UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Stephanie Andrews

v. Civil No. 16-cv-270-PB Opinion No.

US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner, Nancy A. Berryhill

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Stephanie Andrews challenges the Social Security

Administration’s decision to deny her claim for Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”). She argues that the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) erred by ignoring a medical opinion and using lay

knowledge to assess her residual functional capacity (“RFC”).

I. BACKGROUND

In accordance with Local Rule 9.1, the parties have

submitted a joint statement of stipulated facts (Doc. No. 14).

Because that joint statement is part of the court’s record, I do

not recount it here. I discuss facts relevant to the

disposition of this matter as necessary below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

I am authorized to review the pleadings submitted by the

parties and the administrative record and enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the “final decision” of the

1 Commissioner. See

(g). That review is limited,

however, “to determining whether the ALJ used the proper legal

standards and found facts [based] upon the proper quantum of

evidence.” Ward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(1st

Cir. 2000). I defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, so long as

those findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence exists “if a reasonable mind, reviewing the

evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate

to support his conclusion.” Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam)

(quoting Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1981)).

If the substantial evidence standard is met, the ALJ’s

factual findings are conclusive, even where the record “arguably

could support a different conclusion.” Id. at 770. Findings

are not conclusive, however, if the ALJ derived his findings by

“ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters

entrusted to experts.” Nguyen v. Chater,

(1st

Cir. 1999) (per curiam). The ALJ is responsible for determining

issues of credibility and for drawing inferences from evidence

in the record. Irlanda Ortiz,

. It is the role

of the ALJ, not the court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence.

2 III. ANALYSIS

Andrews is a thirty-one-year-old woman with negligible work

history who alleges that she has been disabled since March 30,

2012. In April 2013, she filed an application for SSI. When

her claim was denied, she requested a hearing before an ALJ.

The hearing was held in October 2014, and in March 2015 the ALJ

issued a written decision concluding that Andrews was not

disabled.

The ALJ evaluated her claim under the five-step sequential

process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. Tr. at

105–16; see

(a). At step one, the ALJ found

that Andrews had not worked since she applied for benefits. At

step two, the ALJ found that Andrews had severe impairments of

depression and panic disorder with agoraphobia, but declined to

find any severe physical impairments. At step three, the ALJ

found that Andrews’ impairments did not qualify for any listed

impairment. The ALJ then assessed Andrews’ RFC, finding that

she could physically perform “a full range of work at all

exertional levels” but had a limited capacity for social

interaction and handling complicated or unexpected work.

Recognizing at step four that she had no past relevant work, the

ALJ found that despite her limitations Andrews could perform a

significant number of jobs in the economy. Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded that Andrews was not disabled. The Appeals Council

3 declined to review the ALJ’s decision, which is now ripe for

review in this court.

Andrews argues that the ALJ ignored the opinion of an

examining psychologist and used lay knowledge to arrive at an

RFC unsupported by any opinion in the record. The Acting

Commissioner responds that the ALJ plainly considered the

psychologist’s opinion and did not improperly use lay knowledge

to craft the RFC.

I begin by explaining that the ALJ did not ignore the

psychologist’s opinion. I then discuss the opinions and

evidence supporting the mental RFC assessment before explaining

why the physical RFC assessment does not present a reversible

error.

A. Dr. Griffin’s Opinion

Andrews argues that the ALJ ignored an opinion by examining

psychologist Stefanie Griffin, Ph.D. For the following reasons,

I disagree.

“Ordinarily . . . an ALJ’s failure to consider a medical

opinion in the record at all is legal error that requires

remand.” Grenier v. Colvin,

. An ALJ must also

evaluate all medical opinions. See

(c)

(2015) (amended 2017). Accordingly, an ALJ “must explain in the

decision the weight given to” opinions by non-examining sources.

4 § 416.927(e)(2)(ii); see also SSR 96-8p,

, at *7

(July 2, 1996).

In February 2014, as part of Andrews’ application for state

disability benefits, she attended a single examination with Dr.

