UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Rochelle Pouget, Plaintiff

v. Case No. 22-cv-382-SM Opinion No.

Kysa M. Crusco; Philip Cross; Salem Five Bank; Harmon Law Offices; Sgt. Timothy Loveless; Chief James R. Brace; Town of New Boston, NH; Patricia Murphy; John Coughlin; 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC; and NH DCYF, Defendants

O R D E R

This is the latest in a series of lawsuits that pro se

plaintiff Rochelle Pouget has brought against prosecutors,

attorneys, investigators, police officers, a bank, its legal

counsel, a guardian ad litem, and others – all arising out of a

series of domestic disputes that eventually led to her 2014

divorce, the loss of parental rights with respect to her

daughter, and, ultimately, the foreclosure of the first mortgage

deed securing her home. In this action, she seeks damages and

injunctive relief against eleven defendants. Of the eleven parties named in Pouget’s amended complaint,

it appears that only eight have been properly served. 1 Seven of

those defendants move to dismiss Pouget’s claims for failure to

state a viable cause of action. For the reasons discussed,

those motions are granted.

Background

Although this is Pouget’s first federal suit raising claims

arising out of various incidents of domestic violence, her

divorce, the loss of her parental rights, and the foreclosure of

the first mortgage deed securing her home, she has filed at

least three prior state court actions against numerous

defendants – all arising out of the same events: Pouget v. Derek

Coburn, Executor of the Estate of James Coburn, 216-2022-CV-197

(quiet title action to Pouget’s home dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction); Pouget v. Derek Coburn, et al.,

216-2022-CV-427 (petition for a restraining order to stop the

impending foreclosure of the mortgage deed securing Pouget’s

home and asserting numerous claims against nearly 30 defendants

and dating back roughly a decade, all of which were dismissed

1 Despite having been granted four extensions of time to effect service, Pouget has not provided evidence of proper service upon the following defendants: DCYF, Patricia Murphy, and Philip Cross.

2 for a variety of reasons); and Pouget v. Bangs, et al., 216-

2022-CV-788 (raising a number of claims arising out of the

foreclosure of the mortgage deed securing Pouget’s home, all of

which were dismissed).

Pouget’s amended complaint is comprised of three separate

filings (documents no. 1, 8, and 9). In total, it spans more

than 140 pages, contains numerous exhibits, and describes events

that date back more than ten years. In it, Pouget sets forth a

broad array of allegations of misconduct and fraud, but there is

no clear legal or factual basis for any of her requests for

relief – that is to say, none of her claims sets forth a viable

cause of action. Moreover, the majority of claims she raises in

this action have already been litigated and resolved against her

in prior state proceedings. Indeed, a significant portion of

Pouget’s amended complaint consists simply of photocopies of (or

slightly amended versions of) documents she submitted in her

prior state court litigation.

The amended complaint is difficult to understand and it is

unclear which of the numerous, seemingly-unrelated facts alleged

are actually relevant to her various claims against each of the

defendants. Fortunately, in one of Pouget’s earlier state-court

3 actions, the court was able to bring some order to her filings,

discern the relevant background facts, and distill it all into a

fairly brief summary (the names of defendants in this proceeding

are in bold):

For purposes of this order, the Court assumes the truth of the following facts as set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint and accompanying affidavit. In 2012, the plaintiff filed for divorce from her husband. In November 2012, the plaintiff’s husband assaulted her, prompting her to call the police. Sergeant Aiken of the New Boston Police Department responded, but failed to properly investigate the incident. In 2013, the plaintiff reported additional abuse to the New Boston Chief of Police, James Brace, but ultimately did not press charges against her husband. During another incident of abuse in early 2013, Chief Brace had the plaintiff arrested for assaulting her husband, while ignoring the fact that the plaintiff’s husband had also assaulted her. The plaintiff reported this to the Attorney General’s Office, but investigator Dick Tracy failed to properly investigate the claim.

In July 2013, the court assigned Attorney Kysa Crusco as a guardian ad litem to the divorce case to care for the interests of the plaintiff’s daughter. However, Attorney Crusco did not properly investigate the case. Attorney Crusco hid information from the court, the court-appointed psychologist, and the Division of Children, Youth, and Families. In 2014, when the plaintiff reported an incident of child sexual abuse, Attorney Crusco told Chief Brace that she believed the plaintiff was lying. Attorney Crusco attempted to have the plaintiff arrested for lying, and petitioned to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights.

