Pondimin® and Redux™ are two prescription diet drugs manufactured by defendant, Wyeth (formerly known as American Home Products Corporation). Both drugs were approved by the United States Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of obesity.1 Both Pondimin® and Redux™ are anoretics, causing a *550decrease in one’s appetite. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 90 (25th ed. 1990).

On Jidy 8,1997, physicians at the Mayo Clinic publicly reported findings of unusual heart valve lesions and/or valvular regurgitation in twenty-four patients being treated for obesity with phenfen. Mayo Clinic press release, July 8,1997. Simultaneously, the FDA issued a Public Health Advisory to health care professionals notifying them of the twenty-four Mayo Clinic cases and nine additional cases of “unusual valvular morphology and regurgitation” in women who had received phen-fen therapy for an average of ten months.

During the next several weeks, these findings and subsequent developments related to them were widely reported in the media.2 Wyeth responded by issuing a “Dear Doctor Letter” to health care providers and subsequently, at the direction of the FDA, revising the labeling on the drugs.3 However, after additional adverse information became available, Wyeth withdrew Pondimin® and Redux™ from the market on September 15,1997.

Litigation ensued, with claims made that Pondimin® and Redux™ (phen-fen)4 cause valvular heart disease and that Wyeth, among other things, should have warned the plaintiffs’ health care providers of that risk. Thirteen cases currently are scheduled for *551trial on May 31,2005.5 In its April 7, 2005 Opinion, the court held that the heeding presumption will apply to these thirteen cases.6 Subsequent to that holding, Wyeth sought additional depositions of the plaintiffs’ prescribing physicians in order to attempt to rebut this presumption. This motion was granted and commissions to depose the physicians in North Carolina issued. Wyeth now seeks an order permitting its attorneys to meet ex parte with plaintiffs’ treating physicians prior to their deposition testimony. That motion is the subject of this opinion.

I.

Ex parte interviews are an informal discovery technique. Wyeth seeks to employ this technique in advance of the treating physicians’ depositions. Plaintiffs oppose this and challenge the availability of ex parte interviews where the plaintiffs’ treating physicians live and practice in North Carolina. To resolve this dispute, the court must examine federal preemption principles and the following competing interests: (1) the New Jersey Supreme Court’s directives in Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985);7 (2) plaintiffs’ and their physicians’ interests in priva*552cy and the duty of loyalty as reflected in North Carolina law;8 and (3) the federal policy of uniformly guarding against the over disclosure of privileged patient information.9

II.

A.

In order to further federal goals of increased access to health care, Congress passed The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).10 Congress sought to increase access by expanding portability and renewability of insurance. Diane Kutzko et al., HIPAA In Real Time: Practical Implications Of The Federal Privacy Rule, 51 Drake L.Rev. 403, 406 (2003) (citation omitted). During the legislative process, *553concern was expressed that innovations in technology might endanger the ability to protect health information; hence the adoption of privacy and security standards reflected in the HIPAA Privacy Rule (the Privacy Rule). Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 160 and 164).11 Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services the task of adopting national standards “to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information.” Id. at 82,453; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2)(A).

The Privacy Rule controls the “use and disclosure” of “protected health information” by “covered entities].”12 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (explaining rules regarding use and disclosure of protected health information); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining relevant terms). It creates a foundation or “mandatory floor” for the protection of medical information. 65 Fed.Reg. 82,462, 82,471.13 Covered entities, including health care providers like doctors, must develop, implement, monitor, and maintain compliance poli*554cies and procedures to ensure against unauthorized disclosure of private health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530.

B.

In Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to determine whether defense counsel could conduct an ex parte interview with plaintiff’s decedent’s physicians. More specifically, the issue presented was whether a court should compel a plaintiff to authorize ex parte communications between defense counsel and decedent’s physicians; and if compelled, “what protective conditions” would be imposed. Id. at 373, 495 A.2d 857.