Griffin. See Tr. at 372–78. Dr. Griffin observed that Andrews’

speech was normal, her affect was appropriate, and her mood was

“mildly dysphoric.” Tr. at 375. Andrews reported severe

depression and anxiety that worsened in social settings. See,

e.g., Tr. at 375. She also stated that she lacked friends. See

Tr. at 375. Andrews reported the following daily routine: she

awoke at 4:30 AM each morning to drive her boyfriend to work and

spent the remainder of the day making breakfast for her

children, playing games with her son, preparing her daughter for

school, cleaning, playing games on her phone, picking up her

boyfriend from work, picking up her son from school, and

alternating cooking duties with her boyfriend. See Tr. at 375.

Andrews successfully managed the household finances, but had

difficulty showering and cleaning on a regular basis, and

experienced anxiety while shopping alone. See Tr. at 375. Her

medical care over the years was inconsistent, and she had a

history of failing to take her prescribed medication. See Tr.

at 374–76, 378.

On the basis of the examination, Dr. Griffin opined that

Andrews has a “reduced quality of completion of daily activities

5 due to depressive symptoms”; “appears capable of interacting

appropriately with others on a superficial level but [her]

capacity for sustained relationships with others appears

somewhat reduced”; and has “difficulty with attention/

concentration and task completion.” Tr. at 376–77. As for

work, Dr. Griffin opined, “[o]verall, [Andrews] does not appear

capable of interacting appropriately with others in a work

setting or adhering to a work schedule because of psychiatric

symptoms.” Tr. at 377. Dr. Griffin added that Andrews “does

not appear to have had regular psychiatric treatment as an

adult,” and her functioning would improve if she consistently

received such treatment and took her prescribed medications.

See Tr. at 377–78. Based in part on Dr. Griffin’s evaluation,

Andrews was found disabled for purposes of the state disability

program and Medicaid benefits. Tr. at 365–371, 379.

The ALJ plainly considered Dr. Griffin’s opinion. In

determining whether Andrews met a listed impairment and in

assessing her RFC, the ALJ explicitly discussed Dr. Griffin’s

findings, see Tr. at 107, 110, and repeatedly cited her report,

see Tr. at 106–07, 110. Thus, the notion that the ALJ ignored

Dr. Griffin’s opinion is flatly incorrect.

The ALJ also evaluated Dr. Griffin’s opinion. In

evaluating the medical opinions in the record, the ALJ wrote:

6 I have fully considered the findings contained within the Medicaid Disability Determination, including the finding that the claimant meets listing 12.04, as previously discussed. Nevertheless, I give little weight to such determination due to its inconsistency with the objective medical evidence and the other opinion evidence of record . . .

Tr. at 113. Dr. Griffin’s opinion and findings were part of the

state determination. Although a nurse made findings for the

state, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Griffin’s opinion as well. First,

the ALJ repeatedly discusses it earlier in the decision. See,

e.g., Tr. at 110 (noting that Andrews “reported to Dr. Griffin

that she often forget[s] to take [her medication], indicating

she was not necessarily compliant with treatment”). Second, the

ALJ’s decision explains that the ALJ “fully considered the

findings contained within the Medicaid Disability Determination”

and found them inconsistent with the objective medical and

opinion evidence. Tr. at 113. Although the ALJ’s statements

are not a paragon of clarity, I conclude that the ALJ did

evaluate Dr. Griffin’s opinion.

Relatedly, Andrews argues that the ALJ erred by not

explicitly mentioning Dr. Griffin’s finding that Andrews “does

not appear capable of interacting appropriately with others in a

work setting or adhering to a work schedule because of

psychiatric symptoms.” Tr. at 377; see Doc. No. 9–1 at 4. But

the ALJ explicitly noted a contrary conclusion by reviewing

state agency psychologist Nicholas Kalfas, Ph.D. Tr. at 113.

7 The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Kalfas’ opinion, discounting

only the “overly pessimistic” finding that Andrews had moderate

limitations in activities of daily living because the finding

conflicted with the record. See Tr. at 113. The ALJ also

mentioned and implicitly discounted a finding by examining

psychologist Robert Su Prescott, Ph.D., that Andrews had work-

interaction limitations similar to those found by Dr. Griffin.

See Tr. at 112–13, 309. The ALJ’s discussions are adequate when

coupled with her explanation that Dr. Griffin’s opinion was

“inconsisten[t] with the objective medical evidence and the

other opinion evidence of record.” Tr. at 113. Moreover, the

assigned RFC essentially reflects the work-interaction

difficulties identified by Dr. Griffin with relatively minor

differences. See Tr. at 108. For these reasons, the ALJ did

not commit reversible error by not explicitly mentioning Dr.

