NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4229-11T2

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION APPLICATION FOR A RETAIL March 28, 2016 FIREARMS DEALER'S LICENSE RENEWAL BY CAYUSE CORP. APPELLATE DIVISION LLC, T/A WILD WEST CITY ______________________________

Submitted November 12, 2015 – Decided March 28, 2016

Before Judges Alvarez, Ostrer and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County.

Mary K. Benson, attorney for appellant Cayuse Corp. LLC, t/a Wild West City (Michael Stabile, on the pro se brief; Ms. Benson, on the reply brief).

Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Laura L. Nazzaro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

This appeal involves the denial of an application for a

retail firearms dealer license under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2. It

requires us to clarify the procedure to be followed by trial

judges considering applications under this statute, as well as

the applicant's burden to prove entitlement to a license. In this case, the judge denied the application after an ex

parte proceeding. The applicant did not appear at this hearing,

and there is no persuasive evidence the applicant received

advance notice. The applicant was then permitted to "appeal"

the denial in a hearing before the same judge. Over a year

after the initial denial, the applicant was notified of the

hearing, but he chose not to appear. The hearing took place in

the applicant's absence, and the judge entered an order

dismissing the "appeal" of the initial denial. The applicant

appeals from that order.

We hold the court erred in proceeding ex parte. The offer

of a plenary hearing did not cure that error. However, we also

conclude an applicant bears the burden to establish that he has

satisfied the eligibility requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2.

Inasmuch as the applicant has not met that burden in an

appropriate hearing, we reject his contention that he should

automatically receive a license because of procedural

infirmities. We also decline to order a new hearing, because

the term of the license at issue has already expired.

Therefore, we vacate the license denial, but do not remand for a

hearing.

2 A-4229-11T2 I.

We discern the following facts from the record. Michael

Stabile filed the application at issue in August 2010 on behalf

of "Cayuse Corp. LLC." (Cayuse).1 Stabile sought to renew retail

firearms dealer's license number 2530, issued to "Western World,

Inc. t/a Wild West City" (WWI), and transfer it to Cayuse.

License 2530 was set to expire October 4, 2010, three years

after it was issued.2 "Wild West City" is the trade name of a

Western theme park in Byram Township.

The State Police apparently forwarded the application to

the Law Division on September 21, 2010. The record does not

include a State Police investigation of the application. On

September 28, 2010, an assistant Sussex County prosecutor wrote

to the court that "the State objects to the renewal and/or

continued issuance of a retail firearms' license to Michael

Stabile and/or the Cayuse Corporation." The opposition was

based on Stabile's involvement, as manager of Wild West City, in

an accidental shooting at the park. On July 7, 2006, a juvenile

actor employed by the park used live ammunition in his weapon

1 We also use "Cayuse" to refer to "Cayuse, LLC," the limited liability company Stabile formed. "Cayuse Corp. LLC" appears to be a misnomer for "Cayuse, LLC," as there is no record evidence of the formation of an entity by the name "Cayuse Corp. LLC." 2 See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a) (retail dealer licenses are valid for three years).

3 A-4229-11T2 during a skit, and shot and grievously injured another actor.

Actors used real firearms in the skits, but were supposed to

only load them with blanks.

The assistant prosecutor wrote, "The State has concluded

that Mr. Stabile's recklessness in the handling and distribution

of firearms caused the injury" to the actor. Stabile had been

charged, in a June 2008 grand jury indictment, with thirteen

offenses, including unlawful transfer of a firearm to a minor;

facilitating possession of a handgun without a permit;

aggravated assault; and violating a law intended to protect

public safety. The same judge assigned the license application

was presiding over the criminal proceeding. The prosecutor

summarized the charges, and asserted an investigation revealed

that firearms safety procedures under Stabile's management were

lax; live ammunition was routinely kept in the same place as the

blanks the untrained actors loaded into their operable firearms;

and "Mr. Stabile hid the bullets from law enforcement officers

investigating the shooting."

The grand jury had also indicted Cheyenne Corporation,

which owned the land under the theme park, and WWI, which

operated Wild West City at the time of the shooting. The

prosecutor noted that both entities had been dissolved into a

new entity named Cayuse LLC, which Stabile owned. The

4 A-4229-11T2 prosecutor urged that "[t]o the extent Cayuse, LLC presently has

a retail license, that license should be revoked." Attached to

the letter were the criminal complaints and indictment against

Stabile, Cheyenne and WWI; and corporate documents pertaining to

Cheyenne, WWI and Cayuse LLC. The letter was sent to the State

Police Firearms Investigation Unit and Robert Gluck, WWI's and

Cheyenne's attorney, but not to Stabile or his attorney.

On September 30, 2010, the judge conducted an ex parte

telephonic and in-person hearing, on the record, on Cayuse's

application. Only Gluck and a different assistant prosecutor

appeared. Gluck made it clear he did not represent Cayuse or

Stabile. Neither Stabile nor any representative of Cayuse

participated in the hearing. Stabile contends on appeal that he

was not given notice of the hearing. The State does not contest

that contention.3

At the hearing, the court did not admit evidence or hear

argument. The judge noted he had read the prosecutor's letter.

The judge assumed the State had the burden to establish reasons

to deny the application, which he found was met based on the

pending charges against Stabile and Cayuse. The judge denied

3 We note that the assistant prosecutor asserted at the end of the hearing, after Gluck had already signed off, that Stabile "didn't want to be here." However, there is no evidence of prior written notice to him, or an effort to reach him by telephone.

5 A-4229-11T2 the application, but stated Cayuse was entitled to a de novo

hearing. The judge referenced In re Sportsman's Rendezvous

Retail Firearms Dealer's License,

(App. Div. 2005), in which a trial judge summarily denied a

license application and thereafter held a de novo hearing. The

judge explained, "[I]f I deny this, this gets back to [Stabile],

then he can, I guess, pursue whatever he wishes to pursue."

On October 13, 2010, the State Police advised Stabile by

fax that his application was denied and that he could request a

hearing in Superior Court within thirty days of the denial.

Stabile was advised he was not permitted to conduct retail

firearms business after the prior license expired.

On October 14, 2010, Stabile wrote to the court requesting

a hearing. He also asked whether he should be represented by

counsel at the hearing, whether he should file papers in

advance, and if the hearing would be before the same judge.

Having received no response, Stabile mailed another copy of his

letter on October 31, 2010, adding a post-script requesting that

court staff contact him regarding a hearing. License 2530

expired on October 4, 2010.

Stabile took no further action until January 2012, when he

was informed by a federal Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms inspector

that License 2530 had expired. Stabile then contacted the State

6 A-4229-11T2 Police and the court, contending that he had timely requested a

hearing and that, because no hearing had been scheduled, his

license renewal should automatically be approved.

After multiple letters and phone calls between Stabile and

court staff, the court scheduled a hearing for March 2, 2012,

for "Firearms Appeal: Denial of Retail License Renewal." On

February 22, 2012, Stabile received written notice of the

hearing. However, he decided to pursue an appeal with this

court. On March 1, 2012, he informed the Law Division he would

not attend the hearing.

The March 2012 hearing proceeded without Stabile. An

assistant prosecutor appeared, but did not introduce evidence.

The judge summarized the history of the application. He noted

that, consistent with Sportsman's, the applicant was entitled to

a plenary hearing, but he rejected the contention that the

license should automatically be renewed because the court did

not conduct a timely hearing. As for the merits, the court

found it would be inappropriate to grant the application while

the criminal charges against Stabile were pending.4 On March 12,

2012, the judge issued an order stating, "the Applicant's appeal

of the Court's previous denial is dismissed based on the pending

4 In 2011, the court dismissed two of the charges against Stabile with the State's consent, but most of them remained.

7 A-4229-11T2 indictable charges against the Applicant . . . as well as the

Applicant's failure to appear for the requested plenary

hearing."

