McComb v. McComb
Opinion of the Court
The petition in above cause is filed for a divorce on the ground of desertion. The parties, who were acquainted from childhood, were married October 15th, 1907. One child, a son named Galen, now aged about five years, was born of the marriage. At the time of the marriage the defendant was deputy city collector of Jersey City, receiving a salary of $1,500 a year. He was in receipt of no other income, had substantially no property, and relied wholly upon his salary for the maintenance and support of his family. Prior to the marriage the mother of the petitioner (a widow) very properly questioned the defendant as to his ability to support her daughter, and was informed by the defendant of his position and income; he said there was likely to be a change in the Jersey City administration; that he would probably lose his position; but had secured a better one in the health board. The petitioner was also advised of this situation.
After returning from their wedding trip, they occupied a house at Hackensack, the rent of which was $40 a month; the petitioner’s mother, and son, aged about thirteen years, also resided with them and paid board. The defendant paid the first
In the course of his employment with the Union Trust Company he became acquainted with a business called the "wet wash business,” and conceived the idea that it was very profitable. He told his wife that he was going to engage in it and here his lack of judgment and discretion is made to appear. He borrowed $600 from the Union Trust Company and invested it in the business, without making a reasonable investigation. His wife advised against this course until he made a proper examination of the business and consulted a lawyer on the subject. This advice he did not heed, with the result that within a very short time the wet wash business became a failure, the money embarked in the enterprise was lost, and he was driven to seek other employment.
His next venture was in a corporation which, with Mr. Mason, they formed for conducting the laundry business, called the M. & M. Laundry. He represented to his mother-in-law that it was a very good business, that ample money could be made in it, and borrowed from her $1,200. Afterwards, in the summer of 1909, and while he knew the business was running down and was virtually a failure, he borrowed from her an additional $1,000, on the representation that they were doing a splendid business, that the money was necessary to enable them to properly handle the same, and that he would repay her in a short time. On these j (¡presentations the money was loaned; at the same time he borrowed $350 from his wife. During his stay in the laundry business he delivered to his wife checks in small amounts, made payable to the order of the M. & M. Laundry, which he, as president of the company, endorsed. She demurred to accepting them, thinking that it was suspicious, and inquired why the money was not put into the account of the company. líe, however, allayed her suspicions. The day after Thanksgiving, 1909, he said he was going away, that the laundry business was doing nicely; that he was going with the knowledge and assent of Mr.
The petition was filed within a month thereafter.
Aside from the foregoing, other facts appear which shed some light on the case. The petitioner says that on a visit to her about Labor Day, 1910, the first thing lie said was,
“I will send you some money; I have consulted my lawyer, and you will never get a divorce from me. I will send you some money from time .to time, and, if necessary, have it registered. He told me that.”
She, in reply, said she did not want a divorce. He denies that he ever spoke to her about a divorce or that he consulted a lawyer until this suit was brought. Owing to his admitted untruthfulness ip dealing with his wife and her mother, and the fact that he did send her a registered letter, which he says was sent so that be could have something to fail back on in case anything happened, which might naturally he taken to mean, if his wife applied for a divorce, I am inclined to the belief that the petitioner is telling the truth. Prior to leaving the laundry business, which was in November of 1909, she learned that her husband owed money to the Glen Island Hotel, which, she said was a notorious resort, and her suspicions were aroused. Taking these suspicions in 1909, and his statement as to how he. would prevent her from obtaining a divorce, made about October, 1910, into consideration, she consulted a lawyer some tiane in July, 1911, and laid the circumstances before him, acting upon whose advice she employed a detective to follow defendant and only discontinued his services because her funds gave out. She kept copies of her letters written to him, as well as his letters to her, after this date, because of her lawyer telling her to be very careful. The married life of the petitioner down to this date having been so unsatisfactory, with such little hope of betterment in sight, I am inclined to believe she then conceived the idea of obtaining a divorce if conditions did not improve. The defendant explains that the bill referred to was contracted on the day of the HudsonEulton celebration, when he went into the hotel with a number of friends hoping to secure all the laundry work of the hotel.
“I have taken an additional $2,000 (policy), the quarterly payment of which falls due on July 15th, Galen’s birthday. Should anything happen to me, you will collect $3,000, as everything is payable to yon,”
to which she replied, sajdng:
“I sincerely hope that I shall never be the one to profit by it. You know you have many tasks to perform yet, and it is our ambition, or should be, to live until we have done them well.”
