Burke, for the defendant.
This court has no jurisdiction out of the limits of this state over persons or things.
Downer v. Shaw, 22 N.H. 277 . It is a foreign tribunal with regard to the citizens
of other states. It cannot send its process into the jurisdiction of another state,
and compel the citizens of that state to come here and answer to and defend any
action, complaint, or bill pending before itself. These propositions hardly require
authority to support them. But the following are referred to as recognizing the
principle contended for: Story Confl. Laws, s. 509; Freeman Judgments, s. 564; Ewer
v. Coffin, 1 Cush. 23; 1 Waite Actions and Defences 47; Story Eq. Pl., ss. 75-78,
and authorities cited; Equity Rules 22 and 47 of the Supreme Court of the U.S. Service
of process on a defendant residing in another jurisdiction must be made upon him
in this state in order to compel him to answer in one of its tribunals. Libbey v.
Hodgdon, 9 N.H. 396 . Nor will service out of the state avail when the defendant
has specially appeared by attorney to object to it. Wright v. Boynton, 37 N.H.
9 . And March v. Eastern R. R., 40 N.H. 583 , recognizes the same doctrine. The
defendant in this case is not a resident of the state, was not in the state when
the service of the bill in this case was made upon him, and has not appeared in
this case save to except to the jurisdiction of this court, for want of due service
of process. Nor has he sought redress in this tribunal in any case. He has, in another
suit, when casually in this state; been summoned by the plaintiff to answer to an
action, and has appeared to defend himself against what he deems a false claim made
against him by the plaintiff.
A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law, unless the complainant
has an equitable defence, of which he was not entitled to avail himself at law,
or of which he was prevented availing himself by fraud or accident, he being free
from negligence. Hendrickson v. Hinkley, 17 How. 443; Sample v. Barnes, 14 How.
70; Wynn v. Wilson, Hempst. 698; Kidwell v. Masterson, 3 Cranch C. C. 52; Creath
v. Sims, 5 How. 192; Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210; Le Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns.
Ch. 436. The plaintiff comes within the principles of these decisions. The record
of the court in Chicago, on file in this court, shows that he had ample opportunity
to try all the matters in issue between himself and the defendant. He did try everything
but his own set-off. That he withdrew just before the trial, in order to catch and
sue the defendant in this jurisdiction, hoping to gain something by the adroit manoeuvre.
If the defendant has committed fraud, perjury, or other crime in Illinois (which
is utterly denied and repelled), let the plaintiff pursue his remedy for such crime
in the jurisdiction in which it was committed. He should not be permitted to harass
the defendant in his defence to the legal action, which he has instituted in this
jurisdiction when he has himself submitted to the
trial of the matter in controversy before a competent tribunal in another jurisdiction.
Cushing, Wait, and Parker, for the plaintiff.
"In general it may be stated, that in all cases where, by accident, or mistake,
or fraud, or otherwise, a party has an unfair advantage in proceedings in a court
of law, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, and it
is, therefore, against conscience that he should use that advantage, a court of
equity will interfere, and restrain him from using the advantage which he has thus
improperly gained." Story Eq., s. 885.
Divested of its verbiage, the naked proposition of the plea filed in this case is,
that this court has no power to prevent itself from being made the instrument of
a wrong, however palpable, merely because the party proposing to make use of it
for that purpose chooses to remain, in person, beyond the territorial limits of
the state, making use of counsel here for the accomplishment of the purpose. The
plaintiff brings his suit against the defendant, who, by appearing to defend, has
submitted himself, in everything pertaining to the cause, to the jurisdiction of
this court. Although our process may not reach his person in such a manner as to
subject it to pains and penalties, he is, nevertheless, subject, for all the purposes
of the cause, to any and all orders and decrees which the proper conduct of the
case may require to be made. Stone v. Anderson, 25 N.H. 221 .
