Wilson v. East Jersey Water Co.
Opinion of the Court
The questions now to be considered were reserved on the former hearing because of the absence of the municipalities principally affected. These municipalities have been brought in and the case is ready for final determination. The questions reserved were stated in the opinion (Wilson, Attorney-General, v. East Jersey Water Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 330) as follows:
(1) Has the legislature, by necessary implication from its various acts giving to municipalities a right to obtain a water-supply, granted to them the state’s right in so much water to be taken from the streams of the state as they may need for their lawful purposes ?
As to the first question, there can be no doubt. The authorities, cited in my former opinion, lead inevitably to the conclusion that when the legislature has authorized a municipality to procure a water-supply, it has, by necessary implication, granted the state’s right in so much of the water of the stream, from which the supply is to be taken, as the municipality may need. There never has been a direct grant of such right to any municipality and if the grant be not implied, every municipality is now appropriating the state’s right in the water unlawfully. The uniform course of decision is in favor of the implication.
The next question is whether the East Jersey Water Company and those other corporations which are now engaged in bringing the waters of the Passaic to the defendant municipalities are the lawful agents or instrumentalities of the municipalities for that purpose.
The act of 1888 (Gen. Stat. p. 2210) cited at length in my former opinion, authorizes the appropriate municipal authority
“to make and enter into a contract or agreement with any water company or other company, contractor or contractors for one year or a term of years for the obtaining or furnishing of a supply or a further or other supply of water,” &c.
This the defendant municipalities have done. Having done so, they may lawfully take, as against the state, water for “their lawful uses and purposes.” The attorney-general contends, however, that the act is to be construed strictly and that the company having the contract is without authority, as he expresses it, “to farm out its duty or delegate its agency.” But that this so-called delegation is not unlawful, has been very recently decided by the supreme court in cases in which ’some of the very contracts here attacked were the subject of investigation. Paterson v. Kearny, 84 N. J. Law 456; Paterson v. Jersey City, 84 N. J. Law 454.
“the charge and management of the joint property and of the pipe lines connected therewith, so far as owned in common, for the purpose of operating the same and delivering the water for each of them into the pipe lines used exclusively by the said parties z-espectively, to the extent of their several requirements.”
The township of Kearny entered into a contract with the East Jersey Water Company in 1895. In 1903 this contract was assigned to the New Jersey Suburban Water Company and the New York and New Jersey Water Company. In 1904 Kearny ratified the assignment and is now receiving its water thereunder. On May 18th, 1911, the East Jersey Water Company entered into a supplemental agreement with the New Jersey suburban company and the New York and New Jersey company by the terms of which the Passaic river at Little Ealls was designated as the source of supply and the East Jersey Water Company was constituted the agent and employe of the New Jersey suburban company and the New York and New Jersey company
“to use its watez- powez-, mains and z-ipaz-ian and othez- facilities to accomplish the diversion which is authorized by said municipal contracts and to receive per million gallons, for the water so delivered through its mains, into the mains of the parties of the second part, the prices prescribed in its contracts as compensation, not for water sold, but for services as agent and for the use of its appliances, water power’, mains and propez’ty in accomplishing the municipal supply which the party of the first part hereby agrees to use and provide for that purpose.”
The situation then, as far as respects Kearny, is as follows: Kearny has, in effect, a contract for a supply of pure and wholesome water with the New Jersey suburban company and the New York and New Jersey company, made pursuant to the
The contracts attacked in this suit were the basis of Paterson’s attack and the court found nothing illegal in them. They could not be, as contracts, legal as against Paterson and illegal as against the state. The attorney-general argues that the New York and New Jersey company and the New Jersey suburban company Could not delegate to other companies the duty of bringing water to Kearny. They do .not attempt to do so. That they may perform their own contractual obligation, not having pipes extending the whole distance and a pumping system of their own, they contract for the use of the pipes and pumping system of the East Jersey company. By the supplemental agreement of May 18th, 1911, heretofore referred to, made since my former decision, and no doubt in consequence of it, the East Jersey company renounces, in express terms, all claim to sell water. It agrees to act as the agent of the two companies and to permit them to use its mains and appliances. It asks compensation for this and this only. It no longer asserts or pretends that it is “the owner of various sources of water-supply.” As Mr. Justice Swayze points out, it is really the municipality which is taking and using the water. It is taking it by means of the instrumentalities provided under and pursuant to its contract with the New York and New Jersey and the New Jersey suburban companies.
As the question of the legality of the arrangement made by the municipality with the two companies and by them with the East Jersey compajiy is a purely legal one, and as the supreme court has passed upon it, it is not open to question here.
It is unnecessary to consider the case of the other municipalities separately. As far as the contracts, under which they obtain water are challenged, they stand on substantially the same ground.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.