UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Lorraine MacDonald et al.

v. Case No. 17-cv-499-AJ Opinion No.

Jacobs’ Family Trust

O R D E R

Plaintiffs Lorraine and Peter MacDonald bring this action

against the Jacobs’ Family Trust through its trustee, Arthur

Jacobs, alleging two counts of negligence and one count of

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs

contend that Arthur Jacobs’s sister, Lisa Jacobs, harassed and

threatened the plaintiffs and made false reports against them

while residing with the Trust’s permission at a property the

Trust owned that abutted the plaintiffs’ property. Originally

filed in state court, the Trust removed the matter to this court

based on diversity jurisdiction. See doc. no. 1. The

plaintiffs move to remand the case to state court, arguing that

the removal was untimely. Doc. no. 4. The Trust objects. Doc.

no. 6. For the reasons that follow, the motion to remand is

denied.

Background

The plaintiffs first filed this action in state court on

January 26, 2017. See doc. no. 1-1 at 5. On June 6, 2017, the plaintiffs effected service of process on the Trust. See doc.

no. 4-2 at 1-2. The plaintiffs concede that this service did

not comply with New Hampshire law. See doc. no. 4-1 ¶ 2. The

Trust moved to dismiss the action for, among other things, lack

of personal jurisdiction. See doc. no. 1-5 at 3-30. On

September 12, 2017, the state court denied that motion on

personal jurisdiction grounds, but directed the plaintiffs to

effect proper service within 60 days. See doc. no. 1-7 at 20.

The plaintiffs properly served the Trust on September 14,

2017. See doc. no. 1-4. On September 22, 2017, the plaintiffs

received a $160,000 jury verdict against Lisa Jacobs in a

separate action. Doc. no. 6-2 at 2-3. On that same day,

plaintiffs’ counsel emailed counsel for the Trust and indicated

that this award would “constitute an element of damages in

connection” with this case. Id. at 1. Plaintiffs’ counsel

referenced the jury verdict form, which he attached to the

email. Id. at 2-3. On October 16, 2017, the Trust removed the

case to this court. Doc. no. 1.

Discussion

The procedure for removing civil actions is governed by

. Section 1446(b) sets forth two thirty-day

windows for removal. See Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2014). Section 1446(b)(1) generally

2 requires that removal occur “within 30 days after the receipt by

the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the

initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which

such action or proceeding is based . . . .”

(quoting

(b)(1)). But if that pleading does not state a

removable case, § 1446(b)(3) allows for removal “within 30 days

after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of

a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is

or has become removable.” Id. (quoting

(b)(3)).

The removing defendant has the burden of showing that removal is

proper. Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., LLC,

, 48 (1st

Cir. 2008).

As the Trust solely invokes this court’s diversity

jurisdiction, and there is no dispute the parties reside in

different states, the removability of this action depends on

whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

(a). The plaintiffs contend that this was

ascertainable from the complaint, 1 and that the Trust therefore

should have removed this matter no later than thirty days after

1 Though the plaintiffs do not explicitly raise this contention, it is implied in their more general argument that the Trust “had sufficient information to ascertain the action was removable” once it received the complaint. Doc. no. 4-1 ¶ 11.

3 it received the complaint. 2 The Trust counters that it could not

ascertain that this matter was removable until it received the

September 22, 2017 email indicating that the plaintiffs would

seek to recover the $160,000 verdict against Lisa Jacobs as part

of this lawsuit. Only then, according to the Trust, was it

clear that there was a sufficient amount in controversy for this

matter to fall within this court’s diversity jurisdiction.

“[A] plaintiff’s pleading or later paper will trigger the

deadlines in Section 1446(b) if [it] includes a clear statement

of the damages sought or . . . sets forth sufficient facts from

which the amount in controversy can easily be ascertained by the

defendant by simple calculation.” Romulus,

.

“The defendant has no duty, however, to investigate or to supply

facts outside of those provided by the plaintiff.”

