BEY v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TAKARA BEY, Case No. 2:23-cv-03376 (BRM)(ESK) Plaintiff, OPINION v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY; ABRAHAM KINSTILINGER, ESQ.; and ROSE TERRACE HOLDINGS LLC, Defendants.

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Takara Bey’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint and request for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 1), as well as her Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1-1). Both were docketed on June 21, 2023, and are before this Court on an expedited basis.

When a non-prisoner seeks to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the applicant is required to submit an affidavit that sets forth his assets and attests to the applicant’s inability to pay the requisite fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Stamos v. New Jersey, Civ. A. No. 095828 (PGS), 2010 WL 457727, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2010), aff’d, 396 F. App’x 894 (3d Cir. 2010) (“While much of the language in Section 1915 addresses ‘prisoners,’ section 1915(e)(2) applies with equal force to prisoner as well as nonprisoner in forma pauperis cases.”); Roy v. Penn. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 14– 4277, 2014 WL 4104979, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014) (citations omitted). The decision whether to grant or to deny the application should be based upon the economic eligibility of the applicant, as demonstrated by the affidavit. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP application, the Court finds leave to proceed IFP is warranted and the application is GRANTED. Therefore, the Court is required to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s filings and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts are required to review civil actions in which a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Stamos v. New Jersey, Civ. A. No. 095828 (PGS), 2010 WL 457727, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2010), aff’d, 396 F. App’x 894 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying § 1915 to nonprisoners). When reviewing such actions, the PLRA instructs courts to dismiss cases that are at any time frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune.

Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the applicable provisions of the PLRA apply to the screening of his Complaint. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. In order to survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, they “still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). All pleadings are likewise required to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (requiring, as to complaints, “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “a demand for the relief sought”). Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the complaint must “provide the opponent with fair notice of a claim and the grounds on which that claim is based”).

II. DECISION Plaintiff alleges the attorney for Rose Terrace Holdings LLC (“Rose Terrace”)1, Abraham Kinstilinger, misrepresented a document to her “for her signature . . . in attempt to deprive [her] of [her] rights of being secure in [her] home and [her] rights of due process before the proper venue that handles real estate issues and land controversies such as this District Court.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Judge Stephen L. Pedrillo of Essex County Superior Court “signed the misrepresented document and closed the case” without her being present. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks relief from Mr. Kinstilinger, Rose Terrace, Judge Pedrillo, and the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Civil Division (“Superior Court”) (collectively, “Defendants”), contending she suffered damages

Even construing pro se Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, see Mala, 704 F.3d at 245, Plaintiff’s conclusory contention that she was deprived of her rights to be secure in her home and for due process of law in a proper venue is unsupported by her allegations. Rather, Plaintiff alleges fraud

Plaintiff’s request for restraining orders is likewise denied. Even assuming this Court has jurisdiction, Plaintiff must show the following to obtain such relief: (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted. . . . [In addition,] the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.

Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919–20 (3d Cir. 1974)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing “the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors . . . . If these gateway To the extent Plaintiff seeks a review or appeal of a state court order or judgment, that claim is improper in the District Court. Wharwood v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 20-3449, 2021 WL 4438749, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2021). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege that Judge Pedrillo is liable for damages, he is immune from suit for money damages in his official capacity.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED, and this matter shall be marked CLOSED. Plaintiff has 30 days to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies addressed herein. Failure to do so will result in the matter being dismissed with prejudice without further action from this Court. An appropriate Order follows.

Date: June 27, 2023 /s/Brian R. Martinotti BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE