

portion of the entire relief sought by the class.” Manson v.

GMAC Mortgage, LLC,

(D. Mass. 2009)

(Stearns, J.) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the plaintiffs level their substantive claims --

trespass, nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment and strict

liability -- at both Saint-Gobain and Busnel.22 The plaintiffs

allege that Saint-Gobain has owned and operated the Merrimack

plant since 2003, and that Saint-Gobain owned the prior

operator, ChemFab, between 2000 and 2003. They further allege

that Busnel was the “General Manager for Saint-Gobain at its

Merrimack, New Hampshire facility,” and that “at all times

22They bring only two claims against Saint-Gobain alone -- one for liability under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of Saint-Gobain’s employees, including Busnel’s actions, and a claim for exemplary damages.

17 relevant” to this action, he “had a duty to operate [the

Merrimack plant] in a safe and reasonable manner, in conformance

with the laws and had a duty not to allow chemicals used in the

[p]lant to contaminate the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’

property.”23 The parties agree that Busnel, a New Hampshire

citizen, served as Plant Manager of the Merrimack plant between

2012 and February 2016.24 As discussed below, the plaintiffs’

allegations against and relief sought from Busnel render him a

significant defendant for purposes of the local-controversy

exception in the action seeking to recover for damages to

property values, but may not be sufficient with respect to the

medical monitoring action.

a) “Substantial basis”

In determining whether Busnel’s alleged conduct forms a

“substantial basis” for the plaintiffs’ claims, the court

compares Busnel’s alleged conduct to that of all other

defendants -- here, Saint-Gobain. “If the local defendant's

alleged conduct is a significant part of the alleged conduct of

23 First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 8. 24Plaintiffs submit, via a copy of Busnel’s profile page on LinkedIn, a social media platform for professional networking, that he began managing the Merrimack plant in 2010. See Appendix J (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 18-12). This document suggests that Busnel has worked as a plant manager for Saint- Gobain since 2010, but does not indicate when he ceased managing the “Worcester plant” and began managing the plant in Merrimack.

18 all the Defendants, then the significant basis provision is

satisfied. Whether this condition is met requires a substantive

analysis comparing the local defendant's alleged conduct to the

alleged conduct of all the Defendants.” Kaufman,

. Such a comparison reveals that plaintiffs have

demonstrated that Busnel’s activities served as a substantial

basis for the plaintiffs’ claims in their action seeking

recovery for property damages, but have not made so strong a

showing in the medical monitoring action.

In the complaint operative at the time of removal, the

plaintiffs alleged that Busnel: (1) was the general manager for

Saint-Gobain at its Merrimack facility “at all times relevant

hereto” and (2) had a duty to operate that facility “in a safe

and reasonable manner, in conformance with the laws,” and “not

to allow chemicals used in the Plant” to contaminate surrounding

properties.25 The plaintiffs then describe the actions of “the

defendants” that allegedly gave rise to their claims --

specifically, that the defendants used PFOA, a hazardous

substance, at the Merrimack facility, released it into the

environment, and thereby contaminated water in the surrounding

25First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 8; First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 1-1) ¶ 8.

19 area.26 They level all four of their substantive claims against

both defendants, seeking to recover from Saint-Gobain alone only

for exemplary damages (count 6) and on a theory of respondeat

superior (count 5). As discussed supra, Part II.A, the Second

Amended Complaint, though elaborating on Busnel’s job duties as

a General Manager, likewise charges him with the same offenses

as Saint-Gobain.27 Insofar as the allegedly culpable conduct

imputed to Busnel is, in effect, the same as that imputed to

Saint-Gobain, Busnel’s conduct -- albeit not well-defined --

forms a “significant basis” of the plaintiffs’ claims.

That renders these actions distinct from the decision of

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Woods v. Standard Ins.

Co.,

(10th Cir. 2014), which the parties discuss

at some length.28 There, the plaintiffs named a local insurance

agent as defendant alongside the national insurance company.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the agent’s conduct did not

constitute a significant basis for the plaintiffs’ claims where

“the sole basis of Plaintiffs’ claims against” her was a failure

26First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 1-1) ¶¶ 23-24, 31, 38-43; First Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 1-1) ¶¶ 23-24, 31, 38-43. 27Second Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 17) ¶¶ 8, 23, 35-44; Second Amended Compl. (no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 16) ¶¶ 8, 23, 35-44. 28 This Circuit’s Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue.