A subpoena out of chancery may not reach the defendant out of New Hampshire, but
when he comes here, either in person or by his counsel, to make his defence, he
has submitted his case and all its subject-matter to the jurisdiction of the court,
and any order or decree relating to the cause, of which he or his counsel has notice,
will bind him with respect to the cause. The subject-matter of this bill is the
action at law pending in this court between the parties, and the unconscionable
defence which the defendant is attempting to set up. This is all within the jurisdiction
of this court, and its process can reach either the defendant, or his agents or
counsel, whenever they come into court for the purpose of making such defence. March
v. Eastern R. R., 40 N.H. 583 , seems to us to recognize the doctrine for which
we contend. St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatchf. 259, and Marco v. Low, 55
Me. 549 , seem to be directly in point. See, also, Adams Eq. 322, 324.
Wait, for the plaintiff.
The bill alleges, in substance, that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff's
unavoidable absence, from illness, to obtain, by perjury and fraud, a judgment against
him in the court of Illinois, which he knew was unjust. And the question is, Shall
he be
permitted, against conscience, to make use of that judgment in New Hampshire? On
general principles, as administered in courts of equity, can the relief be afforded?
It is held, in Company v. Mathes, 5 N.H. 574 , that "It is a good cause for granting
a new trial, that one of the witnesses of the party in whose favor the verdict is,
has been convicted of perjury in the cause." That was a motion or a new trial in
an action at law. We conceive that conviction of the perjury is required only that
it may be rendered certain that the judgment obtained was the product of perjury,
and so that it shall not be made an issue in the trial of the cause. A demurrer
to the bill admits every material allegation of the bill. It admits that the defendant's
judgment was obtained by injury, corruption, and fraud; there is no issue to be
trial, and no facts to be established by evidence; all stand admitted by the demurrer.
There are no laches or negligence on the part of the plaintiff; but his misfortune
was taken advantage of, to obtain the judgment which the defendant is now seeking
to use, against conscience.
The reasoning on which courts of law refuse new trials, merely because a judgment
has been obtained by false testimony, to wit, that it would lead to interminable
litigation, each party asserting, and offering to prove, that the result obtained
by the other was by falsehood and perjury, has no application to a bill in equity
like the present. The judgment was not obtained merely by false testimony. The defendant
sought his opportunity, or at least availed himself of the opportunity, when he
knew the plaintiff was, by illness, unavoidably absent, to obtain an undue and unconscionable
advantage. To this was added perjury. If this judgment had been obtained in New
Hampshire, and by the same means, it would present a clear case for a new trial
at law; much more a case for restraining its use, as against conscience, in equity.
The case of Stowell v. Eldred, 26 Wis. 504 , is strongly in point. If this relief
cannot be granted, there will be a failure of justice which principle does not require.
Davis v. Headley, 22 N.J. Eq. 115 , 123 ,; Simmons v. Clark, 56 Ill. 96 , 103
; French v. Pease, 10 Kan. 51 , 54 ; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa 261 ; Kinnier v.
Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 535 ; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217 , 225 ; Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H.
388 .
That fraud, as a general proposition, vitiates judgments as well as all other legal
obligations, has been well enough settled from a time long prior to the Duchess
of Kingston's case (11 St. Trials 262), where the doctrine is declared by the twelve
judges of England. It is there laid down that fraud is an extrinsic, collateral
act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice Lord Coke says,
it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. Fermor's case, 2 Coke
77. For the purpose of the present discussion, we suppose that all the material
allegations of the bill are to be taken as true, and therefore that the judgment
here
complained of was obtained by the defendant in the Illinois court by fraud. It will
be in season to try that question, as one of fact, when it is denied by the answer
of the defendant. Assuming the fraud, then, as alleged, does this court possess
the power to grant the relief prayed?
1. What is the relief prayed? It is not that the judgment in Illinois may be set
aside, nor is it that an erroneous judgment may be corrected. A bill in equity never
does either of these. Story Eq., ss. 875, 1571. Had courts of equity assumed any
such power, it is safe to believe that the controversy upon this subject would have
had a very different termination in the time of Lords Ellesmere and Coke from that
given it by King James, under the advice of the learned jurists of the realm. The
relief sought is that the defendant may be restrained from the use, against conscience,
of a judgment obtained in Illinois by fraud.
2. Were the relief sought against a judgment recovered by the same means in the
courts of New Hampshire, we suppose there can be no doubt that it would be granted.
Hibbard v. Eastman, 47 N.H. 507 , and cases there cited; Robinson v. Wheeler, 51
N.H. 384 , 386 . And the question is, Does it make any difference that it was a
judgment obtained in another state of the American Union? The case of Borden v.
Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, is often cited as sustaining our view, and I think the reasoning
of the court there is altogether in that direction. I do not, however, rely upon
that case, as it is doubtless capable of vindication on other grounds. Nor do I
rely upon any of that large class of cases where the judgments have been resisted
on the ground of a want of jurisdiction in the courts where they were rendered.
Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544 ; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 — S.C., 1
Duer 142, dissenting opinion of Paine, J.; Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Iowa 58 ; Engel v.
Scheuerman, 40 Geo. 206; Davis v. Smith, 5 Geo. 274; Hoit v. Alloway, 2 Blackf.
108; Coffee v. Neeley, 2 Heisk. 304, are authorities for the plaintiff. The remarks
of the chief-justice, in Luckenbach v. Anderson, 47 Pa. St. 123, show his understanding
of the rule to be as laid down in the above cited cases. Such was also Judge Story's
view. Confl. of Laws, s. 609. Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio 109 , has been sometimes
cited as favoring an opposite doctrine; but how it can be so regarded is more than
I can discover. The case was an action at law founded upon a judgment rendered in
Virginia; and although the court held that to such an action fraud was not a good
plea, they very distinctly affirm the doctrine that a court of equity will afford
relief against such a judgment, and give reasons, which to the court were satisfactory,
why the remedy should be exclusively in equity. The case is, in truth, a strong
authority in favor of the doctrine for which we contend.
The case of Bicknell v. Field, 8 Paige Ch. 440, has been cited by some text writers
as an authority directly against the doctrine
for which we contend. If it is so, it is the only case I have been able to find,
or to find any reference to, which holds that relief may not be had in equity against
such a judgment. It is to be observed that Bicknell v. Field was decided by the
chancellor alone; and, however confessedly learned and able, it at least adds nothing
to the weight of his judgment in the case that it is opposed to that of Vice-Chancellor
McCoun, which shows that it was only because the relative positions of the two judges
were not reversed that the final decision was not the other way. But if Bicknell
v. Field is what has been claimed for it, it must be regarded as overruled in New
York by the later case of Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 . But I submit that Bicknell
v. Field is no authority for this defendant. In the Duchess of Kingston's case,
which is cited by Chief-Justice Parker in Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N.H. 227 , it
is said, — "Although it is not permitted to show that the court were mistaken,
it may be shown that they were misled." And that is precisely what is claimed in
the case at bar. It is, that the court of Illinois was misled by the fraud of this
defendant. Now, in Bicknell v. Field, the bill which was demurred to alleged in
substance that the record of the judgment in the Massachusetts court from which
relief was sought was entered up without authority from the court, against its rules,
and by fraud and collusion of the clerk who made the record; in short, that there
was, in fact, no such judgment, and that the record was a false record. And the
opinion of the chancellor proceeds' upon such an assumed state of facts, and no
other. That was not, therefore, a case where the court were misled by fraud, but
it was a case where the court were misrepresented by the record. And the chancellor
held the record of such high verity, because in Massachusetts, that it could not
be allowed to be shown in New York to be false. Now we do not deny the authenticity
of the record, nor was that denied in any of the other cases above cited; but we
say the court of Illinois was imposed upon by the defendant's fraud, and thereby
misled, and induced to render an unjust, though not a legally erroneous, judgment.
Bicknell v. Field is therefore as unlike as possible to the case at bar, and is
no authority whatever for the decision of the latter. If, however, the case at bar
were like that of Bicknell v. Field, we should with some confidence ask this court
to consider whether it was correctly decided. It does seem to me, on reading that
case, that it was not well considered, and that it cannot stand, in view of the
reasoning of the other cases which are cited above. It seems to be a case appropriate
to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and that the relief there prayed ought
to have been given. But, whether the case were well decided or not, it is no authority
in the case now before the court.
By the case of Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, it is now settled, so far as the
question can be settled by the supreme court of the United States, that fraud is
not a good plea to an action of
debt upon a judgment. As I understand the opinion of the court in that case, however,
it does not proceed upon any doctrine derived from the federal constitution or laws,
but goes upon the general ground that fraud is not a good plea in a court of law
to an action upon a judgment; and the reasoning relates as much to a domestic judgment
as to one of a sister state. It does not at all touch the question whether a court
of equity can grant relief by way of injunction from such a judgment. The case is
viewed in the same way by Mr. Bigelow — Estoppel 217, note 3; Fraud 179.
In Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N.H. 227 , 264 , the chief-justice discusses the case
of a supposed erroneous judgment — one which might be reversed on a writ of
error. And he is undoubtedly sustained by all the authorities in the view that such
a judgment can only be attacked by the proper proceeding for the correction of the
error. But he admits very distinctly that the rule does not apply to a judgment
obtained by fraud. And he observes, "To warrant that, there must be, not mistake
of the court, but covin, collusion, or falsity of the party." And for this he cites
the Duchess of Kingston's case, with other authorities. Nor are the federal constitution
and laws at all relied upon by the chief-justice; but he asserts, and doubtless
clearly maintains, that a judgment regularly rendered in a state court is not liable
to be reexamined in the federal courts except upon a writ of error. We do not assail
the court of Illinois, nor do we assail its judgment because of error in rendering
it. We assail this defendant for having by fraud misled that court, and thus obtained
from it a judgment which it is against conscience that he should use.
It is said that this judgment must stand until regularly set aside in the jurisdiction
where rendered. That observation has no application except to erroneous judgments,
such as may be set aside on a writ of error. Courts of law do not set aside their
own judgments for fraud. By a great and decisive preponderance of the authorities
above cited, as well as many others that might be adduced, the only remedy against
such a judgment is in equity; although in Iowa and New York, and perhaps in other
states, where codes have been adopted, the remedy is afforded according to their
peculiar practice. (See above cited authorities in those states.) But in those cases
which hold that a remedy may be had in a court of law, that remedy is not by way
of setting aside the fraudulent judgment. It is only by way of plea to an action
which may be brought for recovery of its amount. It is idle, therefore, to talk
about setting aside this Illinois judgment. The remedy, wherever sought, must be
in some other form. Now, suppose the remedy by way of plea were allowed by the practice
of the courts of Illinois: must this plaintiff make the journey to Illinois for
the purpose of being sued, in order to set up that defence by way of plea? Perhaps,
if he should be accommodating enough to do so, the defendant might not choose to
bring suit
against him there. He would hardly be likely to do so if by refraining he could
insure the unassailability of his fraudulent judgment in every other state of the
Union, and be at liberty to pursue an action upon it in the home of the victim of
his fraud.
But it is said that the plaintiff may prosecute a bill in equity in Illinois for
relief against this judgment. Courts of equity do not set aside the judgments of
courts of law; they can only restrain by injunction the unconscionable use of such
judgments. Such an injunction operates only upon the person and within the jurisdiction
of the court where granted. Such an injunction in Illinois can have no force in
New Hampshire. It is equally idle, therefore, to insist in New Hampshire that the
equitable remedy must first be sought in Illinois.
In Freeman on Judgments, s. 576, it is said, — "All defence which are admissible
against a judgment where it was pronounced, are equally admissible in actions upon
it in another state." And again: "Whether fraud can be assigned as a defence, seems
to depend upon the form of practice in the state where the action on the judgment
is brought. If, in such state, fraud can be pleaded to an action on a domestic judgment,
it is equally available and equally efficient in actions on judgments of other states.
But if, to avoid a domestic judgment for fraud, proceedings must be instituted in
equity, then like proceedings, and those only, must be resorted to as against a
judgment of another state." And see authorities there cited. Judge Cooley declares,
— "The same defences may be made to a judgment when sued in another state,
which could have been made to it in the state where rendered." Const. Lim. 17, note
1. The latter rule is acted upon by Judge Dillon and the court in Rogers v. Gwinn, 21
Iowa 58 ; and, assuming that relief against the judgment there in question would
be afforded in Kentucky, it is on that ground administered in Iowa.
The act of congress of May 26, 1790 (1 St at Large 122; U.S. Rev. St., c. 17, s.