The indictment was thereafter dismissed as to Stabile.

However, on April 11, 2012, WWI entered a conditional plea of

guilty through Stabile to unlawful possession of a handgun,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Stabile stated in his allocution that WWI

provided operable handguns to the actors and, to the

corporation's knowledge, they did not have carry permits. WWI

retained the right to appeal the limited question whether a

carry permit was required by the actors in the skit. That

appeal was dismissed in September 2015 upon WWI's request.

II.

On behalf of Cayuse, Stabile appeals from the March 12,

2012 order.5 He argues the court's denial in September 2010

violated his right to due process, because the hearing was held

without notice and an opportunity to be heard. He claims he

satisfied the prerequisites for a license, and the unproved

allegations of the indictment were an insufficient basis to deny

5 Although Stabile appeared pro se before the trial court, Cayuse was required to obtain counsel on appeal. R. 1:21-1(c).

8 A-4229-11T2 licensure.6 Stabile adds that the indictment was dismissed as to

him.

Stabile also defends his decision to absent himself from

the plenary hearing. He contends his right to appeal to this

court ripened after the trial court's denial in September 2010.

He argues he "attempted to invoke this right as soon as he

learned, in January 2012, that his license had been denied."

Stabile also states he did not attend the March 2012 hearing to

avoid prejudicing his pending criminal case.

The State responds that the judge properly denied the

license application, relying on investigation reports related to

the July 2006 shooting incident. However, these documents were

not in the record before the trial court. The State also relies

on Stabile's admissions in entering WWI's plea on April 11,

2012. The State contends that even if there were procedural

errors in the application process, they do not compel automatic

licensure. The State argues that denial was appropriate given

Stabile's failure to appear at the March 2012 hearing.

6 His appendix includes various documents not of record before the trial court, including corporate documents, grand jury transcripts, investigatory records related to the shooting, and evidence of prior inspections of Wild West City.

9 A-4229-11T2 III.

We defer to a trial court's fact findings if supported by

substantial credible evidence. In re Return of Weapons to

J.W.D.,

, 116-17 (1997). However, we owe no

deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, including its

interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.

Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

(1995); see also In

re Pantano,

(App. Div. 2013), certif.

dismissed as improvidently granted, ___ N.J. ___ (2014).

A.

We begin by reviewing the statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a)

prohibits retail dealers from selling firearms "unless licensed

to do so." To obtain a license, applicants must apply to the

Superior Court using a standard form prescribed by the State

Police Superintendent.

The judge "shall grant a license"

if he or she finds "the applicant meets the standards and

qualifications established by the superintendent and that the

applicant can be permitted to engage in business as a retail

dealer of firearms . . . without any danger to the public

safety, health and welfare."

Anyone who is under twenty-

one years old, or who would not qualify for a permit to purchase

a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card (FPIC), is

ineligible for a retail dealer license.

Licenses are

10 A-4229-11T2 subject to various administrative and recordkeeping conditions.

Breach of a condition is grounds for revocation, after

notice and a hearing.

Regulations promulgated by the State Police clarify that

the application form is first submitted to the State Police,

which forwards the application to the court. N.J.A.C. 13:54-

3.3(b). "The Superintendent shall cause the applicant . . . to

be investigated for purposes of providing the judge . . . with

such information as the Superintendent deems appropriate

. . . ." N.J.A.C. 13:54-3.7. State Police may also conduct

criminal and mental health records checks. N.J.A.C. 13:54-3.3.

N.J.A.C. 13:54-3.4 sets forth "standards and qualifications"

that essentially mirror the statutory requirements. N.J.A.C.

13:54-3.7 largely restates the statutory standards governing the

court's determination. Renewal applicants must meet the same

requirements as initial applicants and, with minor exceptions,

follow the same procedures. N.J.A.C. 13:54-3.10. Any person

"denied approval by a Superior Court judge . . . may file an

appeal in accordance with law." N.J.A.C. 13:54-3.18(a).

B.

