In re the state highway commission
Opinion of the Court
The state highway commission of the State of New Jersey, under the provisions of an act entitled “An act to establish a state highway system and to provide for the improvement, betterment, reconstruction, resurfacing, maintenance, repair and regulation of the use thereof” (P. L. 1917 ch. 14), and by virtue of “An act to regulate the ascertainment and payment of compensation for property condemned or taken for
The commission, on September 30th, 1932, filed a petition for the condemnation of these lands, and on December 22d, 1932, Tombleson Estate instituted foreclosure proceedings upon these two mortgages, upon one of which the principal sum of $6,400 was due and on the other of which the principal sum of $7,600 was due. One of said mortgages covered part of the lands so taken and condemned by the commission and the other covered the remaining part. The commissioners in condemnation were appointed on January 1st, 1933, by Hon. Erank T. Lloyd, justice of the supreme court, and on March 17th, 1933, the commissioners awarded the sum of $3,400 for the land, from which award appeals were taken but afterward dismissed, and on June 12th, 1934, the state highway commission, by virtue of an order of the court of chancery, paid into that court the amount of the commissioners’ award of $3,400, with interest of $309.07, making a total of $3,709.07, and gave notice of such payment to the parties interested.
In the foreclosure suit, Ealk Realty Company filed an answer and counter-claim alleging the making of a certain agreement by which Tombleson Estate was to release the lands taken by the state highway commission upon the payment of a certain consideration, together with certain other claims, and prayed that the Tombleson Estate should be restrained from proceeding with the foreclosure proceedings and for other relief. At the final hearing the cause was decided in favor of the complainants and by the final decree the mortgaged premises, which included the lands taken by the state highway commission, were directed' to be sold to satisfy and pay the mortgage indebtedness of Tombleson Estate which aggregated approximately $16,000. The prem
The state highway commission, was a party defendant in the foreclosure proceeding, a decree pro confesso was taken against it, consented to by the attorney-general, and under foreclosure proceedings the lands condemned were sold to Tombleson Estate. It will be noted that the moneys awarded by the commissioners in the condemnation proceedings were not paid into court until some months after the sale of the mortgaged premises and the conveyance of the same by sheriff’s deed to Tombleson Estate. The moneys paid into this court represent the lands taken under condemnation proceedings; the sale of these lands made in the foreclosure proceedings could not operate to take away from the state highway commission, such lands, but even though such sale might be a nullity so far as the state highway commission is concerned, the lien of the mortgage of the Tombleson Estate was transferred from the land to the money in court representing the land, and that lien was not lost by the attempted foreclosure and sale, and purchase by the mortgagee, whether or not such proceedings were effective to bar the equity of redemption of Falk Realty Company, mortgagor. Mount v. Manhattan Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 25; affirmed, 44 N. J. Eq. 297.
The exceptants contend that the Tombleson Estate has no claim upon the fund because at the time of the filing of the petition the estate claimed to be the owner of the lands so condemned by reason of the foreclosure. Certainly at the time of the foreclosure proceedings and for some time after their conclusion, no money had been paid into court to represent the land, and it seems to me immaterial in what capacity the claim was made by the Tombleson Estate, whether as owner or mortgagee. The sale under foreclosure left a large deficiency over and above the amount realized by the sale and the full amount of the award by the commissioners to satisfy the decree under the foreclosure proceedings and it is apparent that Ealk Realty Company cannot be heard to claim the money in good conscience until it offers to pay the decree of the mortgagee. The mortgagee is first entitled to be paid.
As to the claim of Milton C. Nur'ock, counsel for the Ealk Realty Company, for a lien upon the moneys paid into court, it has been determined that he represented the Falk Realty Company and such services as he rendered would enure to the benefit of that company, the owner of the lands, and in the absence of any proof that he represented the Tombleson Estate, he must look for payment of his fees for services rendered in the condemnation proceedings, to his client, the Ealk Realty Company. Any lien which he might have cannot attach to the moneys payable to the Tombleson Estate. The exceptions to the master’s reports will be dismissed and the reports confirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.