As part of mediating the divorce, the plaintiff signed a quitclaim deed for the property that she held jointly with her husband. The quitclaim deed was to be held in escrow for three years to give the husband time to either sell or refinance the home. However,

4 the quitclaim deed was given to the husband immediately after the divorce was finalized and he recorded it. The plaintiff’s husband was later found in contempt of court for failing to sell or refinance the home.

In 2019, the plaintiff’s husband died. The plaintiff attempted to file a plea of title to get the property back, but her counsel failed to properly pursue the claim. The plaintiff’s step-son, as executor of the husband’s estate, sought to evict the plaintiff and her daughter. The property was eventually placed into foreclosure after the plaintiff stopped making payments on the mortgage.

In May 2020, Chief Brace pulled the plaintiff over for driving without valid plates on her car. He released the plaintiff with a warning, but as she was driving away she called him an idiot. Chief Brace stopped her again and gave the plaintiff a citation. The plaintiff made a report to the Hillsborough County Attorney’s office, but investigator Mark Putney did not interview the plaintiff’s daughter, who was in the car, about the incident. Instead, Mark Putney stalled the investigation until County Attorney John Coughlin dismissed the case.

Pouget v. Coburn, et al., Case no. 216-2022-cv-00427, N.H.

Super. Ct. (Oct. 17, 2022) (“Pouget I”) (Exhibit B to document

no. 37-2). The court in Pouget I denied Pouget’s request to

enjoin the impending foreclosure proceedings and dismissed all

claims against all defendants. Pouget did not appeal.

After Pouget was unable to stop the foreclosure sale of her

home and failed to secure injunctive or monetary relief against

any of the many defendants named in Pouget I, she brought

5 another suit in which she challenged the validity of that

foreclosure sale (again, individuals named in this action are in

bold).

Ms. Pouget has sued Meghan Bangs, the winning bidder at a foreclosure auction for the subject property at 20 Lincoln Drive, New Boston, which took place on September 27, 2022; Harmon Law Offices, the law office which represented the foreclosing lender, Salem Five; and the Hillsborough County Register of Deeds, who is responsible for the Hillsborough County Registry where various deeds relative to the subject property have been recorded. The pertinent deeds include the 2006 deed reflecting the acquisition of the subject property by Plaintiff and her deceased ex-husband, James Coburn, as joint tenants; a December 31, 2014 Quitclaim deed by which Plaintiff’s interest in the marital property was conveyed to James Coburn when their divorce was finalized; and a foreclosure deed, dated October 2, 2022, into 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC to which Ms. Bangs assigned her acquisition rights after the foreclosure auction. Salem Five was the original lender and mortgagee in connection with the 2006 purchase loan to Plaintiff and James Coburn. There is no dispute that the mortgage was in arrears and that Salem Five had a contractual right to foreclose upon default for nonpayment.

Ms. Pouget has alleged in various lawsuits, this being the third in this Court, that the 2014 title into James Coburn and now his estate should be voided based on fraud in connection with the deed. She alleges that her ex-husband’s divorce lawyer, when she retired in 2015, wrongfully gave Coburn the Quitclaim deed, which Plaintiff had executed in December 2014 in accordance with the final divorce decree conveying the property to him. . . . Plaintiff claims entitlement to the real estate, where she has been living with her daughter since his death, under the 2006 deed.

6 Pouget v. Bangs, et al., Case no. 216-2022-cv-00788, N.H. Super.

Ct. (Dec. 14, 2022) (Exhibit E to document no. 37-2) (emphasis

supplied, footnotes omitted) (“Pouget II”). The court in Pouget

II dismissed all claims against all defendants. Again, Pouget

did not appeal.

Discussion

New Hampshire’s common law doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel apply in determining the extent to which

Pouget’s state court litigation bars any claims asserted in this

litigation. See Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp.,

(1982); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,

(1984). The New Hampshire Supreme Court

has summarized those doctrines as follows:

The doctrine of res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually litigated, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation by a party in a later action of any matter actually litigated in a prior action in which he or someone in privity with him was a party.

