UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Darryl Gould, et al.

v. Civil No. 16-cv-359-PB Opinion No.

First Student Management, LLC, et al.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

A group of bus drivers and driver assistants has filed a

class action alleging that their employer, First Student

Management, LLC (“First Student”), failed to pay wages due under

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New Hampshire’s wage

and hour laws. First Student has challenged the complaint in a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

I. BACKGROUND

First Student provides busing services to schools in New

Hampshire. For several years, First Student has employed the

plaintiffs as bus drivers and driver assistants. Their

employment agreement entitles them to compensation “for all time

spent in the service of” First Student, including an overtime

premium of one-and-a-half times their regular rate for all hours

worked over forty in a week. Doc. No. 1 at 6, 17, 25–26. To track and calculate the compensation due, First Student

uses a computer program. See

at 18–22. Upon contracting

with a school district, First Student estimates the time

required to drive each route. Id. at 18. Estimated route times

are then inputted into a computer, which assigns each driver a

daily schedule and projects the amount of time the driver will

work in a given week. Id. at 19.

The drivers base their complaint on three of First

Student’s payment practices. First, the drivers claim that they

are not compensated for preliminary and “postliminary”

activities that they must perform before and after driving. See

id. at 19–20. Before commencing a bus route, the drivers must

appear at First Student’s bus yard at a designated time, wait in

line to receive their assignments and keys, proceed to the

buses, and log in to an equipment inspection system. Id. These

activities take approximately six minutes each day. Id.

Although the preliminary activities are an essential feature of

the drivers’ duties, they are not recorded or compensated. Id.

at 19. Similarly, once the drivers complete a bus route, they

must return to the bus yard and again log in to the inspection

system. Id. at 20. At that moment, their credited working time

ends, yet they are still required to conduct postliminary

activities, including inspecting and cleaning the buses,

2 returning equipment, and reporting issues to the First Student

office. Id. These uncompensated activities take another six

minutes each day. Id.

The drivers next claim that First Student substantially

undercompensates its employees by refusing to pay for time spent

on trips that exceed preset limits. Id. at 20–21. Immediately

before and after driving a bus route, a driver must log into a

system that tracks the time elapsed while driving. Id. If the

time elapsed falls within a preset tolerance range, the driver

is paid for the estimated time that First Student established

for that particular route. Id. at 21. If the actual elapsed

time exceeds the tolerance range, the system generates an

exception report. Id. Exception reports are routinely ignored,

with drivers receiving compensation only for the preassigned

estimate, not the amount of time they actually spent driving.

Id.

The third way in which First Student allegedly

undercompensates its employees is by miscounting the hours they

work on charter routes. Id. at 22. To evade its obligation to

pay overtime for hours worked above the forty-hour threshold,

First Student sometimes improperly shifts time an employee

devotes to a charter route from one pay period into a later pay

period. Id. First Student also separates employees’ driving

3 time into “Charter” and “Regular” categories, and refuses to pay

any overtime unless the employee works more than 40 hours in a

week within one or both categories. As a result, an employee

may fail to receive overtime for a given week even if she works

more than forty weekly hours when the time across both

categories is combined. Id. at 23. Compounding this problem,

First Student does not compensate employees for “dead time”

between regular routes and charter routes. Id. at 22.

The drivers assert that First Student uses these payment

practices to avoid its duty to pay both overtime and regular

hourly wages, known as “straight time.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, plaintiffs must make factual allegations sufficient to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A claim

is facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.”

In deciding a motion to dismiss, I employ a two-step

approach. See Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset,

,

4 12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, I screen the complaint for

statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact

or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”

(citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations

omitted). A claim consisting of little more than “allegations

that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action” may be

dismissed.

Second, I credit as true all non-conclusory

factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from

those allegations, and then determine if the claim is plausible.

The plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” of illegal conduct. Twombly,

. The

“make-or-break standard” is that those allegations and

inferences, “taken as true, must state a plausible, not a merely

conceivable, case for relief.” Sepúlveda–Villarini v. Dep’t of

Educ.,

(1st Cir. 2010); see Twombly,

(“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level . . . .”).

