UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher David Clark

v. Civil No. 22-cv-375-LM Opinion No.

P Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

ORDER

Christopher Clark seeks judicial review, pursuant to

(g), of

the decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration that

denied his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Clark moves to reverse

the decision (doc. no. 5) on the grounds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

erred in evaluating the medical opinions, which resulted in a residual functional

capacity assessment that is not supported by substantial evidence. The Acting

Commissioner moves to affirm the decision (doc. no. 8). For the reasons that follow,

the court grants Clark’s motion to reverse and remand and denies the Acting

Commissioner’s motion to affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner under § 405(g), the court

“is limited to determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and

found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.” Nguyen v. Chater,

(1st Cir. 1999); accord Sacilowski v. Saul,

(1st Cir. 2020). The court defers to the ALJ’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial

evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill,

(2019). “Substantial-evidence

review is more deferential than it might sound to the lay ear: though certainly ‘more

than a scintilla’ of evidence is required to meet the benchmark, a preponderance of

evidence is not.” Purdy v. Berryhill,

(1st Cir. 2018) (citation omitted);

see also Biestek,

. Rather, the court “must uphold the [Acting]

Commissioner’s findings if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record

as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support her conclusion.” Purdy,

(citation and internal modifications omitted).

DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Administration’s regulations set out a five-step process

that ALJs must follow to evaluate whether a person is “disabled” under the Social

Security Act—that is, unable to engage in any “substantial gainful activity.” See

(d)(1)(A);

The five steps are as follows:

• Step One: If the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. § 404.1520(b).

• Step Two: If the claimant does not have any impairment or any combination of impairments that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, he is not disabled because he lacks a “severe” impairment. § 404.1520(c).

1 Unless otherwise noted, the court will cite the regulations under Title II

(disability insurance), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, which are not materially different from those under Title XVI (supplemental income), 20 C.F.R. pt. 416, in the context of this case. See, e.g., Kimball v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-943-LM,

, at *1 n. 1 (D.N.H. July 7, 2022).

2 • Step Three: If any of the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, he is disabled—and the ALJ need not proceed to steps four and five. § 404.1520(d).

• Step Four: If the claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from doing his past relevant work, then he is not disabled. § 404.1520(e)-(f).

• Step Five: If the claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from doing other work that exists in the national economy, then he is not disabled. § 404.1520(g).

At steps one through four, the claimant has the burden of proof. Sacilowski,

. At step five, however, the Commissioner has the burden of

proof.

If the claimant meets his burden at the first two steps of the sequential

analysis, but not at the third, the ALJ proceeds to steps four and five, which begin

with a determination of the claimant’s “residual functional capacity,” i.e., a

determination of what kind of things the claimant can and cannot do, mentally and

physically. See

(a)(1). A person’s residual functional capacity

is an assessment of “the most” the claimant can do despite his limitations.

After

the ALJ formulates the claimant’s residual functional capacity, he compares that

assessment against the demands of the claimant’s past work (at step four) and

against other jobs that exist in the national economy (at step five). § 404.1520(e)-

(g). If the claimant’s residual functional capacity allows him to perform his past

relevant work or work that exists in the national economy, the claimant is not

disabled. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), (e), (f).

3 BACKGROUND2

Clark filed applications for social security benefits on October 7, 2019, with

an onset date of February 1, 2018. He alleged disability due to bipolar 1 disorder,

ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder), cannabis use disorder, and

excoriation disorder.3 His applications were denied initially and on

reconsideration. At Clark’s request, an ALJ held a hearing on Clark’s applications.

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on February 29, 2021.

I. Medical History

Clark’s medical history begins with an evaluation by a neuropsychologist,

Bryan T. Vogel, Psy.D., in July 2015 when Clark was 21 years old. Dr. Vogel

diagnosed severe and recurrent major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. In

June 2016, the police were called to Clark’s workplace because of Clark’s disruptive

behavior. Following that incident, Clark was held on an involuntary basis at New

Hampshire Hospital in Hampstead, New Hampshire. The court ordered an

evaluation for involuntary commitment to New Hampshire Hospital. After the

evaluation, Clark was recommended for commitment for one year.

