Stockton v. Central Railroad
Opinion of the Court
The original information in this cause represented, in substance, that, in pursuance of a scheme between the defendants to-restrict or prevent competition in the production and sale of anthracite coal, a staple commodity in this state, and thereby to-effect an increase in the price thereof, on the 12th of February, 1892, the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, a body corporate of this state, without authority of law, and in violation of the statute approved May 2d, 1885, entitled “An act respecting the leasing of railroads,” through the instrumentality of a nominal lease to the Port Reading Railroad Company, another corporation of this state, and a tripartite agreement of even date with that lease, between it, the Port Reading Railroad Company,, and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, indirectly leased its property and franchises to the latter company, which is-a corporation of Pennsylvania, for the term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years, the purpose and effect of such lease being to-combine producers and carriers of anthracite coal and to partially destroy competition in the production and sale of such coal, and. thereby facilitate an increase in the price of that commodity, to-the injury of the people of New Jersey.
Upon the presentation of that information, on the 31st day of May, 1892, an order was made that the defendants show cause-why an injunction should not issue according to the prayer off
“ desist and refrain from operating their railroads in the State of New Jersey in such manner as to diminish competition in the trade in anthracite coal, and •desist and refrain from making, continuing or acting under any arrangements or combinations with each other by contract or otherwise, having for their object, effect or result either the creation of an artificial scarcity of such coal, by limitation or diminution of the supply thereof, despite the natural law of demand and supply, or having for their object, effect or result the arbitrary increase of the price of such coal or the prevention of existing or future legitimate competition in the production, transportation or sale of such coal.”
Argument upon that order was heard late in July, 1892, and on the 29th of August following it was directed that an injunction issue to restrain the defendants from, among other things,
“ further performing and carrying into effect the aforesaid lease and tripartite agreement; and * * * the Port Reading Railroad Company and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, their officers and agents, from .continuing to control the roads, property and franchises of the Central Rail-road Company of New Jersey, and from in anywise further intermeddling therewith, and further restraining and prohibiting the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, its officers and agents, from permitting the Port Beading Railroad Company or the Philadelphia and Beading Railroad Company to use, .control or operate its road, property and franchises; and enjoining and commanding the said The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, its officers and agents, to again resume control of all its property and franchises and the performance of all its corporate duties; and further restraining and prohibiting the defendants * * * from making, continuing or acting under any .arrangements or combinations with each other, by contract or otherwise, having for their object, effect or result the control and operation of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, its roads, property or franchises, by the other defendants, or either of them, and thereby effecting either the creation of an artificial scarcity of such coal by limitation or diminution of the supply thereof, despite the natural law of demand and supply, or the arbitrary increase of the price of such coal or the prevention of existing or future legitimate competition in the production, transportation or sale of such coal.”
By supplemental information, lately filed, the attorney-general represents that both the restraining clause of the order of May 31st and the injunction subsequently issued under the order of August 29th have been disobeyed by the defendant companies,
The present order to show cause is decided upon the pleadings- and affidavits heretofore used in this cause, the supplemental information and affidavits thereto annexed, affidavits submitted in behalf of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company and an agreement between coal companies and admission by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey hereafter referred to.
By their affidavits, the defendants admit that the prices of coal were increased on the 1st of July and again on the 1st of September, but they deny that the increase was the act of the defendant companies. They claim that the responsibility for it is upon the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company,, which they insist is a distinct corporate entity of Pennsylvania, for whose acts they cannot be held responsible. They show that upon the service of the injunction which was issued under order of August 29th, the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey resumed possession of its property and the exercise of its franchises, and that although the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre coal has been shipped over railroads controlled by the Central Rail
It is an undisputed fact in the case, that the Central Railroad Company at the time of the lease to the Port Reading Railroad Company, was and since then has been the owner of a large majority of the shares of the capital stock of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company, a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania and a large miner and producer of anthracite coal, and that the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company then was and since then has been the owner of almost all the capital stock of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, a Pennsylvania corporation of the same character, and that those two companies have represented, and yet represent, the coal investments and agencies of the last-named railroad companies, together constituting more than one-half the entire anthracite coal available to the people of this state.
By their affidavits the defendants affirmed that the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company had sold its entire output of coal to the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, without reserving any right in itself to fix or control the price at which the coal should be sold by its vendee. Those affidavits were vague, in that they failed to disclose that the sale was by instrument in writing, and to refer to such instrument or to state the date of the sale, and upon the attorney-generals demanding information as to those particulars, the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey produced a written agreement between the coal companies, dated on the 30th day of April, 1892—that is, before either injunction was issued, but after the lease and tripartite agreement between the defendants—in which, after reciting that the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre company was the owner or lessee of coal lands and mines along the lines of the Lehigh and Susquehanna railroad, and that the Port Reading Railroad Company, as lessee of the Central Railroad Company, had arranged with the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company for the transportation of all anthracite coal consigned by
“the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Company may supply coal in their place to an extent not exceeding a certain proportion of the whole amount of coal marketed from the anthracite region ; that the sizes of the coal to be delivered to the purchaser shall be restricted to an indicated proportion of the sales by the purchaser; that the coal sold shall pass to market over the Central Eailroad of New Jersey system; that this contract shall be-binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, and their successors and assigns, respectively, for and during the period of nine hundred and ninety-nine years from the date hereof, unless the said lease of the Central Eailroad Company of New Jersey to the Port Beading Eailroad Company shall be canceled or annulled before the termination of that period, and that in that event this contract shall, at the option of either party thereto, and upon written notice by such party to the other of its intention to exercise that option, cease to be in force at and upon the termination, cancellation or annulment of the said lease.”
