In re the application for an attachment against Hewitt
Opinion of the Court
Julius H. Pratt and Henry C. Spaulding, having been, as bail in error, compelled to pay the amount of a certain verdict with costs, recovered by Samuel K. Benson and Henry K. Benson against The Montclair Bailway Company, which at the time of such payment was, and still is, an insolvent corporation, were, by a decree of this court, subrogated to the rights of the plaintiffs in the premises. The verdict was recovered on an appeal by the Messrs. Benson from an award made under the charter of the company, for the value of a lot of land belonging to them, in the township of Bloomfield, in the county of Essex, and damages on condemnation of that property for the purposes of the railroad. By that decree, the sureties were subrogated to all the rights, equities, powers, and privileges of the Messrs. Benson in reference to the land and to the payment of the amount of the verdict and costs by the company; and the amount of the verdict, costs, and interest, with the costs of the proceedings for subrogation, wmre declared to be a lien on the land ahead of all encumbrances put upon it, or attempted to be put upon it by the company.
It was further ordered, that on due and legal service of notice of that decree, on the receivers of the company, and •demand of the payment of the amount of the verdict, costs, and interest to Messrs. Pratt and Spaulding, or to said Samuel K. Benson and Henry K. Benson, unless the same be
Mr. Hewitt, as receiver of The New York and Oswego Midland Railroad Company, was operating the road when this decree was obtained. He ceased to do so, however, on the 30th of March last, although a license was given to him by Messrs. Pratt and Spaulding to continue running all trains on the road up to the time of the sale of the road,, and until further notice to the contrary, “ without prejudice to the rights of Messrs. Pratt and Spaulding in any proceeding had ” in this court. Erom the 1st of April last, to the 30th of July last, the use of the road for public travel ceased. The holders of the second mortgage bonds, previous to, and about the latter date, authorized Mr. Hewitt, as trustee under their mortgage, to operate the road on their account, and he accordingly, as’ such trustee, resumed the running of trains over the road. The road had then been sold by the receiver. Mr. Hewitt acted on the advice of counsel, in thus operating the road as trustee. He was advised that the prohibition of the, decree did not extend to him in that capacity,, and that as trustee, he might operate the road without becoming liable to the charge of violating the interdict of this court. A motion is now made for an attachment against him, as- for contempt. It is, however, conceded by the counsel of Messrs. Pratt and Spaulding, that his conduct in the premises has not been such as to call for any animadversion on the part of the court, and the real purpose of this motion is understood to be to obtain the views of the court as to the right of the mortgagees to use the road, in view of the above prohibition. That the- mortgagees have no greater right in the premises than the company itself, is obvious. The real question is, whether this- court will, under the circumstances, deprive the public of the use of the road. The plea of public convenience, or even public necessity, of course, will not avail to deprive a citizen of his-
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.