2 The background information is taken from the parties’ statements of facts.

Doc. nos. 6 & 9; see LR 9.1(c) & (d).

3 Excoriation disorder is “chronic skin-picking.” Everson v. Kijakazi,

, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2022); K.C. v. Saul,

, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2021).

4 In February 2018, immediately after the alleged onset date, Clark was

transported by ambulance to the emergency department at St. Joseph’s Hospital in

Nashua, New Hampshire. Dr. Vatti Deepak noted that Clark had a long history of

psychiatric issues, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and had prior

psychiatric admissions. During Dr. Deepak’s evaluation, Clark left the building

through the ambulance bay doors. Dr. Deepak notified security but concluded that

Clark was not a danger to himself or others.

Clark was hospitalized for a week in March 2018 for a psychiatric inpatient

admission after expressing homicidal and suicidal thoughts to his father and having

an encounter with the police. Dr. Alexander de Nesnera examined him and

diagnosed bipolar I in a manic episode with psychotic features and cannabis abuse

disorder. At discharge, Clark’s father agreed to bring him to follow-up

appointments. Clark was again admitted to New Hampshire Hospital in June 2018

for six days, where he was held in the locked secure psychiatric unit.

During the summer of 2018, Clark’s treating physician, Dr. Emad Milad,

changed his medications. Clark also underwent electroconvulsive therapy at

Dartmouth Hitchcock Clinic to treat depression. Nevertheless, Clark was

hospitalized for psychiatric issues four additional times between the end of June

2018 and July 2019.

After his last psychiatric hospitalization in July 2019, Clark received mental

health treatment through Greater Nashua Mental Health, which included

medication and therapy. He met with a therapist weekly and with a psychiatrist

5 monthly. He also met with a case manager and a nutritionist once a week. With

that treatment, Clark improved. His mental status examinations were mostly

normal, and he reported feeling stable. Clark experienced no serious manic episodes

that required hospitalization or additional treatment after July 2019.

II. Daily activities

Except for a brief unsuccessful period on his own, Clark has always lived with

his parents. At the time of the hearing on January 28, 2021, and for some time

before that, Clark worked part-time, ranging from 4-5 hours to 15 hours per week,

for a wholesale floral distributor where his mother worked. He cut flowers and

helped pack orders. Clark testified that he was able to do that work because the

employer was flexible and accommodated his needs to come in late and leave early

when necessary. He also testified that when he tried to work longer hours he would

experience stress that triggered a manic feeling, which caused him to become

belligerent and adversarial with his co-workers.

Clark completed high school. Other than his part time work with his mother

at the floral distributor, he has had no significant work experience. He has a

driver’s license and is able to drive. Treatment notes from Greater Nashua Mental

Health during 2020 show that at times Clark reported feeling better on the

medication regimen, going out to eat with friends, playing video games, taking a

trip to North Carolina to hike with friends, and trying some free online courses. At

other times, Clark was depressed and isolated at home.

6 III. Medical Opinions

A. John J. Warren, Ed.D.

Dr. Warren, a state agency consultant, completed a “Psychiatric Review

Technique” form evaluation of Clark’s psychiatric impairments on December 18,

2019, for purposes of his application for benefits.4 Based on his review of the

medical record, Dr. Warren found that Clark had medically determinable

impairments due to depressive and bipolar disorders and substance addiction

disorder. Doc. no. 4-3 at 7. He found that Clark had moderate limitations in

sustaining concentration and persistence and moderate limitations in his ability to

work with or near others. He also found that Clark could sustain the mental

demands of work that involved simple tasks over a workday and work week but

that he was moderately limited in his ability to interact with the public, get along

with coworkers, and accept criticism from supervisors.

