Ray, Drew Jordan, for the defendants.
The court allowed evidence to go to the jury touching the complainant's mental
condition on July 12, 1875, the day of the alleged riot and assault, but ruled out
all evidence of his mental condition on any other day, before or afterwards. This
was clearly wrong. Potter's unsoundness of mind was the product of a disease which
had long existed. It arose from epilepsy. The case finds that Potter had been subject
to that disease for a long time; that Dr. Wardwell had treated him for it; as early
as May, 1875; and that, upon a careful examination of the complainant's person
the next morning after the alleged affray, he found no signs of injury from an assault,
but discovered that he was then suffering from an attack of epilepsy. It appeared
on trial that a person subject to that disorder is affected with insane delusions,
odd freaks and fancies, and is liable to do all manner of strange things.
"A lunatic is a person who enjoys intervals of sound mind, and may be admitted as
a witness during a lucid interval. He must of course have been in the possession
of his intellect at the time of the event to which he testifies, as well as at the
time of his examination, and it has been justly observed, that it ought to appear
that no serious fit of insanity has intervened so as to cloud his recollection and
cause him to mistake the illusions of his imagination for the events he has witnessed."
Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 127.
"It makes no difference from what cause the defect of understanding may have arisen;
nor whether it be temporary and curable, or permanent; whether the party be hopelessly
an idiot or maniac, or only insane as a lunatic, or be intoxicated; or whether the
defect arises from mere immaturity of intellect, as in the case of children. While
the deficiency of understanding exists, be the cause of what nature soever, the
person is not admissible to be sworn as a witness." 1 Gr. Ev., sec. 365.
In this case, it was a question for the jury whether Potter's memory was so far
impaired as to render his testimony worthless or not. Regina v. Hill, 2 Bennett H.
Lead. Crim. Cases 204; Hill v. Nash, 41 Me. 585 . And any evidence of the acts,
conduct, or declarations of Potter, either before or after the time of the alleged
affray, tending to show an insane mental condition, was clearly admissible. U.S.
v.
Holmes, 1 Clif. (U.S.) C. C. R. 98-130; Lake v. The People, 1 Park. (N.Y.) C. C.
556; Peaslee v. Robbins, 3 Met. 164; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225 ; Grant v.
Thompson, 4 Conn. 208 ; State v. Hays, 22 La. Ann. 39; — see, also, the remarks
of LADD, J., in State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 -382, where he says "that evidence,
tending to show the defendant's mental and moral character and condition for a
period of many years before the act, was properly received."
It makes no difference whether the question of insanity is raised against a witness
whose testimony is offered, or in behalf of a respondent charged with crime. The
methods of proof are the same in both cases.
The evidence rejected did not tend to raise a collateral issue. The issue was, whether
Potter was in an insane condition, July 12, 1875. Proof that he was in an insane
condition four days earlier, — in other words, proof that he talked, acted,
and appeared like an insane man, July 8, 1875, — was just as competent to
rebut the legal presumption of Potter's sanity, July 12, 1875, and to establish
the fact of his insanity at the last named date, as the proof which the court admitted.
The reason of this is, because insanity, delusion, lunacy, and the like, are continuing
disorders. When once shown to exist, the presumption is that they remain, or continue,
the same as sanity is presumed to exist and continue, in the absence of proof to
the contrary. The rejected evidence tended to show that Potter's story about being
poisoned was not only untrue and impossible from the situation of the parties, but
also that he was at that very time suffering from another attack of the same disorder
he had on July 12, afterwards.
As to effect of epileptic fits, see Dr. Raue's work on Pathology and Therapeutics,
page 25; Dr. Blandford on Insanity and its Treatment, pages 90, 91; Dr. Flint's
Principles and Practice of Medicine, pages 606, 619; Ray's Med. Jur. of Insanity,
ch. 8.
H. Heywood, solicitor, for the State.
1. On the trial of this case by the jury, the respondents' counsel sought to prove
that Potter, the complainant, and a witness for the State, was acting under an insane
delusion as to what was done to him at the time of the alleged riotous assault.
To prove this, the court allowed the defence to prove that Potter was subject to
epileptic fits, and also to prove by an expert that a person subject to this disease
is likely to have insane delusions. They were also allowed to read a letter written
by Potter, which tends to prove that he was illiterate and foolish, or, it may be,
insane, when he wrote it. But all of this did not prevent a verdict against the
respondents. It seems that there was still evidence enough to prove that they were
guilty of a riotous assault. They believed that a man subject to all the disabilities
named, and who wrote a foolish letter, might still be abused, and that the respondents
were guilty of the abuse.
The evidence excluded was, that on July 8, 1875, four days before
the riotous assault, the witness Potter made a complaint against Miss Dolloff, which
he charged her with an attempt to poison him, and that the complaint was not true.
The counsel for the defence proposed to go outside of the issue in this case, and
try the issue as to whether or not the complaint was true. It is said that this
was offered to show his "mental condition, and as affecting his credit before the
jury." Undoubtedly, if this had been admitted, and Miss Dolloff had testified that
she did not attempt to poison Potter, the counsel would have contended that he was
discredited as a witness, because he had sworn falsely in making oath to the complaint.
But who ever heard of impeaching a witness in that way?
Evidence was received tending to prove that Potter was suffering from an attack
of epilepsy when the riotous assault was claimed to have been made, and that this
was likely to cause a delusion. But no offer was made to show that he was suffering
in the same way when he made the complaint; so that it was not proposed to prove
that on July 8 he had a malady that was likely to cause a delusion, and that on
that account he made a false charge against Miss Dolloff, and that from this it
might be inferred that from the same cause he made a false charge against the respondents.
But the offer was, to prove that he made a false charge against Miss Dolloff. From
this it would be inferred, that if he made a false charge in that case, he did in
this case, or that he was then under a delusion and made a false charge, and that
on this trial he was under a delusion and made a false charge. Such proof as this
does not legally prove anything for the defence.
In State v. Knapp, 45 N.H. 143 , it was decided that on the trial of the respondent
for a rape, it was not evidence on his behalf to prove that the complainant was
unchaste with other men.
The question as to whether Potter made an unfounded charge against Miss Dolloff
is a collateral issue.
Again: the legitimate inquiry as to Potter's mental condition had reference to
July 12 only. If it had been claimed that he was permanently insane, it might be
relevant to inquire into his condition an indefinite time before or after that time.
But the claim was, that he was subject to sudden attacks of epilepsy, which rendered
him for the time insane, or caused delusion. The court, then, did right to confine
the evidence, as to this point, to that day, and it was a matter of discretion that
they might do so. State v. Knapp, above cited.