20 to disclose the insurance company’s allegedly unlawful practices

to state employees. Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Busnel

has significant responsibilities vis-à-vis the action giving

rise to liability in this case -- that is, operation of the

Merrimack plant and oversight of its emissions. Nor is this

case like Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Sols., Inc.,

(5th Cir. 2011), where the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals concluded that nothing in the complaint distinguished

the actions of a bill review company from a separate insurance

company, thus preventing the former’s actions from forming a

significant basis for the plaintiff’s claims. Here, the

defendants are not unrelated entities; Busnel is, rather,

alleged to be an employee and agent of Saint-Gobain tasked with

managing operations of the Merrimack plant.

With respect to the medical monitoring class, though,

Busnel’s role as a significant defendant is undercut by the

length of time that he served as the Merrimack plant’s general

manager. As discussed supra Part II.B.2, the plaintiffs have

not clearly defined the proposed class in their suit seeking

medical monitoring for present and former residents of the two-

mile radius around the facility. Busnel’s decisions as plant

manager would not have impacted any potential members of that

class who lived within the radius during the class period but

left before his tenure began -- whether in 2010 or 2012 -- and

21 thus could not serve as the basis for their claims. As also

discussed supra, the plaintiffs offer no information on the size

of this cohort. This raises a question as to whether Busnel’s

actions serve as the significant basis for the claims of some

unknown fraction of the medical monitoring plaintiffs. See,

e.g., Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc.,

(11th

Cir. 2006) (local defendant’s conduct not “significant basis”

where it spanned less than half of the total 85-year class

period); Carter v. Allstate Ins Co., No. 12-cv-72,

, at *10 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 21, 2012) (local defendant’s

actions not a significant basis for relief where defendant was

only involved for half of the class period). In the absence of

any information as to the size of that percentage from the

plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proving it, the court is

disinclined to consider Busnel a significant defendant with

respect to the medical monitoring action.

b) “Significant relief”

To satisfy the “significant relief” requirement, the

plaintiffs must show that Busnel is a defendant “from whom

significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class.”

(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb). Relief is significant

“when the relief sought against that defendant is a significant

portion of the entire relief sought by the class.” Evans, 449

22 F.3d at 1166-67. One relevant measure is the proportion of the

plaintiff class that could conceivably recover from that

defendant. See id.,

(concluding that

plaintiffs did not seek “significant relief” where allegations

against defendant supported right to relief for only a small

portion of the class). Applying this measure, the plaintiffs

seeking a property-damage remedy appear to satisfy this

requirement; those seeking medical-monitoring may not have met

the same burden.

Defendants first argue that the plaintiffs have not met

their burden on this element because Busnel managed the

Merrimack plant for only a portion of the class period. This

would theoretically limit the percentage of the class that could

recover from him. Courts have found that plaintiffs do not seek

significant relief from defendants whose involvement in the

alleged conduct affected only a small percentage of the class

members. See, e.g., Busker v. Wabtec Corp., No. 15-cv-08194,

, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) (local defendant

hired four years after the start of the events at issue was not

one from whom significant relief was sought).

Defendants primarily argue that the plaintiffs cannot seek

significant relief from Busnel because he, as an individual,

23 could not satisfy a judgment should the plaintiffs prevail.29

Courts are split on the issue, and the First Circuit Court of

Appeals has not weighed in. Some courts, as the defendants have

urged this court to do, take into consideration the proposed

significant defendant’s ability to pay. See Manson,

; cf. Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc.,

(C.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd,

(9th Cir. 2011) (detailing origins of “ability to pay” analysis,

but rejecting such an interpretation). Others, including the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, have rejected any reliance on

such an analysis, on the basis that the statute’s plain language

requires the relief that “is sought” by the class to be

significant -- not the defendant’s ability to satisfy a

judgment. See Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold,

(10th Cir. 2009).

This court, like those in Coffey and Coleman, finds the

statutory language unambiguous. It requires that “at least 1

defendant is a defendant[] from whom significant relief is

sought by members of the plaintiff class . . . .”