In re Alfred P.,

(1985) (emphasis supplied;

citations omitted). See also Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129

7 N.H 561, 570 (1987); Morgenroth & Associates Inc. v. State of

New Hampshire,

(1985).

I. Salem Five Bank and Harmon Law Offices.

At the foreclosure sale of the referenced property, Meghan

Bangs was the high bidder. Bangs subsequently assigned her

right to purchase the property to 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC. On

October 3, 2022, the mortgagee (Salem Five) conveyed title to

the property to the LLC by foreclosure deed. That foreclosure

deed was recorded in the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds.

See Exhibit to Amended Complaint (document no. 8-1) at 63 of 82.

Not long thereafter, the LLC served Pouget with an eviction

notice, pursuant to which she appears to have been evicted from

the property. See

at 58 of 82.

Although the various documents of the amended complaint do

little to describe the precise claims Pouget is advancing

against Salem Five and Harmon Law Offices, her prayer for relief

provides some insight. In it, she seeks the following:

That those who committed fraud with the Quit Claim Deed at Harmon Law, Salem Five, and 20 Lincoln Drive LLC, be required to either give me my marital residence back, free and clear of any debt owed, after the Quit Claim Deed is removed from the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds and returned to the Goffstown Courthouse where it should have gone after Patricia A.

8 Murphy retired, or pay $1,000,000.00 for committing fraud against me and causing my minor child and me a horrendous amount of emotional trauma.

Amended Complaint (document no. 8 ) at page 9, para. I (emphasis

supplied).

Parenthetically, the court notes that none of the

defendants in this proceeding had anything to do with the

quitclaim deed that is the focus of so much of Pouget’s

attention. In October of 2014, roughly eight years prior to the

foreclosure sale, plaintiff and her former husband were

divorced. As part of the negotiations attendant to that

divorce, the parties stipulated to the following (which became a

part of their divorce decree):

Marital Home: The former marital homestead of the parties located at 20 Lincoln Drive in New Boston, New Hampshire is awarded to James free and clear of all right, title or interest of Rochelle, subject to all costs associated therewith and debt thereon. Rochelle within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Order shall execute a Quitclaim Deed transferring all her right, title or interest to James which shall be held in escrow pending the refinance of the debt into James’ sole name, at which point the deed shall be released.

Permanent Stipulation, Exhibit to Amended Complaint (document

no. 8-1) at page 34 of 82 (emphasis supplied). Following her

former husband’s death, Pouget began to assert that she had been

9 coerced and/or duped into granting her former husband that

quitclaim deed and she has argued (in previous litigation) that

it was improperly recorded. Despite having conveyed all her

interest in the property to her former husband, Pouget believes

she is entitled to remain in the property. See generally Pouget

II, at 2 (“According to Plaintiff, pursuant to the decree, the

Quitclaim Deed was to be held by her ex-husband’s lawyer for a

three-year period during which James Coburn was obligated to

either refinance or modify the loan to relieve Plaintiff from

having any responsibility for repayment of the outstanding loan

or sell the property to pay off the promissory note that the

mortgage secured. In either event, there was no expectation

that Plaintiff would receive any proceeds, to which she now

claims she agreed as a result of duress. . . . Plaintiff claims

entitlement to the real estate, where she has been living with

her daughter since his death, under the 2006 deed.”) (emphasis

supplied).

The validity of the foreclosure of the first mortgage deed

to Pouget’s home, as well as Pouget’s claims against Salem Five

and Harmon Law Offices, were fully, fairly, and finally

litigated in state court. See Pouget I and Pouget II. Pouget’s

claims against Salem Five and Harmon Law Offices are, therefore,

10 barred by the common law doctrines of res judicata and/or

collateral estoppel. Even if they were not barred, however,

those claims fail to state the essential elements of any viable

causes of action and are subject to dismissal on that ground as

well.

II. 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC.

As noted above, 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC acquired the right to

purchase the subject property from Meghan Bangs, the high bidder

at the foreclosure sale. After acquiring title to the property

by foreclosure deed, the LLC instituted eviction proceedings

against Pouget.

