Baker & Co. v. Fischer
Baker & Co. v. Fischer
Opinion of the Court
This is a suit for patent infringement. The defendants are charged with infringement of United States patent No. 2239302, granted April 22, 1941, on an application filed by S. H. Pritchard for a mounting for gems or precious stones. Previously, on March 9, 1939, Pritchard had filed an application for a British patent, which was subsequently granted and, therefore, plaintiff now claims this as the date of invention of the patent in suit since there is but a slight variation between the British and the American patents.
The invention is alleged to consist, in a general way, of a specific type of mounting for a gem, or precious stone. The method of setting is described as “a cage or frame”, “having' claws”, “which are bent over the edge of the gem”, and enclosing a plate centrally apertured within the cage “to encompass the pavilion of the gem intersmediate its length” which displays “an upwardly reflecting surface to extend outwardly beyond and beneath and in closely spaced relation to the girdle of the gem”. The purposes of the invention are said to be, first, to “provide a secure mounting for the gem” and, second, to “enhance the appeal to the eye”, “by providing a setting which will give the gem the appearance of being larger than in fact it is”. To accomplish the first object, Pritchard purposed to add to the conventional cage, a slotted centrally apertured plate and by seating the gem thereon and holding it thereto by means of claws or prongs, to dispense with the necessity, present in prior art, of forming notches, bearings or seatings on the prongs in order to support the gem. However, plaintiff contends that the main object of the patent was not to secure the gem, but to create an illusion that the gem is larger by means of the polished upper surface of the slotted plate mounted underneath and extending outwardly beyond and in closely spaced relation to the girdle of the gem.
The question arises as to whether the particular combination so described is not necessary to support the patent. It is debatable, if a glittering or faceted surface were mounted in closely spaced relation to the girdle of the gem but without having been brought there by this peculiar method, whether such a device would fall within the claims and specifications. The subject matter is inseparable and the means are based upon a particular device.
But if the question of the patentability of the particular combination be laid aside in view of this situation, and only the alleged invention involved in the closely spaced relation between the slotted plate and the gem be scrutinized, the question of whether the object of creating the illusion specified was accomplished is first to be considered. There were introduced in evidence, two models constructed along the lines laid out in the .patent which were set not with diamonds, but with imitations thereof. At certain angles and in certain lights, there is a momentary illusion to an uncritical observer, of a larger expanse of reflecting surfaces than is actually contained within the limits of the imitation stone so mounted. It is probable that if an actual stone was mounted in either of these rings the illusion should not be as effective.
However, we are still confronted with the question of whether or not there is an invention involved. The great commercial success of the device is cited as proof thereof. This exemplification of success is found in the tremendously increased sales of rings of this type over other designs. Courts are not expected to discover that fashion rules in the realm of settings of diamonds as well as in other fields of feminine decoration, but this court attributes the favor claimed for the illusion settings to the nod of the arbiters of style.
The record in this case is replete with proof that diamond setting is an art and not a mathematical science. The court takes judicial notice that this art has been practiced for hundreds of years. The setter will, of course, be controlled by the current style. The proofs of plaintiff in this case went to great length to establish the fact that the artist does not regard the forms of the mechanical cages and prongs as the answer to his problem. Each gem requires individual artistic treatment. Some of the canons of the art may be standardized, but the function of a faceted metal surface in closely spaced relation to the gem cannot control the artist nor, on the other hand, can his method of approaching other processes of setting be the basis of a patent even if the result is novel and perhaps startling. And here, of course, it must be noted that this patent does not purport to cover a method, but only a particular mechanical device.
This court needs no proof to support the proposition that the principles of reflecting and refraction of light from gems have not changed. The court requires no proof to show that in the small space afforded by a ring, of polished metal and small diamonds have been used in accordance with such principles for the purpose of enhancing the beauty and the brilliance of the central gem.
No patent should, therefore, have been issued for this reflection of an idea. Not only this patent, but the whole series of cited patents with reference to the setting of diamonds, seems to illustrate the reason for the judicial weakening of the presumption'of invention formerly extended by virtue of the administrative grant from the patent offices.
Eliasoff patent
Likewise, in the Bennett catalogue of 1936 and 1938, there is displayed a ring with a bezel placed underneath the girdle and extending beyond the gem. The primary purpose of this was to protect the edge of the gem from chipping, but the result was characterized as “a small metal line” which “adds beauty by making the diamond appear larger.” It may well be, as was expressed by the artisan who designed this ring, that the expression quoted above was the poetry of the catalogue maker, but after all, it seems, whether in close proximity to the girdle or at a distance, that the small metal line surrounding the diamond for the purpose of enhancing its size and beauty is all the plaintiff can claim. The placement of the line- is a question of workmanship. Again the court has before it only a rough model of the Bennett ring, unset. How effective the device may have been in actual practice, therefore, is left somewhat to speculation.
If consideration be given to rings set with other stones the Suderov
There is another ground for holding that defendants must prevail. The defendants’ models are much more like former designs of plaintiff which are in the public domain, or like the Traub setting produced in 1927, than they are like the model of the patent. To the view of the court, none of these produces the same effect as do the exhib
Appropriate findings and judgment may be prepared.
“A patent is not good for an effect or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.” Continental Can Co., Inc., v. Cameron Can Machinery Co., 7 Cir., 76 F.2d 173, 176, and cases therein cited.
See Hartford Empire Co. v. Obear Nester Glass Co., 8 Cir., 71 F.2d 539; In re Ernst, 71 F.2d 169, 21 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1235; In re Garratt, 63 F.2d 113, 20 C.C.P.A., Patents 878; Lapeer Trailer Corporation v. Fruehalf Trailer Co., D.C.Michigan, 50 F.2d 634; Myers v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corporation, D.C., 36 F.Supp. 752.
See Bailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 Cir., 115 F.2d 904. See, also, Toledo Pressed Steel Company v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U.S. 350, 356, 357, 59 S.Ct. 897, 83 L.Ed. 1334.
This tendency although not express is extremely well marked. See Cuno Engineering Corporation v. Automatic Devices Corporation, 314 U.S. 84, 90-92, 62 S.Ct. 37, 86 L.Ed. 58; Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts Inc., supra; Paramount Publix Corporation v. American Tri-Ergon Corporation, 294 U.S. 464, 55 S.Ct. 449, 79 L.Ed. 997; Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corporation, 283 U.S. 420, 51 S.Ct. 496, 75 L.Ed. 1153. Contrast with Boyd v. Janesville Hay Tool Company, 158 U.S. 260, 15 S.Ct. 837, 39 L.Ed. 973; Westinghouse Electric & Manfuacturing Company v. Formica Insulation Company, 266 U.S. 342, 45 S.Ct. 117, 69 L.Ed. 316.
No. 37576 (October 25, 1905).
No. 1,368,909 (March 20, 1920).
No. 281176 (1927).
No. 1,252,966 (October 11, 1937).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- BAKER & CO., Inc. v. FISCHER
- Status
- Published