UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher Beres

v. Case No. 25-cv-79-SM-AJ Opinion No.

RELX, Inc., d/b/a LexisNexis USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc.

O R D E R

After multiple unsuccessful defamation suits against RELX,

Inc., d/b/a LEXIS NEXIS USA, and Portfolio Media, Inc., in other

courts, Christopher Beres, who is a lawyer proceeding pro se,

brought the same claims in Hillsborough County (New Hampshire)

Superior Court. Defendants removed the action to this court,

but Beres then added Andrew Delaney as a plaintiff to destroy

diversity jurisdiction and sought remand to state court. The

court granted the defendants’ motion to sever Delaney from the

case to preserve diversity jurisdiction, and denied the

plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Doc. no. 29. Delaney is no

longer a party in this case.

In response, Beres filed a notice of voluntary dismissal

without prejudice. Doc. no. 30. Defendants move to convert

Beres’s notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice to

dismissal with prejudice and also seek an award of fees incurred

in litigating this case. Doc. no. 31. Beres responded to the defendants’ motion by refiling his notice of voluntary dismissal

but did not address the issues defendants raise. For the

reasons that follow, the case is dismissed with prejudice. The

defendants’ request for an award of fees and costs is granted.

Standard of Review

In the circumstances presented here, a “plaintiff may

dismiss an action without a court order by filing [] a notice of

dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a

motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Unless otherwise stated, a voluntary dismissal is without

prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). “But if the plaintiff

previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on

or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as

an adjudication on the merits.”

The limit on voluntary

dismissal without prejudice is known as the “two-dismissal

rule.” García–Monagas v. De Arellano,

, 49 n.3 (1st

Cir. 2012).

When the two-dismissal rule applies, the court may award

defendants costs incurred in the prior suit. Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(d). A circuit split exists as to whether fees incurred in a

prior suit are recoverable under Rule 41(d) as costs. Horowitz

v. 148 South Emerson Associates LLC,

(2nd

Cir. 2018). Under New Hampshire law, the court, in its

2 discretion, may award fees as a sanction for bad faith

litigation, “to do justice and vindicate rights, as well as to

discourage frivolous lawsuits.” Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v.

Devenport,

(2017).

Background

Delaney was employed in a temporary position at a law firm,

where he worked on a project for the firm’s client, Toyota, and

apparently had access to confidential documents. The project

was suspended during the COVID pandemic, resulting in Delaney

losing his job. Delaney, through Beres, who was acting as his

legal counsel, sent a demand letter to Toyota, but Toyota did

not respond. In April of 2020, Beres filed a lawsuit against

Toyota on Delaney’s behalf in Brevard County, Florida. Beres

included allegedly sensitive information about Toyota in that

complaint. Delaney later dismissed the suit without prejudice.

The agency that employed Delaney and placed him in a

temporary position at the law firm filed suit against Delaney in

federal court in the Southern District of New York, alleging

breach of contract and other claims, arising from information

about Toyota that Delaney included in the complaint filed in

Florida state court. That case remains stayed because of

Delaney’s ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.

3 Defendant RELX owns PMI, which publishes Law360, an

internet legal news service. Between December 20, 2021, and

January 6, 2023, Law360 published articles about the case

against Delaney in the Southern District of New York. Delaney

and Beres then filed a series of defamation lawsuits against PMI

and RELX, based upon statements published in those articles.

The first defamation suit was filed in federal court in the

Southern District of Florida on February 10, 2022, challenging

eight statements in four of the Law360 articles as defamatory.

When defendants moved to dismiss the claims, Delaney and Beres

voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice. A year later,

however, Delaney and Beres filed an identical complaint in

Florida state court, and, again, when defendants moved to

dismiss, Delaney and Beres voluntarily dismissed the suit. In

that suit, the court awarded defendants fees under Florida’s

two-dismissal rule and Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, because

Beres and Delaney had previously dismissed the same defamation

claims against the same defendants in the federal action.

