Farr Stevens, for the plaintiff.
This action comes before this court on a motion for a nonsuit, the defendant claiming
that the plaintiff's declaration, which is made a part of the printed case, is
in case when it should be in trespass. We are inclined to the opinion that there
is a distinction in this state between trespass on the case and trespass; but just
exactly where the trespass stops and the case begins, or the common ground is —
where they "telescope" without smashing — over which they are chemically blended
or mechanically spliced, so to speak — are questions not so easy to determine.
That this question gave our ancient brethren great worriment is evident from a study
of their subtile disputations, "crossly indented" and "whimsically dovetailed,"
a perusal of which almost leads us to wish
our lot had been cast in Maine, Indiana, or some other state where they have given
this question decent burial by statute.
The better to enable us to discuss this distinction as it arises in the case at
bar, and to assist the court in translating the plaintiff's declaration, we give
a view of the locus in quo in the following diagram: __________________________
| | | D | A.
Plaintiff's land. | ___ | | [ ___ ] | B.
Passage-way occupied but | | not owned
by the plaintiff | __________________ | | | C. Dump
fence. | | C | | D. Premises occupied by the | B | plaintiff
as tenant at | | will. | | ________________ | |
______________ E. Obstructions. | ------------ E | | ------------ |
| A ---------- | | |
I. We maintain that, under the facts stated in the declaration, the plaintiff has
suffered two distinct injuries, caused to two separate estates, and for which he
may have the choice of two remedies, — trespass, or case. (1) For the act
itself — the direct injury to his own land — which must be in trespass,
and which is not sought to be recovered in this action; (2) for the consequential
injury to the use and occupation of the premises, of which he is a tenant, which
may at least be in case. This action is brought, evidently, for the consequential
damage, and ought to obtain. Suppose his landlord in possession, the other facts
remaining: there can be no doubt but that he would have to bring case. See Felch
v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 38 ; Hays v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. 42; Runyan v. Bordine, 2 Green.
472; Shafter v. Smith, 7 H. J. 67. Or suppose the defendant owned lot A: then the
plaintiff's remedy would be case, beyond controversy.
In either case, the damage resulting to the use and occupation of lot B and D would
be no more consequential than now.
II. Conceding that the plaintiff stands no differently than he would if he owned
both estates, we then contend that under this declaration, considered as in case,
he may recover: not for the trespass, — that is, the act itself, the direct,
immediate injury, the injury to the reality — he waives that; but he may recover
for the consequential damage, — that is, the personal injury, the injury to
his relative rights, — which in this case is the extra travel going round
the obstruction, or the loss of the passage-way, and the other consequential injury,
as set forth at large in the plaintiff's declaration. Take the familiar illustration,
as laid down by 1 Chitty's Pl. *127: If a log is thrown into the highway, and,
in the act of throwing or falling, it hit another, it is trespass; but if afterwards
a person falls over it, and is hurt (or, as in this case,
is compelled repeatedly to walk around the log), it is case; — and we contend
that the result is not changed by throwing the log upon the plaintiff's land, except
it gives him an election of action as to the consequential damages: he may waive
the direct injury, and sue in case for the consequential. See Oliv. Prec., 4th ed.,
p. 447, where it is said, — "When one is injured by the act of another accompanied
with force, and there are also consequential damages, there appears to be no impropriety
in suffering the plaintiff to waive the force and direct injury, and recover in
case for the consequential damages;" — see, also, illustration of this doctrine
on page 448: also, 3 Campb. 188; 1 Chitty's Pl. 139; Gibson v. Fiske, 8 N.H. 404
; Boerum v. Taylor, 19 Conn. 123 , and cases cited.
In conclusion, we submit that the equity is with the plaintiff, and that, after
having suffered a substantial injury, and having set forth his grievance with a
painful minuteness, following the facts to the letter, he ought not to be kicked
out of court for lack of technical averments, which are immaterial, or surplusage.
Bingham Mitchell, for the defendant.
The action is in form and nature an action on the case. The defendant moved for
a nonsuit, upon the ground that the proper action for the injury complained of is
trespass, the logs having been placed on the plaintiff's own land, and the injury
he sustained being a disturbance of his possession, and an interruption and prevention
of the occupation and use of this land, — short, it being an injury to real
estate. This motion the court granted.
Trespass is an action instituted for the recovery of damages for a wrong committed
against the plaintiff with immediate force, — as, an unlawful entry upon his
land, assault and battery against the person, or an unlawful injury, with direct
force, to his personal property. In short, trespass is the action when the injury
is the natural, immediate, and direct result of the defendant's act. Trespass on
the case is the remedy when the tort or wrong was not committed with actual or implied
force; when the matter or thing affected was not tangible, and the injury was not
immediate but consequential, — as, for instance, where the person sustains
damage on account of his reputation having been assailed, or for an injury resulting
to A's land in consequence of B's act upon his own land, — such, for example,
as the digging of a ditch by B upon his own land, the water from which runs upon
and injures A's land, — or an injury to a person's reversionary interest
in real estate. It is the remedy when the thing affected is incorporeal and intangible,
and the injury is the mediate and consequential result of the wrong-doer's act
and not the direct and immediate result of the act, nor when the thing affected
is tangible and corporeal. 1 Chitty's Pl. 122, 127; Dalton v. Favour, 3 N.H. 466
; Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593, and authorities cited; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns.
257; Guiele v. Swan, 19 Johns. 382 — Balloon case; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black.
