J. Y. Mugridge and S.C. Eastman, for the defendants, cited 1 Barb. 495;
1 Graham Waterman, New Trials, 549; Clerk v. Udall, 2 Salk. 649. Hewlett v. Cruchley,
5 Taunt. 281; Goodwin v.
Gibbons, 4 Burr. 2108; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 ; Hamilton v. Bullock, 2 Hayw.
(N.C.) 224; Com'rs v. Ross, 3 Binn. 520; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Binn. 180; Woodruff
v. Richardson, 20 Conn. 238 ; M. W. R. R. v. Winn, 26 Geo. 250; Russ v. Steamboat, 14
Iowa 363 ; Sexton v. Brock, 15 Ark. 345 .
Chase Streeter, for the plaintiff. In cases of tort, where it is claimed that the
damages assessed by the jury are excessive, and that their verdict should he set
aside for that reason, courts almost universally hold that they will not interfere
unless the damages are so exorbitant, when compared with the circumstances of the
case, as to satisfy them that the jury must have been influenced by passion, partiality,
prejudice, or corruption in making the assessment. Rand v. Redington, 13 N.H. 76
; Belknap v. Rail road, 49 N.H. 358 ; Field Dam., c. 37, and numerous authorities
cited in notes; Sedg. Dam. (5th ed.) 707, and authorities cited; Hilliard New Trials,
c. 17; Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick. 380; Treanor v. Donahoe, 9 Cush. 228; Worster
v. Canal Bridge, 16 Pick. 541; Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. 156; Stoneham School Dist.
v. Richardson, 23 Pick. 62; Tompson v. Mussey, 3 Me. 305 ; Jacobs v. Bangor, 16
Me. 187 ; Gilbert v. Woodbury, 22 Me. 246 ; Kimball v. Bath, 38 Me. 219 ; Campbell
v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 ; Gee v. Patterson, 63 Me. 49 ; Powers v. Cary, 64
Me. 9 ; Hobbs v. E. R. R., 66 Me. 573 ; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 509 ; Woodruff
v. Richardson, ib. 243; Nicholson v. Railroad, 22 Conn. 88 ; Waters v. Bristol, 26
Conn. 405 ; Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45; Worford v. Isbel, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 247;
Solen v. Railroad, 13 Nev. 106 ; Ford v. Ward, 26 Ark. 360 ; Railroad v. Parks, 88
Ill. 373 ; Westerville v. Freeman, 66 Ind. 255 ; Railroad v. Casey, 52 Texas 112[
52 Tex. 112 ]; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205; Ash v. Ash, Comb. 357; Cowp. 230; 2
Wils. 405; 3 Wils. 61; 1 D. E. 277; 2 W. Bl. 1327; 1 Burr. 609; Butler v. Bangor, 67
Me. 385 ; Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 330 ; Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 281;
Duberley v. Gunning, 4 D. E. 651; Shaw v. Railroad, 8 Gray 45; Clerk v. Udall,
2 Salk. 649; Chambers v. Robinson, 1 Strange 691; Anon., 6 Mod. 22; Railroad v.
Winn, 26 Ga. 250 ; Russ v. Steamboat, 14 Ia. 365 . We think no case can be found
where the court have set aside a second or subsequent verdict that was substantially
like the first, on the ground that the damages assessed were excessive. "There ought
to be an end of things," and a second verdict, substantially like the first, is
reasonable proof that the first is right.