RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3651-15T4

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR COMMUNICATIONS DATA WARRANTS TO February 2, 2017 OBTAIN THE CONTENTS OF STORED APPELLATE DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS FROM TWITTER, INC., FROM USERS @ ______ AND @ ______, ESS-147-CDW-16 AND ESS-148-CDW-16. ___________________________________________

Argued December 13, 2016 – Decided February 2, 2017

Before Judges Messano, Guadagno and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket Nos. 147-CDW-16 and 148-CDW-16.

Camila A. Garces, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor and Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Garces, of counsel and on the brief).

Lawrence S. Lustberg, amicus curiae, argued the cause (Gibbons, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Lustberg and Avram D. Frey, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression involving

the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37. The State of New Jersey sought

two communications data warrants (CDWs), N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(a),

to obtain from Twitter, Inc., an extensive list of information

and data associated with two specific Twitter accounts (the

accounts), as well as the contents of those accounts.1 The Law

Division judge approved both warrants but edited both so as to

include only the "visual but not oral component of video

messages," and the "visual but not aural/oral component" of any

"videos."

1 "Twitter is self-described 'as an information network made up of 140-character messages called Tweets.'" State v. Hannah, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ n.1 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting In re J.F.,

, 44 n.7 (App. Div. 2016)). "People post Tweets, which may contain photos, videos, links and up to 140 characters of text. These messages are posted to [the person's] profile, sent to [his or her] followers, and are searchable on Twitter search." New User FAQs, Twitter, Inc., https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920# (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). Tweets may be "public" or "protected," and when an individual subscribes to Twitter, his or her tweets are public by default. "About public and protected Tweets," Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016#. If a user changes the default settings to maintain privacy, the public may not simply access the Tweets unless the user consciously accepts the request. "FAQs about following," Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14019#. For our purposes, we assume the account holders in this case changed their default settings to maintain privacy over the contents of their Tweets, and therefore they are not accessible without judicial intervention. See N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c) (permitting interception of wire, electronic and oral communications when one party has given prior consent), and (e) (permitting the interception or access of electronic communications where they are "readily accessible to the general public").

2 A-3651-15T4 After we granted the State's motion for leave to appeal,

the judge filed a written amplification of reasons for his

decision, Rule 2:5-1(b), which has significantly assisted our

consideration of the issues. In large part, the judge relied

upon the "Administrative Procedures for Wiretap Applications,"

issued in October 2010 by the Administrative Office of the

Courts (AOC), and the AOC's Electronic Surveillance,

Communications Data Warrant and Communications Information Order

Manual (the Order Manual).2 The judge quoted a portion of the

latter "for analogous applications" involving searches of

cellular phones with cameras:

The type of application (Wiretap Order or CDW) to search a cellular phone depends upon the phone's capabilities. Some phones have the capability only to take pictures and other [sic] can record rolling video with audio.

a. Current Law

The current state of the law is that the audio portion of a video camera or video tape falls within the Wiretap Act as an oral communication. State v. Diaz,

(App. Div. 1998). However, the Wiretap Act does not apply to silent video surveillance or the video portion of a videotape. Kinsella v. Welch,

(App. Div. 2003). Therefore, a search for a video (without

2 The Order Manual has since been updated, but the section cited by the judge in the 2012 version has remained virtually unchanged in the 2015 version.

3 A-3651-15T4 audio) or a picture (without audio) in a cellular phone would require a CDW. If there is an audio portion, a Wiretap Order is necessary.

[Id. at 72 (emphasis added).]

Recognizing these secondary sources were "not precedent" and

relying on Diaz, the judge concluded "the . . . Act applied to

the State's application to intercept the aural, oral, or audio

component of a video."

Given the ex parte nature of the State's applications and

the need to maintain confidentiality as to the identity of the

account holders, we requested amicus curiae address the issues

presented for the benefit of the panel. We thank amicus for its

participation in this appeal.

I.

Amicus stressed during oral argument, and we agree, the

issue is largely one of statutory interpretation. As a result,

we start at the beginning, with the Act's definitions.

A "wire communication" is

any aural transfer made . . . through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception, including the use of such connection in a switching station, furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate or foreign communication.

4 A-3651-15T4 [N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(a) (emphasis added).]

The Legislature's 1993 amendments to the Act substituted the

term "aural transfer," now defined as "a transfer containing the

human voice at any point between and including the point of

origin and the point of reception[,]" N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(t), for

the term "communication." L. 1993, c. 29 §§ 1-29 (the

Amendment).3 The Amendment also provided that a "[w]ire

communication includes any electronic storage of such

communication . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(a) (emphasis added).