Griffin’s statement. See Ward,

(“While an error

of law by the ALJ may necessitate a remand, a remand is not

essential if it will amount to no more than an empty exercise.”

(citation omitted)).

Accordingly, the ALJ’s handling of Dr. Griffin’s opinion

does not warrant remand.

B. RFC Assessment

Andrews next argues that the ALJ impermissibly used lay

knowledge to craft an RFC that departs from every medical

8 opinion in the record, including the lone physical RFC

evaluation. The Acting Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s RFC

assessment was supported by substantial evidence and emphasizes

the dearth of objective medical evidence showing a disabling,

medically determinable physical impairment.

A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do

despite [her] limitations.”

(a)(1). The ALJ

must assess the claimant’s RFC “based on all the relevant

evidence in [the] record.”

On appeal, I determine whether

the assigned RFC is free of legal error and supported by

substantial evidence. See Nguyen,

.

1. Mental Limitations

Andrews argues that the ALJ rejected every medical opinion

and used lay knowledge to “craft[] an RFC unlike any imagined by

the medical professionals in the [record].” Doc. No. 9–1 at 6.

I disagree.

The ALJ gave the following assessment of Andrews’ mental

limitations:

[Andrews] can understand, carry out and remember simple instructions. She can make judgment[s] on simple work that is repetitive from day to day with few and expected changes. Furthermore, she can interact occasionally with supervisors and coworkers, but not with the general public.

Tr. at 108. In crafting this RFC, the ALJ considered the

objective medical record, five opinions, Andrews’ daily

9 activities, her treatment history, and her statements about her

symptoms. The ALJ determined that although Andrews’ depression

and panic disorder imposed functional limitations, her

allegations regarding the extent of those limitations were not

fully credible.

The ALJ’s RFC largely mirrors the RFC by reviewing state

agency psychologist Kalfas, who opined that Andrews

is limited to understanding, remembering and carrying out short and simple instructions. She is able to get along with coworkers and supervisors, and respond to supervisory criticism, in a semi-isolated work station under non-critical supervision. Under these conditions, she is able to adjust to routine stressors. She is able to ask simple questions, request assistance, and set routine goals in the work setting. She can keep a regular schedule without special supervision. She is able to sustain a full 8 hour day and 40 hour week, without an unreasonable number of interruptions from psychologically based symptoms.

Tr. at 95. The ALJ accorded Kalfas’ opinion partial weight.1

The ALJ also gave weight to a similar opinion by examining

consultant psychologist Su Prescott.2 As for the remaining

opinions, the ALJ explicitly considered and evaluated them. See

1 The ALJ discounted only the finding that Andrews had moderate limitations in activities of daily living. The ALJ explained that this finding “overly pessimistic” in light of Andrews’ reported daily activities, including successfully caring for two young children. See Tr. at 113.

2 The ALJ discounted Dr. Su Prescott’s opinion to the extent that he examined Andrews only once and lacked a treating relationship with her. Tr. at 112–13.

10 Tr. at 113–14. Thus, despite Andrews’ protestation, the mental

RFC assessment found by the ALJ is a far cry from Jabre v.

Astrue, where the “ALJ reject[ed] the opinion of a medical

professional as a step toward fashioning an RFC that [was]

unsupported by any other medical opinion in the record.” See

Jabre v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-332-JL,

, at *8

(D.N.H. Apr. 5, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub

nom. Jabre v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 11-cv-332-JL,

(D.N.H. Apr. 9, 2012). Here, in contrast, the assigned

RFC is supported by the opinions of two psychologists.

More particularly, Andrews argues that “[t]he ALJ’s

limitation that ‘she can interact occasionally with supervisors

and co-workers’ is not supported by any medical opinion.” Doc.

No. 9–1 at 9. I disagree because Dr. Kalfas expressed

essentially the same opinion that the ALJ adopted on this issue.

