UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher Robert Beaulieu, Plaintiff

v. Case No. 14-cv-280-SM Opinion No.

John P. Aulis, Aaron M. Belanger, Edward P. Kirrane, Dominic M. Salce, Michael Shepley, Paul Laflamme, Kevin Washburn, Jason Whitney, Scott Collier, and Rueben James Ruiter, Defendants

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Christopher (Crystal) Beaulieu, is an inmate at

the New Hampshire State Prison (“NHSP”). She has sued eight

corrections officers and two inmates, asserting claims arising

from three incidents in which Beaulieu alleges she was

assaulted. 1 Before the court is a motion for summary judgment

filed by the eight NHSP corrections officers who are named as

defendants. 2 Plaintiff objects.

1 Beaulieu has notified the court that she prefers the use of female pronouns in reference to her. Beaulieu identifies as transsexual, and the court will defer to her pronoun preference in this Order.

2 The two inmate defendants, Scott Collier and Rueben Ruiter, have not appeared. Defaults have been entered against both. See Doc. Nos. 50 and 57. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue

is ‘genuine’ if it can be resolved in favor of either party, and

a fact is ‘material’ if it has the potential of affecting the

outcome of the case.” Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A.,

(1st Cir. 2016)(internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.

JBW Capital, LLC,

(1st Cir. 2016) (“the mere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine

issue of material fact.” (emphasis in original) (citation and

internal punctuation omitted)). At the summary judgment stage,

the court draws “all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving party, but disregard[s] conclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Fanning v.

Fed. Trade Comm’n,

(1st Cir. 2016) (citation

and internal punctuation omitted).

“A party moving for summary judgment must identify for the

district court the portions of the record that show the absence

2 of any genuine issue of material fact.” Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac,

Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2016) Once the moving party

makes the required showing, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party, who must, with respect to each issue on which [it] would

bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of

fact could reasonably resolve that issue in [its] favor.”

(citation and internal punctuation omitted). “This

demonstration must be accomplished by reference to materials of

evidentiary quality, and that evidence must be more than ‘merely

colorable.’”

(citations omitted). The nonmoving party’s

failure to make the requisite showing “entitles the moving party

to summary judgment.”

Background

I. January 2012 Incident

On January 19, 2012, Beaulieu was housed on C-tier, in the

NHSP Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). Decl. of Christopher

(Crystal) Beaulieu, Aug. 2, 2016 (doc. no. 87) (“Beaulieu

Decl.”), at 1. NHSP Corrections Officer (“CO”) Kevin Washburn

and CO Jason Whitney were on duty in the SHU control room and

they were responsible for operating the control panels that are

used to remotely open and close SHU cell doors. Id.; Statement

of Jason Whitney, Jan. 26, 2012 (doc. no. 59-15) (“Whitney

3 Statement”), at 16. NHSP Chef Paul Laflamme was also in the SHU

control room at that time, socializing with Washburn. Aff. of

Jason Whitney, Dec. 9, 2015 (doc. no. 59-7) (“Whitney Aff.”) at

para. 8; Beaulieu Decl. at 1; Statement of Kevin Washburn, Jan.

25, 2012 (doc. no. 59-15) (“Washburn Statement”), at 15.

After returning from a state court hearing, Beaulieu was

being escorted by CO Michael Shepley back to her cell. Officers

Washburn and Whitney were on duty in the control room. (First)

Aff. of Christopher (Crystal) Beaulieu, Aug. 2, 2016 (doc. no.

87-1) (“Beaulieu Aff. #1”), at para. 2. As Shepley and Beaulieu

approached the C-tier entrance, Beaulieu saw inmate Rueben

Ruiter outside of his cell on the tier. Beaulieu Decl. at 1.

Ruiter was a “tier worker,” whose cleaning duties involved being

outside of his cell in the tier corridor at times. Beaulieu

asked Shepley to have Ruiter locked up before they entered the

tier and it is undisputed that Shepley radioed the control room

to have Ruiter returned to his cell. Id.; Statement of Michael

Shepley, Jan. 19, 2012 (doc. no. 59-12) (“Shepley Statement”),

at 1. Ruiter then entered his cell and the cell door closed

behind him. See Shepley Statement, at 1. After Ruiter was

secure in his cell, Shepley escorted Beaulieu to her cell and

radioed the control room to secure the door to that cell. Id.;

4 Aff. of Michael Shepley, Dec. 17, 2015 (doc. no. 88-1) (“Shepley

Aff.”), at para. 6. Once the door to Beaulieu’s cell closed,

she backed up to the “cuff slot” and Shepley removed her

handcuffs.

