CITY OF ENGLEWOOD v. EZEKWO
Trial Court Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CITY OF ENGLEWOOD,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 20-12799 (SDW) (LDW) v. OPINION
CHUKWUEMEKA EZEKWO, IFEOMA
June 11, 2021
EZEKWO, et al.,
Defendants.
WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Plaintiff City of Englewood’s (“Englewood”) Motion to Dismiss itself from this interpleader action and Dismiss pro se Defendants Ifeoma Ezekwo and Chukwuemeka Ezekwo’s (collectively, the “Ezekwos”) counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1397. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated herein, Englewood’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This Court writes primarily for the parties and briefly summarizes the lengthy history of this case. Englewood is a public entity and municipal corporation located in New Jersey. (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 6.) The Ezekwos reside in New Jersey and previously sued Englewood and three of its police officers in this Court for violating their civil rights. See Ezekwo v. Quirk, Civ. No. 15- 3167 (D.N.J. filed May 5, 2015). The other defendants in this matter—Maggiano, Digirolamo & Lizzi, P.C., Romanucci & Blandin LLC, and Joshua S. Moskovitz, Esq. (collectively, the “Law Firm Defendants”)—are law firms or attorneys that previously represented the Ezekwos and claim liens against the Ezekwos in connection with their past legal work. (See Compl. ¶¶ 9–11.) In the previous suit, the Ezekwos were represented by counsel and reportedly settled their claims for $1.31 million. (See Compl. ¶ 13.) They later terminated their counsel and contested the settlement, but this Court found it to be enforceable. See Ezekwo v. Quirk, Civ. No. 15-3167, 2018 WL 4091068 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2018) (adopting report and recommendation and granting Englewood’s Motion to Enforce Settlement). On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that this Court “admirably fulfilled its duties,” but remanded for a limited evidentiary hearing in view of the Ezekwos’ pro se status. 784 F. App’x 79, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). On remand, the Ezekwos did not appear for their evidentiary hearing and this Court granted Englewood’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement a second time. See 2020 WL 1048670 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2020). The Ezekwos appealed again, but the Third Circuit dismissed their appeal for “failure to timely prosecute.” See No. 20- 1728, 2020 WL 5814217, at *1 (3d Cir. June 17, 2020).
Englewood filed this interpleader action on September 17, 2020, alleging “legitimate fears of multiple claims against the litigation settlement monies,” including claims by both the Ezekwos and each of the Law Firm Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 37.)1 To “protect itself and its current and former employees” that were named as individual defendants in the prior lawsuit, and to “avoid further involvement in a litigation in which it no longer has an interest,” Englewood sought leave to deposit the $1.31 million settlement monies with the Court. (Compl. ¶¶ 36–38.)2 The Honorable
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Interpleader Action
“The equitable remedy of interpleader allows a person holding property to join in a single suit two or more persons asserting claims to that property.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “The plaintiff in an interpleader action, who may already be the defendant in an underlying lawsuit claiming the property, is a stakeholder that admits it is liable to one of the claimants[] but fears the prospect of multiple liability.” Amethyst Int’l, Inc. v. Duchess, Civ. No. 13-4287, 2014 WL 683670, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing Metro. Life, 501 F.3d at 275). “Interpleader allows the stakeholder to file suit, deposit the property with the court, and withdraw from the proceedings. The competing claimants are left to litigate between themselves.” Metro. Life, 501 F.3d at 275 (citation omitted).
Chukwuemeka Ezekwo. (See D.E. 26.) In view of Judge Bumb’s preclusion order, and because this Court will dismiss Englewood from this action, Englewood’s request for restraints is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this time. 3 D.E. 17 is an amended filing that includes a page that was omitted from D.E. 16.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis, 553 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In the first stage, “the court determines whether the interpleader complaint was properly brought and whether to discharge the stakeholder from further liability to the claimants.” Id. (citations omitted). “The key prerequisite . . . is that there be two or more claimants to the fund who are adverse to each other.” Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. v. Kissinger, 89 F. Supp. 3d 622, 626 (D.N.J. 2015) (quotation and alteration omitted). In the second stage, “the court determines the respective rights of the claimants to the interpleaded funds.” Prudential, 553 F.3d at 262 (citation omitted). B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
An adequate complaint must be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Iqbal standard). If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . [and] they cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Interpleader Analysis
In this first stage of the interpleader action, this Court must “determine[] whether the interpleader complaint was properly brought and whether to discharge [Englewood] from further liability to the claimants.” Prudential, 553 F.3d at 262 (citations omitted). The jurisdictional requirements are met here. There is minimal diversity between the adverse claimants, as the Ezekwos are citizens of New Jersey and both members of Romanucci & Blandin LLC are citizens of Illinois. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, 10); 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1). The $1.31 million in controversy is well above the $500 minimum and Englewood has already deposited that amount into the Court’s registry. (See D.E. 12; Compl. ¶ 31); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335(a) and (a)(2).5 Accordingly, Englewood’s complaint was properly brought and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
The Ezekwos’ counterclaim alleges civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks “monetary relief of at least one billion dollars.” (D.E. 13 at 18; D.E. 18 at 18.)6 As an initial matter, the Ezekwos’ allegations are facially implausible and do not allow this Court “to draw the reasonable inference” that Englewood (or any other party) is responsible for the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (“The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must show that the allegations of his or her complaints are interpleader complaint, as Englewood did here. See, e.g., United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York v. Holtzman, 723 F. App’x 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s order directing plaintiff to deposit funds and “perfect jurisdiction”); Wells Fargo, 2019 WL 6873257, at *2–3.
Because Englewood, its employees, and its counsel are not liable for more than the deposited settlement amount in this matter, and because Englewood will no longer have any interest in this matter, this Court will grant Englewood’s motion to be dismissed from this action. IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Englewood’s request for interpleader relief is GRANTED and Englewood is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action. The Ezekwos’ counterclaim is also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk cc: Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
Parties
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.