See Tr. at 95.3 Moreover, Andrews does not challenge the ALJ’s

3 The ALJ did not err by not explicitly adopting Dr. Kalfas’ statement that Andrews can “respond to supervisory criticism, in a semi-isolated work station under non-critical supervision.” See Tr. at 95; see also Doc. No. 9–1 at 9. The social limitations found by the ALJ — only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors and no interaction with the general public — essentially reflect Dr. Kalfas’ vague limitations. See Cericola v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-391-DBH,

, at *2– 4 (D. Me. Oct. 15, 2013) (affirming where ALJ interpreted limitation to “occasional or well-modulated criticism” as limitation to “brief supervision” with a preference for independent work); Downs v. Colvin,

, 9–11, 27 (affirming where ALJ omitted limitation of ‘not-overly-critical’ supervision but limited claimant to “brief and superficial” 11 determinations that she was not fully credible and failed to

follow prescribed treatment that would improve her symptoms.

See

(a) (2015) (amended 2017) (“In order to

get benefits, you must follow treatment prescribed by your

physician if this treatment can restore your ability to work . .

. .”); see also, e.g., Tr. at 110 (noting that Andrews “was not

necessarily compliant with treatment”), 111, 112 (noting that

Andrews’ treatment was “essentially conservative,” and she “has

generally not received the type of medical treatment one would

expect for a disabled individual”). Thus, the ALJ did not

improperly use lay knowledge in finding that Andrews could

occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors.

interaction with supervisors); Breton v. Berryhill,

, 13 n.1, 26 (affirming where ALJ omitted limitation to ‘not- overly-critical’ supervision despite RFC opinion to that effect); Robar v. Astrue,

, 22–23 (affirming where ALJ omitted limitation to ‘not-overly critical’ supervision found in opinion to which ALJ gave great weight); cf. Young v. Barnhart,

(7th Cir. 2004) (remanding where ALJ failed, inter alia, to limit claimant’s interaction with supervisors despite finding that claimant had limited ability to respond to supervisors’ criticism). Moreover, several opinions omitted a limitation to non-critical supervision. Cf. Lincourt v. Colvin,

, 9–12, 14 (affirming where at least one RFC evaluation found claimant could accept supervisory criticism, and implicitly finding ‘not- overly-critical’ supervision limitation was consistent with no supervisory limitation and occasional coworker interaction). But see MacKenzie v. Colvin,

, 10–13 (remanding where, inter alia, ALJ limited claimant to “brief and superficial social interaction with . . . supervisors” but “ALJ did not explain why he omitted the requirement of a non-critical supervisor” found in only opinion supporting ability to work). 12 For these reasons, the ALJ did not err in assessing

Andrews’ mental limitations.

2. Physical Limitations

Andrews next argues that the ALJ improperly used lay

knowledge in arriving at a physical RFC that was not fully

supported by the only physical RFC evaluation in the record.

The Acting Commissioner responds that the evidence did not

support more than a mild physical impairment.

Before examining Andrews’ argument, I highlight what she

does not challenge. First, Andrews does not challenge the ALJ’s

conclusion at step two that she had no severe, medically

determinable physical impairments. See

(“The law defines disability as the inability to do any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment . . . To meet this

definition, you must have a severe impairment(s). . . .”); §

416.908 (2015) (amended 2017) (“Your impairment must result from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which

can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques” and cannot be established merely “by your

statement of symptoms”). Had the ALJ not found that Andrews’

mental impairments were severe, the ALJ would not have fashioned

an RFC because her disability claim would have failed at step

two. See § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Tonev v. Sullivan,

,

13 at *2 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished); Perez v. Sec’y

of Health & Human Servs.,

, 446–47 (1st Cir. 1991)

(per curiam).4

Second, Andrews does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility

determination. Andrews bore the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that she was disabled due to a

medically determinable impairment. See Morse v. U.S. Soc. Sec.

Admin., Comm’r, No. 12-cv-446-PB,

, at *5 (D.N.H.

Oct. 25, 2013); § 416.905. But a claimant’s statements about

her pain cannot alone establish that she is disabled.

§ 416.929(a) (2015) (amended 2017). Instead, “there must be

medical signs and laboratory findings which show . . . a medical

impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the

pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. Andrews fails to

challenge the ALJ’s determination that the pain Andrews reported

was not credible to the extent alleged, given the medical record

and her daily activities.