III. ANALYSIS The drivers seek damages for straight time and overtime

that First Student failed to pay them in violation of both New

5 Hampshire’s wage and hour laws and the FLSA. I address First

Student’s challenges to each type of claim in turn.1

A. Straight-Time Claims

1. State Law Straight-Time Claim New Hampshire law requires employers to pay “all wages

due.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”) § 275:43, I (2016) (since

amended); see Gruda v. Fred H. Hamblet, Inc., No. 11-CV-053-JD,

, at *1 (D.N.H. May 11, 2011) (“Although the

statute refers to the timing and means of paying wages, it is

used to claim unpaid wages from employers.”). The drivers

argue, straightforwardly, that First Student violated the

statute by failing to pay them wages they are due for all time

worked. They allege in detail the mechanisms by which First

Student underpaid them, including time they spent driving

students and performing required ancillary activities for which

they were not compensated. The plaintiffs claim that they

bargained for particular rates and hours, and their express

employment agreement provides that they “shall be paid for all

time spent in the service of” First Student. See Doc. No. 1–4

at 25.

1 Plaintiffs have sued both First Student and a related entity, First Student, Inc. Plaintiffs have agreed, however, to abandon their claim against First Student, Inc. (Doc. No. 17). Accordingly, I need not consider plaintiffs’ argument that First Student, Inc. can be held liable as a joint employer. 6 First Student nevertheless argues that the drivers’

straight-time claims fail because the drivers do not

sufficiently allege that they had a contract with First Student

that obligated the company to pay the omitted wages. This

argument is a nonstarter. The drivers allege that they

bargained with First Student to receive certain rates “for all

time in [its] service,” and they adequately allege that through

a variety of mechanisms First Student failed to pay them wages

due under that arrangement. Cf. Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr.

Corp.,

, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding contract pled

adequately under Massachusetts law). That is all that is

required to survive a motion to dismiss.

2. FLSA Straight-Time Claim The drivers also bring a claim for straight-time wages

under the FLSA, seeking compensation at a regular rate of pay

for hours worked under forty in a week. The legal theory on

which their claim is based is that the FLSA’s overtime provision

provides a cause of action and remedy for uncompensated straight

time during weeks in which they also worked overtime. Cf.

(a). I agree with First Student that this claim is

not cognizable under the FLSA.

The FLSA’s overtime provision requires employers to pay

their employees a premium rate for each overtime hour. Id.

7 (“[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a

workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives

compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above

specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the

regular rate at which he is employed.”); see Perez v. Mortg.

Bankers Ass’n,

(2015) (construing overtime

provision). “Overtime is defined as any employment in excess of

40 hours in a single workweek.” Reich v. Newspapers of New

England, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 1995).

The claim asserted by the plaintiffs is not, strictly

speaking, for unpaid overtime hours. Instead, they seek to

recover a regular rate of pay for uncompensated hours worked

under forty. But the plaintiffs limit the scope of their claim

to only those weeks during which they also worked overtime. The

plaintiffs thus distinguish this “overtime gap time” claim from

a “pure gap time” claim seeking unpaid straight-time during

weeks in which they did not also work overtime.

I conclude that the plaintiffs’ overtime gap time claim is

not cognizable under the FLSA. The plain language of the

overtime provision provides an employee a cause of action only

for “compensation for his employment in excess of [forty]

hours.” See

(a). The plaintiffs do not engage

with the plain language of the provision, and courts regularly

8 and persuasively hold that it does not support an overtime gap

time claim. See, e.g., Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long

Island Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he text of

FLSA requires only payment of minimum wages and overtime wages.

It simply does not consider or afford a recovery for gap-time

hours . . . even if the employee also works overtime hours the

same week.”) (citation omitted); Banks v. First Student Mgmt.

LLC, No. CV 16-4316,

(E.D. La. Feb. 15,

2017) (noting agreement among district courts within Fifth

Circuit); Murphy v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. 1:16-CV-01966-

DAP,

, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2017) (same

within Sixth Circuit); Sargent v. HG Staffing, LLC,

, 1078–1079 (D. Nev. 2016) (same within Ninth Circuit);

cf. Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp.,

(3d Cir.

2014) (“[W]e agree with the clear weight of authority and hold

that pure gap time claims . . . are not cognizable under the

FLSA, which requires payment of minimum wages and overtime wages

only.”).

In concluding that the overtime gap time claim is not

cognizable under the FLSA, I join six other courts that have

rejected this theory in cases brought by the plaintiffs’ counsel

against First Student. See Spencer v. First Student Mgmt. LLC,

No. 15 C 9069,

, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22,

9 2016); Hensley v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 15-3811,

, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2016), motion to certify

appeal denied, No. CV 15-3811,

(D.N.J. Dec. 7,

2016) (concluding that “there is not a substantial ground for

difference of opinion sufficient to justify interlocutory

review”); Rosario v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 15-6478,

, at *3–6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2016); Terrell v.

First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. 4:16-CV-481 SNLJ,

,

at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2016); Murphy,

, at *3–4;

Banks,

.