Rep. 892; Ogle v. Barnes, 8 D. E. 188 — 6 D. E. 128; Savinac v. Boome, 6
D. E. 125; Day v. Edwards, 5 D. E. 648; Wilson v. Smith, 10 Wend. 325; Shepherd
v. Scott, 3 Will. 411; 1 Stra. 596, 636; 1 T. R. 569; 5 Bos. Pull. 117, 446; 1
Bos. Pull. 472; Smith v. Rutherford, 2 Serg. Rawle 358; Cotteral v. Cummings,
6 Serg. Rawle 343; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; 1 Ld. Raym. 188; 5 East 485;
9 Johns. 61; 12 Johns. 183; 11 Johns. 385, 140; 3 Hill 26.
Then it must be regarded as established, that for an injury caused by or resulting
from the immediate act of a wrong-doer, or when the thing affected is tangible and
corporeal, the remedy is in an action of trespass, while, if the injury is occasioned
not by the immediate act of the wrong-doer but is merely a consequence of that act,
or when the thing affected is intangible and incorporeal, the remedy is an action
on the case.
Let us inquire, then, in the case at bar, (1) Was the injury complained of caused
by the immediate and direct act which the defendant did, or was it the mediate and
consequential result of that act? (2) Was the thing affected tangible and corporeal,
or was it intangible and incorporeal?
The defendant's act of which the plaintiff complains is, drawing and placing logs
upon the plaintiff's land. The injury that the plaintiff sustained was the disturbance
of his possession of this same land, and the interruption and prevention of its
occupation and use by him as its owner and possessor. Then it is logically clear
and certain that the injury, viz., the disturbance of possession and the interruption
of the use and occupation of this land, was the direct and immediate act of the
defendant, viz., placing the logs on the land. The matter or thing affected was
the plaintiff's land. This is tangible and corporeal. In Chitty on Pleading 127,
in defining an injury which is immediate, and the remedy for which is consequently
trespass, it is said, "or if he pour water on another person or his land, or do
any act thereon * * * the injury is immediate, and trespass is the remedy." See,
also, Reynolds v. Clark, 2 Ld. Raym. 1403. In 1 Ld. Raym. 188, it is said, —
"The plaintiff brought case against the defendant, and declared that he was possessed
of a close, and the defendant dug pits in it, etc., per quod, etc., and after verdict
for the plaintiff it was adjudged that the action will not lie, because the cause
of action was properly trespass, for which the party might have an action of trespass,
but could not turn it into an action upon the case." On page 139 of Chitty on Pleading
it is said, — "When the injury was immediate and committed on land, etc.,
in the possession of the plaintiff, the remedy is trespass." The same author, on
page 173, says, — "Trespass may be supported for an injury to land, though
not fenced from the property of others, and by the owner of the soil, etc., though
it be an highway or a public bridge." See, also, Cortelyou v. Van Brundt, 2 Johns.
357; 1 Burr 143; 2 Stra. 1004; Mayor of Northumberland v. Ward, 1 Will. 115; 6 East
154. In Reynolds v. Clark, 8 Mod. 272, the court say, — "When the freehold
is
in the plaintiff, and the defendant hath only the use of it, and he misuses it,
trespass is the proper action." In Oliver's Precedents, 2d ed., p. 347, in speaking
of the injuries for which case will lie, it is said, — "This action cannot
be maintained for a mere trespass, as if a man enters my land and does a nuisance
there." 1 Rol. 105 L. 25.
Hence it will be seen that it has been invariably held that where the injury is
occasioned by the direct and immediate act of the defendant, and when it has been
committed upon the plaintiff's land, trespass is the proper remedy. It is immaterial
for what purpose the plaintiff used this land. It was his to appropriate to any
use he saw fit; and the remedy for an injury to him, committed upon it, is not in
the least governed by the use to which he puts it. It is his absolutely, and the
remedy, for an injury to him by disturbing his possession and interrupting his occupation
of it, is trespass, whether he used it to plant potatoes upon or travel over. A
man, having the possession and owning the fee in land, cannot have a right of way
through it independent of his right to the land. Barker v. Clark, 4 N.H. 382 ;
Clark v. Boston Concord Montreal R. R., 24 N.H. 118 .
There is a further element in this case which renders an action on the case an improper
remedy for an injury proceeding from the act. The injury here was not only committed
upon the plaintiff's land, and the direct and immediate result of the defendant's
act, but it proceeded from the wilful and intentional act of the defendant, because
the declaration alleges that the defendant, "contriving and intending unjustly to
injure the plaintiff, and annoy and disturb him," did this act. And when the injury
is the immediate result or effect of the defendant's act, and it has been wilfully
done, the remedy must be trespass. Dalton v. Favour, 3 N.H. 466 , and authorities
there cited; Wilson v. Smith, 10 Wend. 325, and cases there cited.
We are aware that when either trespass or trover might be maintained, the injured
party may waive both the trespass to and the conversion of the chattel, and recover
damages in a special action on the case. But we do not understand that this settles
that for a wilful trespass upon land the injured party can recover any damages he
may have sustained, in a special action on the case. In the first place, either
trespass or trover could not here be maintained. In the second place, it was a wilful
act, and when it is, the trespass cannot be waived and have case lie. See Wilson
v. Smith, 10 Wend. 325, cited supra. Though an act was direct and immediate, if
it resulted from the defendant's negligence the trespass might be waived and case
brought.