B. Philip Robbins, Ph.D.

Clark was referred to state agency consultant psychologist, Dr. Robbins, for

an evaluation as part of his application for disability benefits. Dr. Robbins

evaluated Clark through telehealth technology on September 16, 2020. He noted

that Clark reported that he played video games all day and smoked marijuana

except when he worked on Sundays and Mondays. Based on his examination and

Clark’s records, Dr. Robbins diagnosed bipolar disorder type I, depression, ADHD,

4 The ALJ mistakenly identified Warren as Ph.D. in the decision. Doc. no. 4-2

at 25. Dr. Warren is an Ed.D.

7 generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, excoriation disorder, and

cannabis abuse. He found that Clark was functioning fairly well and that he could

understand, remember, and apply information; could interact with others; and could

concentrate and maintain motivation and focus. Dr. Robbins conditioned those

findings, however, on Clark not experiencing a manic episode. He also noted that

while Clark was able to work part time, Clark was concerned that additional work

time would cause a manic episode.

C. Craig E. Stenslie, Ph.D.

For purposes of Clark’s request for reconsideration of the denial of his

application for benefits, another state agency psychologist, Dr. Stenslie, reviewed

Clark’s records and completed a “Psychiatric Review Technique” form on September

21, 2020. As part of the record, Dr. Stenslie considered Dr. Robbin’s evaluation of

Clark that was done on September 16, 2020, and found that Dr. Robbin’s opinion

was consistent with other medical evidence in the record. Dr. Stenslie also found

that Dr. Robbins’s opinion confirmed that Clark had improved. Dr. Stenslie found

that Clark has medically determinable mental disorders of bipolar disorder,

depressive disorder, and “related disorders.” Doc. no. 4-3 at 34. He found that

Clark had no limitations in understanding and memory, concentration and

persistence, and social interactions. He did find that Clark was moderately limited

in his ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.

8 D. John Pelletier, Sc.D.

Dr. Pelletier, a clinical psychologist, completed an “APTD Medical Eligibility

Review Summary” form on September 20, 2019, for purposes of Clark’s application

to the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services for the APTD

(Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled Program).5 Dr. Pelletier noted that

Clark had impairments due to bipolar I disorder, cannabis use disorder, ADHD, and

excoriation disorder. He found that Clark had moderate limitations in some aspects

of sustaining concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adaptation. He

also found that Clark was not capable of basic unskilled work in a competitive labor

market, which made him eligible for the ADTP.

E. Marie Macedonia, Psy.D

Dr. Macedonia, who was one of Clark’s providers at the Greater Nashua

Mental Health Center, completed a “Mental Impairment – Medical Source

Statement” form on October 23, 2020. She indicated on the form that Clark would

be limited at least one third of the time or most of the time in completing daily

activities, concentrating, completing tasks, tolerating stress in a work environment,

maintaining attendance, accepting instructions and criticism, working with others,

adapting appropriately to changes in the work setting, performing at a consistent

pace, and adhering to standards of neatness and cleanliness. Dr. Macedonia wrote

that when Clark was not properly medicated he had had episodes of mania that

5 See www.nhcarepath.dhhs.nh.gov/partner-resources/documents/cb- 177b.pdf (last visited May 3, 2023).

9 lasted for weeks. She further explained that every manic episode was triggered by

work-related stress and that although medication has helped Clark was still

struggling. She expected that he would be absent more than four days per month

from work.

F. Marilou Patalinjug Tyner, M.D.

Dr. Tyner, who is a psychiatrist, also treated Clark at the Greater Nashua

Mental Health Center and completed a “Mental Impairment – Medical Source

Statement” on November 12, 2020. Dr. Tyner noted diagnoses of bipolar disorder I

and ADHD. In the area used for identifying signs and symptoms, Dr. Tyner wrote

that the symptoms she checked had been observed “without medication.” Doc. no.

4-13 at 1112. For functional limitations, Dr. Tyner found that Clark would be

limited at least a third of the time or most of the time in completing daily activities,

concentrating, tolerating work stresses, maintaining attendance, accepting

instructions and criticism, working with others, adapting appropriately to changes

in the work setting, completing a normal work day and week, performing at a

consistent pace, and adhering to standards of neatness and cleanliness.