There, the defendant Speidell diagnosed decedent with a fecal impaction. The day after the decedent was admitted to the hospital, she suffered cardiac arrest and died. Since the decedent had received medical care from numerous physicians, defendant sought authorizations from plaintiff to compel other physicians to release information about the decedent. Plaintiff resisted providing unrestricted authorizations permitting such interviews of these doctors by Speidell’s counsel. The New Jersey Supreme Court “weighted] the interests protected by the patient-physician privilege and the physician’s professional obligation of confidentiality against the interests advanced by permitting defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews with decedent’s physicians regarding those conditions pertinent to the claims asserted in the litigation.” 14 Id. at 373-74, 495 A.2d 857.

*555The Supreme Court held that such ex parte interviews could be conducted. In doing so, the Stempler Court noted that personal interviews are “an accepted, informal method of assembling facts and documents in preparation of trial.” Id. at 382, 495 A.2d 857.15 However, the Supreme Court imposed procedural safeguards. While a plaintiff must provide an authorization for such ex parte interviews,16 defense counsel must: (1) give plaintiffs counsel “reasonable” notice of the time and place for the interviews; and (2) provide the physician with a description of the expected scope of the interview and indicate, with “unmistakable clarity,” that the doctor’s participation in the interview is voluntary. Id. at 382, 495 A.2d 857.17

The Privacy Rule appears to have narrowed the scope of disclosure of relevant medical information in litigation. Because the Privacy Rule is federally directed to the disclosure of medical *556information, the court must first consider federal preemption principles.

C.

Preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.18 There are two types of preemption, express and implied.19 The difference lies in whether “Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” Jones v. The Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977) (citation omitted). Express preemption occurs when the federal law, statute, or regulation20 contains explicit language regarding whether it preempts the State law, statute, regulation or common law. See e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (interpreting statutory provision that expressly preempts state law); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (same). Implied preemption is present when a Congressional intent to preempt can be discerned. See e.g., Jones v. The Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977) (dealing with labeling and packaging regulations and assessing preemption principles); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963) (dealing *557with state and federal regulations for maturity certification of avocados and assessing whether state regulation was obstacle to accomplishing purposes and objectives of Congress). Implied preemption is found where the state law conflicts with the federal law21 or the federal law is “so pervasive [in the field] as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 331 U.S. 247, 67 S.Ct. 1160, 91 L.Ed. 1468 (1947).

Here, there is an express preemption provision contained in the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. It provides that “[a] standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this subchapter that is contrary22 to a provision of State law preempts the provision of State law.” However, if “[t]he provision of State law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and is more stringent23 [than the Act’s Privacy *558Rule,]” the preemption provision is inapplicable. Id. at 160.203(b).24 Hence, the Court must conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether a State law is preempted by the Privacy Rule. See e.g., Stewart v. The Louisiana Clinic, 2002 WL 31819130 (E.D.La.) (conducting preemption analysis to see if state law was contrary and whether it fell under an exception). First, a court must determine whether the State law is contrary to the Privacy Rule, i.e., when compliance with both State and federal rules would be impossible; or the State law is an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the Privacy Rule].” 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. If the State law falls within this category, then the second step seeks to determine whether one of the exceptions enumerated in 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 applies.25

*559Here, HIPAA and the Stempler ex parte interview can coexist.26 The court agrees with Smith v. American Home Products *560Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, 372 N.J.Super. 105, 855 A.2d 608 (Law Div. 2003), to the extent that it found HIPAA preemption only with respect to the authorization. The Stempler interview itself is not preempted. In Smith, the court held that: (1) HIPAA does not preempt the informal interview authorized by Stempler, but (2) HIPAA does preempt Stempler with regard to the authorization content.27 The Smith court reasoned that HI-PAA does not conflict with the discovery techniques allowed under Stempler, but the Stempler safeguards in disclosure authorizations fall below the HIPAA requirements. Id. at 110, 131, 855 A.2d 608.28 This court’s preemption analysis agrees with that conclusion.