The Act defines an "oral communication" as "any . . .

utter[ance] by a person exhibiting an expectation that such

communication is not subject to interception under circumstances

justifying such expectation . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(b).

The Amendment also added several terms which we must

consider. An "[e]lectronic communication," as distinguished

from a "wire communication" or "oral communication," is defined

as

any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any

3 The 1993 amendments were identical to amendments Congress made to the Act's federal counterpart, Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,

- 2520 (Title III), by enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Title II of which is known as the Stored Communications Act. White v. White,

(Ch. Div. 2001).

5 A-3651-15T4 nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical system that affects interstate, intrastate or foreign commerce, but does not include:

(1) Any wire or oral communication . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(m)(1) (emphasis added).]

See State v. Gaikwad,

(App. Div. 2002)

(noting that in conjunction, the definitions of wire and

electronic communications make "clear . . . the Legislature

intended to cover the wide spectrum of potential communications

made possible through technological advances"). The Amendment

made both wire and electronic communications, but not oral

communications, subject to "[e]lectronic storage," defined as

"[a]ny temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic

communication incidental to the electronic transmission

thereof[,] and [a]ny storage of such communication by an

electronic communication service for purpose of backup

protection of the communication . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-

2(q).

Among other things, the Act makes it illegal for anyone to

"[p]urposely intercept[] . . . any wire, electronic or oral

communication . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-3(a) (emphasis added);

see also State v. Ates,

(explaining the

statutory scheme), cert. denied sub nom., Ates v. New Jersey,

6 A-3651-15T4 ___ U.S. ___,

,

(2014).

"'Intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the

contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through

the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device[,]"

meaning "any device or apparatus . . . that can be used to

intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication . . . ."

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(c) and (d).

The State may apply ex parte to designated judges for "an

order authorizing the interception of a wire, or electronic or

oral communication . . . when such interception may provide

evidence of the commission of" certain enumerated crimes.

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-8 (emphasis added). However, the State must

shoulder a heavy burden before it may "intercept" a

communication:

In part, the judge must find probable cause to believe that

a. The person whose communication is to be intercepted is engaging or was engaged over a period of time as a part of a continuing criminal activity or is committing, has or had committed or is about to commit an [enumerated] offense . . . ;

b. Particular communications concerning such offense may be obtained through such interception; [and]

7 A-3651-15T4 c. Normal investigative procedures with respect to such offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ.

[Ates, supra,

(alterations in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-10(a)-(c)).]

The Amendment also created a new crime under the Act.

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-27 makes it unlawful to "knowingly . . .

obtain[] . . . access to a wire or electronic communication

while that communication is in electronic storage." (Emphasis

added). With limited exceptions, an electronic communication

service4 "shall not knowingly divulge . . . the contents of a

communication while in electronic storage . . . ." N.J.S.A.

2A:156A-28(a)(1).

One such exception permits disclosure to law enforcement

"of the contents of an electronic communication," but not a wire

communication, "without notice to the subscriber . . . if the

law enforcement agency obtains a warrant[,]" i.e., a CDW.

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(a).5 We have previously held

4 An "'[e]lectronic communication service' means any service which provides to the users . . . the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A- 2(p). 5 The Act requires a lesser standard for access to "a record, the location information for a subscriber's or customer's mobile or (continued)

8 A-3651-15T4 a CDW is not subject to the more restrictive procedures and enhanced protections of the . . . Act, which include a showing of necessity because normal investigative procedures have failed, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-10. By contrast, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(a) requires only that a law enforcement agency obtain a warrant upon a showing of probable cause.

[State v. Finesmith,

(App. Div. 2009).]

Additionally, unlike a wiretap order which may only be issued to

intercept evidence of the commission of certain crimes, N.J.S.A.

2A:156A-8, a CDW may be obtained without regard to the nature of

the crime being investigated.

The State argues that since the judge found sufficient

probable cause for the issuance of a CDW, it was entitled to

obtain all requested data stored by Twitter on behalf of the

accounts, because that data, including the audio contents of any

video, consisted of "electronic communications." Concomitantly,

the State contends the data was held in post-transmittal

"electronic storage" and not subject to interception, as defined

(continued) wireless communications device, or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of the service," and not the contents of an electronic communication. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A- 29(c). In those circumstances, the judge "shall issue" an "order for disclosure" "if the law enforcement agency offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the record or other information . . . is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(e) (emphasis added).

9 A-3651-15T4 by the Act. The State urges us to vacate the redactions and

limitations entered by the judge on the CDWs.