Shepley then walked off the tier and, as he did

so, he radioed the control room to release Ruiter, so he could

continue his cleaning work.

At some point thereafter, Ruiter entered Beaulieu’s cell

twice. See Defs.’ Mem. of Law (doc. no. 59-1), at 16. After

leaving Beaulieu’s cell for the second time, see

Ruiter

approached the end of the tier, signaled the control room

officers, and told them that the door to Beaulieu’s cell was

open. The control room officers then secured Beaulieu’s door.

See Washburn Statement; Whitney Statement.

Shepley has specifically denied knowing either that Ruiter

had entered Beaulieu’s cell on January 19, 2012, or that

Beaulieu’s cell door had become unsecured at any time after

Shepley put her in the cell and called for the door to be closed

and secured. Shepley Aff. at paras. 4, 7. Moreover, says

Shepley, Beaulieu never signaled to him that the door was

unsecured; that if Beaulieu had done so, Shepley would have

radioed the control room to have the door locked; and that

5 Shepley never noticed anything wrong while he was on the tier.

at paras. 6-7. Beaulieu questions Shepley’s statements and,

in her declaration, she says she believes Shepley knew her cell

door was unlocked. She bases that inference on her claim to

have seen Shepley smile as he walked by the tier with another

inmate, and her claim that Shepley did not check to make sure

her cell door was secured before walking away with that inmate.

Beaulieu Decl. at 1; see also Statement of Christopher Beaulieu,

Jan. 19, 2012 (doc. no. 59-15) (“Beaulieu Statement”), at 6.

Several hours later, during the second shift, CO David

Miville noticed bruises on Beaulieu’s face. Statement of David

Miville, Jan. 19, 2012 (doc. no. 59-20), at 9. Investigators

later determined that, at some point on January 19, 2012, during

the first shift, Ruiter had entered Beaulieu’s cell and hit her.

See id.; Beaulieu Statement (doc. no. 59-15) at 5. Ruiter was

written up for assault and, after a hearing, was found guilty of

the lesser offense of being “out of place.” Disciplinary

Hearing Results, Feb. 19, 2012 (doc. no. 59-20), at 13; Beaulieu

Aff. #1, at para. 3.

Each of the control room officers has filed an affidavit

stating that he would not have purposefully opened Beaulieu’s

6 cell door while another inmate was out on the tier. Aff. of

Kevin Washburn, Dec. 9, 2015 (doc. no. 59-9) (“Washburn Aff.”),

at para. 7; Whitney Aff. at para. 8. Washburn has stated that

he does not recall opening Beaulieu’s cell when Ruiter was on

the tier but that, if it somehow happened, it was accidental.

Washburn Aff. at para. 7; Washburn Statement (doc. no. 59-10).

Whitney also states that, if Beaulieu’s door became unsecured,

it would have been accidental. Whitney Aff. at para. 8. Both

officers state that they did not know Ruiter had entered

Beaulieu’s cell while they were in the control room, and that

they were unaware an assault had occurred at that time.

Washburn Aff. para. 4, at 2; Whitney Aff. para. 4, at 2.

III. August 2013 Incident

On August 16, 2013, Beaulieu was housed in the NHSP Secure

Psychiatric Unit. On that date, Corrections Officers Edward

Kirrane and Aaron Belanger were escorting Beaulieu back to her

cell after an appointment. Aff. of Edward Kirrane, Dec. 15,

2015 (doc. no. 59-2) (“Kirrane Aff.”), at para. 4; Aff. of Aaron

Belanger, Dec. 4, 2015 (doc. no. 59-4) (“Belanger Aff.”), at

para. 4. In their sworn declarations, Kirrane and Belanger

state that Beaulieu appeared agitated during the escort. Once

the officers arrived at Beaulieu’s cell, Kirrane released the

7 buckle on the leather “belly belt” attached to Beaulieu’s

handcuffs. According to the officers, before they could close

the door, Beaulieu turned quickly, while still handcuffed, and

swung the leather belt and metal buckle toward Kirrane. Kirrane

Aff., at para. 4; Belanger Aff., at para. 4. While Beaulieu

does not specifically dispute that she swung the belt toward the

officers, she previously described that act as inadvertent,

stating in an (unsworn) Inmate Request Slip (“IRS”) that the

officers “had the door closed most [of] the way when I slipped

and hit the window [with] the buckle.” IRS, Aug. 17, 2014 (doc.

no. 59-21), at 1. But, regardless of Beaulieu’s subjective

intent, both officers perceived that her conduct was

intentional.