D.

Privacy is a fundamental right.29 The United States Supreme Court plainly has recognized personal health information as constitutionally protected. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (noting that “few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy as maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose personal material.”). The filing of a complaint against Wyeth clearly has eroded some of these plaintiffs’ privacy interests. By filing a personal injury suit, plaintiffs have placed their medical condition in issue and therefore waived significant rights to privacy. See Stempler, 100 N.J. at 372-73, 495 A.2d 857 (noting that “[p]laintiff concedes that instituting suit extinguishes the [patient-physician] *561privilege to the extent that decedent’s medical condition will be a factor in the litigation.”); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4 (providing that “[t]here is no privilege under this act in an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the patient ...”). Generally, the procedural safeguards suggested in Stempler will serve to protect plaintiffs privacy interest and does survive HIPAA’s adoption.30

III.

The plaintiffs complain that even if Stempler does not conflict with Federal law, North Carolina law does not permit ex parte interviews in cases such as these. The court agrees that the North Carolina courts do not permit ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs treating physician absent consent. See Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). Since the plaintiffs and their physicians reside in North Carolina, the court must consider conflict of law principles. Plaintiffs’ complaints were filed in New Jersey. However, the treating physicians who are the subject of this motion reside in and are licensed in North Carolina. Moreover, it is almost certain that the ex parte interviews requested will take place in North Carolina. In any case, North Carolina plainly has a significant interest in regulating the conduct of its licensed physicians.

New Jersey is the forum. Accordingly, New Jersey’s choice of law rules are followed. Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 94, 792 A.2d 1208 (2002), Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 117, 733 *562A.2d 1188 (1999), Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484, 679 A.2d 106 (1996). New Jersey applies the “ ‘governmental-interest’ test that seeks to apply the law of the state with the greatest interest in governing the specific issue in the underlying litigation.” Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 118, 733 A.2d 1133 (citation omitted). The analysis is two-pronged. The first prong requires the court to determine, on an issue-by-issue basis, whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the states. Ibid. (Citation omitted). If so, it must determine which state has the most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence. Id. at 119, 733 A.2d 1133 (citation omitted).31

North Carolina generally prohibits ex parte communications between plaintiffs treating physicians and defense counsel. In Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), the defendant’s attorney had ex parte meetings with two of plaintiffs physicians, who were expected to testify “as to facts and circumstances” surrounding the plaintiffs treatment. In both instances, the defendant’s attorney also told the doctors that plaintiff had waived the physician-patient privilege when, in fact, she had not. The North Carolina court was guided by its public policy concerns that a physician might become liable for inadvertent disclosures and/or the interview might disintegrate into improper discussions *563beyond waived matters.32

The Crist Court concluded that “considerations of patient privacy, the confidential relationship between doctor and patient, the adequacy of formal discovery devices, and the untenable position in which ex parte contacts place the nonparty treating physician supersede defendant’s interest in a less expensive and more convenient method of discovery____ [Tjhus ... defense counsel may not interview plaintiffs nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiffs express consent. ” Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The defendant there was thus left with traditional and more formal discovery methods, such as a deposition.

Notably, that court stressed its holding was not meant to discourage “consensual informal discovery.” Ibid. But in North Carolina consent is a key component. This point is embodied in the Medico-Legal Guidelines of North Carolina, which provide:

Authorization. Proper authorization is necessary before a physician can release medical information. No attorney should request and no physician should furnish any medical information concerning the history, physical or mental examination, condition, diagnosis or prognosis of a patient except with the written consent of the patient, the patient’s authorized representative, & judicial or administrative order, or in conformity with other applicable legal authority. The scope of the authorization determines the scope of the inspection, release, copying or report: If the requesting attorney wants information beyond what is authorized to be released, the attorney must obtain additional authorization.33

Id. at IV.A.3.b at 575 (2004) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).34

*564Clearly, if the plaintiff consents, New Jersey and North Carolina are in accord in concluding that treating physicians are free to participate in ex parte interviews with defense counsel. In this respect, New Jersey and North Carolina are consistent.35

IV.