Amicus suggests we affirm the CDWs as issued, albeit for

reasons other than those expressed by the judge. See, e.g., Do-

Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway,

(2001) ("[I]t is

well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments

and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written

decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."). It

contends that the audio portions of the data were "wire

communications" in "electronic storage," and the State's

acquisition of the audio components of any video would

constitute an "interception" under the Act. As a result, amicus

submits a wiretap order was required, and the State failed to

establish necessary grounds for its issuance.6

We have considered the arguments raised in light of the

record and applicable legal standards. We reverse.

6 Amicus also asserts that we should vacate the CDWs in their entirety because all communications, even "electronic communications" in "electronic storage," deserve enhanced protection under the Act. The well-recognized general rule is that "amicus curiae must accept the case before the court as presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties." State v. O'Driscoll,

(2013) (quoting State v. Lazo,

(2012)). Even though this appeal involves an ex parte application by the State, we conclude the general limitation placed upon amicus should apply and decline to consider, for purposes of this appeal only, the suggestion that the CDWs be vacated entirely.

10 A-3651-15T4 II.

A.

"In construing the meaning of a statute, our review is de

novo." State v. Goodwin,

(2016) (quoting

Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad,

(2012)).

Our "goal . . . is to give effect to the intent of the

Legislature." State v. Morrison, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2016) (slip

op. at 14) (quoting Maeker v. Ross,

(2014)).

We first look at the statute's language, giving the words their

plain meaning and enforcing the statute as written. State v.

Grate,

(2015) (citing State v. Drury,

(2007)). However,

[i]f the language is ambiguous or "admits to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may look to sources outside the language to ascertain the Legislature's intent." Such extrinsic sources, in general, may include the statute's purpose, to the extent that it is known, and the relevant legislative history.

[Drury, supra,

(quoting State v. Reiner,

(2004)).]

Additionally, "[w]hen reviewing related statutory provisions we

generally consider them in pari materia, harmonizing their

meaning with the Legislature's intent." In re G.C.,

(2004) (citing State v. Green,

(1973)).

11 A-3651-15T4 Lastly, the Act was modeled after Title III of the federal

Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act,

,

Ates, supra,

, and "must be strictly construed to

safeguard an individual's right to privacy." Id. at 268

(citations omitted). Although the Act is "more restrictive than

the federal act in some respects," we have recognized that "when

sections of the federal and state acts are substantially similar

in language, it is appropriate to conclude that our

Legislature's 'intent in enacting the sections of the . . . Act

. . . was simply to follow the federal act.'"

(quoting State v. Fornino,

(App. Div.), certif. denied,

, cert.

denied,

,

,

(1988)).

Interpretations of the federal act, therefore, provide

additional guidance in construing similar provisions of the Act.

B.

As an initial matter, the videos posted on the accounts

were not "oral communications" as defined by the Act.7 In Diaz,

supra,

, we "consider[ed] the

7 The judge concluded the audio portions of any videos or video messages were "oral communications" under the Act. Amicus agrees with the State that the judge's reasoning in this regard was incorrect.

12 A-3651-15T4 admissibility of a videotape, which include[d] a sound

recording, made by parents in their own home of the conduct of

their child's daytime 'nanny.'" After reviewing federal

precedent, we concluded that the "Act was not intended to apply

to a recorded silent video surveillance or the video portion of

a videotape which includes a sound component."

.

However, we expressly did not consider the admissibility of the

"audio portion" of the recording that included the defendant's

phone conversations with others not seen on the videotape.

. We also concluded that the defendant's statements to

the child captured on the video were admissible under the theory

of "vicarious consent."

.

We agree with Diaz to the extent it implied audio portions

of surreptitiously-recorded videos may be "oral communications"

subject to the Act. However, federal precedent makes clear that

"oral communications" are "narrowly defined as a nonelectronic

'oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an

expectation that such communication is not subject to

interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.'"

In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., Delwood Farms,

Inc.,

(7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)

(quoting

(2)); see also Huff v. Spaw,

(6th Cir. 2015) (holding communications were "oral"

13 A-3651-15T4 where the plaintiff unknowingly "pocket-dialed" the defendant on

his cell phone, and the defendant heard and recorded face-to-

face conversations between the plaintiff and others); United

States v. King,

(S.D. Cal. 1971), remanded

in part on other grounds,

(9th Cir. 1973) (in-

person, background conversations overheard via wiretap were

"oral communications" and not within the scope of a wiretap

order authorizing interception of wire communications); Daniel

J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law,

, 1279 (2005) (explaining "if the police

attempted to place a bug in one's home to record one's

dinnertime conversations, this would be an interception of oral

communication"). This narrow interpretation of an "oral

communication" finds support in the legislative history of the

Act's federal counterpart. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, 99th Cong.