Belanger and Kirrane then went into the cell to retrieve

the belt and took Beaulieu to the floor. Kirrane Aff., at para.

4; Belanger Aff., at para. 4. According to the officers,

Beaulieu became “resistive” and disobeyed their orders. While

Beaulieu generally denies resisting, it is undisputed that

during the struggle for the belt, she attempted to pull the

handcuffs beneath her body. Kirrane Aff., at para. 4; Belanger

Aff., at para. 4. And, at some point during the struggle with

Beaulieu, Officer Belanger injured his shoulder. Belanger Aff.

8 at para. 5. In an effort to secure Beaulieu’s compliance and to

stop her resistance, Belanger delivered a “knee strike” to

Beaulieu’s left leg, while Beaulieu was on the floor. Kirrane

Aff., at para. 4; Belanger Aff., at para. 4. Once the officers

regained control of Beaulieu, they took back the belt, brought

Beaulieu to the cell door, and removed her handcuffs through the

tray slot. Both officers join in saying that they used no more

force against Beaulieu than was reasonably necessary to regain

possession of the belt, after she had attempted to strike

Kirrane with it. And, say the officers, they used that modest

amount of force without malicious or sadistic intent. Kirrane

Aff., at para. 5; Belanger Aff., at para. 6. 3

For her part, Beaulieu does not offer a specific account of

the events in question. Rather, she generally denies the

accuracy of defendants’ version of the relevant events

surrounding the August 2013 incident. Second Aff. of

Christopher (Crystal) Beaulieu, Aug. 2, 2016 (doc. no. 87-7)

3 A video filed with the motion for summary judgment shows two officers walking with Beaulieu to a cell, while Beaulieu is handcuffed in front of her body. The two officers stand outside the partially closed cell door, while Beaulieu is in the cell. The officers then quickly step into the cell and remain out of view of the camera for less than two minutes. The two officers then back out of the cell, into the corridor, close the cell door, and appear to remove Beaulieu’s handcuffs through the door’s tray slot. See Video, SPU Infirmary Camera, Aug. 16, 2013.

9 (“Beaulieu Aff. #2”) at para. 11. She also generally denies

offering any resistance during the incident - again, without

providing any specific facts or details to rebut defendants’

version.

at para. 8. Beaulieu also says the officers

weighed more than she did; they called her a “rat bitch” during

the incident; and Kirrane prevented her from blocking Belanger’s

knee strike.

at paras. 8-9.

Following the incident, Beaulieu received medical

attention, but only complained of wrist pain. Statement of

Aaron Belanger, Aug. 16, 2013 (doc. no. 59-5). She appears not

to have complained of pain in, or injury to, her leg where

Belanger delivered the knee strike. Beaulieu was later found

guilty of the disciplinary offense of “throwing or propelling an

object or substance at another person or which may cause

property damage.” DOC Disciplinary Log Search (doc. no. 87-9);

Beaulieu Aff. #2, at para. 2.

IV. March 2014 Incidents

Finally, Beaulieu alleges that, while she was an inmate in

the Secure Psychiatric Unit in March 2014, inmate Scott Collier

harassed her and assaulted her by spraying her with a firehose.

Beaulieu sent an Inmate Request Slip to SPU Capt. Paul Cascio,

10 and then filed grievances with the SPU Director and the

Commissioner’s Office, in which she complained about a number of

things, including that Collier had sprayed her with a hose.

Beaulieu also complained that Collier had acquired information

about her criminal charges - a sexual assault - as well as the

name of Beaulieu’s boyfriend, which Collier had used to mock or

harass her. See Defs.’ Mem. of Law (doc. no. 59-1), at 8-10.

