Worcester Gaffney, for the plaintiff, to the point that the declaration
is sufficient, and that the want of a collar would be matter of defence which should
be shown by the defendants, cited Norton v. Ladd, 5 N.H. 203 ; State v. M'Duffee, 34
N.H. 523 , p. 528; Cummings v. Perham, 1 Met. 555; The case of Swans, 7 Co. 180;
Com. Dig. Biens F.; 2 Bl. Com. 391; Dodson v. Mock, 4 Dev. Batt. (N.C.) 146; Dunlap
v. Snyder, 17 Barb. 561; Lentz v. Stroh, 6 S. R. 34; 2 Ch. Pl. 860; Steph. Pl.
350; State v. Fuller, 33 N.H. 259 ; State v. Wade, 34 N.H. 495 ; State v. Godfrey, 24
Mo. 232 ; State v. Hewett, 31 Mo. 396 ; State v. Adams, 6 N.H. 532 ; State v.
Godfrey, 24 Me. 232 ; Rex v. Hall, 1 T. R. 320; Steel v. Smith, 1 B. Ald. 94; State
v. Sommers, 3 Vt. 156 ; Gill v. Scrivens, 7 T. R. 27; Spieres v. Parker, 1 T. R.
141; Com. v. Hart, 11 Cush. 130; 1 Saund. 276, note 2; id. 211, note 2; Anon., 2
Salk. 519; Birch v. Bellamy, 12 Mod. 540; Charlie v. Belshaw, 6 Bing. 529.
As to the proposed amendment, Gen. Stats., ch. 207, secs. 8, 9; 15th Rule of Court;
Stearns v. Wright, 50 N.H. 295 ; Perley v. Brown, 12 N.H. 493 ; Stevenson v. Mudgett, 10
N.H. 341 ; Elliot v. Abbot, 12 N.H. 549 ; Newell v. Horn, 47 N.H. 382 ; Tarbell
v. Dickinson, 3 Cush. 345; Hill v. Penny, 17 Me. 409 ; Miller v. Watson, 6 Wend.
506; Harding v. Township, 3 Ohio 227 ; Pullen v. Hutchinson, 25 Me. 249 .
C. K. Sanborn and J. G. Hall, for the defendants, against the sufficiency of the
declaration, cited State v. M'Duffee, 34 N.H. 528 ; Hill. on Torts, Bk. 3, c.
1, sec. 4; Gillis v. Black, 6 Clarke (Iowa) 439; Henniker v.
Railroad, 29 N.H. 146 ; Smith v. Woodman, 28 N.H. 520 ; State v. Wilson, 43 N.H.
418 ; Bouv. Law Dic., "Statute;" Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 55 ; Drowne v. Stimpson, 2
Mass. 444 ; Soper v. Harvard College, 1 Pick. 178; Williams v. H. Q. Bridge, 4
Pick. 341; State v. Warde, 34 N.H. 495 ; Clough v. Shepherd, 31 N.H. 490 ; Faribault
v. Hulett, 10 Minn. 30 ; R. R. Co. v. Hendricks', 26 Ind. 228 ; Toledo R. R.
v. Bevin, 26 Ind. 443 ; Great W. R. R. Co. v. Hanks, 36 Ill. 281 ; Board of Education
v. Greenebaume, 39 Ill. 609 ; McGlone v. Prosser, 21 Wis. 275 .
As to the amendment, they said the very term or word "amend" or "amendment" signifies
to amend something that exists. Where there is no declaration or no cause of action
stated in the declaration, it cannot be amended; nothing exists to amend. Brown
v. Seymour, 1 Pick. 32; Brigham v. Este, 2 Pick. 420. "An amendment, where there
is something to amend by, may be made in a criminal as in a civil case." 1 Bouv.
Law Dic., 14th ed., 118.
The writ is no better than a blank paper, so far as containing any declaration goes.
The words of the statute are, — "No person shall be liable by law for killing
any dog." And the sole charge in the writ is that the defendants killed a dog of
the plaintiff's; that is the plaintiff complains that the defendants have done
an act, for the doing of which the statute says in express terms they shall not
be liable. Now this is in no sense alleging a cause of action, so that the amendment
proposed is inserting a new cause of action, which kind of amendment is in direct
violation of the 16th Rule of Court, and the decisions of this state relative to
amendments of writs. Melvin v. Smith, 12 N.H. 462 , is trespass for cutting trees
— amendment quare clausum fregit — amendment not allowed. It was held
a change of cause of action, though for cutting same trees.
Case at bar — declaration for killing a dog for which there is no penalty,
no damage; if amendment allowed, there may be a penalty, a damage, though for killing
same dog. The position of the defendants is not inconsistent with sec. 8 of ch.
207 of Gen. Stats., nor of the Rules of Court. There is no writ in the case at bar.
There is no cause of action. The amendment if allowed makes a writ, — makes
a cause of action where none exists. The amendment is not consistent with the original
declaration.