2d Sess., at 13 (1986) ("In essence, an oral communication is

one carried by sound waves, not by an electronic medium.").

We have no idea what the audio portions of any videos or

video messages posted on the accounts in this case might

contain. If, for example, a posted video included the

contemporaneous recording of a conversation, that recording

might well be considered an interception of an oral

communication subject to the Act. See

(indicating

14 A-3651-15T4 Title III would apply to the "interception of the audio portion

of a [videotaped] meeting"). However, we are firmly convinced

that a posted video held by Twitter is not itself an oral

communication as defined by the Act, nor is its audio portion a

separate "oral communication" that must be segregated from the

video portion and only obtained by issuance of a wiretap order.

In this regard, we liken the situation to those numerous

cases that have held satellite television transmissions that

contain the aural transfer of sounds, including, presumably the

human voice, do not lose their character as "electronic

communications," whose contemporaneous illegal interception is

prohibited by the federal act. See DIRECTV Inc. v. Pepe,

(3d Cir. 2005) (citing DIRECTV Inc. v.

Nicholas,

(4th Cir. 2005); United States v.

One Macom Video Cipher II, SN A6J050073,

(6th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Herring,

(11th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Lande,

(9th

Cir. 1992); United States v. Davis,

(8th

Cir. 1992); United States v. Splawn,

(10th

Cir. 1992)(en banc)).8

8 The State correctly points to some of the practical problems associated with the judge's reasoning and why compliance with the wiretap provisions of the Act to secure the audio portions of these videos is impossible. The Act requires any application (continued)

15 A-3651-15T4 Rather, we must decide whether videos and video messages

held in Twitter accounts are "electronic communications," which

may be accessed with a CDW when held in storage, or, as amicus

urges, "wire communications," the interception of which, even

when held in storage, requires a wiretap order.9 Amicus properly

(continued) for a wiretap order to include a "showing that there is probable cause to believe that such communication will be communicated on the wire or electronic communication facilities involved . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9(c). The audio portion of the subject videos has already been communicated and recorded. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-10(d) requires that, with certain exceptions, the wiretap order shall be issued only if there is probable cause "the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, electronic or oral communications are to be intercepted, are or have been used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of [certain] offense[s], or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by, such individual." As the State points out, it may never know who recorded a posted video, or when or how it was recorded. Every interception made pursuant to a wiretap order is subject to minimization, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-12(f), requiring the State to terminate "as soon as practicable," any unnecessary interception. We have no idea how the State could comply with such a requirement regarding the audio portion of these videos. Finally, in many circumstances, the Act requires the service of an inventory of intercepted conversations upon the individuals whose conversations were intercepted. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-16. The State correctly notes that it may never be able to identify those whose oral communications are captured in the audio component of the videos. 9 In adding "electronic storage" to the definition of "wire communications," Congress's "sole purpose . . . was to protect voice mail . . . ." United States v. Councilman,

(1st Cir. 2005). Notably in 2001, as part of the Patriot Act, Congress amended the federal statute to remove "electronic storage" from the definition of "wire communication." See

(1). In so doing, "Congress . . . reduce[d] (continued)

16 A-3651-15T4 points to the blurring of any distinction between the

definitions of the two types of communications, since a "wire

communication" means any "aural transfer made in whole or in

part . . . by the aid of a wire . . . or other like

connection[,]" N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(a), while an electronic

communication includes "any transfer of . . . sounds . . . of

any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire . . .

system . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(m). Indeed, in construing

the similar provisions of Title III and the ECPA enacted by

Congress in 1986, federal courts have observed "the intersection

of these two statutes 'is a complex, often convoluted, area of

the law.'" Konop, supra, 302 F.3d at 874 (quoting United States

v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 1998)); see also, Steve

Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv.,

(5th Cir. 1994) (noting the federal statute is "complex,"

(continued) protection of voice mail messages to the lower level of protection provided other electronically stored communications." Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Our Legislature has not made a similar change to the Act. However, the continued use of "electronic storage" in the definition of a "wire communication" does not, as amicus suggests, necessarily mean Tweets and associated videos are no longer "electronic communications." See

("No document or legislator ever suggested that the addition of the electronic storage clause to the definition of 'wire communication' would take messages in electronic storage out of the definition of 'electronic communication.'").

17 A-3651-15T4 and "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity")

(citations omitted).