With these considerations in mind, I examine Andrews’

argument that the ALJ improperly used lay knowledge to assign a

physical RFC without an expert RFC evaluation directly on point.

Generally, “an ALJ, as a lay person, is not qualified to

interpret raw data in a medical record.” Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y

4 Andrews does not argue that the ALJ failed to consider all of her impairments in formulating the RFC. 14 of Health & Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1996) (per

curiam). For that reason, “an expert’s RFC evaluation is

ordinarily essential.” See

“Of course, where the medical

evidence shows relatively little physical impairment, an ALJ

permissibly can render a commonsense judgment about functional

capacity even without a physician’s assessment.”

Such

independent judgments are permissible so long as the “evidence

suggests a relatively mild . . . impairment posing, to the

layperson's eye, no significant . . . restrictions.” Roberts v.

Barnhart,

(1st Cir. 2003) (per curiam)

(unpublished) (alterations in original) (quoting Manso-Pizarro,

76 F.3d at 17–18); see also Gordils v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs.,

(per curiam).

The medical record and the hearing in this case centered on

Andrews’ mental limitations, not any exertional or postural

limitations. Although Andrews alleged that she had physical

impairments, she conceded to the ALJ that “they’re not

documented.” Tr. at 42. Andrews alleged “severe back and hip

pain” and tendonitis in her arms, Tr. at 42, 218,5 but she did

not discuss these alleged impairments with treating providers,

see, e.g., Tr. at 373–74. At Andrews’ primary-care

appointments, she consistently presented with a normal gait,

5 The ALJ also recognized Andrews’ acne, obesity, and headaches as non-severe impairments. 15 see, e.g., Tr. at 329, 334, 337, inconsistently reported back

and joint pain, see, e.g., Tr. at 325, 333, 346, and

musculoskeletal examinations were normal, see, e.g., Tr. at 325,

334.

The record contains one physical RFC report. In July 2013,

Andrews was examined by consulting physician G. Silvia Sironich-

Kalkan, M.D. Tr. at 301. The examination results were

essentially normal. Although Andrews alleged arm and hand

numbness, and Dr. Sironich-Kalkan noted spinal “tenderness,”

there is no elaboration. Tr. at 303. Dr. Sironich-Kalkan wrote

that Andrews

reports that she can be sitting as much as she needs, standing 15 minutes, her back hurts, walking 30 minutes, she has pain in her feet and her hip. In an assessment of eight hours, she can cumulative be sitting for four hours and standing and walking for three hours. She does not need to lie down during the day. She can lift and carry on an occasional basis 70 pounds. She has no trouble bending, squatting, or kneeling for short periods of time.

Tr. at 301.

The ALJ accorded this opinion little weight. The ALJ noted

that although the examination revealed no significant

abnormalities, Dr. Sironich-Kalkan determined without

explanation that Andrews was subject to restrictive limits on

sitting, standing, and walking. The ALJ explained that those

assessments “are essentially a reflection of the claimant’s

self-reported allegations of physical pain and limitations and

16 are unsupported by the medical record and her own

contemporaneous findings.” Tr. at 112.

I conclude that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr.

Sironich-Kalkan’s conspicuously self-contradictory assessment.

Dr. Sironich-Kalkan noted Andrews’ admission that “she can be

sitting as much as she needs,” but inexplicably opined that

Andrews “can cumulative be sitting for four hours.” Tr. at 301.

Similarly, Dr. Sironich-Kalkan wrote that Andrews “does not need

to lie down during the day,” but inexplicably opined that she

can cumulatively sit, stand, and walk for only seven out of

eight hours. Tr. at 301. These limitations conflict not only

with Dr. Sironich-Kalkan’s essentially normal examination

results, but also with Andrews’ sparse complaints to treating

sources and the absence of any supporting diagnoses, treatment,

and diagnostic or laboratory findings. Finally, although Dr.

Sironich-Kalkan opined that Andrews’ anxiety and depression

precluded work, she failed to likewise state that Andrews’

alleged physical impairments precluded work. Given the

significant weaknesses in Dr. Sironich-Kalkan’s opinion, the ALJ

permissibly accorded it little weight. See Swales v. Berryhill,

No. 16-10214-RWZ,

, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Mar. 28,

2017) (stating that ALJ did not err in according little weight

to only physical RFC evaluation in record).