(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa). It does not require that the relief

sought “may be obtained” or “can be collected” from the

29See Obj. to Mot. to Remand (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 22-1) at 14.

24 defendant in question. Coffey,

. Accordingly,

Busnel’s purported inability to satisfy a judgment does not

impact the court’s determination as to whether he satisfies the

significant defendant criteria.

Turning then to the actions at hand, the court measures the

relief sought from Busnel against the relief sought from Saint-

Gobain. The proposed class seeking relief for damage to

property values comprises current property owners. Taking the

plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Busnel’s four-year tenure at

the Merrimack plant exposes him to potential liability to those

who currently own damaged property. As such, he qualifies as a

defendant from whom significant relief is sought with respect to

that action. The proposed class seeking medical monitoring

again poses a more difficult question. Depending on how far

back the class period extends -- and, as discussed supra, this

remains an open question despite plaintiffs’ general allusion to

the limitations period -- there may exist a percentage of the

plaintiff class not impacted by any action taken by Busnel, and

who therefore could not seek to recover from him.

In sum, the court concludes Busnel constitutes a

significant defendant with respect to the class seeking to

recovery for property damage because Busnel’s alleged actions

impact the entirety of that class. The open question as to the

constitution of the class of plaintiffs seeking medical

25 monitoring precludes the plaintiffs from carrying their burden

of demonstrating the same.

C. Diversity jurisdiction

The defendants argue that, CAFA aside, diversity

jurisdiction exists because the plaintiffs improperly joined

Busnel.30 To draw such a conclusion, the court would have to

find that “there is no reasonable possibility that the state’s

highest court would find that the complaint states a cause of

action upon which relief may be granted against” Busnel.

Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2014); see also Nordin v. PB&J Resorts,

LLC,

(concluding that defendants had not

carried the “heavy burden” of demonstrating improper joinder).

The court would be hard-pressed to come to such a

conclusion after determining, as it has supra Part II.B.3, that

the plaintiffs’ allegations against Busnel render him a

significant defendant under the local-controversy exception --

even despite the court’s reservations with respect to the

30See Objection (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 22-1) at 18-24. The defendants invoke the term “fraudulent joiner,” which, as Judge McAuliffe has explained, “is a term of art that applies to the joinder of an in-state defendant against whom plaintiff simply has no chance of success, whatever the plaintiff's motives.” Longden v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

(internal quotations omitted). The term is interchangeable with “improper joinder,” which this court employs.

26 medical monitoring action. The court need not conclusively

decide this issue, however, having concluded that the local-

controversy exception does not apply to these actions and, thus,

that this court has jurisdiction over them under CAFA.

Consolidation

Some months ago, the court notified the parties that these

two actions may be consolidated pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 42(a) and Local Rule 42.1.31 Defendants agree to

consolidation32; plaintiffs do so for discovery purposes, but

object to consolidation for class certification and trial.33

Both cases arise out of the same allegedly-culpable activities

of the same defendants affecting classes that, while not

identical, admittedly overlap to some significant degree. The

plaintiffs have offered no argument as to why the cases could

not proceed with the two classes as subclasses. As such, the

court consolidates these actions, though remains open to

discussing bifurcating the cases for trial at the appropriate

time.

31Potential Consolidation Order (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 11; civil no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 12). 32Response to Obj. to Consolidation (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 31; civil no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 32). 33Plaintiffs’ Obj. to Consolidation (no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 30; civil no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 31).

27 Conclusion

Because the plaintiffs have not carried their burden of

demonstrating that these cases satisfy all of the requirements

for the local-controversy exception to this court’s jurisdiction

under CAFA, the plaintiffs’ motions to remand these actions to

Hillsborough Superior Court34 are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge

Dated: November 30, 2016

cc: Kevin Scott Hannon, Esq. Paul M. DeCarolis, Esq. Bruce W. Felmly, Esq. Douglas E. Fleming, III, Esq. Mark Cheffo, Esq. Patrick Curran, Esq. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Esq. Nicholas F. Casolaro, Esq.

34Civil no. 16-cv-242, doc. no. 18; civil no. 16-cv-243, doc. no. 17.

28