905), is, "And the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid,
shall have such faith and credit given them in every court within the United States
as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records
are or shall be taken." When it is considered that this act was passed in pursuance
of section 1 of article 4 of the federal constitution, which expressly empowers
congress to "prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall
be proved, and the effect thereof," how would it be possible, even in the absence
of all judicial authority upon the subject, to hold otherwise than that a judgment
of a state is to be treated in the same manner, and its enforcement restrained for
the same causes everywhere, as in the state where rendered? I submit that the language
of the act of Congress leaves nothing open for discussion upon this point. How this
judgment would be treated in Illinois seems not to have been, thus far, fully settled
by actual
decision of the courts of that state, though the cases of Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam.
536, and Hopkins v. Woodward, 75 Ill. 62 , would seem to leave little doubt how
the question would be decided should it there directly arise, or that the decision
would be in accordance with the prayer of our bill. "In the absence of proof," however,
"the presumption is, that the laws of another state are the same as those of this
state." 5 U.S. Dig., First Series, 501, s. 401, and the numerous authorities there
cited. By the federal laws a judgment rendered in any state has the effect of a
domestic judgment in other states. The defendant's Illinois judgment is as good
here as in Illinois, but no better; and it is no better here than a New Hampshire
judgment. Board v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 529; Snydam v. Barber, 18 N.Y.
468 . In Illinois it is not reversible on error, nor correctible on supplementary
proceedings, but it is voidable there for fraud; and it stands here as it stands
there, so far as the defendant attempts to enforce it here. To dismiss this bill
would be to give more effect to the judgment here than it would have in Illinois.
If, in the absence of authority, there could be any doubt as to the law of New Hampshire
all question is removed by Hibbard v. Eastman, 47 N.H. 507 , where it is fully
settled that a party will be relieved in equity by injunction against the effects
of just such a judgment as this. The presumption is, and that is fortified by an
unbroken weight of authority in other states, that the same relief would be afforded
in Illinois. If so, this plaintiff is entitled to equivalent relief here.
The authority of Bigelow has been referred to as favoring a doctrine adverse to
the prayer of this bill. But so far from this being so, both in his book on Fraud
and in that on Estoppel, although he favors the opinion that fraud cannot be set
up in a court of law as a defence to an action on a judgment of a sister state,
he distinctly declares that "The apparent conflict in these cases may be partly
reconciled in the fact that several of the cases which assert the right of impeachment
for fraud were proceedings in equity; and most of the authorities admit that the
plea of fraud is good in equity." Frauds 178. And again: "We apprehend that the
supreme court of the United States would not refuse to allow the allegation of fraud
in either of the three following cases: First, where the jurisdiction of the court
was obtained by fraud * * *; secondly, where the judgment itself, or some material
step leading to it, was concocted in fraud," etc. Id. 179. And the whole force of
the discussion of the subject by the same author in his book on Estoppel 214, 218,
seems altogether to favor the doctrine that, though not at law, relief may be afforded
in equity against a judgment obtained by fraud in a sister state. Freeman on Judgments,
s. 576, seems clearly to favor the same view.
Burke, for the defendant, in reply.
The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from enforcing a judgment recovered
by him against the plaintiff in Illinois, which the plaintiff alleges was obtained
by the fraud of the defendant. The fraud alleged in the bill is "false and fraudulent"
testimony given by the defendant in the trial of the cause in the court in Illinois.
It is not denied that the court in Illinois before whom this cause was tried had
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, due notice having been given
to the plaintiff of the commencement and pendency of the suit.
The principal question is as to the binding power of a judgment recovered in one
state and sought to be enforced in another. And this question has been fully and
conclusively settled by the constitution of the United States (article 4, section
1), the legislation of congress under it, and the almost innumerable decisions of
the courts of the several states and of the United States, given in interpretation
of such constitutional provision. Judicial interpretation has established the principle,
not now to be shaken, that the judgments of one state, when duly authenticated,
are to receive the same recognition and force in other states as the judgments in
those states are entitled to in the jurisdictions, in which they were rendered.