17 Andrews also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing an RFC

without an expert RFC opinion directly on point. I disagree.

It is true, of course, that an ALJ may not interpret technical

medical data or draw functional conclusions from a highly

ramified medical record. But the flaw in Andrews’ position is

the lack of medical evidence of disabling physical impairments

to evaluate in the first place. For example, a physician

assistant examining Andrews noted that her disabling impairment

was “mental status (anxiety)” without noting any disabling

physical impairments. See Tr. at 114, 325 (also noting that

Andrews denied any pain, including back and joint pain); SSR 06-

03p,

, at *2 (August 9, 2006) (stating that ALJ

may use information from physician assistants to assess severity

and functional impact of an impairment). Although the ALJ as

layperson may not interpret raw, technical, medical data,

Andrews does not cite any medical evidence that outstripped the

ALJ’s ken as a layperson. Andrews does not even suggest what

medically determinable physical impairment could plausibly have

imposed the sitting, standing, and walking limitations found by

Dr. Sironich-Kalkan.

I conclude that the ALJ was permitted to draw the

commonsense conclusion that Andrews was physically able to

perform sedentary work. Sedentary work generally involves

sitting for six hours, standing or walking for two hours, and

18 lifting at most 10 pounds. See

(a); SSR 83-

10,

, at *5 (January 1, 1983). The ALJ was

permitted to find that Andrews had the required capacity for

lifting because there was no evidence of diminished strength and

Dr. Sironich-Kalkan found that Andrews could occasionally lift

70 pounds. See § 416.967(a); Tr. at 301. The ALJ was also

permitted to find that Andrews could sit for six hours. There

was no objective medical evidence of hip or back impairments,

save a lone note of spinal “tenderness,” and the record does not

contain any explanation, diagnosis, or treatment. Moreover, the

ALJ’s credibility determination went unchallenged, and Andrews

admitted that she can sit “as much as she needs.” Tr. at 301.

The ALJ was also permitted to find that Andrews could perform

the modest standing and walking required for sedentary work.

There was simply no diagnosis of hip or back disorder, no

medical evidence to corroborate Andrews’ one-off complaint of

foot pain, and no treatment for these alleged impairments. In

addition, Andrews admitted doing housework for five-hour

stretches, Tr. at 92, and Dr. Sironich-Kalkan found that she can

stand and walk for three hours, see Tr. at 301.

In these ways, the “evidence suggests a relatively mild

physical impairment posing, to the layperson's eye, no

significant . . . restrictions.” See Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d at

17–18; Roberts,

. Thus, the ALJ was permitted

19 to make a commonsense judgment about Andrews’ physical

limitations. See Gordils,

(finding no expert

required); Perez,

(same); Roberts,

(same); cf. Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d at 17–19 (finding

expert required because record on claimant’s heart condition was

sufficiently ramified, containing diagnoses, symptoms,

treatment, and lengthy hospitalizations). Although Andrews

surely had severe mental impairments, the ALJ permissibly

concluded that she did not have physical limitations that

precluded sedentary work. I do not find reversible error.6

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, I grant the Acting Commissioner’s

motion to affirm (Doc. No. 15) and deny Andrews’ motion to

6 Any error was harmless. The ALJ found that Andrews “has the residual functional capacity to perform a full-range of work at all exertional levels,” subject to non-exertional limitations. Tr. at 108. Even if the ALJ erred in finding that Andrews could physically perform very heavy work, that error was harmless because the ALJ permissibly concluded that she could perform sedentary work. See Gordils,

. The ALJ and the vocational expert specifically identified a significant number of sedentary jobs that Andrews can perform. See Tr. at 115–16 (identifying 448,000 sedentary jobs nationwide); see also Dashnaw v. Astrue,

, 16–17 (finding 30,000 jobs nationwide to be significant); Vining v. Astrue,

(D. Me. 2010) (collecting cases and finding approximately 10,000 to 11,000 jobs nationwide to be significant). 20 reverse (Doc. No. 9). The clerk is directed to enter judgment

accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

June 20, 2017

cc: Laurie Smith Young, Esq. T. David Plourde, Esq. Terry L. Ollila, Esq.

21