Armstrong v. Potts
Opinion of the Court
The Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, in the year 1832, constructed the feeder for its canal through the city of Trenton. In doing this the company took lands of William. Potts, under whom the defendant, William PI. Potts, derives title, and in passing through his land stopped the flow of a great part of the water of Petty’s run, a stream which passed through his land and through lands of others, and emptied into the Delaware. This stream was used for water power on the lands of Potts and of some others of these owners. The company, to restore to Potts the water thus taken away, permitted him to construct a trunk from the feeder, by which water was taken to turn the wheel of his mill. This water was supplied in greater quantities than the' natural flow through Petty’s run, and some of the owners below, who did not use it for water power, and were injured by the excess of water, brought suits for the injury. In August, 1848, an agreement was made between these owners and Potts to com
At the date of this agreement there was a trunk constructed from the feeder to the mill, on Potts’ upper tail-yard; from this there were two gates — one to let the water on the mill-wheel, called the wheel-gate, and another called the side-gate, at one side of the wheel, which was opened to let down the water when the wheel-gate was closed, so that the owners of the lands and mills below should have the constant use and benefit of the flow of the water through their premises.
Each of the other jjartias granted to Potts, and to each other, the right of flowing the water drawn from the feeder over liis lands along Petty’s run.
To this agreement, which was under seal, there ivas appended a written memorandum, signed by three of the parties, William Potts, Isaac Dunn, and H. P. Welling, by which they agreed that the trunk, from the feeder to the head-race at Potts’ upper yard, slioxdd be repaired, kept up, and maintained at their joint expense.
Prom the date of this agreement to the interference complained of in 1869, the water which flowed from the feeder in the trunk thus constructed, had been permitted to pass down Petty’s run through the two gates mentioned; the side-gate being raised when the wheel was stopped and the wheel-gate closed. The complainant, who had purchased the lands
The complainant having refused to pay some claim made by the defendant for repairs, the latter closed the side-gate and refused to allow the complainant to open it, thus depriving him of the benefit of the water drawn from the feeder, except at such times as the wheel-gate was open.
These facts stated in the bill are not denied by the answer’, except that it is denied that the closing of the side-gate, or any other act of the defendant, intercepts the flow of all the water. The answer states that a flow of water equal to sixty-four square inches drawn under a head of four feet, has not been stopped or intercepted, but has constantly been permitted. The answer further sets up that the water was drawn by virtue of agreements with the canal company — one of which was with William Potts, and the other with Garret D. Wall through whom the complainant derives title — that the water to be drawn from the feeder was to be the quantity of sixty-four square inches, drawn under a head of four feet; and that the complainant has no right to have any more water flow to his land from the feeder than this quantity.
In the first place, these agreements are set up in the answer not in response to the bill, but in avoidance, and in limitation of the rights claimed in it; and by the settled practice of this court, an injunction will not be dissolved or refused upon new matter set up in the answer not responsive to the' bill. This was so held by Chancellor Green in The Society v. Low, 2 C. E. Green 26; by Chancellor Williamson in Green v. Pallas, 1 Beas. 267; and in Butler, v. The Society, Ib. 264; in which case on appeal, (Ib. 506,) the doctrine was recognized in the Court of Appeals in the opinion of the court delivered by Green, C. J. Chancellor Kent so held in Minturn v. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 499, citing as authority Allen v. Crabcroft, Barnardist. Ch. R. 373.
But if these agreements were propeidy before the court,
If it did not appear in Avhat manner these gates were kept open at the date of the agreement, the provision that they were to be used in such manner as would best promote the beneficial use of it at the mills, would require one gate to be always open.
The motion to dissolve must be denied..
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.