Against the plain language of the statute and accumulating

adverse case law, the plaintiffs argue that I should follow the

Fourth Circuit in recognizing overtime gap time claims under the

FLSA. In Monahan, the Fourth Circuit held that the FLSA does

not allow claims for pure gap time, but may allow claims for

overtime gap time in limited circumstances. See Monahan v. Cty.

of Chesterfield, Va.,

, 1280–1284 (4th Cir. 1996);

see also Koelker v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland,

(D. Md. 2009) (construing Monahan as binding

precedent recognizing overtime gap time claims).2

2 Monahan may be materially distinguishable from the case before me. The court examined employment agreements of police officers who “are paid a salary pursuant to a partial exemption to the FLSA . . . [and] work a 24-day cycle which has an accompanying [FLSA] overtime threshold of 147 hours,” but worked more than 10 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit relied on

interpretive bulletins issued by the Department of Labor. See

; 778.317; 778.322.3 But unlike regulations,

these bulletins do not have the force of law. See Lundy,

; Reich,

; compare

(describing purpose of part 533) with § 778.1 (describing

purpose of part 778). Accordingly, they are “entitled to

respect . . . only to the extent that the agency’s

interpretation has the ‘power to persuade.’” Flores v. City of

San Gabriel,

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Christensen v. Harris Cty.,

(2000)); see

the 135- and 144-hour periods for which they were scheduled. See 95 F.3d at 1265–66. Here, however, the plaintiffs do not work a comparable schedule, are not salaried, and do not receive a partial exemption under the FLSA. Cf. Rosario v. First Student Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 15-6478,

, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2016) (noting that Monahan acknowledged viability of overtime gap time claim in “limited circumstances”).

3 For example,

states, “In determining the number of hours for which overtime compensation is due, all hours worked (see § 778.223) by an employee for an employer in a particular workweek must be counted. Overtime compensation, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, must be paid for each hour worked in the workweek in excess of the applicable maximum hours standard. This extra compensation for the excess hours of overtime work under the Act cannot be said to have been paid to an employee unless all the straight time compensation due him for the nonovertime hours under his contract (express or implied) or under any applicable statute has been paid.” 11 Reich,

, 1070–72 & nn.5, 7, 8; Skidmore v. Swift

& Co.,

, 138–40 (1944).

The interpretive bulletins do not persuade me that the

plaintiffs’ gap time claim is cognizable under the FLSA. Where

Congress has provided express causes of action and remedies,

courts should exercise caution before implying additional causes

of action and remedies despite the plain language of the

statute. See Cooley,

, at *5 & n.10; Trejo v.

Ryman Hosp. Properties, Inc.,

, 450–51 (4th Cir.

2015). Moreover, it is not clear that the interpretive

bulletins even endorse the plaintiffs’ theory. And even if the

bulletins do, the DOL “provides no statutory support or reasoned

explanation for this interpretation,” which is “not grounded in

the statute.” Lundy,

& n.9; see Murphy,

, at *4 (noting that analytical starting point is statute

itself and rejecting DOL bulletins). Instead, that

interpretation “results in an expansion of the FLSA” beyond what

Congress provided. Hensley,

, at *4.

Accordingly, I grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim

for straight-time pay under the FLSA. See Doc. No. 1 at 18–23

(Count I).

This conclusion does not leave the plaintiffs without

recourse. See Banks,

(noting

12 availability of state law remedies); Lundy

(same).4 As discussed above, the plaintiffs have successfully

stated a claim for unpaid straight-time wages under state law.

B. Overtime Claims

1. FLSA Overtime Claim

The plaintiffs also bring a traditional claim for overtime

pay under the FLSA. First Student argues that the plaintiffs

fail to adequately allege an overtime violation. I agree.

“A claim for unpaid overtime wages must demonstrate that

the plaintiffs were employed ‘for a workweek longer than forty

hours’ and that any hours worked in excess of forty per week

were not compensated ‘at a rate not less than one and one-half

times the regular rate.’” Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp.,

(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting

(a)(1)).

In a class action, the complaint must sufficiently allege that

each named plaintiff worked more than forty hours in a given

week. See id. at 44, 46–47.

The First Circuit addressed the standard for pleading an

overtime violation in Pruell v. Caritas Christi,

(1st Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs in Pruell alleged that they

4 The FLSA “supplements the hourly employment arrangement with features that may not be guaranteed by state laws,” Lundy,

, but straight-time claims are well-suited for resolution under state law in state courts. See Koelker,

n.11; Monahan,

. 13 “regularly worked hours over 40 in a week and were not

compensated for such time,” but the court concluded that this

allegation was “little more than a paraphrase of the statute.”