Despite the voluminous nature of Pouget’s amended

complaint, the LLC is referenced only twice. The first

reference alleges that the LLC engaged in some type of fraud or

theft:

the new buyers [20 Lincoln Drive LLC], who I suspect know the attorneys and/or employees at Salem Five, have filed Court documents to evict my daughter and me and they referenced the wrong deed as well, to get around the fact that my home has been stolen from my daughter and me and Real Estate Fraud, that has yet to be investigated, actually occurred and my daughter and I are being abused and kicked out due to corruption in law enforcement, collusion, and Family Court malfeasance.

11 Amended Complaint (document no. 8) at page 7, para 23 (emphasis

supplied). The second reference to the LLC appears in Pouget’s

prayer for relief, in which she seeks an order compelling the

LLC “to either give me my marital residence back, free and clear

of any debt owed, after the Quit Claim Deed is removed from the

Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds . . . or pay $1,000,000

for committing fraud against me.”).

at page 9, para. I

(emphasis supplied).

Pouget’s earlier, state-court challenges to the validity of

the foreclosure sale were fully, fairly, and finally resolved

against her. In Pouget I, she was denied an injunction seeking

to prevent the foreclosure from happening. Then, in Pouget II,

all claims challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, as

well as her claims of fraud and collusion, were resolved against

her. See, e.g., Id. at 1 (“There is no dispute that the

mortgage was in arrears and that Salem Five had a contractual

right to foreclose upon default for nonpayment.”). See also Id.

at 3 (“Plaintiff claims that there was some collusion in the

auction sale between Ms. Bangs and the law firm or bank.

However, Ms. Pouget pled and produced insufficient facts at

[the] hearing to support her speculative conclusion.”).

12 Pouget’s theories of theft and fraud as they relate to the

LLC are, like those she raised in state court against Ms. Bangs,

entirely undeveloped and unsupported by factual allegations.

One thing is clear however: they rest upon her mistaken belief

that the quitclaim deed she gave to her husband during their

divorce proceedings is somehow relevant to the subsequent

foreclosure proceedings. It is not. In fact, the LLC had

nothing to do with the preparation or recordation of that

quitclaim deed.

For purposes of this litigation, the only relevant document

is the mortgage deed that Pouget and her former husband conveyed

to Salem Five Mortgage Company on January 31, 2006, and recorded

in the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds in Book 7622, Page

2872. There is no dispute that the underlying note secured by

that mortgage deed went into default. See, e.g. Pouget I at 7-

8. At that point, Salem Five had the contractual right to

foreclose, which it did. See Pouget II at 4. See also

Foreclosure Deed, Exhibit to Amended Complaint (document no. 8-

1) at 63 of 82. Nothing alleged in the amended complaint

supports Pouget’s bald assertion that the LLC engaged in theft

and/or fraud. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed for

failure to state a viable cause of action.

13 III. Kysa Crusco and Hillsborough County Attorney John Coughlin.

In her amended complaint, Pouget seeks an order of the

court directing that:

Kysa Crusco and County AG John Coughlin be permanently restrained from having any contact with me or my minor child and that they be permanently banned from having anything to do with any investigations that might be in the works or opened up in the future that involve my daughter, me, or my marital residence.

Amended Complaint (document no. 8) at page 9, para. E (emphasis

supplied). According to Pouget, Attorney Crusco failed to

properly investigate certain matters relating to Pouget’s 2014

divorce and allegedly hid information from the court-appointed

psychologist. See Amended Complaint (document no. 1-1) at 3.

With respect to Attorney Coughlin, Pouget says he failed to

properly investigate a complaint that Pouget made against her

then-husband and Attorney Crusco, see id. at 10, as well as a

complaint she made against Chief Brace and members of the New

Boston Police Department, see Amended Complaint (document no. 8)

at page 4, para. 11.

But, as Pouget herself acknowledges, she previously raised

the same claims against Coughlin and Crusco in Pouget I. See

Amended Complaint (document no. 1) at 2, para. 2. Those claims

were fully, fairly, and finally resolved against Pouget. See

14 Pouget I (Exhibit B to document no. 37-2) at 3-5 (addressing

claims against Attorney Crusco); Id. at 8-9 (addressing claims

against Attorney Coughlin). They are, then, barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. To the extent Pouget’s current

claims differ from those in Pouget I, they arise from the same

facts and transactions and they could have been pursued in that

earlier state court litigation. Consequently, they are barred

by the doctrine of res judicata. See generally E. Marine Const.

