Sargent Chase, for the plaintiffs.
Gen. Stats., ch. 63, sec. 10, provide that "any land-owner or other person aggrieved
by the decision of the selectmen, in laying out or altering of a highway, or in
the assessment of damages in any case relating to a highway, may appeal therefrom
to the supreme court, by petition, within one year after the highway or alterations
are made, and on notice, as provided in section two, and such other notice as the
court may order, the petition may be referred to the commissioners.' Section 11
provides that when the land-owner, or other person interested, appeals from the
decision of the selectmen laying out or altering a highway shall file his petition,
etc., and with it a bond * * conditioned to pay to the petitioners their costs,
etc. It is claimed by the defendants that the General Statutes are only a revision
of the law of 1862, which gave the petitioner the right of appeal from the decision
of the selectmen only in case of the "laying out a highway," and that this law of
1862 did not give, and that the General Statutes were not intended to give, the
petitioner the right to appeal in case of the widening and straightening of a highway.
But this we think to be a manifest error.
In the General Statutes it was evidently intended to give all persons interested
in the widening and straightening of a highway the same rights that were given to
them by the law of 1862, in case of the laying out of a highway. This is done in
express terms by the language of the General Statutes. The object was, to give the
light of appeal to all persons who might be aggrieved by the action of the selectmen,
whatever that action might be, in laying out, or in widening and straightening.
This is evident from the language adopted in section 12 of the same chapter. The
law of 1862 provided that the decision of the selectmen might be affirmed or reversed
by the court upon the report of the commissioners. This was all that could be done
upon an appeal from a decision laying out the highway. But in the General Statutes,
where the appeal is given to any person aggrieved by the laying out or the widening
and straightening of a highway, it is also provided (sec. 12) that the decision
of the selectmen may be affirmed, modified, or reversed by the court, according
to the report of the commissioners. This change was made in the law to meet a necessity
which was found to exist, and to supply a defect which evidently existed before,
and which the defendants claim still exists, to wit, the necessity of resorting
to a multiplicity of applications to the selectmen in such a case. In this case,
we claim that, while the selectmen widened and straightened this highway in form,
they did just as little as they could do and do anything at all. They intended to
do enough so that the petitioners could not go to the court upon the grounds that
they had neglected or refused to do anything, but did so little as to fail entirely
of meeting the requirements of the public. Now if these petitioners must wait, and
file a new petition, the selectmen may widen and straighten the road again in such
a way that the petitioners cannot go to the court upon the ground of their neglect
or refusal to widen and straighten, and yet they may not do what the public good
requires should be done; and this might be repeated time after time in the same
way. Suppose a road needed to be widened a rod its whole length, and the petitioners
ask the selectmen to widen accordingly, and they, simply to prevent the petitioners
from going to the court with their petition, widen the road one foot: then, if the
defendant's law is sound, they have succeeded in their object, but have done nothing
that benefits the public. Then suppose the petitioners try again, and with the same
result: this must be repeated sixteen or seventeen times before the road is widened
so as to meet the wants of the public and the petitioners; whereas, by allowing
an appeal from the first decision, the whole case could be brought before the county
commissioners at once, and be settled with a single petition and one proceeding.
We cannot doubt that this change in the law was made to meet this
very case, or, at least, this class of cases, so that when the selectmen of a town
should do just enough to prevent the petitioners from going to the court upon the
ground that they refused to do anything, but at the same time intend to do as little
as possible, and thus fail entirely to meet the wants and the necessities of the
public, an appeal might be taken by the petitioners as well as by any other party
aggrieved, and thus the whole matter be considered by the court upon the report
of the commissioners, and the decision of the selectmen be so modified as to meet
the public necessities and the wants of the petitioners, and thus avoid the necessity
of a multiplicity of suits. The whole thing may thus be accomplished and terminated
by one proceeding, as well, nay, much better because much more expeditiously, than
by a dozen or twenty.
In this case we claim that the selectmen widened the highway the whole length petitioned
for, but that they did not widen or straighten it so as to meet the wants of the
petitioners or the necessities of the public, and that the petitioners, being aggrieved
by the action of the selectmen, may appeal from their decision, and thus have it
modified upon a report of the commissioners in such a way as to do justice to all
parties, and to meet the public necessities.
This appeal being properly taken, there was no necessity of filing the bond which
the statute requires, only for the benefit of the petitioners. These plaintiffs
did not need to give a bond for their own indemnity against their own costs. This
was not what the statute contemplated in requiring the bond.
Mugridge, for the defendants.
We submit that the motion to dismiss should be allowed.
The petition in appeal shows that the selectmen acted on the original petition to
them, and widened and straightened the highway within the termini specified; and
it states, as the ground for appeal, that the widening and straightening thus made
were not sufficient for the accommodation of the public, and the facts of the case
show that such is the only ground for the appeal. The appeal is founded on secs.
10 and 11 of ch. 63, Gen. Stats., p. 142; and the only construction of those provisions
which will sustain the appeal is the broad one, that an appeal will lie when the
appellant is aggrieved by any decision of the selectmen in the course of their proceedings
on highway petitions, that is, in the manner and extent of their subsequent action
in carrying the petitions into effect, as well as in the preliminary question of
granting the prayer of the petitions. But such is not the correct construction.
The "decision" mentioned in the statutes is, "in laying out or altering," thus including
only the main question of granting the petition, and not any subsequent action in
carrying it into effect. The original statutes on this subject allowed appeals from
the action of selectmen when they laid out or widened and straightened highways,
only as to the amount of damages. There was no appeal by the town
or any person from their decision to lay out, or to widen and straighten, but that
was final and conclusive. See Rev. Stats., ch. 60, sec. 9, p. 121; Comp. Stats.,
ch. 54, sec. 9, p. 138.
As the law then was, a petitioner had a remedy in case of the neglect or refusal
of the selectmen to grant his petition, by a petition to the court; but the town
or any person aggrieved by the granting of the petition had no corresponding or
any remedy whatever, in case of an improper decision in thus granting it. The act
of June 27, 1862, was passed to remedy this defect, and provided that any party
interested, who is aggrieved by the decision of the selectmen "laying out a highway,"
may appeal, c. Laws of 1862, p. 2615. The General Statutes are merely a revision
of that original act, not an alteration of it. The phraseology of the act of 1862
expressly confined it to the decision to "lay out," and did not extend to any subsequent
proceedings, except the amount of damages awarded.
The remedy for petitioners, when the action of the selectmen in the manner or extent
of laying out, or widening and straightening, is unsatisfactory, is not by appeal
like this, but by a new petition for whatever further or different is desired, with
the right of applying to the court if the selectmen neglect or refuse to grant it.
The whole phraseology and provisions of the sections referred to show that they
were not intended to provide an additional remedy for the petitioners in such cases,
but a remedy for opposing parties who may be aggrieved by any granting of the petitions,
and who, before the passage of the act of 1862, had no remedy in such cases.