In addition, Dr. Tyner wrote that Clark had had long periods of

decomposition in the past and that he would be absent from work about four days

per month. Dr. Tyner explained that work stress had caused Clark to experience

mania or depression that required periods of inpatient psychiatric treatment. She

further wrote that “even with adherence to meds, mood lability manifest. ADHD

further compromises ability to sustain work.” Doc. no. 4-13 at 1114.

10 G. Danielle Zimmerman

Danielle Zimmerman, who was Clark’s case manager at the Greater Nashua

Mental Health Center, completed a “Mental Impairment – Medical Source

Statement” form on January 14, 2021. Before assessing Clark’s limitations,

Zimmerman explained that Clark becomes fatigued when the stress in his life

increases, which requires him to reschedule appointments. She wrote that he needs

“significant supports to regulate his symptoms and diagnosis [and] needs frequent

reminders to attend weekly appts. and oftentimes still forgets during these periods

of stress.” Doc. no. 4-27 at 1461. She also wrote that Clark’s medication caused him

to be lethargic for five days after each monthly injection.

Zimmerman checked the following signs and symptoms: generalized

persistent anxiety, mood disturbance, difficulty thinking or concentrating, change in

personality, and emotional withdrawal or isolation. She found that he would be

limited for at least a third of the time in completing daily activities, maintaining

social functioning, understanding and remembering, completing tasks, tolerating

work stresses, and maintaining attendance. Zimmerman explained that at times

Clark was “unable to function during high periods of stress in his life” and that he

would “often isolate and disengage with any and all supports until the stressful

situations or periods pass.” Id. at 1465.

11 IV. Administrative Proceedings

The ALJ held a telephonic hearing on January 28, 2021. Clark was

represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. A vocational expert also

testified.

The ALJ posed this hypothetical question to the expert: a person who should

avoid social interaction with the general public, avoid tandem tasks and teamwork

with coworkers, who requires a low stress job with only one or two step tasks with

only minor changes in the routine, and who can only have brief and superficial

social interaction with a supervisor. The vocational expert identified several jobs

that met that hypothetical. When the ALJ added that the individual would be

absent one or more times per month or would come in late or need to leave early

weekly, the vocational expert testified that would preclude all jobs. If the person

would be off task more than 15% of the day, that too would preclude all jobs.

In the decision denying Clark’s application for benefits, the ALJ found that

Clark had a residual functional capacity to do all work as long as he avoided social

interaction with the general public, avoided tandem tasks and teamwork with

coworkers, was limited to brief and superficial social interaction with supervisors,

and was limited to working in a low stress environment with only one or two step

tasks and with only routine changes in the work routine. Based on that functional

capacity and the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that Clark could do

jobs as an industrial cleaner, a change house attendant, and a sweeper cleaner. The

ALJ concluded that Clark was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Clark’s

12 request for review on July 21, 2022, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of

the Acting Commissioner.

DISCUSSION

In support of his motion to reverse the Acting Commissioner’s decision, Clark

contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by

substantial evidence. He argues that the ALJ erred by accepting the state agency

consultants’ opinions and failing to incorporate limitations based on the opinions of

his treating sources and the examining state agency physician, Dr. Robbins. The

Acting Commissioner moves to affirm, arguing that the ALJ properly assessed the

medical opinions and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual

functional capacity assessment. For the reasons that follow, the decision is reversed

and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

I. Opinions Based on Incomplete Record

Clark contends that the ALJ erred in relying on the opinions provided by

state agency consultants Drs. Warren and Stenslie because they were issued before

significant additional evidence was available in the record. Specifically, Clark

states that Drs. Warren and Stenslie did not review treatment records from the

Greater Nashua Mental Health Center in later 2020 and early 2021 and

assessments done by Case Manager Zimmerman, treating psychiatrist Dr. Tyner,

13 treating psychologist Dr. Macedonia, and clinical psychologist Dr. Pelletier.6 The

Acting Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly relied on the consultants’

opinions to make the residual functional capacity assessment.

