NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-5554-14T3 RUGIATU SESAY, Complainant-Appellant, v. BAYSHORE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Respondent-Respondent. _______________________________ Submitted April 4, 2017 – Decided April 19, 2017 Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.

On appeal from the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, Department of Law and Public Safety, Docket No. EN18WB-63987.

Rugiatu Sesay, appellant pro se.

Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for respondent Bayshore Community Hospital (William M.

Honan, of counsel; Sarah Beth Johnson, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Beverley A. Lapsley, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Rugiatu Sesay appeals from a June 29, 2015 final agency determination of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Division) finding no probable cause supporting her claim that Bayshore Community Hospital (Bayshore) engaged in national origin and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. We affirm.

Sesay became employed at Bayshore in 1995 as a nurse's aide. In 2007, Sesay was promoted to the position of registered nurse, and was employed in that capacity until May 2013, when Bayshore terminated her employment.

On June 18, 2013, Sesay filed a verified complaint with the Division alleging Bayshore discriminated against her by terminating her employment based on her national origin,1 her alleged disability, and in retaliation for making a prior complaint about national origin discrimination. Bayshore disputed the allegations, claiming Sesay was terminated in accordance with its established progressive discipline policy for multiple performance issues.

The Division investigated Sesay's allegations. The Division served a document and information request upon

In a detailed report, the Division found the investigation did not support [Sesay's] allegation that [Bayshore] discriminated against her based on her national origin or race.[3] The investigation found that [Sesay] We employ initials to protect the privacy of the personnel information of these non-parties to this dispute.

Rather, the investigation showed that in 2011 [Bayshore] reviewed [Sesay's] race discrimination complaint, determined that [Sesay] had been differentially treated in a discipline matter because of her race, and rescinded the discipline. Based on the investigation, and in the absence of any persuasive evidence of a discriminatory or retaliatory animus, this case is closed [based on a finding of no probable cause].

On June 25, 2015, the Division "determined pursuant to N.J.S.A.

10:5-14 and N.J.A.C. 13:4-10.2 that there is no probable cause to credit the allegations of the complaint and the file is therefore closed." This appeal followed.

On appeal, Sesay argues:

(continued) national origin discrimination claim also as a claim of racial discrimination.

Our review of the Division's decision is a limited one.

Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988). "We accord 'a "strong presumption of reasonableness" to an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities.'" Wojtkowiak v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 439 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)). We "must survey the record to determine whether there is sufficient credible competent evidence in the record to support the agency head's conclusions." Ibid. (quoting Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 587).

We are also required to give due regard to the agency's expertise. Ibid. "We may reverse the Director's decision only if 'the Director's finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Ibid. (quoting Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 588). We "will not upset an agency's ultimate determination unless the agency's decision is shown to have been 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. (quoting Barrick v. State, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014)).

Sesay's contention that the Division failed to investigate her allegations is undermined by the record. The Division conducted a comprehensive investigation over a two-year period that included the review of over 900 pages of documents, interviews with Bayshore's employees, numerous interactions with Sesay, and a careful assessment of Sesay's claims in light of the evidence. We discern no abuse of the Division's discretion in the manner in which the investigation was conducted and Sesay fails to demonstrate otherwise.

Sesay's second argument is that her discrimination and retaliation claims should be decided by a jury. A person alleging discrimination or retaliation under the LAD has a 6 A-5554-14T3 choice of remedies: they "may pursue their claims administratively, by filing a verified complaint with the [Division], or judicially, by directly instituting suit in the Superior Court." Hernandez v. Region Nine Housing Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 652 (1996) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-13). Filing a complaint in the Superior Court "would normally culminate in a full-scale plenary trial" before a jury. Sprague v. Glassboro State Coll., 161 N.J. Super. 218, 225 (App. Div. 1978); see N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 (providing for jury trials in Superior Court suits alleging violations of the LAD). Sesay did not opt to file her complaint in the Superior Court here.

Sesay selected the Division as the forum in which her complaint would be decided, thereby taking advantage of the more expeditious administrative process. Hermann v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 183 N.J. Super. 500, 504-05 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 573 (1982). "[H]aving chosen to pursue her grievance administratively, [however], that chosen remedy [was] exclusive while it [was] pending and when it [had] been concluded." Id. at 504; N.J.S.A. 10:5-27. The administrative remedy chosen by Sesay does not permit or provide for a jury trial. See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 93 (2002) (explaining "a jury trial is not applicable" in administrative

Affirmed.