We discern no basis in the statute or the Rules of Court

for a court to decide a contested application ex parte, and then

allow an unsuccessful applicant to seek de novo review by the

11 A-4229-11T2 same judge. We hold that a court should ordinarily conduct a

hearing on the record, with notice to the applicant, on a

contested application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2. An evidentiary

hearing is required if there are genuine issues of material

fact. If the application is unopposed, however, a hearing is

not required, unless the judge sua sponte discerns issues of

concern or grounds to reject the application. These rules are

necessary to preserve the judicial nature of proceedings under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2.

In authorizing a judge to decide an applicant's eligibility

for licensure, we presume the Legislature intended the process

to conform with that typical of judicial determinations. The

Supreme Court has recognized that when the Legislature delegates

nonjudicial duties to the judiciary — including deciding

firearms-related licenses — it does not intend to alter the

nature of judicial action. See Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett,

(1950). Rather, the delegation "reflects an

intent of the Legislature to seek an impartial and independent

tribunal for the decision of matters deemed vital to the welfare

of the community."

. In a contested matter, that

implicates notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Rule 1:2-1 requires that hearings "be conducted in open

court, unless otherwise provided by rule or statute." "[E]xcept

12 A-4229-11T2 in unusual circumstances, a trial court should not communicate

ex parte with a party or witness, even with the parties'

consent." In re Dubov,

(2009). These

are fundamental principles. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon

3(A)(6) ("A judge should accord to every person who is legally

interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right

to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law,

neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications

concerning a pending or impending proceeding."). Indeed, due

process mandates the hearing requirement of Rule 1:2-1. Dubov,

supra,

.

We also presume that, as with other licensing proceedings,

the Legislature intended the judge's decision on a contested

application to be based on competent evidence. In Weston v.

State,

(1972), our Court discussed the

procedural protections for applicants for FPICs. A police chief

is authorized to grant or deny an application ex parte.

. Given the informality of the chief's initial decision,

an evidentiary hearing is required when an applicant appeals a

denial to the Law Division.

. At the hearing, the

judge may admit hearsay, but "a residuum of legal and competent

evidence in the record" must support the court's decision.

.

13 A-4229-11T2 In light of these principles, the process used in this

case, which involved a contested application, was deficient.

Cayuse was not given an opportunity to participate in the

initial ex parte hearing, but the assistant prosecutor, who

contested the application, was. The court should not have

relied on the prosecutor's letter, as it was not served on

Stabile.7 An "appeal" to the same judge does not cure these

deficiencies. Although denominated an "appeal," the second-

round hearing differs from an appeal because the judge who hears

the "appeal" has previously ruled against the applicant on the

same issue. The applicant may feel the court has already made

up its mind on the matter. The process is also unlike a motion

for reconsideration, where the initial order is entered after

notice and an opportunity to be heard.

We recognize the trial judge followed the two-stage

procedure utilized in Sportsman's, supra, where the trial court

summarily denied a renewal application based on the State

Police's recommendation; the applicant "appealed" the denial;

and the court conducted a de novo plenary hearing with the

applicant's full participation.

. On

appeal, the panel held this procedure was not reversible error,

7 The court also should have marked the prosecutor's letter as an exhibit, R. 1:2-3, and entered a formal order embodying its decision, R. 1:6-2(f).

14 A-4229-11T2 as the applicant was afforded a de novo hearing at which both

sides presented witnesses and documentary evidence.

at 581-

82. We decline to read Sportsman's to establish this two-stage

procedure as the default mechanism for deciding applications

under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2.8

Furthermore, in denying Cayuse's application, the court

relied on unproved allegations in an indictment. A decision on

an application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 must be based on competent

evidence, which may include hearsay if it is corroborative. See

. A pending criminal charge,

standing alone, is not competent evidence. To rely on facts

underlying pending criminal charges, the State must present

competent evidence to establish those facts. See In re Osworth,

(App. Div. 2003) (dismissal of criminal

charges does not bar court from considering underlying facts in

deciding application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3). But a court may

not rely on unproved allegations in an indictment. See In re

Kollman,

(2012) (in expungement cases, court

8 Although the panel analogized the ex parte denial of the application to the ex parte issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO),

, an ex parte TRO may only be granted upon a showing of emergent circumstances, see R. 4:52-1(a), which are not present in license applications. Moreover, a TRO is by definition temporary, while an ex parte license denial is final unless the applicant takes a further "appeal."