Corp. v. First S. Leasing, Ltd.,

(1987)

(defining “cause of action” to mean “all theories on which

relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction

in question” and concluding that res judicata bars “a subsequent

suit based upon the same cause of action . . . even though the

plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) to present

evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the

first action, or (2) to seek remedies or forms of relief not

demanded in the first action”) (citations and internal

punctuation omitted).

Although Attorney Crusco has not yet moved to dismiss the

claims against her, for the reasons discussed above, the court

dismisses them sua sponte, having concluded they are barred by

the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

15 Moreover, none of the claims asserted against Crusco and

Coughlin states a viable cause of action and all are barred by

the applicable statute of limitations. They are, then, subject

to dismissal on those grounds as well.

IV. Town of New Boston, James Brace, and Timothy Loveless.

The Town of New Boston, New Hampshire, Sergeant Timothy

Loveless, and Chief James Brace of the New Boston Police

Department (collectively, the “New Boston Defendants”) all move

to dismiss Pouget’s claims against them on grounds that none

states a viable cause of action.

The basis for Pouget’s claims against the New Boston

Defendants is entirely unclear. In her request for relief,

Pouget moves the court to order that:

The NBPD pay my daughter and me $800,000.00 for all the pain and suffering they have caused my daughter and me from November 2012 on, while failing to do a basic investigation into multiple DV incidents when my daughter and I were being repeatedly assaulted and emotionally tortured by my husband and [when] my daughter ended up being molested repeatedly, due to their negligence and intentional interference in my divorce/custody case.

Amended Complaint (document no. 8) at page 9, para. K (emphasis

supplied).

16 Those claims were, however, previously raised (or could

have been raised) in Pouget I. See Id. at 6-7. Pouget is,

then, precluded from attempting to relitigate them in this

forum. Moreover, to the extent Pouget’s claims turn on

defendants’ alleged failure to properly investigate her reports

of perceived unlawful activity, they fail to state viable causes

of action. As the court observed in Pouget I, “As a general

proposition, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable

interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another. It

is for this reason that, generally, a victim has no right to

intervene in the criminal case of the accused, to appeal the

substantive rulings of the trial court, or to contest the

prosecutor’s decision to dismiss criminal charges.” Id. at 4-5

(citations omitted).

V. The Remaining Defendants.

Finally, all claims against defendants DCYF, Patricia

Murphy, and Philip Cross are also dismissed, for failure to

properly effect service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 23, 2022. Since

then, she has been granted four extensions of time within which

to properly serve all defendants. The most recent extension of

time for service has expired and Pouget has yet to properly

17 serve any of those defendants. Because more than ten months

have passed since Pouget filed her original complaint and

because she has neither sought a further extension nor properly

served DCYF, Patricia Murphy, and/or Philip Cross, the court

will assume that she is no longer interested in pursuing those

defendants.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in

defendants’ memoranda (documents no. 22-1; 28-1; 30-1; and 37-1)

none of the claims advanced in the various documents comprising

Pouget’s amended complaint states a viable cause of action

against any of the defendants. Even if the amended complaint

did advance any cognizable claims, they would be barred by the

doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel and/or the

applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, defendants’

motions to dismiss (documents no. 22, 28, 30, and 37) are

granted.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice

as to defendants Kysa Crusco, Salem Five, Harmon Law Offices,

the Town of New Boston, Timothy Loveless, James Brace, John

Coughlin, and 20 Lincoln Drive, LLC., as any effort to further

18 amend that pleading would be futile. Pouget’s claims against

defendants DCYF, Patricia Murphy, and Philip Cross are also

dismissed, albeit without prejudice, for failure to properly and

timely serve those defendants, but with the observation that

those claims will likely meet the same fate if asserted again.

All remaining pending motions are denied as moot, including

plaintiff’s “Motion to Add Two Defendants and to Provide New

Evidence of Obstruction of Justice and Real Estate Fraud”

(document no. 27) and her “Motion to Add New Information”

(document no. 35).

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with

this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

August 3, 2023

cc: Rochelle Pouget, pro se Kysa M. Crusco, pro se Counsel of Record

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