The court turns first to the complaint. This pleading

plainly does not include a clear statement of the damages

sought. The court therefore must determine whether it sets

forth sufficient facts from which the Trust could have easily

ascertained the amount in controversy by simple calculation.

2 The plaintiffs alternatively argue that this occurred on June 6, 2017, when they initially, but improperly, served the Trust, on September 12, 2017, when the state court denied the Trust’s motion to dismiss and directed service, or on September 14, 2017, when they properly served process. As there is no dispute that the Trust did not file its notice of removal within thirty days of any of these dates, the court need not determine which date is operative.

4 The court concludes that it does not. Though the complaint

makes certain references to damages, see doc. no. 1-1 ¶¶ 1, 29,

31, 33, and at one point states that the plaintiffs are entitled

to a “substantial monetary reward,” see id. ¶ 31, there is no

indication that the plaintiffs seek to recover an amount

exceeding $75,000 as part of this action. 3 Thus, there was no

way for the Trust to ascertain from the complaint that this case

was removable. Receipt of the complaint accordingly did not

trigger the 30-day period under § 1446(b).

The September 22, 2017 email is the only other document

that could have indicated to the Trust that this case met the

court’s jurisdictional threshold. The court must therefore

determine whether that email provided sufficient basis for the

Trust to remove this action. The court has little trouble

concluding that it did. The First Circuit has previously held

that an email sent by a plaintiff constitutes the type of “other

paper” that can trigger § 1446(b)(3)’s thirty-day deadline. See

Romulus,

. The September 22, 2017 email

specifically indicated that the plaintiffs would seek to recover

3 Indeed, the only discussion of the amount in controversy in the complaint is several references to the New Hampshire superior court’s jurisdictional limits and minimums. See doc. no. 1-1 ¶¶ 39, 31, 33. These references do not put the action within the jurisdictional limits of this court, however, because the superior court has a significantly lower threshold for both concurrent jurisdiction ($1,500) and exclusive jurisdiction ($25,000). See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann §§ 491:7; 502-A:14.

5 the jury verdict they received in their action against Lisa

Jacobs as part of this action. Doc. no. 6-2 at 1. And the jury

verdict form, referenced in and attached to the email, indicated

that the verdict totaled $160,000. Id. at 2-3. Based on this

information, the Trust could easily ascertain that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000. The September 22, 2017 email

therefore triggered the thirty-day period under § 1446(b)(3).

As the Trust filed its removal within thirty days of that email,

see doc. no. 1-1, removal was timely.

Though the parties only address timeliness in their papers,

the court has an independent obligation to ensure there is a

substantive basis for federal jurisdiction. See Henderson ex

rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,

, 434 (2011). While in

some cases this requires a separate analysis of whether the

amount actually in controversy meets the jurisdictional

threshold, see, e.g., Romulus,

-81; Thomas v. Adecco

USA, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00070-JAW,

, at *4-7 (D.

Me. Nov. 21, 2013), in this case this analysis is coextensive

with the above determination with respect to timeliness. Though

the First Circuit has never addressed the specific circumstances

at issue in this case, it has held in a similar context that a

removing defendant “must show a ‘reasonable probability’” that

the amount in controversy is met. Romulus,

(citation omitted). The First Circuit has stressed, however,

6 that “the pertinent question is what is in controversy in the

case, not how much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to

recover.”

(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Here, the September 22, 2017 email plainly establishes that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As there is no dispute

that the parties are diverse, there is a substantive basis for

diversity jurisdiction over this action. See

(a).

Conclusion

In sum, the court concludes that the Trust timely removed

this action and that it falls within the court’s diversity

jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ motion to remand (doc. no. 4) is

accordingly denied.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Andrea K. Johnstone United States Magistrate Judge

April 11, 2018

cc: Joseph S. Hoppock, Esq. Christopher T. Hilson, Esq.

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