While before his marriage, and. for some time afterwards, his conduct towards the petitioner was rather reprehensible, he seemed to be filled with a desire to do his best for his familyi But he says that the constant talk in the house when he tyent to Hackensack was “money, money, money,” which was very annoying. I think perhaps he exaggerates this, yet, under the circumstances, it was but natural that there should have been some talk of money matters that made it rather disagreeable to him, considering the large amounts of money of his mother-in-law and wife he had squandered in such a short time, and' afterwards finding how difficult it was, in open competition, to earn a livelihood. Bui it did not excuse his fáilúre to visit his wife while
The whole aspect oC the ease is peculiar. The petitioner contends that the desertion commenced in October, 1910; that at that time he had a deserting mind, that this is evidenced by the fact that he told her, two weeks after Labor Day of 1910, that she would not get a divorce because he had consulted a lawyer, and would send her money which would defeat it. If his intent at that time was to desert his wife and never afterwards resume marital relation, the mere fact that he sent her money would not of itself prevent a decree being entered against him; the mere sending of money to a wife does not constitute the full measure of duty which a husband owes to his wife. His desertion could be willful, and yet ho might support her. The strange part of the case, however, is that while he was with the laundry company he actually took about $300 of the company’s funds and gave it to his wife for her support. It is unlikely that he would do this if he was not anxious to care for her. On these various trips he sent her virtually all he earned, less a sufficient sum to pay his hoard. He did not even have money to buy clothing, and was reduced to sueli a degree that when he came to- New York from Roxborough to become a manager, his wife took him to Rogers, Peet & Company and bought him clothing. If he was carrying out a preconceived design of sending her money for the purpose of defeating a divorce, he certainly punished himself severely to accomplish this end. He might readily have sent less and fully subserved the purpose intended. I can hardly believe this. I think he endeavored to do the best he could, but, by reason of some mental characteristics, which are evidenced a great deal in his letters, he seemed incapable of acquiring a position to properly care for his wife and child; some of these characteristics appear plainly in his letters; they are filled with the most exaggerated statements as to his earning capacity and the money he was making. They were filled with such, expressions as that he was “making a barrel of money,” and he explained that the reason why he wrote such things to his wife was that he desired to buoy her up and make her cheerful.
In her reply she pointedly asked him why he registered the letter when it contained no money and he had never sent her a registered letter before, even letters that contained money, his explanations were rather lame, thus provoking comment on the fact in her subsequent letters. It is apparent that the registry of the letter taken in connection with his previous statement, as to the manner in which he would prevent her from obtaining a divorce, conveyed to her the idea that the letter was registered with the same end in view.
On the stand he testified that lie determined to write the letter to have something to fall back upon in case anything happened.
"While it has not been testified to, I am inclined to the belief that the defendant wrote this letter for use in case his wife should sue for divorce, that it must have been in his mind that his absence might amount to a desertion. He says, however, he did not consult a lawyer about the matter and was not advised until this suit was brought. It appeared that the defendant wrote his wife that he would secure an apartment, and, at another time, that he would secure quarters in a boarding-house. Her letters indicate an acquiescence in these plans, which he then abandoned, saying, he could get neither Ihe apartment nor the boarding-house. He says the reason why he could not get them was that when he went to Hackensack to see his wife, her talk was different from her letters. She also says that his talk was different from his letters, and so the parties did not" resume marital relations. I am satisfied that if the defendant was earning sufficient to enable them to live in substantially the style
She had lived hoping for the arrival of the day when he would be capable of properly earing for his family, and this continued ’ down to the date of the illness of their son, Galen, in January or February, 19.13, during which lie, becoming incensed at not being permitted, against the doctor’s orders, to see his child, stopped sending her further moneys. When it is considered that this man for a whole year lived within a few miles of his child and did not make an effort to sec him, it is plain that his conduct on this occasion was absolutely unjustifiable, and was properly so looked upon by his wife. This, to my mind, completely weaned her love for him, and she then finally concluded to put into effect what, for a long time, was inchoate in her mind, restrained only by her hope and lovo, to seek a divorce. But I am unable to determine at what particular period it can be said that a desertion commenced. She consented to his leaving on these various trips. She bought clothes for him to go as manager on one of the trips. Her letters, after his undertaking this latter trip, were substantially of the same tenor as before. There is nothing in the letters written by or to him during two years prior to the filing of the petition, or even down to the date of the filing of the petition, nor is there anything in the testimony, as I read it, which could, in any manner, be treated as information to the defendant that the wife demanded a resumption of marital relations. These letters and the evidence indicate an acquiescence in their living apart until he could earn enough to support her. Provost v. Provost, 71 N. J. Eq. 204; affirmed, 73 N. J. Eq. 418; Foote v. Foote, 71 N. J. Eq. 273; McAllister v. McAllister, 71 N. J. Eq. 13.
I am constrained to decree that the bill be dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.