They are conclusive upon all matters which might have been pleaded, and could have
legally entered into such judgments before they were rendered. Questions of jurisdiction
over the parties and subject-matter of the suit, want of notice to the adverse party,
or other matters existing before the rendition of the judgment, and affecting the
right of the court to pronounce it, only can be recognized as defences against the
judgment when it is sought to be enforced in another state. And matters happening
after its, rendition, such as release, payment, statute of limitations, etc., may
be defences. This doctrine is fully sustained by the following cases, and numerous
others which it is deemed unnecessary to cite: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Hampton
v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234; Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 340; M'Elmoyle v. Cohen,
13 Pet. 312; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 ; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Woodward
v. Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Reed v. Ross, 1 Baldw. C. C. 36; Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. R.
252; Caldwell v. Carrington, 9 Pet. 101; Voorhees v. Bank of U.S., 10 Pet. 449.
A judgment recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction, while unreversed, is
conclusive, as to the subject-matter of it, to every intent and purpose, and cannot
be reexamined in a new action founded on evidence which would have made a defence
to the original suit. Tilton v. Gordon, 1 N.H. 33 . The judgment of a court in one
of the United States, having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties, is binding
and conclusive on the parties and privies in every other court in the United States
until it is regularly reversed by some court having jurisdiction for that purpose.
Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N.H. 227 . It is a rule to which no exception is recollected,
that the judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction, while unreversed, concludes the subject-matter as between
the same parties. They cannot again bring it into litigation. U.S. v. Nourse, 9
Pet. 8. The judgment of an inferior tribunal, when it comes collaterally in question,
is conclusive so long as it remains unreversed. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 499,
511. Subject to the qualification that they are open to inquiry as to the jurisdiction
of the court which gave them, and as to notice to the defendant, the judgment of
a state court, not reversed by a superior court having jurisdiction, nor set aside
by a direct proceeding in chancery, is conclusive in the courts of all other states
when the subject-matter of the controversy is the same. Christmas v. Russell, 5
Wall. 292; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435. A decree of divorce, valid and effectual
by the laws of the state in which it was obtained, is valid and effectual in all
other states. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108. A judgment rendered in one state will,
even though apparently harsh and erroneous, be regarded as valid and conclusive
by the courts of another state, until reversed in the state where it was rendered,
if the cause of action was there litigated. Rankin v. Barnes, 5 Bush. 20. When a
jury in one state has decided on the question of notice, etc., that question is
not open in an action brought in another state on the judgment. Taylor v. Bryden,
8 Johns. 173, cited by Story in Conflict of Laws, s. 609. A judgment obtained in
one state is sufficient evidence in another state of the debt or matter adjudicated,
until it be shown it was unfairly or irregularly obtained. Ib. But anything that
could have been pleaded or proved in the original trial cannot be shown. See authorities
above cited. Numerous other cases to the same effect might be cited on this point
if it were necessary; but I leave the subject with the remark of the learned editors
of the Am. Leading Cases, vol. 2, 745: "On the whole, it may be concluded that the
provisions of the constitution on this subject are best satisfied by holding that
the judgments of each state are obligations of record in every other, and are consequently
conclusive in pleading and evidence, as a merger of all antecedent matters and causes
of action to which they relate, and which come within their scope and operation."
The proceeding of the plaintiff to evade the force of the judgment is a bill in
equity. And it is admitted by the plaintiff that the bill does not seek to set aside
the judgment, but, on account of the fraud alleged in the bill, to prevent him from
unconscionably using it by the omnipotent potency of an injunction. He substantially
admits that the judgment cannot be set aside by such a proceeding.
In the case of Hibbard v. Eastman, 47 N.H. 507 , Bellows, C. J., remarks, —
"On the other hand, it may, with equal safety, be laid down as a general rule, that
a defence cannot be set up in equity which has been fully tried at law, although
it may be the opinion of the court that the defence ought to have prevailed," —
citing Duncan v. Lyon, 3 Johns. Ch. 351. And it is
the same thing if the party had an opportunity to make the defence, but neglected
it until after the matter had passed into a judgment. "If a party has not used due
diligence in making such a defence at law, relief will ordinarily be refused in
equity." Bellows, C. J., in the same case. The case of Hibbard v. Eastman gives
no countenance to the doctrine attempted to be maintained by the plaintiff.
Nor can fraud or mistake, happening on the trial of the original action, avail in
a proceeding to set the judgment aside, because it is presumed that they are excluded
by the presence and intervention of the judge presiding, who, it is presumed, would
prevent them. 2 Am. Lead. Cases 742 (substantial comment of the learned editors).