Id. at 13. The court explained that such allegations, “while

not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so

threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross ‘the line

between the conclusory and the factual.’” Id. (quoting

Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset,

(1st Cir.

2011) (secondary quoted source omitted). Comparing that

allegation to those found inadequate in Iqbal and its First

Circuit progeny, the court held that the plaintiffs had not

adequately alleged an overtime violation. See

at 13–14. In

reaching this conclusion, the court explained that the pleading

deficiency was not cured merely because the plaintiffs alleged

mechanisms by which the minimum wage or overtime provisions “may

have been violated.” Id. at 14 (emphasis partially omitted).

Thus, it was not sufficient that the plaintiffs alleged that

they regularly worked through their lunch breaks but that the

computer system tracking their time for compensation

automatically deducted a half hour for lunch. See id. at 13–14.

The next year in Manning, a class action involving facts

similar to Pruell, the First Circuit returned to the standard

for pleading an overtime violation. See Manning,

39, 46–47 (“We have seen this case before, albeit with different

parties.”). Because the plaintiffs in Manning adequately

alleged that their employer did not pay them for compensable

work, the court proceeded to squarely address the separate

question of whether “the complaint alleges that each of the

individually named plaintiffs worked more than forty hours in a

given workweek, as required to bring a[n] FLSA overtime claim.”

. Engaging in a plaintiff-by-plaintiff analysis, the

court noted that each named plaintiff was scheduled for a forty-

hour workweek.

at 46–47. Because the plaintiffs also

identified additional, unscheduled, uncompensated working time

that pushed their total weekly hours beyond their scheduled

hours and above the forty-hour overtime threshold, the court

held that the complaint plausibly alleged an overtime violation.

See

The court thus distinguished its decision from the

Second Circuit’s decision in Lundy, where the compliant was

found inadequate because it did not “sufficiently allege 40

hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated

time in excess of the 40 hours.” See Lundy v. Catholic Health

Sys. of Long Island Inc.,

, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2013);

Manning,

; cf. Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC,

, 88–90 (2d Cir. 2013) (tracing post-Lundy case

law elaborating pleading standard).

15 The complaint before me alleges several mechanisms by which

First Student undercompensated its employees. First Student did

not compensate preliminary activities, postliminary activities,

or dead time between routes. In addition, First Student did not

fully compensate driving time because it ignored exception

reports for estimated route times, improperly separated hours

into regular and charter categories, and misallocated time

across pay periods. Thus, the complaint alleges mechanisms by

which First Student failed to pay employees for compensable

work.

Even so, the named plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead

that they worked more than forty hours. To state an overtime

violation, the plaintiffs allege that they “on a regular basis

worked in excess of forty hours, when all time is properly

counted, and were not paid time and a half for hours worked over

forty hours in the given week.” Doc. No. 1–4 at 24. This

statement is more like the allegations found inadequate in

Pruell and Lundy than the allegations found sufficient in

Manning.

The plaintiffs’ statement closely resembles the key

statement rejected in Pruell as “little more than a paraphrase

16 of the statute.” See

.5 Further, unlike in

Manning, the plaintiffs here do not even attempt to roughly

estimate the hours for which they were scheduled or compensated.

See

; see also Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114–115.

Rather, they perfunctorily assert that some unspecified blend of

compensated and uncompensated time, the amount and relative

proportions of which they do not suggest, totaled over forty “on

a regular basis.” Doc. No. 1–4 at 24. Such allegations, “while

not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so

threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross ‘the line

between the conclusory and the factual.’” Pruell,

(quoting Penalbert-Rosa,

(secondary quoted

source omitted)); see also Rosario,

, at *6

(dismissing overtime claim in virtually identical case as here).

Accordingly, the plaintiffs do not provide sufficient factual

allegations to plausibly infer an overtime violation.

Although the key statements here depart from the allegation

rejected in Pruell in two ways, those differences are

insufficient to state an overtime violation. First, the

plaintiffs state that they worked over forty hours “when all

5 The plaintiffs in Pruell alleged that, “[t]hroughout their employment with defendants, Plaintiffs regularly worked hours over 40 in a week and were not compensated for such time, including the applicable premium pay.” Pruell v. Caritas Christi,

(1st Cir. 2012). 17 time is properly counted.” Doc. No. 1–4 at 24. But this

statement merely repackages the mechanisms of undercompensation

alleged earlier. See Manning, 725 F.3d at 44–46 (after

identifying compensable work that was not compensated,

proceeding to evaluate whether plaintiffs adequately alleged

working more than forty weekly hours). Because the complaint

does not offer even a rough sense of the plaintiffs’ schedules

or compensated hours, I cannot plausibly infer that the

uncompensated activities push the plaintiffs’ weekly total over

the overtime threshold. In other words, the complaint alleges

factual matter to show that an overtime violation is possible,

not plausible. See Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Jan. 26, 2015).