15 A-4229-11T2 "may only consider established or undisputed facts, not unproved

allegations").

Accordingly, we conclude the court should not have decided

Cayuse's application ex parte without affording the applicant

notice and an opportunity to be heard. Allowing the applicant

to "appeal" to the same judge did not cure this deficiency.

C.

In outlining the proper procedure for considering retail

dealer license applications, we must also address allocation of

the burden of proof. After reviewing the statutory text and

discussing general principles of burden allocation, we conclude

that an applicant bears the burden to prove the eligibility

requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 are met.

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 generally prohibits the retail sale of

firearms unless the dealer holds a retail firearms dealer

license. The court "shall grant a license" if it finds "that

the applicant meets the standards and qualifications established

by the superintendent and that the applicant can . . . engage in

business as a retail dealer of firearms . . . without any danger

to the public safety, health and welfare."

The statute

also provides that a license "shall [not] be granted" if an

applicant is under twenty-one or would not qualify for a

purchase permit or FPIC.

Thus, the statute does not

16 A-4229-11T2 require issuance unless grounds for denial are presented;

rather, it authorizes issuance only if the court finds these two

positive criteria are met, and there are no disqualifying facts.9

We have held that similar language in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4,

which governs carry permits, puts the burden on the applicant to

prove his eligibility for a permit. That section provides, in

relevant part:

The court shall issue the permit to the applicant if, but only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character who is not subject to any of the disabilities set forth in section 2C:58-3c., that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d).]

In In re Wheeler,

(App. Div.

2013), we held that an applicant bears the burden of proving all

three requirements listed above:

An applicant for a carry permit must demonstrate more than absence of a disqualifying condition. The applicant must show that he or she is "thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns" and that he or she has "a justifiable need to carry a handgun."

[Id. at 575 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d) (emphasis in original).]

9 The applicant's age and eligibility for a purchase permit or FPIC are not at issue in this case.

17 A-4229-11T2 We also held in

that the applicant bears the

burden of proving "justifiable need."

-84

(citing In re Preis,

(1990); Siccardi v.

State,

(1971)).10

We see no reason to depart from this burden allocation when

construing similar text in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2. Both N.J.S.A.

2C:58-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 provide, in essence, that the court

shall grant the license or permit if it finds requisite facts.

We construe these two sections together to resolve any

uncertainty about the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a). See

J.W.D., supra, 149 N.J. at 115 ("Statutes in pari materia are to

be construed together when helpful in resolving doubts or

uncertainties and the ascertainment of legislative intent.").

Our interpretation is supported by more general principles

of burden allocation. Absent a clear legislative direction, the

allocation of the burden of proof is a procedural matter

"normally reserved for the courts." In re Will of Smith,

(1987); see also Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v.

Lotito,

(App. Div.), certif. denied,

(2000). Allocation of the burden of proof

10 Although the burden rests on the State to prove grounds to deny an application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, that statute creates a right to receive the permit or FPIC "unless good cause" for denial appears. See

.

18 A-4229-11T2 can vary depending on the type of proceedings, the comparative interests of the parties, the relative litigational strengths or weaknesses of the parties, the access of the parties to proof, and the objectives to be served by the evidence in the context of the particular proceeding.

[Romano v. Kimmelman,

(1984).]

Our Court has recognized that "the party with greater expertise

and access to relevant information should bear those evidentiary

burdens." J.E. ex rel. G.E. v. State,

(1992). Under the Code of Criminal Justice, in which the retail

dealer license statute is located, the burden to prove a fact

that is not an element of an offense is borne by the party

"whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding

should be made[,]" unless the Code otherwise provides. N.J.S.A.

