W.S.H. VS. V.L.P. (FM-03-0289-14, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0644-19T4

W.S.H.,

Plaintiff-Respondent, v. V.L.P.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted January 5, 2021 – Decided January 22, 2021 Before Judges Fisher and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FM-03-0289-14.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Confusione, of counsel and on the brief), The Law Office of Louis G. Guzzo, attorneys for respondent (Louis G. Guzzo, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this appeal of a post-judgment matrimonial order, defendant V.L.P. (Valerie, a fictitious name) argues that the motion judge erred by denying, without an evidentiary hearing, a modification and clarification of the alimony, child support, and equitable distribution obligations she owes to plaintiff W.S.H. (Warren, also a fictitious name) pursuant to the judgment of divorce. We find no merit in her arguments and affirm.

The record reveals that the parties married in 2000, had two children – a son born in 2006 and a daughter born in 2008 – and divorced by way of a June 8, 2017 final judgment, which incorporated three separate consent orders. The first consent order obligated Valerie to pay Warren alimony for five years at a monthly rate of $5000. The second permitted Valerie to retain all the parties' real estate as well as complete ownership of her business in exchange for her agreement to pay $400,000 to Warren over a considerable period of time. 1 The third consent order addressed custody and parenting time issues that are not at issue here.

By the time the judgment was entered, Valerie was already in arrears. A family judge entered an order on October 11, 2017, that granted Warren's motion for enforcement and concluded Valerie was nearly $15,000 in arrears. Valerie was ordered to pay alimony through the probation department, including $1000 per month against the arrears, as well as her regularly scheduled payments, as required by the divorce judgment.

In July 2019, Warren again moved for enforcement, asserting that Valerie's alimony arrears had increased beyond $50,000 and that she had failed to make the $33,333.33 equitable distribution payment due on September 1, 2018.2 Valerie cross-moved, seeking, among other things: a "[r]estructuring" of the monthly equitable distribution payments "due to a substantial change in circumstances"; an increase in the child-support credit deducted from her alimony payments "reflecting medical, vision, dental, orthodontic, extra - curricular and educational expenses"; a declaratory judgment that would relieve her of the "anti-Lepis"3 clause contained in the judgment of divorce; a modification that would require Warren to pay her child support; and a recalculation of the alimony arrears because of certain alleged credits.

The motion judge heard oral argument on these cross-motions and, without an evidentiary hearing, entered an order and a written opinion on September 13, 2019, that resolved all the issues presented. The judge ordered Valerie to pay Warren: the monthly $5000 alimony payments on a timely basis; $56,798 in alimony arrears within thirty days; and the $33,333.33 equitable distribution, which was due on September 1, 2018, within thirty days. The judge also denied Valerie's motion to revisit or modify the alimony, child support and equitable distribution terms of the divorce judgment.

Valerie appeals, arguing in a single point:

THE FAMILY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING WITHOUT A PLENARY HEARING [VALERIE'S] REQUESTS TO MODIFY AND CLARIFY THE PARTIES' ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS, AND TO MODIFY [VALERIE'S] EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION PAYMENT SCHEDULE, IN LIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANT DOWNTURN IN [VALERIE'S] FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Eric G. Fikry in his written opinion. We add only a few brief comments.

Valerie's attack on the stipulated terms of the three consent orders that were rolled into a judgment of divorce is without merit. Judge Fikry properly recognized that the agreements of matrimonial litigants are "entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability," Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981), so long as the terms are fair and just. The parties were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings; the motion judge correctly recognized that the parties' "fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual consent" were not to be "unnecessarily or lightly disturbed." Id. at 645. Valerie's factual presentation was insufficient to form the basis for a valid argument to upset the parties' consensual arrangement or require an evidentiary hearing. Her arguments – expressed in generalities – reveal only her remorse with the various agreements embodied in the judgment; her alleg ations are neither specific nor compelling and do not warrant further inquiry.

Valerie's arguments also fall far short of suggesting a ground for avoiding the anti-Lepis provision; even assuming that provision's absence, Valerie's submissions to the motion judge failed to suggest sufficiently changed circumstances so as to allow a modification of the alimony obligation or the equitable distribution payment schedule. 4

While Valerie claimed she was incapable of complying with the financial terms of the divorce judgment, Warren asserted that Valerie: owns three homes; possesses both a Porsche and a Range Rover; and traveled extensively during the period of time covering her claim of a financial downturn. Valerie acknowledged the accuracy of these assertions and did not deny Warren's claim that she had recently purchased a Philadelphia home – her third home – which cost nearly $2,000,000. In attempting to downplay the significance of these facts, Valerie claimed, without documentation or specification, that there is "very little equity" in the three homes. 5 She asserted, and provided documentation, that the vehicles are leased not owned, but her documentation shows that the monthly lease payments on the two vehicles collectively amounted to approximately $3000, a large vehicle expenditure for one person, particularly one who claiming to have financial problems. Valerie also did not deny the extensive traveling pointed out by Warren but asserted this was for the benefit of their oldest child, who participates in "sledge hockey," a sport that she claims is played mostly outside the United States.

Valerie also failed to provide an understandable analysis of her income and expenditures, 6 let alone demonstrate why some of her expenditures should take precedence over her court-ordered obligations to timely pay alimony and the periodic equitable distribution obligations. Without greater specificity and clarity, the judge rightfully denied the request for an evidentiary hearing.

Indeed, while Valerie has claimed that her business has suffered a downturn, she has provided little evidence to support that self-serving statement. She attached to her cross-moving certification a letter from an attorney who expressed her client's "inten[t]" to terminate a service agreement the client had with Valerie's company. Nothing but an unsupported statement in her brief suggests the value of that service agreement or its overall impact on Valerie's business.

In short, because of her inadequate factual presentation, and for the other reasons set forth in Judge Fikry's written opinion, we find no substance in Valerie's argument that the judge should have conducted an evidentiary hearing or erred by denying her application.

Affirmed. on appeal. The latter states that Valerie's net income after taxes in 2018 was approximately $250,000. So, even if it were assumed that her business had a downturn, the net income amount acknowledged in the case information statement was clearly sufficient to enable her to pay Warren that which was required by the judgment of divorce.