As hereinbefore stated, no judgment rendered by a court in one state, having jurisdiction
of the parties and subject-matter, and with due notice to the defendant, can be
set aside by the courts of another state for fraud, or any other defence which could
be pleaded or proved in evidence in the original action, by bill in equity or otherwise.
All such defences are merged in the original judgment. Anderson v. Anderson, 8
Ohio 108 ; Tarbox v. Hays, 6 Watts 398; 2 Am. Lead. Cases 737. In an action on a
judgment rendered in New York, a plea of nil debet, and a plea that the judgment
was obtained by fraud and without consideration, were held equally inadmissible
— the first as attempting to deny the legal obligation of what was matter
of record, and the last as inviting an inquiry into the merits of a controversy
which had received a final and conclusive determination. The merits of the cause
of action are not open to examination. Evans v. Tatem, before cited; Benton v. Burgot,
10 S. R. 240; Reed v. Ross, 1 Baldw. C. C. 36; 2 Am. Lead. Cases 738.
Yet, so far as I have been able to examine them, the plaintiff relies upon cases
precisely of that character. He cites on this point Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544
; Dawson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 ; Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Iowa 58 ; Engel v. Scheuerman,
40 Geo. 206; Davis v. Smith, 5 Geo. 274; Hoit v. Alloway, 2 Blackf. 108; Coffee
v. Neeley, 2 Heisk. 304; French v. Pease, 10 Kan. 51 ; Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H.
388 ; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa 200 ; and others which I have not been able to examine,
but which presumably involve substantially the same facts. In Pearce v. Olney the
original judgment was procured by a fraud outside of the record, — by assuring
the defendant that nothing more should be done in the action without notice to him,
and afterward, without giving him notice, proceeding with the case to final judgment.
In Dawson v. Pearce it was declared that a court of equity has power to grant relief
against a judgment procured by a fraud, which, it will be seen hereafter, must have
been intended a fraud committed outside of the record. In Gwinn v. Rogers the plaintiff
assured the defendant that he would discontinue an action which he had commenced
against him. But instead of doing so, the plaintiff, in the absence of the defendant
and without his knowledge, prosecuted
the action to judgment. In Engel v. Scheuerman it was held that a party might be
restrained from enforcing a judgment in one state, where the defendant had been
led to believe that the suit in the sister state had been abandoned. But Bigelow,
in his work on Estoppels (p. 185) says, "This doctrine is unsettled." In Davis v.
Smith it was held that a judgment recovered in one state, and attempted to be enforced
in another, may be impeached for fraud or want of jurisdiction of the person and
subject-matter. I have not been able to find a full report of the case, but it is
presumed, in view of the general drift of the authorities, that the fraud must be
extraneous of the matters which were or might have been pleaded or proved in evidence
in defence. In Holt v. Alloway it was held that to a judgment recovered in another
state the defendant may plead that it was obtained by fraud, or that the court had
no jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter. The fraud presumably must have
been committed outside of the record, as held in other cases. In Coffee v. Neeley,
in Tennessee, in defence against a judgment, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff
took advantage of political prejudices, existing when the suit was commenced in
Kentucky, to combine the citizens of that state to prevent his making any defence,
and therefore the defendant allowed a default to be taken against him, because he
could not appear without endangering his life. Held by the court to be tatamount
[tantamount] to a fraud. The case of Adams v. Adams does not sustain the plaintiff.
The case originated in the jurisdiction of this state, and was prosecuted to a decision
without notice to the party against whom the judgment was rendered. It is a case
over which the supreme court had unquestionable authority.