An opinion provided by a state agency reviewing consultant cannot provide

substantial evidence to support an ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment if

the opinion was based on a significantly incomplete record. Kimball,

, at *7 (citing Giandomenico v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

, at

*4 (D.N.H. Nov. 15. 2017)); see also Provencal v. Kijakazi,

,

, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 29, 2022). “The reviewed record is significantly

incomplete if records added or generated after the review ‘would materially change

the basis for assessing the claimant's limitations.’” Provencal,

,

at *3 (quoting Kimball,

, at *9). In other words, review of a

partial record cannot provide substantial evidence to support a residual functional

capacity assessment “if later evidence supports the claimant’s limitations.” Randy

M. v. Kijakazi,

, at *6 (D.R.I. Oct. 5, 2021).

“[I]t is the ALJ’s burden to determine and explain whether missing evidence

is material.” Motuzas v. Saul,

(D.N.H. 2021). The ALJ

does not carry that burden by providing only a conclusory statement as to

materiality and the content of the new evidence. Id.; see also Gorman v. Saul,

, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2020). Instead, the ALJ must explain why new

6 Clark also cites the assessment done in 2015 by Dr. Vogel, but that

assessment predates Clark’s onset date by several years.

14 records and materials do not show any material change in the claimant’s

limitations. Motuzas,

.

In this case, the ALJ acknowledged that Drs. Warren and Stenslie did not

review Clark’s complete records. The ALJ stated that “they did not consider all of

the impairments of the claimant, including ADHD and anxiety.”7 Doc. no. 4-2 at 25.

The ALJ then stated that he found “the evidence reflects similar, although not the

same, mild to moderate functional limitations, with restriction from interaction

with the general public, and reduced interaction with coworkers and supervisors.”

With that explanation, the ALJ apparently intended to convey that the

additional evidence was not material because, based on the ALJ’s lay interpretation

of the subsequent treatment notes and opinions the additional impairments can be

addressed by the cited restrictions.

The ALJ did not identify the other impairments, in addition to ADHD and

anxiety, that were diagnosed in the subsequent medical records, nor did he cite any

opinion that found only mild to moderate limitations with the addition of the

restrictions he articulated. The ALJ also did not explain how he determined that

7 The ALJ is mistaken that Dr. Stenslie did not have an opportunity to assess

impairments based on ADHD and anxiety. Dr. Robbins diagnosed both ADHD and anxiety, along with other impairments, in the medical statement that Dr. Stenslie reviewed for purposes of his opinion. Dr. Stenslie quoted Dr. Robbins’s diagnosis in his review of Clark’s records but did not include all of the impairments in his own diagnosis and did not explain why his diagnosis was different. Dr. Stenslie also did not address Dr. Robbins’s comments about the effects a manic episode would have on Clark’s ability to function. It appears that Dr. Stenslie may have overlooked the additional impairments that Dr. Robbins found and the additional functional limitations.

15 those restrictions (restrictions from interaction with the general public and reduced

interaction with coworkers) would accommodate Clark’s functional impairments

due to ADHD and anxiety or any other impairments. The ALJ stated that the more

recent treatment notes were consistent with no more than moderate functional

limitations and an ability to work in a low stress environment because the

treatment notes showed “improvement in symptoms and stability and treatment,

and mostly normal mental status exams, with intact memory, judgment and

insight.”

The cited treatment records, however, document variations in Clark’s mental

health and functioning during the period with some improvement noted but also

increased symptoms of depression, anxiety, and isolation at other appointments.

Dr. Macedonia wrote that proper medication had provided some relief for Clark’s

symptoms, that his decomposition episodes of mania were triggered by work, and

that despite proper medication, Clark was still struggling. Importantly, Clark’s

treating sources, his case manager, his psychiatrist, and his psychologist, all

provided opinions that Clark’s ability to function was significantly restricted by his

impairments, including ADHD and anxiety, and that he would be absent from work

a significant amount of time. Drs. Warren and Stenslie did not have the benefit of

those opinions.