V. Beaulieu’s Claims 4

The court has identified Beaulieu’s federal claims, which

she advances pursuant to

, as follows:

Count I: On January 19, 2012, CO Michael Shepley, in violation of Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment rights, allowed inmate Rueben Ruiter access to Beaulieu’s cell and did not prevent Ruiter’s ensuing assault of Beaulieu, despite Shepley’s knowledge that Ruiter had been encouraged to attack Beaulieu and that Ruiter presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Beaulieu.

Count II: Chef Paul Laflamme, CO Jason Whitney, and CO Kevin Washburn, who were in the SHU control room when inmate Rueben Ruiter attacked Beaulieu on January 19, 2012, each acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Beaulieu, in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights: (a) by allowing Beaulieu’s cell door to be open at a time

4 The claims here were identified in the magistrate judge’s June 10, 2015, Report and Recommendation (doc. no. 31), which was approved on July 2, 2015. See Order (doc. no. 37). The claims have been rearranged and renumbered chronologically for the purposes of this Order.

11 when Ruiter was on the tier and had access to Beaulieu’s cell; and/or (b) by allowing Laflamme unauthorized access to the SHU control room and engaging in a social conversation with him, which caused the officers to fail to adequately monitor Beaulieu’s cell while Ruiter was working on the tier.

Count III: On August 16, 2013, CO Edward Kirrane and CO Aaron Belanger used excessive force against Beaulieu, in violation of Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Count IV: CO John Aulis and CO Dominic Salce disclosed unspecified “security information,” as well as Beaulieu’s sex offender status, to inmate Scott Collier, and then failed to prevent Collier from harassing and assaulting Beaulieu with a fire hose. 5

Discussion

I. Exhaustion

As to at least one of Beaulieu’s claims, defendants assert

that she failed to properly exhaust available prison

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See generally

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect

to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.”). But, because the

court concludes that there are no genuinely disputed material

5 As noted above, Beaulieu also advances state common law tort claims for assault and battery against inmates Ruiter and Collier. Those tort claims are not addressed in this Order.

12 facts and Beaulieu’s claims can be resolved on the merits, it

need not address the exhaustion issue.

II. The Eighth Amendment and Failure to Protect an Inmate

In Counts I and II of her complaint, Beaulieu claims that

Shepley, Whitney, Washburn, and Laflamme violated her

constitutional rights by failing to protect her from Ruiter’s

assault on January 19, 2012. Defendants contend that Beaulieu

has not shown that there is any material triable issue of fact

with respect to the merits of those claims.

A. Governing Law

Under the Eighth Amendment, “[p]rison officials have a duty

to . . . take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of

the[ir] inmates.” Giroux v. Somerset Cty.,

(1st

Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

(1994))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Among other things, “prison

officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence

at the hands of other prisoners.” Giroux,

(quoting Farmer,

). Failure to honor those

obligations may amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

13 But, “a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met,” Farmer,

, one of

which is “objective” while the other is “subjective.” To

prevail on her Eighth Amendment claim that prison officials

failed to protect her from Ruiter’s assault, Beaulieu must first

show that, objectively, she was “incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Second, as to

the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, she “must

show that prison officials possessed a sufficiently culpable

state of mind, namely one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to [her]

health or safety.” Burrell v. Hampshire Cty.,

(1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). A prison official acts with

deliberate indifference when he or she “knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer,

. Knowledge of such a risk exists when a prison official

is “both . . . aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . .

also draw[s] the inference.”

Plainly, then, “deliberate

indifference entails something more than mere negligence.”

.

14 B. Shepley (Count I)

Defendants do not dispute that Shepley knew that Beaulieu

was afraid of Ruiter. Nor do they contend that it was unusual

or unreasonable for Beaulieu to ask that Ruiter be confined to

his cell while Beaulieu was out of her cell. But, it is also

undisputed that after Shepley placed Beaulieu in her cell (and

before leaving the tier and radioing for Ruiter’s release),

Shepley contacted the control room and asked that the door to

her cell be secured. There is no submission of evidentiary

quality disputing Shepley’s affidavit, which states that he did

not know that Beaulieu’s door was unlocked after he radioed for

it to be secured. And, nothing in the record provides a basis

for a reasonable jury to find that Shepley was deliberately

indifferent to the risk that Beaulieu’s cell door might be

unsecured while Ruiter was out on the tier. Indeed, on this

record, a jury could not reasonably conclude that he was even

negligent. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on Count I is granted.