When a party, by some act or declaration out of the record, lulls his opponent into
false security, or by other means deceives him and thereby obtains a judgment or
decree to his prejudice, the judgment or decree thus obtained is fraudulent, and
may be impeached on that ground. Ellis v. Kelly, 8 Bush. (Ky.) 621. It is this class
of cases, if any, in which fraud can be pleaded as a defence against a judgment
rendered in another state. And it is upon this principle that Judge Dillon proceeded
in the case of Rogers v. Gwinn, cited by the plaintiff, and that the remark of Judge
Cooley can be explained. Those able judges would not be found expressing opinions
contrary to the volume of authorities denying the doctrine contended for by the
plaintiff. The very paragraph (576 in Freem. Judg.) cited by the plaintiff sustains
the doctrine contended for by the defendant with regard to the conclusiveness of
judgments rendered in one state and sought to be enforced in another. That author
says, in the paragraph referred to, "Nothing which could have been pleaded in the
original action can be pleaded against the judgment. Errors and irregularities in
the proceedings in the original suit do not in any respect impair the effect of
the judgment, unless taken advantage of by an appeal, or
some other appropriate correctory proceeding." The authorities cited by the plaintiff,
namely, the cases mentioned above, and Freeman on Judgments, and Judges Cooley and
Dillon, to the effect that the same defences that can be made to judgments in the
states where they are rendered may be made in the states where they are sought to
be enforced, rightly understood and interpreted, are not disputed by the defendant,
— that is, if such judgments in the states in which they were rendered are
held conclusive against all matters of defence then existing, and which might have
been pleaded or proved in evidence on the trial. If understood to imply more than
this, they are denied. If they had the binding force which is understood to be claimed
for them by the plaintiff, they would in effect repeal the provisions of the constitution,
and the decrees of the courts founded upon such provisions. A judgment, valid otherwise,
cannot be disturbed by parties and privies by a plea of fraud Christmas v. Russell,
before cited; M'Rae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick. 53 If this were so, as Putnam, J., pertinently
remarks in the case last cited, "The law would become a game of frauds, in which
the greatest rogue would become the most successful player."
Nor can a party to a judgment be permitted to impeach it collaterally in equity
by proof of mistake or fraud in the rendition thereof. B. W. R. R. v. Sparhawk.
1 Allen 448; Stovall v. Banks, 10 Wall. 583. Neither fraud nor nil debet can be
pleaded upon a judgment rendered in another state. Maxwell v. Stewart 22 Wall. 77,
confirms expressly the decision rendered in Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; and
Bigelow, in his work on Estoppels, sustains the doctrine contended for. On p. 137
he says, "The cases which have decided the question the other way [namely, that
courts of one state cannot inquire into the question of fraud in a judgment rendered
in another state], are not so few nor so obscure. The point was decided in a recent
case in the supreme court of Iowa [Smith v. Smith, 22 Iowa 516 ]. The offer to
prove that the judgment had been procured by fraud was rejected by the court below,
exceptions were taken, and the ruling sustained on appeal. The court said, `If a
judgment can be attacked for fraud in any case, it can be only by a direct proceeding.'"
The same doctrine is held in Tennessee. Kelley v. Mize, 3 Sneed 59. And Mr. Bigelow
adds (p. 138), "The point has been thus decided also as to the judgments of the
sister states," citing Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio 109 . And he further adds,
"And the strongest case on the subject is one of this class recently decided in
the supreme court of the United States (citing Christmas v. Russell), and there
can now be no doubt that the plea of fraud, by parties and privies, is unavailing
to disturb the effect of an otherwise valid judgment."
Thus the following propositions seem to be well established by the authorities,
viz.:
1. A judgment cannot be disturbed for any matter of defence
existing, and which might have been pleaded or proved in evidence at the time of
the trial.
2. Neither fraud nor mistake can be pleaded against the judgment.
3. The judgment cannot be attacked collaterally by a proceeding at law or in equity.
4. The remedy for any sufficient cause for reversing the judgment must be by a proper
proceeding in some court of competent jurisdiction against the judgment directly
in the state in which it was rendered, and not collaterally in another state, as
is attempted in this case.
5. The judgment in this case cannot be reversed in any court of competent jurisdiction,
even in the state of Illinois, for any cause happening on the trial, not even for
fraud or false swearing, as alleged in the plaintiff's bill, but which is emphatically
denied by the defendant.
And, finally, it is a familiar principle that equity gives no relief when the plaintiff
has a remedy at law. In this case he had such remedy by appeal from the court in
Chicago to a higher tribunal, which he neglected to take. And he may now have his
remedy at law by applying to the same court for a new trial, setting forth, by affidavit
and petition, in the usual manner, the fraud alleged in his bill as a reason for
such new trial.