To the House of Representatives :

In answer to the foregoing resolution, the undersigned, the justices of the supreme court, respectfully submit their opinions, upon the questions therein contained.

As the claimant cannot sue the state under the contract of May 11, 1897, to which the resolution relates, and as no money can be paid him except by direction of the legislature (Const., art. 55; P. S., c. 16, s. 4; lb., c. 20, s. 1), it might be argued that the legality of that agreement was unimportant, and that the only question for the legislature to determine was one of expediency,, upon which our opinion could not be constitutionally required. Const., art. 73. But assuming that it is the policy of the house to provide for the liquidation of this claim if it was legally incurred, we have considered the questions submitted as though they had arisen in an authorized suit. The fact that no suit can be maintained against the state affords the legislature a proper occasion for requiring our advice as to the legal validity of the contract-in question.

By section 3, chapter 2479, Laws 1861, the governor, with the advice and consent of the council, was “ authorized and empowered to negotiate, adjust, and settle all questions, accounts, matters, and things, between this state and the United States, in any way . . . growing out of . any contracts or expenditures which may be made for the public defence or the payment of *604 troops.” The governor and council at the date of the appointment in question, this act being still in force, were therefore expressly authorized to negotiate, adjust, and settle any accounts or claims -of this character then existing in favor of the state against the .general government. That there were such claims appears to have been then contended, and is now established. The power so conferred, by necessary implication included authority to do whatever was reasonably necessary for its proper' and efficient execution. It is not to be supposed the legislature understood the governor and corincil would, or could, personally perform all the services incident to the proper investigation, proof, and prosecution of such claims by the state. Such matters are commonly conducted by persons having special training, experience, and skill. The appointment of suitable persons to represent the state in the prosecution of its claim before the appropriate tribunals must, therefore, have been understood to have been embraced within the general terms by which power in the matter was conferred upon the executive. Evidence in support of this conclusion is furnished by chapter 4076, Laws 1866, in which the governor and council were empowered “ to pay the authorized agent or agents employed by the state in prosecuting the claims of said state against the United States.” No other statutory provision in the matter being found, this act appears to be a legislative recognition of the legal employment of “ agents ” for the purpose named, under the act first cited. We therefore conclude that the governor and council had authority, May 11, 1897, to appoint Mr. Cummings to prosecute the claim of the state in the matter in question, before the proper tribunals.

The authority to employ agents and other persons necessarily implies the power to contract Avith them for their compensation, according to the method usual in matters of the kind. Bohanan v. Railroad, 70 N. H. 526. There is nothing in the facts submitted to us establishing as matter of law that the provisions made were out of the usual course, or improperly induced. A contract between private individuals, in which the compensation was contingent upon success, might be claimed to be void as against good morals and public policy. Edgerly v. Hale, 71 N. H. 138, 150; Butler v. Legro, 62 N. H. 360. But the legislature -can determine for itself what public policy requires or permits to be done, in the prosecution of claims in favor of the state. Davis v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 241. If there are reasons why the state should refuse to recognize and comply with the agreement made in 1897 by His Excellency Governor Bamsdell, legal ground therefor is not to be found in absence of power in the executive to make the appointment and agreement in question, or in any *605 objection arising as matter of law upon the facts stated to ns. We, therefore, upon those facts, answer in the affirmative both questions submitted.

Whether under the provision of the constitution requiring the governor and council “ from time to time, to hold a council for ordering and directing the affairs of the state, according to the-laws of the land ” (Const., art. 61), or under any power constitutionally inherent in the executive, in the absence of legislation, authority exists for the action taken in 1897, has not been considered.