The. agreement was executed in behalf of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company by its president, J. Rogers Max
It appears that the method of selling coal mined by the comr panies named was through the instrumentality of salesagents; that when the agreement referred to was entered into, one John E. Wilson was the salesagent of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company; that on the 1st of May, 1892, Wilson resigned that position, and Percy B. Heilner, who had theretofore been the salesagent for the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, assumed the sales of the coal produced by the Lehigh and Wilesbarre Coal Company and other miners along the line of the Lehigh and Susquehanna railroad, styling such coal as the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Department of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, and that he, together with agents of other coal-producing companies, on the 1st day of July and the 1st day of September, 1892, increased the price of coal substantially as alleged in the information.
Upon this state of facts the defendants urged that they could not be held responsible for the acts of the coal companies, which, being distinct corporate entities of another state, operating in that state through their own officers and agents, are not, in contemplation of law or in fact, within their control.
Upon the other hand, the attorney-general insisted that the defendant companies, the Central Railroad Company of Hew Jersey and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, being the substantial owners of the two coal companies, and, through their presidents, controlling them hitherto during the operation of said agreement concerning the output of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre coal, were, in substance and effect, continuing and acting conjointly under an arrangement, in the use of their properties, the tendency and effect of which was the creation of an artificial scarcity of anthracite coal, by limitation of the supply thereof, or the control of such supply, so that arbitrary in
In proof of his charge of deliberate concealment of that agreement, the attorney-general called attention to the fact that, in his original information, he alleged and charged that other instruments than the lease to the Port Reading Railroad Company and the tripartite agreement between the three defendants, made between them or between them and others, existed for the purpose of effectuating the combination charged, and investing
In my former opinion in this case, I declared that for the substantial purposes of injury to the public by combination to stifle-competition, and the attorney-general’s suit to defeat such combination, the defendants are to be regarded in equity as the owners of the coal mines; not as holders of the legal title,.but as; having substantial control of the corporate entities which hold] that title.
It was made quite apparent to me that the relation of the coal companies to the railroad companies is such that the same minds and wills which dictate the policy of the railroads, and decide what they shall do and what they shall not do,,also, in virtue of the power given by the ownership of a majority of the stock of the two coal companies, which is the property of the defendants, dictate the policy and control the conduct of the coal companies; that the defendant railroad corporations and the two coal companies are, in short, guided, dominated and controlled by precisely the same governing power.
The terms of the agreement of the 30th of April, between the coal companies, coupled with proof of the ownership of the capi
It was thus made to appear that the same individuals, who controlled the corporations under injunction, in virtue of the power which properties of the enjoined companies give them, controlled other corporations whose life is represented by those properties, and used them to accomplish the very ends against which the injunctions are aimed. These individuals professed respect and obedience to the injunctions by causing the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey to resume possession of its tangible property, but they failed to terminate the agreement which they had made through the power which the intangible property of that company gave them and which most effectually nullified the efficiency of those injunctions.
"Whatever difficulty I have had in deciding this application has been with this question. I have not for a moment doubted the power of this court, where it is necessary to prevent the property of the defendant from use in the contrivance of devices to mislead and deceive the court and thereby defeat its injunction, to take control of that property through the instrumentality of a receiver. Indeed, the power of the court to appoint such a receiver, when the appointment is necessary, to effectuate its decree, has not been disputed. Such power is so essential at times to the efficient exercise of the court’s jurisdiction that it has become too well established either to be seriously questioned nr to need citation of authority to support it. Out of consideration for property rights it is sparingly and cautiously exercised, but when execution of a deci’ee depends upon its exercise the court will most certainly use it to the full extent that the exigencies of the case demands.
Since the hearing of this application the representation to me, under stipulation between counsel for the Central Railroad Company and the attorney-general, that the agreement between the coal companies has been terminated at the instance of the Central Railroad Company, has removed the necessity of further consideration of the proofs. That representation-has a two-fold significance—-first, it satisfies me that the railroad company did not exert, prior to the application, its entire power to secure obedience to the injunction, and, second, it evinces a disposition upon the part of that company to now render complete obedience to the court’s writ. Therefore, as the situation now is, I perceive no necessity for the appointment of a receiver. Instead of so doing, in order that I may be completely and particularly informed touching present obedience to the injunction, I will refer it to a master, to inquire whether the injunction is now being obeyed in letter and in spirit. He will be empow
Further order in the premises will be reserved until the coming in of his report.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.