C. Whitney and Washburn (Count II)

Beaulieu claims that Officers Whitney and Washburn are

liable for failing to ensure that her cell door was secure while

Ruiter was outside his cell, on the tier. The evidence is

15 undisputed, however, that neither officer knew that Beaulieu’s

door was unlocked during the relevant time period (that is,

until Ruiter signaled to them, sometime after he left Beaulieu’s

cell). Because Beaulieu has failed to identify any triable

issue of fact as to Whitney’s and Washburn’s lack of subjective

knowledge that her cell door was unlocked, those defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claims.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted

on those claims in Count II asserted against Whitney and

Washburn.

D. Laflamme (Count II)

Laflamme is also entitled to summary judgment on Count II.

The allegedly wrongful (and unconstitutional) conduct underlying

the claims in Count II consists of defendants having allegedly:

(1) allowed Beaulieu’s cell door to be open when Ruiter was on

the tier; and (2) allowed a third party (Laflamme) to be in the

SHU control room during inmate movements. But, it is undisputed

that Whitney and Washburn, not Laflamme, were operating the SHU

control room panels when Ruiter assaulted Beaulieu. And,

Laflamme’s mere act of socializing with those officers during

cell movements that those officers were responsible for

monitoring, falls well short of knowing about and consciously

16 disregarding an excessive risk to Beaulieu’s health and safety.

Stated somewhat differently, the record in no way supports even

an inference that Laflamme was deliberately indifferent to

Beaulieu’s safety and welfare during the events in question, or

that he played any role at all in bringing about any harm to

her.

As Beaulieu has not met her burden to demonstrate the

existence of a triable issue as to that claim, Laflamme is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count II.

III. The Eighth Amendment and Excessive Force

A. Governing Law

“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that

the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the

Eighth Amendment.” Farmer,

(citations and

internal punctuation omitted). But, “[t]hat is not to say that

every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal

cause of action. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel

and unusual’ punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the

17 use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian,

, 9–10 (1992) (citing

Johnson v. Glick,

(2d Cir. 1973) (“Not every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s

constitutional rights”)). Rather, the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids “the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hudson,

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Claims Against Kirrane and Belanger

In Count III, Beaulieu claims that Kirrane and Belanger

used excessive force against her when, on August 16, 2013, they

restrained and kneed her in an effort to subdue her and retrieve

the belt she had swung at them. That conduct, says Beaulieu,

violated her rights under the Eighth Amendment.

The core inquiry presented by Beaulieu’s claim is whether

Kirrane and Belanger employed force against Beaulieu “in a good-

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” or whether they

acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson,

(citing Whitley v. Albers,

(1986)). Relevant factors to that inquiry include: (1) the

18 threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; (2)

whether the use of force “could plausibly have been thought

necessary”; (3) the relationship between the need for force and

the amount of force actually employed; (4) any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response; and, finally, (5)

the nature and extent of Beaulieu’s injuries. Hudson,

.

Here, both officers have stated that, because Beaulieu was

in an agitated state and because she swung the belt buckle at

them, they perceived her possession of the belt to be a threat.

They also join in asserting that she resisted their efforts to

retrieve the belt and, while she was on the floor, attempted to

draw her handcuffed hands under her body. Beaulieu’s general

and conclusory assertion that she “was in no way resisting,”

Beaulieu Aff. (doc. no. 87-7) at para. 8, is insufficient to

create a genuinely disputed triable issue of fact. See

generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986); Serapion v. Martinez,

(1st Cir. 1997).

Whether Beaulieu was resisting or whether she was compliant is a

conclusion that must be drawn based upon all of the facts

attendant to the events in question. And, Beaulieu’s affidavits

are devoid of any factual assertions that contradict (or even

19 undermine) the officers’ claim that, rather than cooperatively

returning the belt in question, Beaulieu forced them to wrestle

it from her as she struggled on the floor of her cell.