The court concludes that ex parte interviews of plaintiffs’ treating physicians can be allowed without compromising HIPAA, or colliding with North Carolina law. While the court has not had the chance to fully explore all aspects of implementing the Stempter procedures due to the timing of this motion,36 it intends to employ certain procedural safeguards. These safeguards, which the court may well revisit and revise in the light of experience, will help to insure HIPAA compliance, while at the same time allowing Wyeth to conduct discovery consistent with Stempler.

Specifically, the court will permit Wyeth to conduct ex parte interviews with plaintiffs’ treating physicians subject to Stempler’s constraints, but any interview must be recorded and transcribed. A copy of that transcript will be made available to plaintiffs’ counsel at the time of each physician’s deposition.37 Plaintiffs will *565sign the Authorization, permitting such interviews. After signing this release, the plaintiffs and their attorneys are directed to take no steps designed to interfere or discourage the physician’s participation. However, plaintiffs’ counsel may communicate with the physicians, in writing only, regarding any concerns about the scope and the extent to which the plaintiffs continue to assert the physician-patient privilege, and the Authorization shall clearly indicate that the physician’s participation is voluntary.38

This court, though following the same path, reaches a somewhat different result than Smith v. American Home Products Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, 372 N.J.Super. 105, 855 A.2d 608 (Law Div. 2003). There the court did not permit the Stempler interviews to proceed. But these seemingly different results are easily harmonized. In Smith, Judge Corodemus did not permit the Stempler interviews because approximately 300 PPA cases were docketed for trial in only one and a half months. The Smith court reasoned that the PPA cases were “extreme” cases and “[t]he holding in Stempler reserves judicial discretion with regard to the appropriateness of ex parte interviews even under 'extreme cases.’ ” Smith, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 136, 855 A.2d 608. According to the Smith court

*566Ibid. (footnote omitted). The court agrees with Judge Corodemus that mass tort cases are “extreme” cases, requiring special management.

*565mass tort cases with their inherent complexity fall within the definition of extreme cases. Therefore under this court’s authority, and given the magnitude of the potential intricacies of entirely redoing the discovery process to include informal discovery with HIPAA-eompliant authorizations, the most practical recourse is to deny the use of Stempler interviews. This court sees no necessity for informal discovery so late into the PPA litigation. This however, does not imply that Stempler is not available as an informal discovery tool for mass tort cases. Kather, given the complexity of such cases, special hearings early during case management for the design of HIPAA-eompliant authorization forms may become the custom for the conduct of Stempler interviews in future mass tort litigation.

*566In these thirteen eases, the court recently ruled that the plaintiffs may avail themselves of the heeding presumption where a prescription drug product is involved. In re Diet Drug Litigation, BER-L-13379-04MT slip op. 11-22, 2005 WL 974924 (April 7, 2005); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 628 A.2d 710 (1993); Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 133 N.J. 610, 628 A.2d 724 (1993). This ruling has shifted the burden of going forward with evidence on proximate cause issues to Wyeth. Under these circumstances, Wyeth should be given appropriate formal and informal discovery tools to seek to accomplish its litigation tasks. Moreover, unlike the Smith court, this court is not required to completely revamp discovery schedules on the eve of trial. This decision also is confined to the thirteen plaintiffs scheduled for trial on May 31, 2005. Here, the litigants clearly have the resources to accomplish these limited discovery objectives while at the same time preparing for trial.

Y.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Wyeth’s motion is granted in part. Wyeth may conduct ex parte interviews of the physicians for these thirteen plaintiffs, employing the procedural safeguards detailed in the Authorization.