Singer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
Singer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court {Goode, J.) dismissing plaintiffs petition for declaratory judgment as not being timely filed under RSA 491:22. For reasons which follow, we reverse.
On August 8, 1977, persons not party to the present proceedings brought suit against the plaintiff alleging, inter alia, that he had locked them out of premises which they had leased from him, thereby terminating the lease and causing them damages. The plaintiff alleges that he then contacted his insurance agent and was informed that none of the many individual and commercial insurance policies he then had in effect provided him with
On February 2, 1979, the agent notified Travelers of the underlying action and furnished it with copies of the writ and depositions. On March 30, 1979, the defendant, after investigating the claim, formally denied coverage, alleging a violation of the notice provisions of the policy by its insured. Immediately thereafter, on April 5, 1979, the plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the insurance carrier. Counsel for the defendant Travelers filed a motion to dismiss the petition, claiming that the six-month limitation period set forth in RSA 491:22 operated as an absolute bar to the petition because it was not filed on or before February 8, 1978, six months after the writ was brought. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
We recently stated that “[t]he six-month limitation period in RSA 491:22 is not an absolute one.” National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Watterson, 120 N.H. 141, 143, 412 A.2d 1007, 1008 (1980). RSA 491:22 provides in part:
“[T]he foregoing prohibition [the six-month limitation period] shall not apply where the facts giving rise to such coverage dispute are not known to, or reasonably discoverable by, the insurer until after expiration of such six-month period....”
It is clear that, under the circumstances described in this section of the statute, a declaratory judgment petition may be brought after the six-month period has expired. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Watterson, supra at 143, 412 A.2d at 1008. In National Grange, we held that an insurer may properly bring a petition after the six-month period has run if the facts giving rise to the coverage dispute were not previously known to or reasonably discoverable by the insurer. In the present case, more than six months had passed since suit was commenced before the insurer first discovered that a writ had been brought against its insured.
RSA 491:22 does not limit the right to bring a petition for declaratory judgment to the insurer when the six-month limitation does not apply because of the exclusion contained in the statute. The statute expressly provides that the six-month “prohibition shall not apply where the facts giving rise to such coverage dispute are not known to, or reasonably discoverable by, the insurer. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Once it is determined that this section of the statute is applicable, the six-month prohibition does not apply to either party. Because the defendant insurer here admits that it did not know, or could not have reasonably discovered, the facts giving rise to a coverage dispute until February 2, 1979, the petition, which was brought on April 5, 1979, is not barred under the six-month limitation contained in RSA 491:22.
Reversed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Irving L. Singer v. Travelers Indemnity Company
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published