Given the undisputed facts of record, each of the factors

identified in Hudson persuasively points to the conclusion that

the use of force against Beaulieu, as well as the quantum of

force applied, were reasonable. Under the circumstances, the

officers plainly could have thought the use of some force was

necessary to retrieve the belt from (an uncooperative and

agitated) Beaulieu. The threat reasonably posed by Beaulieu’s

possession (and swinging) of the belt was both real and

substantial. There is no indication that the officers used a

disproportionate amount of force in order to recover the belt -

indeed, the entire incident lasted less than two minutes and

Beaulieu does not claim the officers continued to use force

against her once she relinquished control of the belt. On that

point, the evidence is undisputed: once the officers recovered

the belt, the struggle with Beaulieu ended, they lifted her off

the floor, and they escorted her to the cell door, so they could

remove her handcuffs through the tray slot. And, finally, the

nature and extent of Beaulieu’s injuries - complaints of a sore

wrist and no documented injuries related to the “knee strike” to

20 her thigh – strongly suggest that the amount of force employed

by the officers was no more than de minimis. Under the

circumstances presented, a knee strike to Beaulieu’s thigh that

produces no resulting injury and no contemporaneous medical

complaint from the prisoner, is not the sort of force that is

“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson,

.

On this record, then, Beaulieu has simply failed to

identify any trial-worthy issues of disputed fact. The force

employed by the officers against Beaulieu in an effort to

recover the belt was, under the circumstances, reasonable and

measured and it served a legitimate penological purpose; nothing

in the record would support the conclusion that the officers

were acting “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,”

Hudson,

, or that they engaged in “the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain,” Whitley

.

Consequently, as a matter of law, the force used against

Beaulieu in order to recover the belt was not violative of the

Eighth Amendment. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to

summary judgment as to Beaulieu’s excessive force claim.

21 IV. Count IV - Leaked Inmate Information and Failure to Protect

Finally, in Count IV of her complaint, Beaulieu claims that

CO John Aulis and CO Dominic Salce violated her rights under the

Eighth Amendment by disclosing “security information” about her

to inmate Collier, which proximately caused Collier to harass

and assault her. And, says Beaulieu, after providing Collier

with the information that inspired his harassing and assaultive

behavior, those officers then failed to prevent or protect her

from that behavior.

Even assuming that Collier’s harassment and spraying of

Beaulieu with the hose inflicted upon her the type of

“sufficiently serious” injury(s) that might give rise to a

viable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, see generally

Farmer,

, it is undisputed that Aulis neither

prompted Collier to harass Beaulieu, nor failed to protect

Beaulieu from him. In his affidavit, Aulis stated - without

contradiction - that he never disclosed any information about

Beaulieu’s sex-offender status or any other “security

information” about Beaulieu to Collier. See Aff. of John Aulis,

Dec. 9, 2015 (doc. no. 59-13) (“Aulis Aff.”) at para. 2. It is

also undisputed that Aulis was unaware that Collier had harassed

or assaulted Beaulieu, or that Collier posed a threat to her.

22 See

Because no reasonable jury could find in favor of

Beaulieu on the factual predicates for her Eighth Amendment

claim against CO Aulis, he is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law on that part of Count IV.

It is also undisputed that CO Salce: (1) never disclosed

any information about Beaulieu’s sex-offender status or other

“security information” about her to Collier, see Aff. of Dominic

Salce, Dec. 17, 2015 (doc. no. 88-2) at para. 2; and (2) was

unaware that Collier had ever harassed or assaulted Beaulieu,

see

6 Again, Beaulieu has failed to show that there are any

triable issues on the factual predicates to her claims.

Accordingly, CO Dominic Salce is also entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims in

Count IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the eight named corrections

officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all

6 The affidavit of Dominic Salce, document no. 88-2, appears to have been executed before Tara L. Whiting, on December 17, 2015, five years after the expiration of her commission as a Justice of the Peace/Notary Public. Nevertheless, that document also includes the declaration required by

. The court has, therefore, accepted that document as equivalent to a properly executed affidavit.

23 claims advanced against them in Beaulieu’s complaint. Their

motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 59) is, therefore,

granted.

Beaulieu’s claims against inmates Collier and Ruiter are

unaffected by this Order. Further proceedings on those claims

will be addressed in a separate Order.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

September 28, 2016

cc: Christopher (Crystal) Beaulieu, pro se Laura E.B. Lombardi, Esq.

24