The ALJ’s brief, conclusory, and somewhat inaccurate explanation of the

record is not sufficient to carry the ALJ’s burden to show that the new parts of the

treatment record were not material. Instead, the opinions provided by Clark’s

16 treating sources document more limited functional ability and support his

limitations.

The ALJ found the treating source opinions unpersuasive for a variety of

reasons, including the use of a check-off form. Drs. Warren and Stenslie, however,

each used a “Psychiatric Review Technique” form. For purposes of the functional

capacity assessment, they provided only two-or-three-word answers, such as

“Moderately limited” and “Not significantly limited.” The forms used by the

treating sources are no more abbreviated and, in contrast, the treating sources

wrote narrative explanations in some parts of the form. Therefore, that basis for

finding the opinions unpersuasive lacks support in the record.

The ALJ noted that the treating sources did not record side effects caused by

Clark’s medications. Although not addressed specifically, that reference apparently

suggests that Clark was not experiencing fatigue from medication that would cause

absences from work. To the extent the ALJ intended to counter the findings about

absenteeism in the opinions, that point is made tangentially at best and does not

support the finding of no absenteeism.

The ALJ stated that it was unclear whether Dr. Macedonia’s opinion was

addressing limitations with or without medication, but he did not request

clarification. Contrary to the ALJ’s assessment, Dr. Macedonia clearly indicated

that she answered questions about decomposition in the context of Clark not being

medicated and explained the effect medication has had. Therefore, Dr. Macedonia’s

opinion was not unclear.

17 The ALJ stated as to each opinion that the severity of functional limitations

found was not consistent with the treatment records. As is discussed above, the

treatment records do not document the consistent improvement and normal results

that the ALJ describes. Given the differences in the opinions and the complex

record, this case would seem to have been an appropriate opportunity for an

independent expert medical opinion. See

.1513a(b)(2).

In the absence of an adequate explanation, the ALJ erred in relying on the

opinions provided by Drs. Warren and Stenslie that were not based on a complete

record.

II. Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is the most a clamant can do despite

the functional limitations caused by his impairments.

(a)(1).

Based on his assessment of the record, including the opinion evidence, the ALJ

found that Clark could

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant should avoid social interaction with the general public; should avoid tandem tasks and team work with coworkers; is limited to brief and superficial social interaction with supervisors; and is limited to working in a low stress environment (defined as performing only simple 1-2 step tasks with only minor changes in work the work routine).

Doc. no. 4-2 at 21. The ALJ used that assessment in questioning the vocational

expert about jobs that would be available for Clark to do. When the ALJ added that

the claimant would be absent from work more than once per month, would come in

18 late or leave early once each week, or would be off task more than 15% of the work

day, the vocational expert answered that those restrictions would preclude all jobs.

Because Drs. Warren and Stenslie did not review the more recent treatment

records and opinions, their opinions cannot provide substantial evidence to support

the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. Dr. Tyner, Dr. Macedonia, and

Case Manager Zimmerman all found that Clark’s ability to function was

significantly more limited than the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment.

Further, they found that Clark would regularly be absent from work, which would

preclude the jobs the vocational expert testified to.

Because substantial evidence is lacking to support the residual functional

capacity assessment, the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did

not accurately reflect Clark’s limitations. “For a vocational expert’s opinion to

constitute substantial evidence, the testimony regarding an individual’s ability to

perform jobs in the national economy must come in response to a hypothetical

question that accurately describes the claimant’s impairments.” Conrad v. Kijakazi,

21-cv-10788-IT,

, at *13 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2023) (citing Arocho v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

(1st Cir. 1982)). Therefore,

substantial evidence is lacking to support the ALJ’s finding that Clark was not

disabled based on the vocational expert’s testimony.

19 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the claimant’s motion to reverse and remand (doc.

no. 5) is granted. The Acting Commissioner’s motion to affirm (doc. no. 8) is denied.

The Acting Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded for further

administrative proceedings pursuant to Sentence Four of § 405(g). The clerk of

court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Landya B. McCafferty United States District Judge May 10, 2023

cc: Counsel of record.

20