Van Dyke v. Dyke
Opinion of the Court
The Chancellor.
Elizabeth A. Van Dyke, the complainant in this suit, -obtained a final decree for the sale of certain mortgaged premises, being a farm of which her husband died seized, in the county of' Mercer, to raise and pay to her the sum of $5,928.02, besides interest and costs. The premises were sold, under the execution, on or about the 14th of February, 1878, by the sheriff, to her, for the sum of $1,100, and he .afterwards conveyed the premises to her accordingly. They were sold subject to a prior mortgage of $5,000 principal, whereon there was due, at the time of the sale, about $300, for interest. The petitioner is one of the creditors of the estate of William Van Dyke, deceased. Mr. Van Dyke’s property consisted of the mortgaged premises and about $2,000 of persona] property. He died in May, 1877, intestate, and James B. Coleman was appointed his administrator. The administrator is a party to this suit.
The estate is still unsettled. The complainant has put in her claim against the estate for the amount due on the bond •secured by her mortgage, after crediting the amount raised by the sale of the mortgaged premises. If the sheriff’s sale be permitted to stand, the estate is insolvent. The petitioner alleges that the premises were sold at a grossly inadequate price, and that they would have brought a much larger sum of money but for the fraudulent contrivance of the complainant to prevent bidding on the part of the creditors of the estate, both by stating, publicly, that she intended to take the mortgaged premises at the sale in satisfaction of the mortgage, and by inducing one person who, otherwise, would have bid upon the property a large sum of money, to refrain from bidding, upon the promise by her to him that, if he would do so, she would pay his debt; he being a creditor of her husband’s estate.
The respondent insists that the petitioner has no standing in this suit, and cannot be heard upon this application, but that the application can only be made by the administrator. The administrator is the mere representative of the creditors and next of kin. In this case, the estate being insolvent if the sale stands, he practically represents the creditors alone. By refusing to take the action necessary for their protection in this suit, he leaves them without remedy, unless they can be heard notwithstanding his refusal.
The petitioner prays that he may be admitted a party to the suit. That, however, is not necessary to the relief which he seeks. He appears in behalf of the creditors of the estate, and might be permitted to do so, under the circumstances, in the name of the administrator, the court imposing such terms, if any, as it might deem proper for the indemnity of the administrator in the premises. The creditors may avail themselves of the administrator’s name and standing in the suit for their protection. Receivers &c. v. Wortendyke, 12 C. E. Gr. 658. And, if occasion require, may be permitted to intervene in their own names to protect their interests. Calvert on Parties 58; Drew v. Harman, 5 Price 319; Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegal, 1 Sim. & Stu. 491; Story’s Eq. Pl. § 365; Williamson v. N. J. Southern R. R. Co., 10 C. E. Gr. 13.
That the mortgaged premises were sold at a grossly inadequate price is entirely clear, from the evidence. They were struck off to the complainant at $1,100, subject to the principal and interest ($5,300) of the prior mortgage. They were reasonably worth from $10,000 to $11,000. As before stated, the sale took place on the 14th of Eebruary, 1878. On or about the 5th of April following, Enoch Perrina
The inadequacy of price, however, would not be, in itself, sufficient reason for setting aside the' sale; but there is clear evidence of successful effort on the part of the complainant to prevent competition, in order that she might become the purchaser of the farm, at the sale, at a price less than its value, or than it would have otherwise brought.
The testimony of Enoch Perrine is clear and unequivocal. He testifies that he is the brother-in-law of the complain
This conversation, to which Mr. and Mrs. Perrine testify, is not denied by the complainant. She was sworn as a witness under the petition, and, when interrogated as to the conversation, merely said that she had no recollection of having had it, but did not deny that she had made the offer and agreement to and with Perrine, testified to by him and his wife. It is manifest that, as the result of this agreement, she was enabled to obtain the farm at a very inad
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.