J. H. Benton, Jr. (of Massachusetts), for the defendants. I. The plaintiff
sues upon the alleged contract made by De Rochemont Son, by signing the assent
to the transfer from Marden to him, September 1, 1879. Such a contract is not the
one made with Marden, nor even a modification, extension, or renewal of that contract.
It is a new and original contract, as distinct from and independent of the contract
between Marden and the defendants as a new policy to the plaintiff. Folsom v. Ins.
Co., 30 N.H. 240 ; Cummings v. Ins. Co., 55 N.H. 457 , 460 ; Wilson v. Hill, 3
Met. 66; Fogg v. Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 337. Under the condition of the policy as to
change of title or possession of the property, the case is not changed by the fact
that when Marden sold the property to the plaintiff and assigned the policy to him,
he took back a mortgage on the property and had the policy made payable to him to
the amount of his claim. Foote v. H. F. Ins. Co., 119 Mass. 259 . The contract
which was made payable in case of loss to Marden was not the original contract which
was made with him and was payable to him, but the new, independent contract, which
was made by the assent to his transfer to the plaintiff, if it was made at all.
It was the new contract to insure the plaintiff against damage by fire to his house
to which the clause written in the policy, "payable in case of loss to Marden to
the amount of his claim," applied; and such provision as to payment necessarily
implies that the old contract with Marden was ended, and a new and independent one
created with the plaintiff.
II. De Rochemont Son had been authorized and directed by the Faneuil Hall company,
who were then liable for any loss under the policy to Marden, to consent to any
transfer of the policy. And it is fairly to be inferred, that when they assented
to the transfer to the plaintiff they acted under such authority and direction,
and intended to bind the Faneuil Hall company by what they did and had a right to
do for them, rather than to bind the defendants for whom they had no right to do
anything; and if this be so, it is clear that the Faneuil Hall company are bound
by the assent, and are liable for the loss for which the plaintiff sues.
III. But even the Faneuil Hall company is not bound by a contract made by their
agent, i.e, by themselves, consenting to the transfer of a policy upon which they
were liable, simply because they made such contract upon a form in which the name
of the defendants was printed; still it does not by any means follow that the defendants
are liable merely because the agent of the Faneuil Hall company, in making a contract
which he had authority to make and was in duty bound to make for it, used the printed
name of the defendants, instead of striking that name out of the form and inserting
the name of the company for whom he acted. The mere use of the printed name of the
defendants, in the form of assent to the transfer, is not conclusive. The party
using that name had no authority to use it to bind the defendants, but had authority
to bind the Faneuil Hall company; and if by such use he intended to bind that company,
as it was his duty to do, and as it is submitted he must fairly be inferred to have
intended to do, then he did bind that company. The case is not different from that
where one person contracts under the name of another, and the court will look to
the substance of the transaction rather than to its form.
When De Rochemont, the agent of the Faneuil Hall company, executed the assent to
the assignment, he was "not the agent of the defendants for any purpose." It is
not, then, a case where a principal may be bound by acts of his agent in excess
of his real authority because he has clothed him in apparent authority, for there
was no agency whatever. Nor is it a case where one really an agent as to certain
property is by the owner of the property clothed with indicia of ownership, such
as possession accompanied by written evidence of title in himself (as in Nixon v.
Brown, 57 N.H. 34 ), where the principal is bound by the act of the agent because
he holds him out as authorized to do the act at the time it is done; for the case
finds that after De Rochemont Son ceased to be agents of the defendants, they never
did anything to hold them forth to anybody as their agents. It is simply a case
where a person who knew that the party assuming to contract with him was an agent,
and who had, by reference to the records of the insurance commissioner, or by asking
from the assumed agent the production of his license, ample means to ascertain whether
he was agent or not, seeks to hold a party for whom the assumed agent
had no authority to act, not on the ground that he had ever dealt with him as agent
for such party, or that at the time of the alleged contract he was clothed by such
party with any apparent authority to make such contract, but simply on the ground
that more than three years before he had been agent for such party for the purpose
of making another contract with another person. The plaintiff alleges that De Rochemont
was authorized to make a contract of insurance with him for the defendant, on September
1, 1879. Is it proved by showing that though he was not in fact so authorized, he
had three years previously been authorized to make such a contract with another
person, who had not been notified that such authority had ceased?
It is conceded that the act of De Rochemont Son, in assenting to the transfer to
the plaintiff, was nor in fact the act of the defendants. Does the fact that, more
then three years before, they had clothed him with authority to make such contracts,
but more than a year before had revoked that authority, prove the authority in law?
Page, for the plaintiff. De Rochemont Son had a general authority. Whar. Ag., s.
203; Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222; Pierce v. Ins. Co., 50 N.H. 297 , 301
; Clark v. Ins. Co., 40 N.H. 333 , 341 . The defendants, having given no notice
of the revocation of their agents' authority, are bound by the agents' assent
to Marden's assignment of his policy to the plaintiff. Whar. Ag., s. 111; 2 Kent
Com. 644; 1 Dan. Neg. Ins., s. 288; Davis v. Lane, 10 N.H. 156 , 160 ; Beard v.
Kirk, 11 N.H. 397 ; Salte v. Field, 5 T. R. 211, 215; Morgan v. Stell, 5 Binn.
305. Partners being agents of their firm (Eastman v. Clark, 53 N.H. 276 ), the
same principle requires notice of a dissolution of a partnership, and of any other
revocation of any other agency. Zollar v. Janvrin, 47 N.H. 324 ; Deering v. Flanders, 49
N.H. 225 ; Sto. Ag., s. 470; 1 Par. Cont. 43, 69, 70; Chit. Cont. 198; Hatch v.
Coddington, 95 U.S. 48 , 56 ; Ins. Co. v. McCain, 96 U.S. 84 , 85 ; Clapp v.
Rogers, 12 N.Y. 283 ; McNeilly v. Ins. Co., 66 N.Y. 23 , 28 ; Claflin v. Lenheim, 66
N.Y. 301 ; Fellows v. H. N. Y. S. Co., 38 Conn. 197 , 200-203 ; Packer v. H. L.
Works, 122 Mass. 484 ; Watts v. Kavanagh, 35 Vt. 34 , 38 ; Tier v. Lampson, 35
Vt. 179 , 181 , 182 ; Bradish v. Belknap, 41 Vt. 172 .
The effect of the reinsurance was, that the Faneuil Hall company became agents of
the defendants for the care of this risk. The defendants remained liable as insurers.
If the assent to the assignment of Marden to the plaintiff is to be regarded as
given by the Faneuil Hall company, that company represented the defendants, and
assented in the defendants' name.