Several months later, Delaney and Beres, undeterred, filed a

third suit in Florida state court, alleging defamation based on

the same statements as well as three additional statements in

new Law360 articles. And, once again, when defendants moved to

dismiss, Delaney and Beres filed a notice of voluntary

dismissal.

4 Delaney then filed a similar defamation complaint in

Minnesota state court, and when that suit was dismissed, filed a

new and similar action in New York state court. Beres filed

this suit in Rockingham County Superior Court (New Hampshire) on

January 3, 2025, alleging defamation against the same defendants

based on many of the same claims that were previously dismissed

in Florida federal and state courts, Minnesota state court, and

New York state court.

Discussion

Beres has filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this

case without prejudice. Defendants move to have the claims

dismissed with prejudice and seek an award of attorneys’ fees.

The two issues are addressed as follows.

A. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice

Beres repeatedly filed the same defamation claims against

the defendants named in this action and then voluntarily

dismissed the claims without prejudice. As the Minnesota court

wrote when dismissing Delaney’s defamation claims against the

same defendants: “Justice is not served by allowing this game

of whack-a-mole to continue.” Doc. no. 11-19, at 16. Beres’s

claims in this case are dismissed with prejudice under the two-

dismissal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).

5 B. Award of Fees

Defendants seek an award of the fees they have incurred in

this action under New Hampshire law and, alternatively, under

the New York anti-SLAPP statue (

-

a(1)(a)). 1 Under New Hampshire law, the court may award fees

“when one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,

or for oppressive reasons, when the litigant’s conduct can be

characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and when it

should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have

defended the action.” Short v. LaPlante,

, 392-93

2021). Because New Hampshire law provides the relief defendants

request and defendants have not shown a conflict with New York

law, the court need not address the New York anti-SLAPP

statute’s attorneys’ fees provision. See Ortiz v. Sig Sauer,

Inc.,

(D.N.H. 2022).

Beres’s practice of filing multiple defamation actions

against these defendants arising out of the same or similar

claims and then voluntarily dismissing the actions without

prejudice, only to refile the same claims, is plainly vexatious.

Beres and Delaney have continued that practice here, which

1 Because defendants seek their current fees, not fees incurred in any of the prior suits, Rule 41(d) does not apply. Referring to their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that New York provides the governing law in this case, which causes the New York anti-SLAPP statute to apply here.

6 appears to be aimed at harassing the defendants despite a

demonstrated lack of merit in the claims. The harassing and

vexatious conduct here included adding Delaney as a party to

destroy subject matter jurisdiction in this case. That maneuver

required defendants and the court to spend time and resources

sorting through plaintiffs’ tangled litigation history to

determine that Delaney did not belong in this case. There is no

doubt that Beres’s litigation tactics were pursued in bad faith

and were vexatious. In the interests of justice and to

discourage Beres’s practice of filing frivolous lawsuits,

defendants are entitled to an award of fees.

Defendants did not seek a specific amount of fees or

provide supporting documentation for an award. 2 For that reason,

the court is unable to award fees based on the present record.

Defendants will be given an opportunity to file a supplemental

motion for an award of fees that addresses the amount and

provides sufficient detail to allow the court to make a reasoned

decision in calculating the award.

2 Supporting documentation would include counsel’s affidavit to address the hourly rate(s) charged and contemporaneous timesheets with sufficient detail to show the work done. See, e.g., Neal v. Omni Boston Corp.,

, at *12-*14 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2025); Huntington Distribution Fin., Inc. v. Outdoor Performance LLC,

, at *5-*6 (D.N.H. May 2, 2024).

7 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to

convert Beres’s notice of voluntary dismissal to dismissal with

prejudice (doc. no. 31) is granted.

This case is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motions

to dismiss (doc. nos. 10 & 11) are terminated as moot.

Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees incurred in this case, and, for that purpose,

they shall file an appropriate motion with sufficient supporting

documentation on or before May 30, 2025. Plaintiff shall file

any appropriate response on or before June 20, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

May 8, 2025

cc: Christopher Beres, pro se Counsel of Record

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