Whether the particular communication contains the human

voice is not dispositive of whether it is a "wire" or

"electronic communication," and, to the extent amicus urges that

the presence of audio on these Twitter videos means they are

wire communications, we reject the contention. As originally

drafted, the ECPA intended to "substitute[] the phrase

'electronic communication' for 'wire communication' throughout

the Act, and subsum[e] wire communications within the newly-

defined term 'electronic communication.'"

. However, as enacted, the ECPA added the term

"electronic communication" to the existing term "wire

communication," and, as we already noted, the Amendment made

similar changes in the Act. Nevertheless,

Congress intended to give the term "electronic communication" a broad definition:

The term 'electronic communication' is intended to cover a broad range of communication activities. . . . As a rule, a communication is an electronic communication if it is neither carried by sound waves nor can fairly be characterized as one containing the human voice (carried in part by wire). Communications consisting solely

18 A-3651-15T4 of data, for example . . . would be electronic communications.

[Id. at 77 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-647 at 35 (1986)).]

Despite these seeming limitations on the term, the Senate report

included "video teleconferences" as an example of electronic

communications. S. Rep. No. 99-541, supra, at 14. In enacting

the Amendment, our Legislature clearly contemplated "electronic

communications" could include the human voice, stating the term

included "digital or voice transmissions to a beeper, a pager,

fax machines, electronic mail service and computers." Assembly

Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Comm., Statement to A. Nos. 130

and 1587 (Sept. 21, 1992) (emphasis added).

Courts have expressed frustration with the failure to

update the federal statute to keep pace with the advent of the

Internet and social media platforms like Twitter. See, e.g.,

Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp.,

,

666 n.2 (D.N.J. 2013) ("Most courts, including this one, would

prefer that Congress update the statute to take into account the

invention of the Internet.");

("[U]ntil Congress brings the laws in line with modern

technology, protection of the Internet . . . will remain a

confusing and uncertain area of the law."). However, courts

have uniformly concluded that communications sent to social

19 A-3651-15T4 media platforms or even private websites are clearly "electronic

communications" under the federal act. See

(the plaintiff's private "website fits the

definition of 'electronic communication'");

("Facebook wall posts are electronic

communications."); In re Application of the United States,

(E.D. Va. 2011) (reviewing statutory

scheme as applied to an order for access to Twitter accounts);

In re § 2703(d) Order,

(E.D. Va. 2011)

(same).

We conclude the Twitter postings are "electronic

communications" as defined by the Act. Like its federal

counterpart, the Amendment's definition of "electronic

communications" intentionally included a broad range of

communications that, unlike wire communications, were not

narrowly defined so as to require an "aural transfer" of

information. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(a). Twitter users routinely

convey their messages without any aural component at all,

instead, using the "transfer of signs, signals, writing . . .

[and] data" in their posts. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(m). The

purposely-intended broader definition of "electronic

communications," see

,

sweeps in other forms of transfer, like "images [and] sounds,"

20 A-3651-15T4 N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(m), but the mere presence of the human voice

does not change the inherent nature of a Tweet.

As a corollary, the State argues accessing Tweets in

storage on Twitter's servers is not an "interception" under the

Act. Amicus acknowledges the videos are in "storage," but

contends that the interception of a wire communication in

storage still requires a wiretap order, not a CDW. Although we

conclude the audio components of the videos stored by Twitter

are part and parcel of electronic communications, not wire or

oral communications, we must still address the issue, because

the Act prohibits the interception of "electronic

communications" without a wiretap order. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-3.

We agree with the State and the overwhelming federal

precedent that holds interception, as defined by the Act and the

federal act, contemplates the acquisition of the communication

contemporaneously with its transmission. Luis v. Zang,

(6th Cir. 2016); accord Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co.,

(3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20,

2004); United States v. Steiger,

(11th

Cir. 2003);

;

872 F.

Supp. 2d at 371-72;

.

But see

(expressing doubt as

to the contemporaneity requirement). In this case, the State

21 A-3651-15T4 does not seek to access the electronic communications in

transmission. Rather, the State seeks to access the electronic

communications already in "electronic storage" on Twitter's

servers. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc., supra,

("Congress did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to

'electronic communications' when those communications are in

'electronic storage.'").

We conclude the audio portions of the videos and video

messages held in the accounts by Twitter are "electronic

communications" under the Act, in electronic storage and

accessible to the State through the CDWs issued by the Law

Division judge. We therefore remand the matter to the Law

Division for entry of CDWs that do not contain the edits and

deletions limiting the State's access. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

22 A-3651-15T4