Second, the plaintiffs state that they did not receive an

overtime premium for the “given” week. Doc. No. 1–4 at 24. But

where the plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that they ever

actually worked over forty hours, adding that they were

undercompensated in the “given” week does not suffice. See

Dejesus,

(explaining that the “requirement that

plaintiffs must allege overtime without compensation in a

‘given’ workweek [is] not an invitation to provide an all-

purpose pleading template alleging overtime in ‘some or all

18 workweeks’”); accord Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC,

, 776–8

(4th Cir. 2017) (citing Pruell,

).

In holding that the plaintiffs here have failed to allege a

plausible overtime violation, I do not require unnecessarily

detailed allegations. The pleading standard must be sensitive

to context. See, e.g., Landers,

. Thus,

plaintiffs need not detail the specific number of hours beyond

forty that they worked, the sum of overtime wages due, or the

exact dates they worked overtime. See

; Hall, 846

F.3d at 776–77. Nor must plaintiffs “keep careful records and

plead their hours with mathematical precision.” Dejesus,

. But to “nudge[] their claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” Twombly,

, the

plaintiffs here must put some flesh on their skeletal overtime

allegations. This conclusion comports with First Circuit

precedent and is strongly reinforced by the standards for

overtime pleading adopted by four other circuits. See Hall, 846

F.3d at 776–77; Dejesus,

, 88–90; Davis, 765 F.3d

at 241–243 & n.7; Landers, 771 F.3d at 644–46.

Because the plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a

violation of the FLSA’s overtime provision, I grant First

Student’s motion to dismiss that claim with leave to amend. See

Doc. No. 1–4 at 23–24 (Count II).

19 2. State Law Overtime Claim

The plaintiffs also bring a claim for overtime under New

Hampshire law. Their claim could be construed in three ways,

but each warrants dismissal.6 First, to the extent that the

plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime wages under RSA § 275:43 based

on a term in their employment agreement, the pleadings are

inadequate for the reasons just articulated. Second, to the

extent that the plaintiffs seek to use § 275:43 to enforce a

right created by the FLSA’s overtime provision, rather than a

term in their employment agreement, their claim is not

cognizable. See Trezvant v. Fid. Employer Servs. Corp.,

(D. Mass. 2006); Gruda v. Fred H. Hamblet, Inc.,

No. 11-CV-053-JD,

, at *1–2 (D.N.H. June 14,

2011); see also Román v. Maietta Const., Inc.,

, 76

(1st Cir. 1998). Third, to the extent that the plaintiffs rely

exclusively on the state overtime provision, their claim falls

into an express exception rendering them ineligible. The state

6 The complaint labels the state overtime claim “breach of contract,” but I follow the plaintiffs in construing it as a statutory claim. See Doc. No. 13 at 17–18. I also deem waived any argument that claims for overtime wages due under RSA § 275:43 pursuant to an overtime agreement are either (1) unavailable because of the effect of another state statutory provision, or (2) preempted under the FLSA. First Student did not adequately develop those arguments. Accordingly, I grant the plaintiffs leave to assert any such claim in an amended complaint. 20 overtime provision requires employers to pay a premium rate for

overtime hours worked by their employees. RSA § 279:21, VIII.

But there is an exemption to this statutory requirement for

“employers covered under the provisions of the [FLSA].” RSA §

279:21, VIII(b). Because the plaintiffs plead that First

Student is an employer engaged in interstate commerce and

covered by the FLSA, see Doc. No. 1–4 at 8–9, any claim under

the state overtime provision fails. See Trezvant, 434 F. Supp.

2d at 54–56.

Accordingly, I grant First Student’s motion to dismiss the

plaintiffs’ claim for overtime under state law. See Doc. No. 1–

4 at 26–27 (Count IV).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I grant First Student’s

motion to dismiss as to Counts I, II, and IV, but deny its

motion as to Count III (Doc. No. 8).

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

August 29, 2017

cc: Steven A. Berkowitz, Esq. Patrick T. Cronin, Esq. 21 Shawn J. Sullivan, Esq. Michael T. Grosso, Esq. Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Esq. Melissa L. McDonagh, Esq.

22