2C:1-13(d).

The applicant should bear the burden of proving the

eligibility requirements because he or she has greater access to

facts demonstrating compliance. The applicant can best present

information regarding his or her ability to deal with firearms

safely. Cf. In re Kollman,

(2012) (burden is

on petitioner to establish grounds for early pathway expungement

in part because he or she "is uniquely qualified to demonstrate

facts about his or her character"). And it is in the

applicant's interest to establish eligibility for licensure.

19 A-4229-11T2 Cf.

(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(d)(1) and reasoning that

burden of proving that expungement serves the public interest

rests on petitioner because the finding "furthers the

applicant's cause").

While the burden of proving entitlement to the license is

always upon the applicant, we add that the State should

generally bear the initial burden of producing evidence

underlying its objection to the application. Requiring the

State to inform the applicant of the perceived deficiencies in

an application, and to produce relevant evidence, will expedite

the hearing by ensuring that only the disputed issues are

addressed. This is not inconsistent with the direction in

, that the hearing on a permit

application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 should begin with testimony

of the applicant, followed by the police chief who bears the

burden of proving the applicant is not qualified, and then any

rebuttal testimony by the applicant. See also In re Appeal of

the Denial of the Application of Z.L.,

(App. Div.), certif. denied,

(2015). Just as the

party without the burden of persuasion must testify first in the

hearing under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, the party without the burden of

persuasion in a hearing under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 – the State –

should generally go first.

20 A-4229-11T2 In sum, the applicant bears the burden to prove he or she

meets the "standards and qualifications" and can "engage in

business . . . without any danger to the public safety, health

and welfare." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2. It is not the State's burden

to prove the negative, although the State generally bears the

burden of production.11 The applicant must prove he or she has

met the requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(f).

IV.

As we have noted, the proceedings in this case did not

comply with the procedure we have outlined.12 Nonetheless, we

disagree that Cayuse is entitled to an order granting it a

retail dealer license. We rejected a similar argument in

which involved an application for a FPIC under N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3. We held that the court's failure to conduct a timely

hearing on a challenge of a police chief's denial did not

entitle the applicant to "automatic approval of his application

without showing that he complies with the statutory requirements

11 We recognize the panel in Sportsman's stated that the State bears the burden of proving the "any danger to public health, safety and welfare" element.

. But the panel did not discuss why the burden should rest with the State as it found that the burden was satisfied on the record evidence in that case.

. 12 We recognize that the court may have been guided by the panel's decision in Sportsman's.

21 A-4229-11T2 for purchasing a firearm."

. As we

stated in Dubov, we do not believe the Legislature intended that

a person who has not established his entitlement to a license

should obtain one because of a procedural oversight. See

The burden of proving entitlement to a license rested with

Cayuse.

It is too late to remand for a hearing that would comply

with our opinion, as Stabile sought a three-year license that

would expire in 2013. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a). Thus, the

application for a 2010-13 license is moot. See Greenfield v.

N.J. Dep't of Corr.,

(App. Div.

2006) ("An issue is moot when the decision sought in a matter,

when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing

controversy.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, the challenge to the denials is not moot. An

applicant for a retail dealer license must disclose on the

application form whether he has been denied a license in the

past. The fact that the 2010 and 2012 denials may prejudice

future applications by Cayuse or some other entity under

Stabile's direction satisfies us that Stabile or Cayuse may

suffer adverse consequences as a result of the denials. See

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P.,

(App. Div. 2009) (an appeal is not moot if a party may

22 A-4229-11T2 still suffer adverse consequences as a result of the decision),

certif. denied,

(2010).

Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the September

2010 and March 2012 orders. However, we shall not remand for a

hearing on the 2010 application. Any new application for a

retail dealer license shall be decided in accord with the

process we have outlined. We express no opinion on the merits

of such an application.

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

23 A-4229-11T2